Sam Mo

[Sam Mo @samshanmo]

56,000 sqkm☺️

[Nils @broodsugar]

87 million people.
Three of the largest harbors in the world.
Strongest IPO market in 2025.

[Martín Alfie @alfiemart]

Recomiendo muy enfáticamente la lectura de este artículo de @jakejsullivan, ex asesor de Seguridad Nacional de Biden.
El artículo es excelente por:
a) su certero diagnóstico de cómo y porqué EEUU está perdiendo la carrera tecnológica y productiva con China.
b) su vinculación con la política de innovación, productiva, de financiamiento y de oganización del Estado.
c) los impactos de la desindustrialización en la seguridad nacional
d) la propuesta audaz de un Fondo de Innovación público-privado que recupera la mejor tradición de política industrial de EEUU
Imprescindible lectura y, salvando las enormes distancias, con muchas cosas para pensar desde Argentina al respecto.
https://t.co/3Qtb73dOgN

[Branko Milanovic @BrankoMilan]

The 2026 version of All the Ginis is out:
https://t.co/yBNwnKeH9S

[Sam Mo @samshanmo]

China has long been aware of this dilemma n works hard to rely more on itself for its prosperity across both production and consumption. & It doesn't sabotage the world, but tries to provide more people in the world better and more affordable products.😌

[Foreign Affairs @ForeignAffairs]

“Beijing is overlooking the defining paradox of its own success: China’s rise remains tied to the openness of the economies it hopes to surpass,” write Enrico Fardella and @DrRadchenko. “Its road to a post-Western order still runs through the West.” https://t.co/qSR9TG9wwR

[Sam Mo @samshanmo]

If you have the best business model and the chance to increase your profits, why wouldn't you?😌

[Bloomberg @business]

For most of the last two years, the AI industry has marveled at how China’s models could evolve so rapidly while the companies price them so low. The aura of cheap but good Chinese AI may be cracking. https://t.co/Pt0ykjHvoK

[Sam Mo @samshanmo]

If you can create a high-tech, top-quality product with technology that no other country possesses, your offering will undoubtedly dominate the world, much like Boeing and Air bus��

[Brad Setser @Brad_Setser]

It is rather shocking -- but there is no sign China's assault on the global auto market is slowing

On track to vehicle exports of over 12m/ $200b this year, and passenger exports of 10-11m

1/

[Sam Mo @samshanmo]

& the central government deliberately limits local government leverage to prevent excessive, uncoordinated investment and regional competition, which has historically led to overcapacity. By centralizing control, it will foster more balanced development across the regions😌

[Steve Hou @stevehou]

The fact that China is increasingly allowing the narrative to surface is itself instructive. @DavidDaokuiLi is pointing out what many of us have known for a long time: China’s exciting and shining new industries with advanced manufacturing like EV and technological breakthroughs like AI simply aren’t big enough to offset the economic output loss from the bust of the property sector. Austerity has not worked and increasingly feels thankless as the rest of the world charges forward with ever larger fiscal deficits and state-directed investments.

China needs to boldly stimulate its aggregate economy and needs to do it soon. But it can’t go back to the property sector, which already suffers from excess capacity. It needs a new infrastructure buildout that’s on the same order of magnitude of its property sector. I wonder what that might be. If only there was a nascent industry with an enormous appetite for infrastructure buildout.

[The Kobeissi Letter @KobeissiLetter]

BREKAING: China now accounts for ~28% of global manufacturing, more than any other country or economic bloc.

This percentage has more than tripled since 2004.

By comparison, US factories account for ~17% of global manufacturing value added, or 11 percentage points less than China.

In 2004, the US proportion stood at ~22%, more than double China's.

Meanwhile, the Eurozone economy represents ~15% of world manufacturing, while Japan accounts for just ~5%.

China has become a critical component of global manufacturing.

[Sam Mo @samshanmo]

😸the 3 pics are weird.

[The Wall Street Journal @WSJ]

OpenAI and Anthropic are sounding the alarm about the rise of cheap AI, particularly powerful new models produced in China, suggesting they will lead to a “dystopian” AI future and present unacceptable security risks without regulation. https://t.co/G8lNgieitx

[Brave New Europe @BRAVENEWEUROPE1]

Chas Freeman, a retired U.S. defense official, says we are becoming a "multi-nodal" world, with Asia as its centrifugal.

'A better word than “multipolar” for this complex and dynamic emerging order is “multi-nodal.” A node is a three-dimensional object at which many connections can converge. Its political, economic, or military ties to others can vary in width and intensity. Nodes can reposition themselves in both space and time. Countries, considered as nodes in the international system, can couple or decouple from other countries and both form and dissolve networks or coalitions. So can companies.

'We are entering a multi-nodal system, and we are doing so in a world in which Asia has become the center of gravity in world affairs.'

Read the article here: https://t.co/t9TjyArfX2 #Multipolarity

#Multinodal #Geopolitics #Asia #China #InternationalRelations

[Blume Industries CEO Balding 大老板 @BaldingsWorld]

@ChinaBeigeBook In 2025, total trade with China accounted for 7.4% of US trade, in 2001 it accounted for 6.8%. Not exact and poorly worded nor cited on my part but basically accurate. I agree with you on the key bottlenecks that we all know about

[The Kobeissi Letter @KobeissiLetter]

Chinese investors are dumping Hong Kong stocks at a record pace:

Hong Kong equity ETFs listed in China posted a record -$3.7 billion in outflows last week, the largest weekly outflow on record.

This marks the 5th consecutive weekly outflow and the 10th over the last 12 weeks.

By comparison, Hong Kong stock ETFs saw 11 weekly outflows during the entire 2025.

Capital is rotating into China-listed semiconductor and AI-linked stocks, which investors view as more direct beneficiaries of the AI boom.

