Angus Martin

Founder | Security Shift Australia
National Security awareness & education program for high school students in Australia.
BBus (QUT), MIR (UQ), AIIA member.

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

“We need to engender a sense in the community that we are entering into a very different world. The world we are moving into is much more complicated. We are going to have to be prepared to make significant adjustments.”

Peter Varghese AO https://t.co/bNrcE0hGhP

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

@NC_Renic Thanks. Just ordered a copy.

[Kevin Rudd @MrKRudd]

The American people have had their say. The midterms are a reminder of the resilience of American democracy, but a bigger question remains. My thoughts at the State of Asia Conference in Zurich.

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

If you’re interested in learning more about AUKUS, and the the arguments for and against nuclear powered subs for Australia, this Lowy discussion (@JAParker29 & @SamRoggeveen) is a very good place to start.

https://t.co/0iyDecyQvA

[Jennifer Parker @JAParker29]

Some thoughts on yesterday’s #AUKUS "report" from Peter Garrett & his team.

Much has been made of the pre-determined headline recommendation, but the deeper problems are the report’s treatment of capability, strategy and the assumptions underpinning 🇦🇺’s sub choices.

Pleased to have been asked to offer some thoughts for @ConversationEDU

🔗https://t.co/wO4A7ZJ6pu

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

@KaiserKuo In Australia, I’ve heard many in the field state something along the lines of “…let’s hope the US demonstrates its capacity for renewal once again.”

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

@NickBryantNY @DashaBurns Remarkable stuff. I’m always amazed at how good journalists have the ability to ask the right questions, in the right tone, under the pressure of live TV.

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

“…“realism” has evolved. Yet for all the nuance & assumptions added by political scientists, real-world events have a rich texture & too regularly defy any single theory. At best, a robust theory captures a significant chunk of reality. At worst, it obfuscates the truth.”

[The Lowy Institute @LowyInstitute]

Morgenthau: A realist ethic | Ved Shinde https://t.co/bQTkpiE8qT

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

@WarintheFuture Hard to hear this.

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

A verifiable political agreement, or politics by other means…

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The Middle East Is Once Again Approaching a Moment of Decision: Can Washington and Tehran Reach a Deal Before Another War?

As Qatar intensifies its diplomatic efforts to broker an agreement between the United States and Iran, one thing is becoming increasingly clear: the risk of another military confrontation remains high, but the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough should not be dismissed. At the same time, if the current negotiations collapse, the likelihood of renewed escalation could increase dramatically.

To understand where things are heading, we need to recognize several important factors. First, neither Washington nor Tehran necessarily wants another war. Both would, in principle, prefer a diplomatic solution that protects their fundamental interests. But neither appears willing to make the concessions the other side considers essential, and both seem prepared to accept the risks of military confrontation rather than compromise on what they regard as core national interests.

Second, There are regional actors, particularly Qatar, that have both the motivation and the diplomatic channels necessary to influence the two sides. The Gulf states have compelling reasons to prevent another war. They understand that any major confrontation with Iran could quickly spread beyond Iranian territory, threatening their own security, energy infrastructure, and economic stability. Their involvement therefore represents an important opportunity for diplomacy.

Yet the obstacles remain enormous. The fundamental problem is not simply the disagreement over the nuclear issue. It is the profound lack of trust between Washington and Tehran. Each side expects the other to make the first meaningful concession. Both are using military pressure to strengthen their negotiating positions. The talks remain indirect, and the two governments have fundamentally different interpretations of the strategic balance and what the previous rounds of fighting actually achieved.

From Tehran's perspective, there is another critical consideration. The last two negotiating processes were followed by American and/or Israeli military strikes. This experience has reinforced the Iranian leadership's suspicion that diplomacy could once again serve as a cover for military preparations. Consequently, Iranian negotiators are not merely seeking American commitments. They want credible guarantees that those commitments will actually be implemented.

This is where Qatar's diplomatic challenge becomes particularly complicated. The objective is to construct an agreement that allows both sides to claim victory. For Tehran, this means demonstrating that Washington has fulfilled Iran's seven conditions and that its resistance to American military and economic pressure has produced tangible results. For the Trump administration, it means securing a meaningful Iranian nuclear commitment that President Trump can present as proof that his pressure campaign succeeded in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

In theory, these objectives are not necessarily incompatible. A carefully structured agreement, with clearly defined sequencing, reciprocal commitments, and credible implementation mechanisms, could potentially bridge at least some of the differences.

One possibility is an interim ceasefire arrangement that creates additional diplomatic space for more substantive negotiations. But such an arrangement would only be useful if it establishes a credible pathway toward resolving the underlying disputes. Otherwise, it would merely postpone the next confrontation rather than prevent it.

The challenge, therefore, is not only reaching an agreement on paper. It is ensuring that the agreement survives its first encounter with political and strategic reality.

Even if negotiators manage to formulate a set of understandings, the depth of mutual suspicion could undermine their implementation almost immediately. Every delay, every ambiguous commitment, and every military move could be interpreted as evidence that the other side is negotiating in bad faith.

