"zahmat keshid" translates "to make great effort" from farsi
when i've felt i've worked hard enough and have achieved then... man zahmat keshidam - "i've made a great effort"
i'm waiting for the day i can say that, i'll show them.
we're hiring a founding engineer @hillclimbai
our goal is to teach models research taste (see more below)
if you're good at
- RL
- training infra
- data engineering
you'll be employee #5 @ 200k + 1% equity
send something about yourself + resume to talent@hillclimb[dot]com
Sunday night my mother passed away from cancer. Im at a loss of words. I won’t be able to play the matches this weekend because of her funeral ,but I have two favors too ask. 1 pray for my mother. 2. Call your parents and talk to them. You’ll never know when it’s the last time.
hillclimb (@hillclimbai) is the human superintelligence community, dedicated to building golden datasets for AGI.
Starting with math, their team of IMO medalists, lean experts, PhDs is designing RL environments for @NousResearch.
Seventeen years after its last championship, the team that once embodied precision and authority stands as an example of structural decline. Ferrari’s problem is not a lack of intelligence, funding, or talent. It’s a system that no longer knows how to learn.
The factory in Maranello remains one of the finest engineering facilities in motorsport. The people are capable, the resources unmatched. Yet every few seasons, the direction changes entirely. Design philosophies are discarded, organizational charts redrawn, technical leadership replaced. Mercedes and Red Bull have refined their philosophies over a decade; Ferrari restarts every two years. The cycle erases experience, resets relationships, and breaks the continuity that sustains competitive evolution. The 2020 SF1000, a car born from regulatory fear after the 2019 power unit controversy, stands as the perfect emblem of reaction over reason — an overcorrection rather than a vision.
The power unit program, once Ferrari’s strength, never fully recovered from that 2019 episode. The FIA settlement curtailed its innovation edge, and instead of addressing the structural limitations that followed, the team buried its powertrain division in defensive oversight. Development slowed, confidence evaporated, and the hybrid-era deficit widened. It wasn’t incompetence — it was institutional paralysis.
Operationally, Ferrari’s race execution remains a weak point. Pit wall errors are not random missteps but symptoms of a management structure that demands consensus in a sport that punishes hesitation. Too many layers of approval, too little authority delegated to those closest to the data. Red Bull’s engineers make decisions in seconds. Ferrari’s take minutes. In Formula 1, that is the difference between victory and humiliation.
Leadership instability has become a defining trait. Six team principals since 2008. Domenicali, Mattiacci, Arrivabene, Binotto, Vasseur — each promising reform, each dismantling the foundations laid before them. In an organization so complex, every new regime restarts a five-year clock — a clock that never reaches zero because it’s reset again before the system can mature. Institutional memory has evaporated. Ferrari doesn’t iterate; it oscillates.
Above it all hangs the weight of image. Ferrari is not merely a racing team; it’s a brand, a national icon, a listed corporation. Public relations and national pride act as governance constraints. Decisions are made for optics as much as for performance. Mistakes are rewritten in corporate language, and accountability is dispersed until it dissolves. Inside the team, departments compete for political cover rather than competitive advantage. Engineers work to protect themselves as much as to advance the car. “Ferrari eats its own” isn’t folklore — it’s operating procedure. [1/2]