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[AZ MZ @theAZMZ_]

@surim0n Toronto

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 38 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Iran has rejected a U.S.-backed temporary ceasefire proposal and instead outlined its conditions for a permanent end to the war. This is consistent with Iran’s position since the beginning of the conflict, whereby it views ceasefires primarily as opportunities for adversaries to regroup. It also signals that Tehran believes it retains sufficient leverage to hold out.

🔹In fact, Iranian messaging consistently frames ceasefire proposals as a deceptive tactic rather than a genuine off-ramp. This narrows the internal political space for compromise, while at the same time indicating a growing consensus among political elites that the country cannot sustain repeated cycles of war-ceasefire-war.

🔹Trump’s reiteration of a “final” deadline, combined with threats to destroy power plants and bridges, is interpreted in Tehran primarily as a sign of strategic frustration. From this perspective, Trump’s options for altering the situation through military means are limited, leading him to increasingly rely on social pressure as a last resort to achieve his objectives.

🔹At the same time, as noted earlier, Iranian discourse does not dismiss these threats outright. Trump is increasingly portrayed as a “madman” capable of unpredictable action. However, at least among circles close to the ruling elite, the preferred approach to dealing with such unpredictability is resistance rather than capitulation. These threats also reinforce arguments in Iran that any pause without guarantees would expose the country to renewed and potentially more destructive phases of war.

🔹In this sense, the unpredictability Trump seeks to leverage to compel Iranian concessions may backfire: if his statements lack credibility, there is little basis for trusting his assurances regarding an end to the war in exchange for reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

🔹In the meantime, strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure – particularly the Asaluyeh petrochemical zone, following earlier attacks on industrial facilities – are framed domestically as confirmation that the conflict has already shifted into full-spectrum economic warfare, even before the expiration of Trump’s deadline. From this viewpoint, while Trump focuses public attention on the possibility of large-scale attacks on civilian infrastructure, Israel is already conducting operations below that threshold whose cumulative effects may be comparable.

🔹In this context, a perception is emerging among Iranian intellectual and analytical circles that the United States, and particularly Israel, are seeking to dismantle the key pillars of Iran’s identity as a regional power: major bridges, large refineries, major steel production centers, and similar assets. Israel’s recent strike on Sharif University of Technology, a major scientific hub in Iran, has further reinforced this view.

🔹Accordingly, some analysts, particularly within harder-line circles, argue that the window for decisive escalation aimed at restoring deterrence is narrowing. In their view, if Iran does not escalate against energy infrastructure across the region before Trump’s deadline, he may follow through on his threats. As a result, the coming hours are seen as highly sensitive.

🔹Beyond industrial infrastructure, Israeli strikes have continued across wide areas of Iran, including Tehran, Qom, Lorestan, and West Azerbaijan, targeting both military and civilian sites. Importantly, unlike the initial phase of the war, these attacks no longer appear to follow a specific geographic pattern, suggesting an effort to degrade both Iran’s military capabilities and its societal resilience across the country.

🔹Among military targets, Israel reportedly succeeded in killing the intelligence chief of the IRGC, whose predecessor had also been killed in the 12-day war last year. At the unofficial level, this has sparked criticism regarding the extent to which an institution responsible for security is vulnerable to enemy intelligence penetration. At the official level, however, the government continues to emphasize that the system remains resilient despite the loss of individuals.

🔹The IAEA confirmed that strikes had landed within tens of meters of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, while Iran warned of a potential radioactive release. Tehran presents repeated strikes near the facility as evidence that U.S. and Israeli actions could ultimately lead to a full-scale regional disaster.

🔹Iran’s parliament has advanced draft measures aimed at securing and regulating the Strait of Hormuz, bringing the concept of wartime control closer to formal policy. This also indicates that, despite Trump’s threats, Iran does not accept a return to the pre-war status quo in the strait.

🔹Reports suggest that Iraq’s oil sector has been severely disrupted by the conflict, even as Iran has allowed exemptions for Iraqi shipments through the strait. This underscores the broader structural impact of the crisis on regional energy flows.

🔹In the same vein, the IMF warns that the war is already contributing to higher global inflation and slower growth, even without further escalation. This indicates that the economic impact is no longer confined to energy markets but is beginning to transmit into the broader global economy.

🔹Overall, Day 38 reflects both sides becoming entrenched in incompatible positions: Iran rejecting a temporary pause and the United States escalating threats, leaving the conflict without a viable off-ramp despite mounting pressure across multiple fronts.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 37 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹The central development of Day 37 was the U.S. rescue operation inside Iran following the downing of an F-15E. In Iranian framing, the point is not to deny that the United States can still conduct complex operations, but to argue that it can no longer do so at acceptable cost, which is presented as evidence that Iran is successfully imposing costs despite the material asymmetry.

🔹At the expert level, another interpretation has emerged beyond those I mentioned earlier today. The new arguments is that the operation may have been a cover story for a failed heliborne attempt in Isfahan, potentially linked to Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, which would make the episode strategically more serious than the public U.S. account suggests.

🔹Trump’s threat to strike Iran’s power plants and bridges if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened has been read in Tehran in two ways. On the one hand, it is treated as a sign that military pressure has failed to push Iran toward capitulation. On the other hand, it is being taken seriously enough to sharpen internal debates over whether Iran should escalate preemptively.

🔹Some state-affiliated sources are warning that unless Washington explicitly backs away from infrastructure targeting, Iran may move toward a large-scale strike on Israeli and Gulf electricity and oil infrastructure, reflecting a shift by the Iranian armed forces toward abandoning proportional, reactive responses.

🔹In that sense, Trump’s threats may end up producing the opposite of their intended effect. Rather than compelling de-escalation, they may strengthen the camp in Tehran arguing that only a decisive and immediate show of force can restore deterrence.

🔹At the societal level, these threats are also reshaping perceptions of the war inside Iran. The conflict is increasingly seen not as an effort to pressure the regime while sparing society, but as a campaign against the country itself, which is deepening public disillusionment and narrowing the political space for any pro-U.S. narrative.

🔹This shift appears to be visible even beyond Iran’s formal political sphere. The fact that some diaspora opposition TV channels have reportedly moderated their tone suggests that attacks on infrastructure are eroding the plausibility of framing the war as “liberation” rather than destruction.

🔹Iran’s attacks on petrochemical and oil-related facilities in the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, as well as Israel, were framed during the day as a calibrated response to the strike on Mahshahr. Their purpose was to show that attacks on Iran’s economic infrastructure will trigger rapid retaliation against the wider regional energy system.

🔹At the same time, there is still no sign that Trump’s threats are pushing Iran to reconsider its Hormuz policy. On the contrary, the IRGC’s assertion that the strait will not return to its pre-war condition points to a hardening of Iran’s position rather than movement toward accommodation.

🔹What stands out increasingly is that Iran is no longer presenting Hormuz simply as a disruption tool. The emerging argument is that access to the strait should now be conditioned on compensation for wartime damage, effectively recasting passage not as a right but as an issue to be renegotiated under the terms of war.

🔹This is reinforced by the emphasis that ships are still transiting the strait with Iranian permission. The strategic point is to show that Hormuz is not closed in a crude sense, but operating under wartime regulations imposed by Iran, which helps undercut the U.S. claim that force is needed to “reopen” it.

🔹The push in Majlis (parliament) to impose cargo-based fees on ships and tankers passing through the strait takes this one step further. It suggests that Tehran is moving from wartime control toward institutionalized control, turning Hormuz into both a strategic lever and a prospective revenue-generating mechanism.

🔹The reported discussions with Oman are important in this regard. Tehran appears to be trying to build not only military control but also a legal and diplomatic basis, potentially with Omani involvement, for redefining the passage regime in a way that would outlast the current war.

🔹On the Lebanon front, intensified Israeli strikes, including in Beirut’s southern suburbs, have been met with drone and missile attacks and reported naval strike attempts. Even where those naval attempts failed, they still served an important purpose by widening the maritime battlespace into the Mediterranean.

