Peter Schroeder

Adjunct Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program, CNAS. Former Principal Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia. Views my own.

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

Reposting this, which seems increasingly relevant. I tried to be pretty even-handed back in January, while highlighting the risks.

But, it is clear that things are breaking bad.

https://t.co/YxsVEVtpz3

[John Foreman CBE @John_ForemanCBE]

Another week, another stale ISW ‘limited’ incursion warning similar to those floating around since 2014.

Moscow cannot be sure that a ‘limited’ military test of alliance political cohesion - its centre of gravity - would generate a limited response, particularly from the United States, upon which the test hinges.

Doctrinally, Russia frames any war against NATO as a ‘regional’, not limited, conflict, with the assumed risk of catastrophic (nuclear) retaliation. Putin understand this risk. NATO is not Ukraine.

A regional war launched by Russia for ‘major, even radical political-military objectives’ is a very different proposition and on a vastly greater civ-mil scale than a purported ‘limited’ operation.

And there’s no sign that Russia is able to launch, wants to launch, or is prepping to launch one.

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

As I have been saying for years, this policy approach of raising the costs for Putin until he quits simply won’t work.

https://t.co/EnW4AiWaa0

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

Today, I say goodbye to my strongest supporter and my dearest friend, my sister @kjomlsna

Taken from us too soon.

[Tatiana Stanovaya @Stanovaya]

Five points that help explain Moscow’s current approach to Ukraine.

1. Time is not really on Russia’s side. The claim that “time is on Putin’s side” is only partly true. The war was never designed to last this long: it is costly and carries mounting political and financial risks. Putin needs to end it sooner rather than later, but only on his terms. It would be more accurate to say that time is not on Ukraine’s side. That, however, does not mean it will become easier for Putin to achieve his goals.

2. While Putin wants to negotiate with the Americans, he is also prepared to talk to Ukrainians — but not to Zelensky. This is a long-standing idea: to reach an agreement with Ukrainian military figures or anyone else he regards as more pragmatic. That intention remains and may grow stronger as disappointment with the American side increases.

3. Russian officials are uncomfortable dealing with Steve Witkoff, but they have no comparable alternative channel. Moscow therefore prefers to invest fully in these contacts for as long as no such alternative is available.

4. There is currently no opening proposal attractive enough to Putin that any outside actor, above all the Americans, could realistically put forward. Moscow may nevertheless appear receptive to an initial draft because it expects to reshape it through painstaking bargaining over the wording, sequencing and implementation of each component. Russian officials calculate that detailed negotiations could gradually bring any eventual settlement closer to what they would regard as an acceptable deal.

5. Europe is increasingly becoming Moscow’s central strategic problem, overshadowing the United States, Ukraine and, to some extent, even NATO. This will shape the nature of negotiations with and about Ukraine, as well as the outcome of any settlement, far more than it did a year ago. It is likely to dominate European geopolitics for decades.

[Tatiana Stanovaya @Stanovaya]

The war in Ukraine is entering a more dangerous phase of multilateral escalation, with few remaining guardrails. Ukrainian attacks are reaching deeper into Russia, Moscow is intensifying strikes on Ukraine and pressure on its maritime trade, and European support is becoming more directly connected to Kyiv’s capacity to strike Russian territory. Germany’s attribution of the attempted Leipzig airport attack to Moscow, alongside a succession of hybrid and other hostile incidents across Europe, has driven Russian-German relations into a new crisis and increased the risk of the confrontation spilling beyond Ukraine.

At the same time, Washington is making a new attempt to reopen negotiations, even though the positions of Moscow and Kyiv remain barely reconcilable.

Witkoff and Kushner returned to Moscow on 5 September after several months of work by Washington on a potential settlement framework. The disputed issues include territory, security guarantees, Ukraine’s future military capabilities, a possible international presence and the political conditions surrounding a settlement.

Russia’s fundamental terms have not changed, while Ukraine continues to signal that it is ready to keep fighting. Neither Moscow nor Kyiv appears prepared to make a strategic concession. The important questions are whether Putin continues to stand by earlier understandings and whether renewed contacts can produce more than another trilateral meeting.

The new R.Politik Bulletin assesses these questions alongside the military, maritime and Russian-European escalation now shaping the negotiating environment.

Russia’s domestic political system is also becoming less predictable as the first federal parliamentary campaign since the start of the war approaches. Yabloko was initially allowed to participate, only to be removed after the party began to look less politically manageable. The significance lies not simply in Yabloko’s electoral prospects, but in the reversal itself: was this a coherent policy shift, an improvised response to changing circumstances or the result of competing assessments of political risk? The bulletin examines the decision-making behind the party’s dismantling and the implications for the remaining boundaries of legal opposition.

Other developments raise similar questions about how wartime governance is changing. A new decree allows the state to place broadly defined critical infrastructure under temporary management without formally transferring ownership. Its practical application will determine whether it remains a security measure or develops into a wider instrument of corporate control.