Even a +10% surge in Tencent on Tuesday failed to stop the outflows, with mainland Chinese investors using the rally as an opportunity to exit ~$268 million worth of its shares during the same day.

Chinese investors are turning away from Hong Kong.

[Bloomberg @business]

Vietnamese diagnostic testing startup Gene Solutions is preparing for a Hong Kong IPO as early as the second quarter of next year, a rare local firm seeking to access deeper capital markets and boost international visibility https://t.co/zDQr47sArm

[Glenn @GlennLuk]

@kyleichan "Retail sales" doesn't tell the whole story as it only measures physical consumption of material goods

Services is the faster-growing part of the consumption basket and NBS releases monthly updates.

https://t.co/AqSbCo1ZZ0

[steve hsu @hsu_steve]

China’s Next-Generation Industrial Policy

US Chamber of Commerce + Think Tanks discover "Industrial Maximalism"

YAWN 🥱

While China’s most dramatic market share gains in the 2020s were in electric vehicles and clean energy, its current expansion is increasingly concentrated in key upstream segments of global value chains, such as chemicals, machinery, and industrial equipment—segments traditionally dominated by advanced economies. Chinese inputs and capital goods are increasingly also embedded in products manufactured and exported by third countries, creating indirect dependencies that are difficult to detect and manage. This expansion is also systematically underestimated, as falling producer prices mask the true pace of market share gains: Measured in volume, China’s market share gains are roughly twice as large as in value terms for many products.

As a result, global reliance on Chinese supply chains is deepening across a growing number of critical products. The number of products where China accounts for more than 50% of global exports, for example, nearly doubled between 2021 and 2024, from 192 to 315. China’s dominance of global manufacturing began with downstream assembly for foreign value-added, but has now flipped—extending into upstream materials, components, and production equipment, giving it increasing leverage over global industrial systems.

Camille Boullenois, lead author of the report, told the FT that China’s evolving industrial policies posed a “real threat” to the economic engine of countries such as Germany and other advanced industrial economies. 

“China’s rise is broadly eroding some of the last areas where they still have a technological and industrial edge, like chemicals, autos, machinery and robotics,” she said. “China is gaining market share incredibly fast in these sectors. If countries don’t react now, the industrial landscape could look very different in just a few years.”

The report noted that China’s most recent five-year plan had for the first time included a focus on advanced technologies such as biomanufacturing, nuclear fusion energy and brain-computer interfaces. This suggested that its industrial policy was evolving from focusing on strategic sectors to a “broader effort to reshape the entire industrial ecosystem”.

The trade surplus growth represented success moving up the production value chain and exporting high-tech goods but also its success substituting domestic products for imports.

[Sam Mo @samshanmo]

peace is so beautiful!

[RT @RT_com]

Iran FM Araghchi shares a cinematic video diary from his recent visit to Beijing

'Agreed to reach a new level of cooperation'

[Sam Mo @samshanmo]

no worries, they can continue to be the centre of their own continent and even a small imagined world😊

[Wolfgang Munchau @EuroBriefing]

By far the hardest thing for liberal Europeans to accept is the rise of a non-eurocentric world. Europeans can deal with the far-right, or Donald Trump's rants. But they cannot deal with being ignored. For over 3000 years, Europe was at the centre of the political, cultural and economic universe. It still thinks it is.
https://t.co/xhrTyJS1Hq

[Andy Mok | Author, China's Innovation Machine @andymok]

Reading this as regulation by fiat misses what’s actually happening.

Chinese governance operates on a different principle than the West: ex-ante guidance over ex-post remedy.

Inside that logic, blocking Manus is a deliberate exercise of state authority to keep a strategically classified asset within China’s borders even after the legal entity relocated to Singapore.

More importantly, the right question isn’t “is this rule of law?” It’s “what is the rule, and what problem does it intend to solve?”

In fact, this is the rule: in deep tech, nationality of origin follows the asset, not the registration certificate. That is clearly a governance choice with both costs and benefits. But iti is not an aberration.

Which means the “founders will just incorporate offshore” prediction misses what Beijing is signaling they cannot take with them: access to the diffusion stack, procurement, standards, talent pipeline, that turns a frontier capability into national infrastructure.

While Singapore offers cover, it does not offer that. I develop this argument at length in The Innovation Machine (Springer, 2026).

[Kyle Chan @kyleichan]

The thing I’m most surprised by with Beijing’s block of the Manus deal is that they let it get this far.

Manus made a big splash last year and was even touted on Chinese state media. The move to Singapore might’ve seemed smart from a commercial standpoint, but the optics were bad for China. China wants its star AI companies listing on Hong Kong and Shanghai, not shedding their China staff and moving out of the country.

Then after the deal with Meta was announced in December, there were soon warning signs from Beijing. While the move to Singapore may have raised some eyebrows, the outright acquisition by a US company was clearly crossing a line for Beijing.

If there’s a chilling effect from this move, then that’s probably Beijing’s intended point. As I wrote earlier in an FT op-ed, I expected Beijing to want to stop the “Manus route” from becoming a trend. Ever since Jack Ma, Chinese tech entrepreneurs have treaded carefully, fearful of getting in trouble with Beijing. But the lines are never fully clear and can be redrawn after the fact.

What has become clear is that Chinese companies are increasingly reaching the tech frontier. And like other countries with tech firms at the frontiers of their fields, China will want to exert some control given their potential strategic value. This creates a dilemma for Chinese tech founders with global ambitions. The more successful they become, the more attractive they are to global partners and investors—but also the more likely Beijing is to treat them as national strategic assets. This tension will likely grow over time.

[Paul Triolo @pstAsiatech]

Beijing blocks Meta's $2bn acquisition of Manus after security review
Huge..... https://t.co/QpWky7jryw