🔹Iraq, by contrast, is being treated as a theater of sustained attritional pressure. Repeated drone operations against U.S. positions are meant to show that American forces remain vulnerable over time, while U.S. strikes on PMF-linked targets keep alive the risk of public mobilization against Washington.

🔹Iran’s decision to continue allowing Iraq safe passage through Hormuz should be read in that same strategic context. Tehran appears to see Iraqi economic stability as essential to preserving the political position of its allies in Baghdad, which makes Iraqi exemption a tool of influence as much as a stabilizing gesture.

🔹Regarding Yemen, the dominant view in Tehran is that its main strategic value lies less in missiles than in geography. The Houthis are therefore seen as preserving their strongest card, Bab el-Mandeb, while calibrating their current involvement so as to sustain pressure without prematurely triggering broader regional escalation.

🔹This makes Yemen a reserve front rather than a secondary one. The threat of activating Bab el-Mandeb more fully functions as deterrence in itself, while preserving room for a much sharper escalation if the war continues to intensify.

🔹Inside Iran, wartime conditions are also being used to justify tighter domestic control. The execution of two detainees arrested during the January protests, alongside a broader rise in executions under national security charges, indicates that the regime is coupling external war pressure with intensified internal repression.

🔹Diplomatic activity has continued, but without visible progress. Regional efforts to broker talks or a temporary ceasefire appear stalled, and Iran’s rejection of proposals tied to reopening Hormuz shows that Tehran still believes its leverage lies in holding its position rather than entering negotiations on U.S. terms.

🔹Overall, Day 37 points to a sharper Iranian shift from reactive signaling to pre-positioned escalation options. Tehran is increasingly trying to formalize control over key pressure points, while preparing politically and militarily for the possibility that Trump’s infrastructure threats will force a wider and more decisive phase of the war.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 36 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹A key development on April 4 was Trump’s 48-hour ultimatum to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. In Tehran, this ultimatum has been analyzed from multiple angles. On the one hand, particularly in state media, there is an emphasis on portraying Trump’s threat not as a sign of strength but as an indication of desperation in dealing with a problem that did not exist prior to the war and has now become Iran’s primary lever. On the other hand, there is an expectation that Trump – especially in light of the recent setback suffered by U.S. air forces – may take bold action against Iran even before the ultimatum expires.

🔹At the same time, Israel’s strike on a key Iranian petrochemical complex in Mahshahr has been interpreted as a serious escalation, effectively initiating a campaign against Iran’s critical infrastructure even before the expiry of Trump’s ultimatum. In other words, this action is viewed not as an isolated event but as a precursor to a broader U.S.-Israeli escalation targeting vital infrastructure.

🔹This perception has fueled serious debates within pro-government analytical circles regarding the necessity of a firm and deterrent Iranian response. A recurring theme in these discussions is that threats of escalation and a focus on U.S. and Israeli military infrastructure have thus far failed to produce deterrence. Instead, the argument is that Iran should not wait for Trump’s threats to materialize but should act preemptively and decisively. The earlier strike on Ras Laffan in Qatar is frequently cited as a successful example that should be replicated elsewhere in the region.

🔹At the official level, however, Iran’s response so far has combined threats of broad escalation with continued attacks on “U.S.- and Israel-related targets.” In this context, claims of attacks on U.S.-linked industrial, radar, and commercial targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE are intended to signal that any expansion of the conflict into Iran’s economic infrastructure would expose the wider U.S.-oriented regional system.

🔹At the same time, part of Iran’s response continues to focus on the Strait of Hormuz. Some Iranian sources claim that among vessels stranded in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, those with links to Israel or the United States can be selectively targeted for retaliation. Reports suggest that the targeting of the MSC Ishyka, described as having Israeli ties, falls within this pattern.

🔹Another notable development on Day 36 of the war is a shift in how the Strait of Hormuz is being framed in Iranian media and analytical circles. Following earlier indications that Iran is seeking to establish a new legal regime for the strait – potentially in coordination with Oman – after the war, Iranian sources are now presenting it as a legitimate wartime order that even hostile powers may ultimately be compelled to negotiate around.

🔹This gives Tehran a stronger bargaining narrative. If Hormuz is framed as a governed space rather than a disrupted one, reopening it becomes a matter of political recognition rather than mere de-escalation. This helps explain why, over the past two weeks, Iranian sources have largely refrained from discussing a full closure or mining of the strait. While this could change, it nonetheless points to a longer-term political approach to this strategic waterway.

🔹At the same time, in a significant development, Iran’s armed forces announced that Iraq is exempt from “any restrictions we have imposed in the Strait of Hormuz,” allowing Iraqi vessels to transit freely. This marks the first time since the start of the war that ships from a specific country have been fully exempted from restrictions in the strait.

🔹This announcement followed large-scale public demonstrations in Iraqi cities such as Baghdad, Maysan, and Mosul in support of Iran and in condemnation of the U.S.-Israeli war. In effect, Iran appears to be implementing a system of reward and punishment in the strait. At the same time, Tehran likely hopes that this move will increase popular support for Iran in Iraq and across the wider region.

🔹At the operational level, Iran is emphasizing air denial as a capability it is increasingly restoring. Officially, Iran’s armed forces claim to be deploying “new air defense systems” capable of countering U.S. and Israeli aircraft. However, at the expert level, it is suggested that Iran’s recent success in targeting U.S. aircraft reflects tactical adaptation rather than a structural upgrade – particularly through the use of thermal detection and portable air defense systems (more on this to follow).

🔹Iranian reporting has also pushed back strongly against the notion that reduced missile visibility indicates reduced capability. The argument is that increased drone usage or mixed salvos should be understood as controlled expenditure and adaptation – especially in the context of a war of attrition – rather than depletion. In this regard, reporting by non-Iranian outlets such as The New York Times and CNN is also cited as evidence of Iran’s residual capabilities.

🔹On the diplomatic front, there are still no clear signs of Iranian willingness to compromise. However, Iranian officials have not categorically ruled out negotiations. After reports suggested that the Islamabad mediation track had collapsed due to Iranian objections, Iran’s foreign minister emphasized that Tehran has no issue with Pakistan, and that the core problem lies in Washington’s demands, which remain unacceptable to Iran.

🔹At the regional level, the Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen fronts remained active, though at varying intensities. In Lebanon, exchanges between Hezbollah and Israel continued. In Iraq, there were reports of new strikes on PMF positions, alongside the temporary closure of the Shalamcheh crossing following strikes near the border. The Houthis also announced the launch of their fifth missile attack against Israel since entering the war. At the same time, a major development is that all components of the “Axis of Resistance,” including Iran, are now explicitly emphasizing coordination and joint operations.

🔹Overall, Day 36 reflects both a gradual escalation in the infrastructure domain and the anticipation of a more sudden and severe escalation by Trump. Iran continues to pursue a combination of threats and calibrated actions to generate deterrence, though this approach is increasingly being questioned within Tehran. All of this is unfolding as there are not only no signs of Iran backing down on the Strait of Hormuz, but the strait itself is becoming more formally embedded as a core component of Tehran’s political-military strategy.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

How is Iran interpreting the U.S. rescue operation?

🔹Reactions inside Iran have been mixed. State media have framed the operation as a clear U.S. failure, pointing to reported losses of aircraft and helicopters and questioning whether the second airman was actually rescued. In this narrative, Washington is seen as concealing both material damage and possible casualties.

🔹Particular attention has focused on Donald Trump’s public messaging. Iranian commentators argue that the absence of any acknowledgment of losses reflects an attempt to construct a narrative of success and distract public attention from the material costs of the operation.

🔹At the same time, reports suggest that clashes did occur during the mission. Individuals on the Iranian side – particularly local people involved in search efforts – were reportedly targeted. This complicates the picture and suggests the operation was not as clean as presented by U.S. officials.

🔹Beyond the information war, some Iranian analysts have focused on what the operation reveals about Iran’s defenses. The fact that large transport aircrafts and accompanying helicopters were able to penetrate deep into Iranian territory raises concerns about gaps in airspace security.