The authorities have designated Pavel Durov an extremist while government bodies, businesses and election managers still rely on Telegram. This unresolved contradiction will become particularly important after the election, when the platform’s political utility may begin to change.

The prosecution of charity leader Lida Moniava tests how far social standing and institutional importance can influence the form of state pressure. In Udmurtia, an unexpected gubernatorial replacement offers a separate indication of the operational and personnel requirements emerging under wartime conditions.

Meanwhile, Russians continue to report relative personal stability while becoming markedly more pessimistic about the country’s future. Business confidence presents a similar picture: limited stabilisation, but at a persistently low level.

R.Politik Bulletin No. 15 (189) examines how these decisions are taken under pressure.
https://t.co/96vHUNgXjb

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

A familiar, tired trope from @MaxBoot that misdiagnoses the problem and proposes solutions that won’t solve it.

https://t.co/XC6FobeLUd

[Kevin Rothrock @MrKevinRothrock]

The amount of defense spending wasted in Ukraine is insane. Kyiv lost about $1.2B to fraud & mismanagement in procurement in 2024 alone, according to secret govt audits obtained by the NYT. Overpayments, costly middlemen, & repeat contracts for companies that had already failed.

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

@MrKevinRothrock Yes, but don’t you see, that is exactly how the FSB would do it, to cover their tracks and sow doubt.

It’s maskirovka / false flag / reflexive control!

[Brian McDonald @BrianMcDonaldIE]

3/ When the FT, Economist, Bloomberg, NYT, WSJ or other Western outlets suddenly boast an anonymous source (supposedly from Putin’s immediate circle) revealing highly sensitive internal thinking, you can almost certainly assume it's complete rubbish (the identity of their interlocutors is pretty obvious to media people, and they aren't insiders by any means).

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

Title says it all here…aligns with what I’ve been saying since last October on the trajectory of the war.

https://t.co/PiaK8O6ElR

[Riddle Russia @RiddleRussia]

Russia does not have the capacity to fight a war with #NATO. Despite Western fears of an attack, the Russian military remains overstretched and unable to achieve Putin’s minimum objectives in Ukraine
@Er_Woods
https://t.co/2sqLGwtR1R

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

@EmmaMAshford Inexorably moving in that direction since August 2025

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

Everyone likes to complain that the US is not doing enough to confront or respond to Putin, but all they can come up with as alternatives are lame platitudes.

Resolve is not the problem here, so showing more of it will not lead to the desired outcome.

[Rebeccah Heinrichs @RLHeinrichs]

“If Mr. Putin is toying with provoking NATO, Mr. Trump could show resolve by loudly canceling troop withdrawals from Europe and signaling more support for Ukraine and NATO’s front lines.”

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

If Ratcliffe went and talked to Russian intel and then back-briefed Caine and Hegseth, then this meeting was primarily about Iran and not Ukraine.

[Anton Gerashchenko @Gerashchenko_en]

The unplanned visit by CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow was undoubtedly driven by specific and serious reasons.

Upon returning from Moscow, Ratcliffe briefed the U.S. administration on the results of his visit. It is reported that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were also present at the White House meeting.

Presumably, the CIA chief traveled to Moscow to warn Putin against any escalation targeting the Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

According to Politico, Ratcliffe also demanded that Moscow reduce its military and economic support for Iran and stop transfers of weapons and defense technologies.

During the talks, the CIA director also reportedly urged Russia not to "overreact" to a possible tightening of sanctions against countries that maintain economic ties with Iran.

Judging by the Kremlin’s reaction, it has no intention of reducing or halting the escalation. Do the U.S. and its allies have a Plan B? A rhetorical question.

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

@leonidragozin “Intel Sources” are almost never officials in the IC…rather, they usually are policy officials, congressional staff, or third country diplomats with access to intel, looking to use intel to put their spin on something

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

@andrewmichta @NATO @ufhamilton @AtlanticCouncil @HooverInst Oh really? Based on what? What information points to a Russian strategy of attacking in hopes the Alliance will politically collapse after failing to respond?

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

Pretty much everything Stephens says here about Putin is wrong…which is emblematic of US policy overall toward Russia…

https://t.co/Ufo9p5t2Ex

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

@DrRadchenko Because they don’t rely on any experts who might know something about Putin and his psychology…

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

I don’t think the visits were anything alike. Burns had been Amb in Moscow and was a well-regarded diplomat, who was credible in delivering a serious message.

Ratcliffe has no wasta in Moscow, nor does his main interlocutor.

[Tymofiy Mylovanov @Mylovanov]

CIA Director Ratcliffe may have gone to Moscow to tell Putin to back off from a new mobilization — WSJ.

The visit echoes 2021, when CIA chief William Burns went to Moscow, and warned Putin that US intelligence saw Russia preparing a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 1/

[Peter Schroeder @schroeder_prs]

The success of—and European support for—Ukraine’s deep strike campaign in Russia is lowering the bar for overt, kinetic Russian strikes in Europe.

The risks from a European response are becoming less consequential than the damage already being done inside Russia.