NO TO HATE
Hate is not the answer!
Can we be honest and agree that the anti-foreigner sentiments are rooted in unaddressed economic and social wants that are plaguing black communities exacerbated by uncontrolled immigration.
Can we be honest that townships and black rural areas are bearing a disproportionate share of the uncontrolled inflows and consequent socio-economic pressures that such inflows place on economic opportunities, housing and shared public services such as schools and hospital spaces, water and electricity.
Can we admit that the absence of a national economic policy framework that seeks to reverse the colonial and apartheid disablement of rural and township economic ecosystems and related livelihoods is a major contributory factor.
That said, hate is not the answer!
If you harm anyone or anyone’s property, that is a crime and you must and will go to jail.
Stay safe and disciplined. Say
#NOTOHATE ⚖️🕊️🦋🇿🇦
South Africa is about to spend R8.5 billion bailing out ArcelorMittal SA, a private steelmaker owned by one of the world’s largest steel corporations.
The Industrial Development Corporation, the state’s development bank, is preparing to assume ArcelorMittal’s debts, take over operations, and gently cushion the landing for its shareholders.
Now, if you’ve been paying attention to South African economic discourse over the past decade, you might be experiencing a slight sense of cognitive dissonance.
Haven’t we been told, repeatedly, emphatically, with the confidence of a first-year economics student who just discovered Milton Friedman, that bailouts are precisely why state-owned enterprises fail? That Eskom, SAA, Transnet, and Denel are irrefutable proof that the government can’t run a hair salon, let alone a business? That taxpayers shouldn’t be forced to subsidise these ‘inefficient dinosaurs’?
It’s crazy, then, that when a private multinational stumbles, the rhetoric shifts with impressive speed. Suddenly, we’re not talking about bailouts anymore. Instead, we’re discussing ‘industrial policy,’ ‘safeguarding strategic capacity,’ and ‘preserving employment.’
It’s the same money leaving the same treasury for the same purpose, but the packaging has been given a considerable facelift.
This is the intellectual sleight of hand at the heart of modern free market economics. When state-owned enterprises struggle, the prescription is unambiguous: privatise, liberalise, streamline, restructure, trim the fat, let the market work its magic. The invisible hand will sort things out.
However, when private companies struggle, particularly large ones, the prescription is different: socialise the losses, protect investor confidence, and most importantly, deploy state resources. Suddenly, the invisible hand needs a very visible helping hand from the public purse.
Let’s rewind a bit to how we arrived here. ArcelorMittal began life as Iscor, a state-owned enterprise established specifically to develop South Africa’s industrial capacity, and it did exactly that for decades.
Then came the 1990s and the great privatisation wave, that exciting period when selling off state assets was considered the height of economic sophistication.
Iscor was privatised. By the mid-2000s, it had been acquired by Lakshmi Mittal’s steel empire, which was busy assembling what would become the world’s largest steelmaker.
For the next two decades, the playbook was entirely predictable: extract profits, minimise reinvestment, consolidate operations globally, rationalise costs (or ‘squeeze harder’).
South Africa’s steel industry, unsurprisingly, stagnated and then declined. Production capacity eroded. Infrastructure aged. The industry that was once considered strategically vital became ‘uncompetitive.’
Now, after squeezing the lemon dry, the bill lands back on the public’s desk.
When Mittal Steel was paid (yes) to acquire Iscor in 2003, the latter was a functioning industrial concern. By 2006, Mittal had merged with Arcelor to form ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steelmaker.
In 2023, twenty years after acquisition, ArcelorMittal announced plans to close two crucial mills, citing high power prices, erratic rail service, cheap imports, and unfavourable government policy.
One might wonder: in two decades of ownership, did ArcelorMittal perhaps have opportunities to address some of these challenges through investment? Or was the strategy always to extract value during good times and exit during bad ones, preferably with the state covering the exit costs?