🔹The depth of penetration – reaching areas south of Isfahan – is seen as particularly significant. It suggests that under certain conditions, the United States can insert forces far inside Iran, even if only temporarily.

🔹From a military perspective, analysts emphasize that countering such operations requires rapid detection and response. However, the presence of U.S. (and possibly Israeli) air cover complicates direct engagement and raises the risks of casualties.

🔹As a result, some experts are calling for expanded use of drones for surveillance and portable missile systems for targeting. The argument is that more flexible, distributed capabilities are needed to address the vulnerabilities exposed by the operation.

🔹There is also a strategic concern. Even if the U.S. incurred losses, the successful extraction of an airman could reinforce perceptions of American effectiveness. In a highly curated information environment, that may incentivize further high-risk operations.

🔹These could go beyond rescue missions. Some analysts warn that such precedents might increase the likelihood of more ambitious actions, including strikes on sensitive facilities or even attempts to secure high-value assets like the stockpile of highly-enriched uranium inside Iran.

🔹At the same time, a counterargument exists. Some analysts believe that the costs – particularly aircraft losses – may have been acceptable for Washington in this case, but could limit the feasibility of repeating similar operations under more contested conditions.

🔹This has fed into a broader debate: does this operation increase or decrease the likelihood of a future U.S. ground operation in Iran? There is no clear consensus yet.

🔹Some Iranian experts frame the episode as part of a learning process. Despite setbacks, they point out that Iranian forces have previously managed to target advanced U.S. platforms and inflict damage, including during this operation.

🔹From this perspective, Iran’s failure to capture the airmen is a setback, but also a source of operational lessons that could improve Iran’s response in future scenarios.

🔹Others urge a more cautious assessment. They note that, compared to other cases where the U.S. has rapidly extracted targets with minimal resistance – particularly in Venezuela – this operation took nearly 48 hours and involved significant friction and losses.

🔹In that sense, they argue, the episode reinforces the idea that Iran is not an easy operational environment. Any similar mission would likely involve complexity, resistance, and real risk.

🔹Finally, some commentators draw parallels with the Operation Eagle Claw. In Iranian discourse, such comparisons are often used to reinforce the narrative that U.S. military operations against Iran are repeatedly frustrated.

🔹For more ideological voices, these parallels are framed in symbolic or even religious terms, presented as evidence that Iran has historically resisted external intervention and that there’s divine support for Iran.

🔹Overall, the episode is being interpreted in two ways at once: as both a sign of vulnerability and a demonstration of resilience. That tension will likely shape how Iran adapts its defenses and how it anticipates future U.S. actions.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 35 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹The most consequential development of the day was the downing of a U.S. F-15E over Iran, but the incident expanded into a broader operational setback. Later reports indicate that a U.S. A-10 was also hit during the rescue phase and that multiple helicopters involved in the mission came under fire, with some sustaining damage.

🔹This matters because the vulnerability was not limited to the initial shootdown. The rescue effort also became challenging, showing that U.S. forces can face sustained risk not only in strike operations but also in recovery missions inside Iranian airspace.

🔹Iranian messaging is treating the incident not as an isolated success, but as proof that the United States misjudged not only Iran’s air defenses but also its capacity to sustain pressure under attack. This helps Tehran rebut the impression that the balance is shifting irreversibly against it.

🔹The fate of the pilots has also taken on strategic significance in Iranian commentary. The successful extraction of one crew member shows that the U.S. retains operational reach, but the challenging environment is being framed as evidence that scaling such operations would come at increasing cost.

🔹This has fed into Iranian assessments of a possible U.S. ground operation. The logic being advanced is that if rescue operations were uncontested, they could lower the threshold for deeper incursions, but the fact that additional aircraft were hit today is being interpreted as a signal that escalation would face immediate challenges.

🔹In parallel, reports of internal reshuffling in the U.S. military leadership are closely scrutinized in Iranian expert circles. Reports that Pete Hegseth has dismissed several senior U.S. military figures are interpreted not as a routine restructuring but as political preparation for escalation.

🔹Iranian analysts frame the dismissals as an effort by the Trump administration to sideline commanders perceived as cautious about a ground campaign and to consolidate a command environment more aligned with a higher-risk strategy toward Iran.

🔹Trump’s public threat to strike Iranian bridges and power plants has given Tehran a new opening in the information battle. Iran is now portraying Washington not as a coercive actor in control of escalation but as a power drifting toward infrastructure destruction because it has failed to secure a decisive military outcome.

🔹In the same vein, the war is increasingly framed as an assault on Iran’s scientific, civilian, and administrative backbone, which could broaden the social constituency of resistance beyond the state’s core security base.

🔹The strike on Shahid Beheshti University was especially important in that respect. Iranian media and commentators present it not simply as damage to a facility, but as an attack on knowledge production itself, allowing Tehran to fold universities and research infrastructure into its broader deterrence narrative.

🔹That is a notable shift in framing. Earlier emphasis centered more heavily on military retaliation and economic chokepoints; today, the Iranian government can more clearly fuse national scientific autonomy, sovereignty, and wartime resilience into a single strategic message.

🔹In the meantime, state media maneuver on the claim that Washington may already be looking for a pause after recent setbacks. The reported rejection of a U.S. proposal for a temporary ceasefire was presented by Iranian media as evidence that battlefield pressure is forcing Washington toward a halt in operations, but not that diplomacy is gaining ground.

🔹In other words, Tehran is trying to establish that any U.S. move toward de-escalation reflects pressure and miscalculation, thereby making continued Iranian escalation look like confidence rather than compulsion.

🔹At the same time, the article by Javad Zarif in Foreign Affairs, in which he outlined a proposal for ending the war, has faced intense pushback from hardliners. Several members of parliament sharply criticized Zarif, accusing him of aligning with the enemy and attempting a “coup.” Simultaneously, pro-government speakers at rallies of Islamic Republic supporters accused him of treason and called for security agencies to take action against him.

🔹Meanwhile, Tehran issues more direct warnings to the Gulf states. The line is no longer just that U.S. forces in the region are at risk, but that states enabling American operations – in any shape or form – may themselves be drawn into the retaliation envelope unless they distance themselves from Washington’s campaign.

🔹In effect, Iran wants to extend deterrence from military platforms to political geography. Tehran is signaling that basing arrangements, overflight permissions, and quiet logistical support can all become strategically punishable choices.

🔹Another notable development on Day 35 was the apparent partial reopening of Hormuz for “politically acceptable” shipping. Reports suggest that a French-owned CMA CGM container ship, three Oman Shipping tankers, and a Japanese-linked LNG vessel managed to cross, often signaling their non-hostile identity en route.

🔹This suggests Iran is no longer communicating a simple binary of closure versus reopening. Instead, Tehran appears to be moving toward selective access, using passage through Hormuz as a political filter that rewards neutral or friendly states while preserving leverage over the wider market.

🔹But in any case, limited transits by French, Omani, and Japanese-linked vessels point to a controlled easing rather than normalization, which allows Iran to reduce some diplomatic pressure without surrendering the price and supply shock it has already created.

🔹Overall, day 35’s picture suggests Iran is refining its war narrative around three linked claims: the United States cannot operate over Iran without cost, infrastructure attacks reveal American frustration rather than control, and any further escalation will widen the conflict horizontally across the region’s political and economic system.

🔹The broader strategic direction, then, is not simply toward more violence, but toward a harsher bargaining environment. Tehran is trying to enter that phase with a stronger argument that it has preserved resilience at home, retained escalation options abroad, and denied Washington the ability to define either the pace or the meaning of the war.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 34 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Iran’s messaging is shifting more clearly toward infrastructure-centric warfare. In both official and semi-official narratives, the emphasis is no longer limited to retaliation against military targets, but increasingly on demonstrating that attacks on Iran’s bridges, industry, and civilian infrastructure will be met with comparable pressure on the broader U.S.-aligned regional system.