There is also a dangerous psychological dimension to the current crisis. Both Washington and Tehran appear to believe that their military capabilities provide them with significant leverage. Both may also calculate that another round of fighting could improve their negotiating positions. This creates a particularly dangerous situation in which neither side necessarily seeks war, but both may convince themselves that escalation is preferable to accepting an unfavorable agreement.

But, there is little reason to believe that another military confrontation would automatically produce better diplomatic conditions. Washington may hope that additional strikes would force Tehran to reconsider its position, but the Iranian leadership has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to absorb considerable military and economic costs rather than accept what it perceives as capitulation.

Yes, another war could make negotiations even more difficult, particularly if Iran responds with a broader regional campaign that raises the costs for the United States and its Gulf partners.

For now, the balance still tilts toward escalation, particularly if the Qatari-led diplomatic initiative fails. But this is not an inevitable outcome. As long as the diplomatic channels remain open and both sides continue exploring possible compromises, there is still a realistic opportunity to reach an understanding.

The difficulty is that time is running short, expectations remain fundamentally incompatible, and mutual distrust is so deeply entrenched that even an agreement in principle could collapse during implementation.

Ultimately, two questions will determine the outcome.

Can Washington and Tehran reach an agreement that allows each side to believe it has prevailed without requiring the other to surrender its fundamental interests?

And perhaps more importantly, do decision-makers in Washington genuinely believe that another round of military escalation would produce a better agreement, despite the considerable risk that Tehran would respond by escalating rather than capitulating?

These questions are particularly important because, from the Iranian leadership's perspective, another confrontation would not necessarily change its fundamental negotiating position. If anything, a more destructive war could reinforce its determination not to yield under military pressure.

The Middle East is once again approaching a critical crossroads. Diplomacy remains possible, but the window for achieving a sustainable agreement may be narrowing.

The greatest danger is not that either side necessarily wants another war. It is that both may come to believe that another war is the only remaining way to achieve the agreement they want.

#IranWar
#iran

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

“The hard part for our allies is if somebody that's responsive & receptive comes in '28, who's going to be there 4 years later? Are we going to get Trump 3.0? I think it's going to take 4-8 years before our allies begin to believe that we are the America they can trust again.”

[Foreign Affairs @ForeignAffairs]

“If people feel like our values don’t matter anymore—our values as war fighters, our values as Americans—then they’re not going to be there when we need them,” says William McRaven.
https://t.co/nOmt3BQMhe

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

This is definitely a worthwhile read and, importantly, highly accessible.

Gideon’s access to the ‘corridors of power’ must surely be unparalleled.

If you find yourself suddenly interested in the big political, economic & strategic forces shaping our world today, start here 👇🏼

[Gideon Rachman @gideonrachman]

My new book - out on October 22nd.

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

“Mbappé being cancelled by Chinese commercial partners, state-owned broadcasters & sports platform..shows how the CCPs influence can be extended beyond 🇨🇳 borders, with the 🇨🇳 market serving as a source of pressure on foreign individuals & institutions.” https://t.co/9UECufUZxo

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

@WarintheFuture @milstrategymag Reminds me of Sebastian Faulks’ Birdsong.

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

@its_mccarthy @DrLeeJones I had no idea I was even looking for this list but glad now I have found it.

[Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins @daniel_dsj2110]

Boy, was Samuel Huntington wrong about this prediction regarding Russia and Ukraine: "In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, pri marily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainian." https://t.co/DJvAeEaGvz

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

This is very good.

[Foreign Affairs @ForeignAffairs]

“Whoever produces and controls frontier models acquires global leverage over innovation, production, science, culture, and, ultimately, advanced thought.”

Read @nfergus, Lisa Klaassen, and @ericschmidt on the imperial nature of AI:
https://t.co/1dI85Oxchm

[Brad Setser @Brad_Setser]

Pretty hard to find a better example of a tariff that is causing more harm to US industry (and consumers) for less strategic or economic gain than the steep tariff on Canadian aluminum

1/2

[Epoch AI @EpochAIResearch]

Since 2022, 72% of the world’s AI compute has ended up in the US and about 10% in China.

And the US share keeps growing. It acquired around 60% of new compute each year from 2022 to 2024, then 72% in 2025, and 78% in the first half of 2026.

This data comes from our interactive AI Chip Imports explorer, which estimates and visualizes national compute shares using customs records.

It’s the latest piece in our project to map the AI chip supply chain, which also provides data on the components used to manufacture chips, sales volumes, the data centers that house chips, and the companies that own and use them.

More on this new data and what we’ve learned below.

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

Very interesting discussion. John argues 🇦🇺 economic relations with 🇨🇳 & rest of Asia are not incompatible with maintaining its deep security & cultural ties with 🇺🇸. 🇦🇺 should focus on opportunities emerging across Asia, particularly Indonesia 🇮🇩.

[The Lowy Institute @LowyInstitute]

What if Washington asked Australia why it sells iron ore to China? Economist John Edwards tells @SamRoggeveen Australia would refuse to choose, because its economic ties with China matter far more than those with the US. 👉Watch the podcast here: https://t.co/mbE3A4ucTL

[Angus Martin @sec_shift_oz]

Link to the view that Australia should build large AI training & inference data center capacity (in remote locations). https://t.co/3aw7LSofLF