The company’s own explanation for the closures is particularly rich: it blames high power prices (from state-owned Eskom, itself requiring bailouts), poor rail service (from state-owned Transnet, also requiring bailouts), and government policy.
Essentially, the state’s failures justify closing the mills, but the state’s money is required to keep them open. Heads I win, tails you lose.
To be clear: South Africa does need a functioning steel sector. Steel is rather useful for things like construction, manufacturing, and infrastructure, the kinds of activities countries tend to need if they’d like to have an economy.
But let’s not get it confused, this isn’t a rescue of ‘the steel industry.’ It’s a rescue of a failed privatisation experiment. The state is being asked to clean up after decades of a model that promised efficiency and delivered asset-stripping.
The salient questions aren’t complicated. Who will own this industry going forward? Who will run it? And, perhaps most importantly, who will benefit this time? It’s not the public, I can tell you that much.
If the state must intervene with public funds, then perhaps the intervention should be structured to serve public interests, rather than replaying the greatest hits of ‘privatise the profits, nationalise the losses.’
Because here’s what the whole episode reveals: bailouts aren’t actually the problem. The problem is who gets bailed out and on what terms.
When the ideology demands it, we’re told state intervention is disastrous, that markets must be left to function, that failure is a necessary cleansing mechanism of capitalism. But when reality intrudes, when actual businesses face actual consequences, oh, suddenly state intervention becomes not just acceptable but imperative.
If bailouts are ‘bad’ when they go to Eskom but ‘good’ when they go to ArcelorMittal, what we’re really being told is quite simple: public money is available for private capital, just not for public purposes.
It’s a fascinating intellectual framework. One might even call it internally consistent if one squints hard enough and doesn’t think about it too much.
Let’s take a look at the numbers, because they’re telling.
The IDC is contemplating an R8.5 billion bid for a company currently valued by the market at R1.32 billion.
Yes, you read that correctly. The state is preparing to pay roughly six times the market capitalisation for a business the market has determined is worth far less than the asking price.
For context: ArcelorMittal’s shares peaked at a market value of R116 billion in 2008. They’ve since declined 99%. The stock is down 13% this year alone, trading at R1.16. This is not, one might say, a business on an upward trajectory.
The R8.5 billion would largely go toward repaying a loan ArcelorMittal extended to its own South African subsidiary, meaning the parent company lent money to its local unit, which struggled, and now the South African state will repay ArcelorMittal for the privilege of taking the struggling business off its hands.
It’s peak City of London financial engineering with a certain poetic brutality to it.
The IDC’s plan, as outlined, involves acquiring control and then immediately seeking ‘strategic investors’ to actually run the plants. Which raises an obvious question: if the business requires strategic investors to operate, why is the state paying R8.5 billion to become the intermediary?
In a 12 September letter to one potential partner, the IDC wrote that it would ‘embark on a process of introducing potential strategic equity partners into ArcelorMittal,’ noting that ‘we have been approached by various parties for potential partnerships.’
This is a fascinating model: the state assumes the debt and the risk, pays well above market value, and then seeks private partners to run the operation. It’s rather like buying an expensive restaurant you don’t know how to cook in, with the plan to immediately hire a chef, except the chef could have bought the restaurant themselves for a sixth of the price.
It’s a comprehensive arrangement: private profits during the boom years, public assumption of debt during the decline, and an immediate search for private partners to run the operation going forward.
The steel may be produced locally, but the playbook is decidedly an international standard.
This moment could be a pivot point. South Africa could use this intervention to reclaim steel as a public utility, a strategic public asset with mandated reinvestment and worker participation. Instead, the IDC seems poised to repeat the very cycle that produced this mess: socialise the debt, privatise the profits.
Some assets, it seems, are too important to fail, and too expensive for taxpayers to succeed.
@lindz_malindz Wena you pimped your daughter to your colleague coz his well off, how did they end up dating in the first place? Now that they wanna get married wa bona gore I might’ve fucked up.