🔹In this sense, Tehran is increasingly framing the war as a contest over regional connectivity rather than battlefield attrition alone. The strategic logic is to signal that the cost of sustained pressure on Iran will not only trigger responses against Israel or U.S. assets and interests in the region, but also against Gulf logistics, data infrastructure, and broader commercial/economic confidence. In other words, the underlying logic is that either all sides endure together, or all face collective ruin.

🔹The Strait of Hormuz remains the central lever, but Iran’s tone suggests ambitions beyond a temporary blockade. Iranian officials are increasingly raising the idea of closure with discussions of postwar protocols and long-term exclusion rules, including potential arrangements with Oman to establish a new legal regime governing the strait.

🔹This is strategically significant because it raises the political cost of de-escalation for Tehran. The more Iran frames Hormuz as a space where wartime sacrifice can be translated into lasting leverage, the more difficult it becomes to reopen the waterway without visible concessions from the opposing side.

🔹Trump’s recent speech was intended to project control over escalation and an endgame trajectory, but Iran has interpreted it in the opposite way. The combination of maximalist threats, the absence of a clear political endpoint, and the lack of a practical plan for reopening Hormuz allows Tehran to portray Washington not as dominant, but as strategically incoherent.

🔹This interpretation helps Iran justify continued escalation without appearing cornered. In Tehran’s framing, U.S. threats are no longer seen as evidence that deterrence has failed, but rather as an indication that Washington is relying on brute pressure due to the absence of a viable exit strategy. Within this framework, attacks on purely civilian infrastructure – such as bridges and pharmaceutical companies – are portrayed as signs of strategic desperation on Trump’s part.

🔹At the same time, Iran has, for the first time, threatened that it may target Israel’s nuclear facilities in response to U.S. and Israeli attacks. Iran’s deputy foreign minister on legal and international affairs stated that if strikes against Iranian infrastructure continue, “the most important option of the Islamic Republic of Iran” would be to target Israel’s nuclear facilities.

🔹This signals a lowering of Iran’s tolerance threshold in response to the attritional infrastructure warfare it has faced in recent days, particularly as Trump’s recent threats suggest the possibility of further escalation. In effect, Iran’s message is that the continuation of such a trajectory is functionally indistinguishable from a nuclear attack and could therefore provoke a response against Israel’s nuclear infrastructure.

🔹On Lebanon, recent developments point to a more entrenched conflict rather than a limited escalation. While Beirut warns that there is no end in sight and Israeli operations appear increasingly oriented toward establishing a longer-term security zone, Hezbollah’s continued strike tempo serves Tehran’s interests by tying Israel down in a costly, open-ended confrontation.

🔹The strategic value of Lebanon for Iran now lies less in decisive escalation and more in its attritional function, particularly if Israel’s northern campaign continues to shift from punitive strikes toward prolonged territorial control.

🔹In Iraq, airstrikes on PMF positions in Nineveh and warnings of potential militia attacks in Baghdad show that Iraq remains a more unpredictable front, where pressure on U.S. interests can increase without Tehran needing to foreground it publicly.

🔹This ambiguity serves Iran’s interests by preserving deniability while keeping the Iraq-Jordan-Syria corridor unstable. The message is that even if the primary theater remains Iran, Washington cannot assume that its regional military footprint is insulated from dispersed retaliation.

🔹Yemen has also become more politically salient. While Houthi attacks themselves are not new, increasingly explicit claims of coordination with Iran and Hezbollah suggest a shift from symbolic solidarity toward a more openly articulated multi-front alignment.

🔹Even where actual command-and-control remains uneven, the signaling effect is significant. Tehran benefits from Yemen being perceived not as an isolated auxiliary front, but as part of a broader escalation architecture that stretches Israeli defenses and underscores that maritime insecurity is not confined to the Strait of Hormuz.

🔹At a different level, international reactions highlight the limits of support for Washington’s preferred response. European reluctance to reopen Hormuz by force or to even allow the U.S. to use their territory for supporting its Iran operations reinforces Iran’s belief that leveraging global economic pressure can generate coalition-management challenges for the United States more rapidly than Washington can generate sufficient pressure to compel Iranian capitulation.

🔹The spike in oil prices underscores this dynamic. With Brent rising above $109 and WTI above $111 following Trump’s remarks, Tehran can credibly argue that the economic burden of the war is increasingly being externalized, reinforcing its view that time and market disruption remain among its most effective strategic tools.

🔹Overall, Day 34 was less about a singular dramatic military shift than about the articulation of a clearer Iranian theory of victory. Tehran used the moment to argue that it can withstand direct strikes, expand the target set to the region’s economic and infrastructural backbone, and shape the conflict around connectivity, cost imposition, and coalition strain, rather than purely tactical destruction.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 32 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Israeli strikes on Iran’s industrial base continued, including repeated attacks on steel facilities and technical universities. This reinforces a pattern of targeting long-term production and technological capacity rather than purely military assets.

🔹These strikes have intensified debate within Iranian circles, with some arguing that Iran’s largely proportional responses in the industrial domain (steel factory for steel factory, refinery for refinery) have failed to generate sufficient deterrence against Israel.

🔹In contrast to earlier escalation against U.S. threats of targeting Iran’s energy infrastructure – where disproportionate responses appeared to impose restraint – current retaliation against Israel is seen as too calibrated to alter Israeli behavior.

🔹This has strengthened calls among some commentators for a shift toward broader horizontal escalation and more disproportionate responses to raise direct costs for Israel. At the same time, analysts note a structural limitation: strikes on GCC infrastructure may influence U.S. calculations but have limited direct deterrent impact on Israel.

🔹 In fact, there are indications that the Iranian armed forces may already be on the path of disproportionate and horizontal escalation. The IRGC has warned that American-linked technology and AI companies operating in the region could be considered legitimate targets.

🔹Growing signs of a shift toward ground-war preparation by the U.S. is becoming visible. The reported deployment of A-10 close air support aircraft, alongside strikes on artillery, rocket systems, and border positions, suggests battlefield shaping for possible ground engagement.

🔹This combination of degrading Iran’s support firepower while brining close-support assets have sparked speculations of a transition from air strikes toward operational preparation for ground scenarios.

🔹Iranian officials continue to reject the notion that negotiations are underway, describing current contacts with the United States as limited message exchanges rather than formal diplomacy.

🔹At the same time, Tehran maintains that it is not seeking a ceasefire, but a comprehensive end to the war across all fronts, coupled with guarantees against future conflict.

🔹The Strait of Hormuz remains a central lever. Iran continues to emphasize that passage is open for non-hostile states, while discussions persist about monetizing control of the waterway through toll systems. In a recent development, Russia has been reportedly told that its ships can safely pass through the strait.

🔹At the same time, global energy markets remain under pressure, with oil prices rising to 118 USD per barrel amid continued escalation and persistent risks to maritime flows.

🔹Israeli targeting patterns appear to be evolving further, with reported strikes on a pharmaceutical production facility. This suggests an expansion from industrial and academic targets into sectors directly tied to public welfare and social resilience.

🔹This has been interpreted as another indication of Israel destroying Iran’s potential to rebuild and reconstruct not only its military potential but also civilian infrastructure after the war and to push the country toward a failed state scenario.

🔹European positioning continues to shift toward caution and partial distancing. After Spain, Italy and France have imposed restrictions on U.S. military access for the war against Iran, while broader European concern is primarily driven by rising economic costs of the war and potential longer term security implications.

🔹As a result, transatlantic tensions are increasing, with Washington openly criticizing European allies for limiting support and signaling a reduced willingness to bear the burden unilaterally.

🔹Within the GCC, divisions remain visible. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are reportedly pushing for continued pressure on Iran, while Oman and Qatar favor de-escalation, reflecting diverging risk calculations among regional actors.

🔹The UAE, in particular, is facing significant economic fallout, with sharp declines in markets, real estate, and aviation activity. These factors help explain its more assertive stance.

