IP KVMs are incredibly handy—and inherently risky. I tested over 20 of them over the past couple years.
One of them even got me an FBI visit ;)
Today's video covers *all* of them: https://t.co/Btq0WqC33c
Microsoft’s handling of Nightmare Eclipse reveals how little they actually value independent security researchers when it becomes inconvenient.
Nightmare Eclipse followed the proper reporting channels, had his MSRC account revoked, received what amounted to legal threats, published PoCs for several unpatched Windows zero-days, and was subsequently banned from GitHub. Now @msftsecresponse issues a statement claiming they have no intention of pursuing researchers, while continuing to insist that coordinated disclosure is the only acceptable approach. Nightmare Eclipse still has no accounts reinstated and has received no meaningful apology.
Several researchers and observers have been clear about this today. @kln_nurv correctly notes that publishing exploits after attempting responsible disclosure is not a crime, yet there has been neither reinstatement nor apology, only damaged trust. @0x0Fuck rightly demands a public apology from Tom Gallagher (@secbughunter) and full reinstatement of Nightmare Eclipse’s accounts before MSRC can expect any credibility. @Stric_Nine, @PierreGrivet and others have made the same point, this is damage control, not accountability.
I once criticized @elder_plinius for releasing powerful jailbreaks and obliteration tools so openly. I believed it would introduce unnecessary risk and noise into the ecosystem. Under different circumstances, in other times, that view might still apply.
However, Microsoft and other large vendors have deliberately created an environment in which researchers who go public after official channels fail them are punished and silenced. In this reality, Pliny was correct. When companies treat disclosure as a threat to be managed rather than a necessary part of security, radical public release becomes one of the few remaining mechanisms researchers have to maintain visibility and pressure.
This problem is made worse by the rise of agentic attacks that can automatically discover and chain vulnerabilities at scale. The more vendors punish transparency, the greater the advantage they hand to automated exploitation.
Nightmare Eclipse should never have been forced into this position. Given how he was treated, his actions were entirely justified. I stand with the researchers who refuse to accept rules designed primarily to protect vendors.
If @msftsecresponse genuinely valued the security community, Nightmare Eclipse would have his accounts reinstated and there would be a substantive apology. Anything less is simply an attempt to reassert control while avoiding a real responsibility.
Over the past several days, we have been listening to the conversation around coordinated disclosure and the relationship between security researchers and vendors. We recognize that this relationship is both critical and, at times, fragile. We deeply value the security community, and will continue to take your feedback seriously.
To be clear about our approach to legal matters, we have no intention to pursue action against individuals conducting or publishing their security research. When an individual breaks the law and engages in malicious activity causing real harm to our customers, we will work with law enforcement as appropriate.
We recognize the work that goes into researching and submitting a vulnerability. We are committed to approaching every interaction with transparency, clear communication, and professionalism. We continue to believe strongly in Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure as the foundation for protecting customers and improving our products. Each year we process a high volume of vulnerability reports. That volume continues to grow and will continue with the rise of AI-enabled research. We acknowledge that some interactions have fallen short and are working to learn from them.
Many of us have experience on both sides of this work, as researchers reporting vulnerabilities and as responders triaging and assessing them. That perspective informs how we approach this feedback and the importance we place on getting it right, particularly as the volume and complexity of research continues to grow.
The security community plays a vital role in helping us protect customers. We are committed to maintaining a constructive and respectful relationship and growing together. We know that, given the nature of this work, there will at times be misunderstandings. We remain committed to engaging in good faith and to providing a respectful and professional experience for all researchers, regardless of past interactions.
We know what probably happened.
From what we see publicly, NightmareEclipse doesn't communicate well, is emotionally immature, and appears to want to extort Microsoft.
Almost certainly, this played a part in the conflict between them and Microsoft -- it's probably as much NightmareEclipse's fault as Microsoft's.
With that said, everything Florian says is correct. It doesn't excuse Microsoft's failures. They are supposed to be the responsible one,
When there is miscommunication or dispute, it's always allowable to drop 0day, regardless whose fault it is. It's Microsoft's job to avoid that, even when they really aren't at fault for the miscommunication.
But Microsoft has convinced themselves of the opposite, that "responsible" disclosure means only the responsibilities of the vuln finder.
Vuln finders have no responsibility. Dropping 0day is responsible. Responsible companies don't have so many bugs.
We let industry subvert the disclosure process. Instead of working to secure their code, vendors have tricked people into believing in the myth of "responsible disclosure", that vendors should be given time to fix and patch their bugs so they are never to blame for the bugs to begin with.
That's why you have customers still buying Fortinet appliances even though their bugs continue to be major sources of customers getting hacked. Customers shrug their shoulders: as long as Fortinet has a vulnerability disclosure program and releases patches, they aren't responsible for when hackers keep breaking into their boxes.
This is garbage. Vendors are still responsible for preventing bugs in the first place, a responsibility that doesn't go away just because they patch.
Regardless of what happened, Microsoft's threats are a gross violation of ethics in the industry.
A researcher found critical Windows zero-days.
Reported them to Microsoft.
Microsoft denied the bug bounty.
Deleted their account.
Banned them from GitHub.
Then threatened criminal charges.
The researcher dropped six zero-days in six weeks.
Three got used in real attacks within days.
Other researchers are now handing them free vulnerabilities as a gift.
Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit is considering legal action.
Against the person whose bugs they refused to pay for.
This is Microsoft’s bug bounty program.