🔹Iranian pressure on UAE is also intensifying, with explicit threats to target critical infrastructure such as the Fujairah port and pipeline networks if support for U.S. operations continues.

🔹At the operational level, Iran appears to be continuing a strategy of targeting logistical hubs and staging areas, including bases in Kuwait and Iraq, to complicate any potential U.S. ground deployment.

🔹This aligns with a broader pattern of preemptive pressure aimed at disrupting force buildup and limiting the feasibility of a ground offensive before it materializes.

🔹Meanwhile, attacks by Iraqi armed groups against U.S. positions continue at scale, indicating sustained pressure across secondary fronts.

🔹Internally, the Iranian regime is tightening control, including executions and arrests, reflecting ongoing concern about internal stability amid prolonged external conflict.

🔹Diplomatic efforts continue in parallel, with Pakistan and China advancing proposals for de-escalation, although key elements – particularly regarding reopening of Hormuz and an immediate ceasefire– remain misaligned with Iranian positions.

🔹At the same time, Israeli leadership has signaled that any ceasefire with Iran would not constrain operations in Lebanon, pointing to a separate track of escalation against Hezbollah. Iran, however, continues to emphasize that the end of the war should cover all regional fronts.

🔹Overall, day 32 highlights a growing asymmetry in which Israel is escalating toward systemic degradation of Iran’s industrial and social infrastructure, while Iran’s responses have yet to impose comparable long-term costs on Israel.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 31 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹A missile strike on Israel’s Bazan refinery complex in Haifa marked a continuation of Iran’s retaliatory strikes targeting Israeli energy infrastructure in response to Israeli attacks on similar facilities in Iran. However, the impact of such strikes on infrastructure in Israel still appears limited compared to similar cases in the Gulf. This may partly reflect constraints on available information regarding attacks in Israel, but it is also likely tied to differences in Iran’s operational capabilities at short range (the Persian Gulf) versus long range.

🔹In any case, Iranian narratives framed the strike not as incidental damage but as part of a deliberate campaign against Israel’s industrial backbone, signaling a shift toward sustained infrastructure warfare as a core pillar of strategy. The prevailing assessment is that, as the conflict enters a more attritional phase and Israel’s missile interception capacity becomes strained, Iran’s ability to inflict more serious damage in the coming days will increase.

🔹Across both state and semi-state spheres, March 30 was presented as a landmark (one month of resistance) and as evidence that the initial U.S.-Israeli objective of rapid strategic collapse had failed. In this sense, there is growing discussion of a transition toward a war of endurance.

🔹This narrative aligns with the growing confidence among Iranian strategists noted earlier. In other words, Iranian discourse is no longer centered on merely withstanding pressure, but on demonstrating that time and economic disruption are increasingly working in Iran’s favor.

🔹The Strait of Hormuz continues to feature as a structural lever to be sustained over the long term. Iranian state propaganda emphasizes near-total disruption of shipping flows to underscore global economic dependence on Iranian decisions. However, beyond propaganda, political actions and legal justifications point to a serious Iranian intent to maintain control over the strait.

🔹In this vein, Iran’s parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission has prepared a draft law for the “management of the Strait of Hormuz,” which is expected to be reviewed soon. The draft includes measures such as imposing transit fees on passing vessels. At the same time, Iran’s Foreign Ministry considers the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz to be legally justifiable, arguing that under wartime conditions, the principle of safe passage does not apply to belligerent parties.

🔹At the same time, the broader debate over the strait reflects an evolution in Iranian thinking, where escalation dominance is increasingly defined in economic terms rather than purely military metrics.

🔹In another related development, satellite imagery showed fires at two pumping stations along the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which transports oil from Abu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Although Iran has not officially claimed responsibility, the prevailing view among commentators is that this was intended to hinder the development of alternatives to the strait and preserve Iran’s leverage.

🔹Trump’s renewed threats to strike Iranian oil infrastructure and force the Strait of Hormuz open were interpreted in Tehran as evidence of strategic frustration rather than strength, reinforcing the narrative that Washington lacks viable off-ramps. Among analysts, there is broad consensus that Tehran is unlikely to take Trump’s threats seriously.

🔹At the same time, Iranian officials continue to publicly reject the existence of meaningful negotiations, framing U.S. diplomatic signaling as, at best, an attempt to calm U.S. and global markets and, at worst, a deceptive cover for continued escalation.

🔹Meanwhile, Lebanon has seen a notable widening of the battlespace, with Israeli evacuation warnings extending into the western Bekaa, suggesting a shift toward broader targeting patterns deeper inside Lebanese territory rather than localized border engagements.

🔹This has been interpreted as Israel moving toward a strategy of fragmenting Hezbollah’s operational space. While Iran benefits from tying down Israeli resources on a secondary front, there are growing concerns about developments on the ground in Lebanon. This helps explain Iran’s insistence that any plan to end the war should encompass “all fronts,” not just Iran.

🔹Simultaneously, political tensions in Beirut have intensified as Iran refuses to withdraw its ambassador despite pressure from the Lebanese government, highlighting Tehran’s unwillingness to concede influence even under military pressure. At the same time, there are concerns in Tehran that this could provide Israel with a pretext to carry out a direct or indirect attack against the Iranian embassy in Beirut.

🔹Yemen’s role has remained limited in immediate impact but has grown in strategic relevance, with drone launches toward Eilat reinforcing the emergence of a southern pressure front.

🔹The significance lies in force dispersion. Even low-intensity Houthi activity compels Israel to divert air defense and surveillance assets away from Iran and Lebanon. This is an advantage for Iran in a war of attrition.

🔹Iraq has remained comparatively quiet kinetically, but tensions have risen as Kuwait formally protested militia activity originating from Iraqi territory. This may signal growing Gulf frustration with Baghdad’s inability to contain armed groups, whose activities could expand into other Gulf theaters if escalation leads them to more directly join the war on Iran’s side.

🔹This may also point to a shift in the role of Iraqi armed groups from a purely anti-U.S. pressure tool to a source of intra-regional friction, thereby increasing the political cost of their operations for the Iraqi government.

🔹Internally, Iran has intensified its domestic security posture, with expanded arrests and counterintelligence activity reflecting concerns over information leakage and wartime dissent.

🔹This reflects a dual-track approach in which external messaging projects resilience and control, while internal measures indicate awareness of vulnerabilities associated with a prolonged conflict.

🔹Across all fronts, a clearer division of labor is emerging: Lebanon as the primary attritional theater, Yemen as a latent maritime pressure zone, and Iraq as a more flexible arena with the potential to engage both the United States and the Gulf states.

🔹Overall, Day 31 reflects consolidation rather than escalation, with Iran refining a theory of victory centered on endurance, distributed pressure, and the progressive externalization of the costs of war.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 30 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Iranian strategic assessments increasingly point to a prolonged conflict, with expectations that the war could last at least eight more weeks and may escalate further, including the potential deployment of U.S. ground forces.

🔹In response, Iranian planning is no longer centered on absorbing strikes but on shaping the battlefield in advance. A concept described as “preemptive destruction” is emerging, involving continuous targeting of U.S. bases, logistics hubs, and staging areas in countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain to disrupt any potential ground or heliborne operation before it can be executed.

🔹This builds on the earlier shift toward “active preemption” and reflects a more offensive posture aimed at suppressing U.S. force buildup at its source rather than responding after an operation.

🔹The United States, however, continues to move in the opposite direction. Reports indicate preparations for limited ground operations involving special forces and airborne units, alongside the deployment of additional naval assets and Marines to the region.

🔹Iranian officials appear to be taking these signals seriously. Military statements emphasize readiness for scenarios involving island seizures, heliborne raids, or limited incursions, while also framing such operations as opportunities to inflict significant casualties on U.S. forces.

🔹At the same time, Israeli and U.S. strikes continue to expand across Iran’s industrial base. A petrochemical facility in Tabriz and infrastructure linked to Isfahan Industrial University have been targeted, reinforcing a pattern of gradual degradation of Iran’s economic and scientific capacity.

🔹Iran’s response continues to mirror this pattern. Iranian strikes have increasingly focused on infrastructure-related targets in Israel, including petrochemical and industrial facilities, indicating a sustained shift toward reciprocal infrastructure warfare.

🔹This dynamic is reinforced by Iranian assessments that Israel is pursuing an incremental strategy aimed at destroying Iran’s infrastructure over time without triggering a large-scale response. In turn, some Iranian analysts are calling for more disproportionate and combined vertical and horizontal escalation to deter further attacks.

🔹The Strait of Hormuz remains a central lever. Iran continues to allow selective passage for certain countries, while maintaining broader restrictions, reinforcing its role as a regulator of maritime traffic while still avoiding a full blockade.

🔹At the same time, diplomatic efforts are attempting to translate this leverage into a negotiated framework. Proposals discussed in Islamabad include the creation of a multinational consortium to manage oil flows through the Strait, potentially offering a face-saving off-ramp for both Iran and the United States.

🔹Iran’s decision to allow a Saudi oil shipment to transit toward Pakistan on the same day appears to align with this diplomatic track, suggesting cautious signaling toward a potential diplomatic solution.

🔹Beyond the Persian Gulf, the war’s geographic scope continues to widen. The Houthis’ entry into the conflict has raised concerns about the security of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandab, with explicit threats to potentially disrupt shipping in the Red Sea region under certain conditions.

🔹European maritime authorities have already warned vessels to avoid Yemeni waters, indicating that even limited Houthi involvement is beginning to affect shipping behavior.

🔹Regionally, fault lines are becoming more visible. While some Gulf states are moving toward a more confrontational stance alongside the United States, others – particularly Oman and Qatar – continue to pursue de-escalation and maintain either neutral (in the case of Muscat) or cautious positions.

🔹Inside Iran, there is a noticeable shift in tone. While earlier phases of the war were marked by concern over regime survival, current discourse increasingly emphasizes achieving strategic outcomes and reshaping the long-term balance.

🔹This is reflected in official messaging. Statements by senior figures stress not only resilience but also perceived successes, including continued control over the Strait of Hormuz, sustained missile operations, and the involvement of regional allies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.

🔹At the same time, internal security measures are intensifying. Authorities have expanded arrests, business closures, and digital surveillance, while the Chief Justice warns of severe punishment for those deemed “betraying the homeland,” reflecting continued concern about domestic stability.

🔹Meanwhile, in a key political signal, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf framed Iran’s war strategy around a three-dimensional framework: “missiles, the streets, and the strait [of Hormuz].” This reflects an integrated approach combining military pressure, control over global energy flows, and sustained domestic mobilization.

🔹The emphasis on “the streets” is particularly notable. The regime continues to call supporters into public spaces every night, both to project internal cohesion externally and to deny the opposition any opportunity to mobilize under wartime conditions.

🔹Economically, the war’s impact continues to deepen. Oil prices have risen to $115 per barrel, suggesting that markets are reacting primarily to battlefield developments rather than diplomatic signaling.

🔹On the battlefield, Iran continues to apply sustained pressure through low-intensity but continuous missile fire, aimed less at immediate destruction and more at maintaining constant disruption and psychological pressure inside Israel.

🔹Confirmation of the destruction of a U.S. E-3 AWACS aircraft in Saudi Arabia has been widely amplified in Iranian media, serving as a major morale boost and reinforcing the narrative that high-value U.S. assets are increasingly vulnerable.

🔹Overall, Day 30 reflects a further shift toward anticipatory escalation. Iran is increasingly attempting to disrupt future operations before they occur, while the United States and Israel continue to expand pressure on Iran’s infrastructure, bringing both sides closer to a phase where escalation is driven less by reaction and more by preemption.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 29 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹The war is increasingly defined by a divergence in strategic timelines. Iran still appears to be pursuing a war of attrition designed to raise costs over time, while Israel is intensifying strikes – including on civilian and infrastructural targets – in an effort to force a quicker, decisive outcome.

🔹This dynamic is reinforcing escalation on both sides. Iranian sources continue to frame Tehran’s approach as establishing deterrence and equilibrium under sustained pressure, while Israeli operations are expanding in scope and intensity, particularly against civilian and industrial infrastructure.

🔹Meanwhile, the war has clearly entered a phase of reciprocal infrastructure warfare. After Israeli strikes on Iran’s steel and industrial bases, the IRGC confirmed attacks on major aluminum facilities in the UAE and Bahrain, signaling a deliberate shift toward targeting economic production nodes across the region.

🔹These targets are strategically significant. Facilities such as EMAL and ALBA are deeply integrated into global supply chains and energy-intensive industries, meaning that strikes on them generate broader economic and market effects beyond the immediate battlefield.

🔹At the same time, Israel has continued expanding its target set inside Iran. Strikes on water infrastructure in Khuzestan, as well as on universities and research centers, suggest a continued focus on degrading Iran’s long-term economic and scientific capacity as well as weakening the state’s resilience.

🔹In response, the IRGC has escalated its rhetoric by declaring Israeli and U.S.-linked universities in the region as legitimate targets, signaling a potential widening of the target set into civilian and educational domains.

🔹A potentially significant military development of the day was the reported destruction of a U.S. E-3 AWACS aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base. This represents further degradation of U.S. early warning capabilities in the region.

🔹The United States is simultaneously reinforcing its military posture. The deployment of the USS Tripoli amphibious group, alongside additional naval assets including the USS George W. Bush carrier group, reflects growing preparation for a wider range of operational scenarios.

🔹These deployments are being interpreted in Tehran as possible precursors to ground or heliborne operations. Iranian sources increasingly assess that the United States may be preparing for limited ground incursions, including targeting Iranian islands.

🔹In response, Iran’s strategy is increasingly shifting toward what its own analysts describe as “active preemption.” In this vein, Iranian forces are targeting U.S. deployments, logistics hubs, and staging areas across the region to disrupt force buildup – particularly around bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iraq – in an effort to prevent a potential ground or heliborne operation before it materializes.

🔹This shift is also reflected in official messaging. Iranian commanders have indicated that responses will no longer be strictly proportional, suggesting a move beyond “eye for an eye” toward broader and less predictable escalation.

🔹At the same time, hardline voices inside Iran are calling for an even sharper escalation. Some argue that infrastructure strikes alone are insufficient and that imposing direct human costs on U.S. and Israeli forces is necessary to restore deterrence.

🔹The Strait of Hormuz remains central to Iran’s strategy. Tehran continues to enforce selective access, allowing passage for countries such as India, Pakistan, and Thailand while restricting others.

🔹This controlled approach also has an economic dimension. Reports suggest Iran could generate substantial revenue through transit fees, indicating that the strait is being used not only as a coercive tool but also as a source of financial leverage.

🔹The regional dimension continues to expand. The Houthis’ entry into the war – though still not in any decisive way – has created expectations of a second maritime axis, with growing discussion of potential disruption in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandab alongside Hormuz.

🔹Houthi officials have raised the possibility of closing Bab el-Mandab. At the same time, Iranian experts link the Houthis’ future escalation to factors such as GCC involvement, attacks on Iranian infrastructure, and the prospect of a ground offensive.

🔹Iraq is increasingly emerging as another area of instability. U.S. strikes on Iraqi military positions and tensions with PMF groups are placing the government under pressure, contributing to a deteriorating security environment.

🔹At the same time, incidents such as the drone attack on Nechirvan Barzani’s residence in Duhok highlight the risks posed by fragmented coordination among Iran-aligned actors, creating complications for Tehran’s broader strategy. Iranian foreign ministry, IRGC, and Artesh, have all condemned the attack and Iranian media claim the source of the attack was unknown.

🔹Tensions are also rising with the UAE. Iranian discourse increasingly frames Abu Dhabi as a central actor supporting U.S. operations, with growing calls for broader retaliation against Emirati infrastructure.

🔹In parallel, reports of restrictions on Iranian nationals in the UAE and the revocation of their visas and residence permits suggest that the conflict is beginning to spill over into micro-economic and social domains.

🔹The nuclear dimension is becoming more pronounced. Following repeated strikes near sensitive facilities such as Bushehr, Arak, and sites in Yazd, members of the Iranian parliament have prepared an urgent draft law calling for withdrawal from the NPT, alongside proposals to shift oversight away from the IAEA toward alternative frameworks involving organizations such as BRICS and the SCO, signaling a potential structural shift in Iran’s nuclear posture.

🔹This reflects a broader strategic framing of the war as part of a transition toward a new global order, with Iran seeking to reposition itself within non-Western institutional structures.

🔹Meanwhile, Israel is facing its own constraints. Reports indicate that it is rationing advanced interceptor systems, suggesting pressure on its air defense capacity as the war continues.

🔹Domestically, the Iranian government is working to maintain control and project resilience, organizing regular public mobilization of regime supporters while tightening internal security to prevent unrest.

🔹Overall, Day 29 points to a tightening escalation loop in which both sides are increasingly targeting the foundations of each other’s war-sustaining capacity. Iran is leaning further into cost-imposition across maritime, regional, and economic domains, while Israel is expanding strikes against civilian and infrastructural targets, reducing the space for controlled escalation and increasing the risk of a broader and less containable conflict.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 28 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Iranian strategic circles increasingly assess that the United States is preparing for direct involvement, including heliborne operations across different parts of the country or ground deployments inside Iranian territory. In response, Iranian military officials claim that they have mobilized one million troops to counter any potential ground invasion.

🔹In the same vein, Iranian forces are reportedly preparing contingency plans aimed at inflicting maximum casualties and potentially capturing U.S. or Israeli personnel, indicating readiness for a higher-intensity phase of conflict.

🔹The Houthis have outlined redlines and conditions for entering the war. They have warned that if additional actors join the coalition against Iran, they will also enter the conflict. This appears to specifically reference the potential participation of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in a campaign against Iran and is intended as a deterrent. The Houthis have also cautioned that any use of the Red Sea for operations against Iran could trigger their involvement in the war.

🔹This effectively expands the geography of Iran’s deterrence beyond the Persian Gulf, raising the risk that escalation could extend to the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandab if additional actors become involved – a scenario that is becoming increasingly likely.

🔹Israeli strikes on Iranian industrial infrastructure continued, including attacks on two major steel production facilities and associated power generation units, reinforcing the pattern of targeting Iran’s economic and industrial base and undermining its post-war recovery potential.

🔹In response, calls within pro-government circles for both vertical and horizontal escalation are becoming more pronounced, with arguments that only a broader and more severe response can restore deterrence.

🔹In this vein, Iranian state media have begun publishing potential target sets across the region, including major steel and industrial facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The IRGC has already warned that retaliation across the region will follow.

🔹This reflects a growing tendency to target regional economic infrastructure at a massive scale in response to attacks on Iran’s economic and industrial bases, suggesting Iran’s readiness to escalate further to establish a deterrence equilibrium.

🔹Iran is also tightening its control over the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC has expanded restrictions, warning that vessels shipping to or from countries supporting the U.S. campaign will be denied passage.

🔹At the same time, Tehran is attempting to construct a legal justification for these actions, framing selective restrictions as a legitimate wartime measure while still allowing conditional transit for non-hostile states.

🔹Despite Trump’s earlier announcement of a delay in potential attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure, markets remain unconvinced. Oil prices have risen above $110 per barrel, indicating low confidence in the credibility of de-escalatory signaling from Washington.

🔹The disruption is now affecting not only energy but also global food supply chains. A significant portion of fertilizer trade and LNG flows passing through the Strait of Hormuz has been impacted, raising concerns about broader economic consequences.

🔹The UAE is emerging as a central focus in Iranian threat perceptions. Reports indicate that Abu Dhabi is exploring participation in efforts to reopen the Strait and may support U.S. operations.

🔹In response, Iranian discourse increasingly frames the UAE itself – and not just American interests there – as a potential target, including critical economic and technological infrastructure.

🔹Some Iranian commentary has gone further, suggesting preemptive action against the UAE or even the seizure of territory (Emirati shores) if it actively supports U.S. military operations. A similar suggestion has also been made regarding Bahrain.

🔹The military balance also remains contested. Reports indicate that only a portion of Iran’s missile capabilities has been degraded, with underground and dispersed systems continuing to enable sustained launches. This contradicts earlier U.S. and Israeli claims of destroying 80-90 percent of Iran’s missile capabilities.

🔹Recent launches from a hardened missile site near Yazd have been widely highlighted as evidence of the resilience of Iran’s missile infrastructure and its ability to absorb repeated strikes while maintaining offensive capacity.

🔹At the same time, concerns are growing about U.S. resource constraints. Reports indicate that interceptor missile stockpiles and precision munitions are being depleted at a significant rate.

🔹Washington is reportedly considering deploying an additional 10,000 troops to the region, expanding its military options despite ongoing discussions about a possible negotiated outcome.

🔹The nuclear dimension is also becoming more prominent. Following renewed strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in Arak and Esfahan, calls within Iran to withdraw from the NPT and pursue nuclear weapons are gaining traction.

🔹This shift is particularly significant given the absence of previous political and religious constraints (Ali Khamenei’s nuclear fatwa), suggesting a potential long-term transformation in Iran’s strategic posture.

🔹Externally, the war is increasingly intersecting with broader geopolitical dynamics. Reports of Russian and Chinese military and technical support to Iran and Ukraine’s indirect involvement via cooperation with Saudi Arabia against Iranian drones are reinforcing emerging alignment patterns.

🔹Overall, Day 28 indicates that the conflict is moving toward a more expansive and higher-risk phase, characterized by growing expectations of U.S. ground involvement, widening target sets across the region, and increasing pressure on both the global economy and the nuclear nonproliferation regimes.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 27 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹President Trump extended his deadline for reopening the Strait of Hormuz to 6 April, while Iran has rejected the 15-point U.S. proposal as “one-sided and unfair,” though left open the possibility of adjustments. This indicates that diplomacy remains a possibility but stalled at the level of framework disagreement without even entering into implementation details.

🔹At the same time, additional U.S. troop deployments toward the region were reported, even as Trumps signals a temporary pause in strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure. This combination reflects a dual-track approach of coercive pressure alongside exploratory diplomacy rather than a shift toward de-escalation. It is also interpreted in Tehran as phycological warfare and a potential blame game by Trump.

🔹Iran launched multiple missile waves targeting Tel Aviv, Haifa, and other Israeli cities, including the continued use of cluster munitions, while Israeli airstrikes continued across Tehran and other Iranian cities. The persistence of high-intensity exchanges shows that both sides are more willing to shape the equations through battlefield pressure rather than through diplomacy.

🔹Israeli operations continued to expand geographically to eastern Iran, including Neyshabur, as well as repeated strikes on Mashhad – both in Khorasan. This widening of targeting indicates a deliberate effort to increase pressure across Iran’s full territorial depth and inflict maximum damage to the infrastructure.

🔹Iranian reporting highlighted continued drone and missile operations under “Operation True Promise 4.” The political messaging accompanying the strikes is intended to demonstrate sustained offensive capacity and counter perceptions that prolonged strikes have degraded Iran’s ability to retaliate.

🔹Iranian official media continue to stress that any agreement to stop the conflict must include a permanent end to the war, compensation for damages, and recognition of Iran’s position regarding the Strait of Hormuz. This confirms that Tehran is framing the war’s end not as a restructuring of strategic equations in the region.

🔹Iran also continues to insist that the Lebanon front must be included in any settlement. This reflects a continued effort to prevent compartmentalization and to preserve the integrated nature of its regional network in any post-war arrangement.

🔹Iranian media and officials increasingly frame U.S. diplomatic outreach as deception or as cover for further escalation. This suggests that Tehran is not only rejecting current proposals, but also questioning the credibility of diplomacy as a genuine off-ramp.

🔹For the second time in a week, a senior military official (Abolfazl Shekarchi) indicated that the country’s military doctrine has shifted from defensive to offensive. This marks an important conceptual shift, signaling a move toward more proactive use of force as part of deterrence (I elaborated this shift in my latest article on Iran Analytica).

🔹Reports indicated that Iran continues to regulate maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz selectively, allowing passage under certain conditions while restricting others. This suggests a transition toward a controlled-access model that Tehran wants to make permanent after the end of the war.

🔹Economic impacts remained significant, with oil prices rising and shipping disruptions continuing due to reduced flows through Hormuz. This highlights how maritime pressure remains a central tool in shaping the broader strategic environment.

🔹Inside Iran, there were further reports of arrests, restrictions on communications infrastructure such as Starlink, and expanded mobilization measures from among the regime supporters. This points to increasing domestic securitization and preparation for a potentially prolonged conflict.

🔹Iranian discourse has increasingly focused on the possibility of U.S. ground operations targeting strategic islands or coastal nodes. This reflects concern that Washington may attempt to directly undermine Iran’s control over maritime chokepoints.

🔹In parallel, Iranian messaging warned that any such operation would trigger unprecedented escalation against Gulf states, particularly Bahrain and the UAE, with some state media even indicating that Iran may consider seizing territory in those countries in response to any U.S. occupation of Iranian lands facilitated by Gulf states.

🔹Iranian narratives also expanded the concept of the battlespace to include digital and technological infrastructure in Gulf countries, particularly those linked to U.S. systems. This suggests a potential shift toward targeting economic and technological nodes and the latest Iranian hit at potential horizontal escalation.

🔹On the regional front, fighting in southern Lebanon continued, with Israeli forces increasing their presence and Hezbollah maintaining engagement. Iranian sources report dozens of Israeli tanks destroyed by Hezbollah. This reinforces Iran’s strategy of sustaining a multi-front environment to complicate adversary planning.

🔹International actors, including China and European states, called for renewed diplomacy while also preparing for post-conflict maritime security arrangements. This indicates that external powers are increasingly focused on managing the consequences of the war, not just ending it.

🔹At the same time, reports emerged of potential Russian involvement in supporting Iran through intelligence or technical means, raising concerns among European states. This suggests that the conflict is becoming more entangled with broader geopolitical rivalries.

🔹Overall, Day 27 reflects a phase in which both sides are maintaining military pressure while consolidating their political positions, with Iran in particular signaling that it still has cards to play should the U.S. decide to escalate by deploying ground troops or targeting Iran’s energy infrastructure.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 26 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Israel continued striking inside Iran, including new waves of airstrikes in Tehran, describing some targets as naval shipyards and other military-related sites. This indicates that Israel was maintaining operational tempo even as Washington publicly emphasized diplomacy with Tehran.

🔹Iranian sources reported strikes on residential areas in Tehran and ongoing rescue operations. This reinforces the narrative in Tehran that Israeli attacks are increasingly aimed at generating societal pressure rather than producing decisive military results.

🔹Israeli strikes also extended to Mashhad in northeastern Iran, targeting areas far from the regular battlespaces of western and central Iran. This is yet another indication that Israel is widening the geographic scope of its campaign, reaching deeper into Iran’s territory rather than concentrating only on core operational zones.

🔹Iran and Iran-aligned forces also kept up regional pressure. Iranian statements claimed new attacks against Israel and U.S.-linked positions in Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain, while GCC states reported drones, missile alerts, and damage to infrastructure such as a fuel tank at Kuwait airport.

🔹As such, despite all the talk about diplomacy, March 26 was not a pause before potential talks. Both sides behaved as if any diplomatic process would be shaped by continued battlefield pressure rather than by restraint.

🔹Trump had said the day before that the U.S. was speaking to “the right people” in Iran and reports circulated about a U.S. proposal sent through intermediaries. Yet Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi publicly said that exchanging messages does not mean negotiations with Washington and insisted there had been no talks.

🔹That distinction was central to Iran’s messaging. Tehran did not fully shut the door to mediated diplomacy, but it rejected the political framing that would portray it as negotiating under pressure.

🔹Iranian state-linked messaging also hardened the conditions for any endgame. Reported Iranian demands include a full halt to attacks and targeted assassinations, guarantees against the resumption of war, reparations, simultaneous end of hostilities on fronts such as Lebanon, and recognition of Iran’s authority in the Strait of Hormuz.

🔹These terms suggest that Tehran is trying to redefine the war’s outcome not as a simple ceasefire, but as a broader regional settlement that preserves the leverage it has created under fire.

🔹At the same time, Washington’s proposal reportedly included demands on uranium stockpiles, enrichment, ballistic missiles, and Iran’s regional allies. This shows that the United States is still trying to convert military pressure into a more expansive settlement on terms that Tehran is unlikely to accept.

🔹Iranian officials and media framed Trump’s diplomatic turn as evidence that coercive pressure had failed to produce capitulation. The message inside pro-government circles in Iran was that Trump’s shift toward diplomacy is proof that continued resistance was working.

🔹That line was reinforced by military messaging. Iranian outlets highlighted new waves of “Operation True Promise 4,” reports of advanced missile and drone use, and statements that the United States and Israel were concealing the true impact of Iranian strikes.

🔹 Here, Tehran is signaling that the military campaign is not being paused for diplomacy and that any eventual agreement would have to be framed as enemy retreat, not Iranian concession.

🔹Iranian messaging also tied battlefield dynamics directly to diplomatic bargaining. Pro-government media and commentators increasingly argue against a simple ceasefire and instead promote the idea of a controlled “window of exit” in which military gains would be translated into a new security equation.

🔹The appointment of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council the day before was also an important point of discussion. The move was interpreted as suggesting that decisions about the war’s endgame are being centralized within a more explicitly security-dominated framework.

🔹On the Lebanon front, Iran seeks to prevent diplomatic compartmentalization. Reports indicate that Tehran insists any ceasefire must include Lebanon and halt Israeli operations against Hezbollah, while Hezbollah itself rejects negotiations under fire.

🔹This shows that Iran is resisting any formula that would separate the Iranian mainland theater from the broader “resistance” network. In Tehran’s view, the settlement must cover the full regional conflict, not just direct U.S.-Iran or Israel-Iran exchanges.

🔹At the same time, Reuters reported Israeli pressure continuing in Lebanon, while Iranian sources warn about a possible new front around Bab al-Mandab. This suggests Tehran is still using the threat of wider regional escalation to shape the developments on ground.

🔹The maritime and energy dimension remained central. Iran’s conditional approach to the Strait of Hormuz, allowing passage only through coordination with Tehran, continues to frame the waterway not as a closed chokepoint but as a regulated corridor under wartime control.

🔹Iranian commentary also increasingly hint that the Hormuz leverage is not merely temporary. Reports about charging commercial vessels with passage fees suggest Iran is already in the process of framing maritime coercion as a possible element of the postwar order rather than only a wartime threat.

🔹Even so, markets reacted more to diplomacy headlines than to physical disruption. Oil prices fell on hopes for talks, despite continued warnings that prolonged disruption in Hormuz is still choking oil, gas, and fertilizer flows.

🔹This has created a paradox. Diplomatic signaling temporarily eased market pressure, but the underlying instruments of coercion remain in place and fully usable.

🔹Inside Iran, media coverage pays unusual attention to governance continuity, including banking access, flexible work arrangements, social support, and infrastructure resilience. This indicates that Tehran is preparing domestic audiences for a prolonged conflict rather than a quick settlement.

🔹That home-front messaging also carries strategic meaning. By emphasizing continuity of services and social order, the government is trying to show that civilian governance is not buckling under strikes and that decapitation and infrastructure pressure had failed to cause systemic collapse.

🔹More broadly, Iranian media are actively educating domestic audiences on how to interpret the first real signs of an endgame: no acknowledgment of defeat, no surrender of missile or maritime leverage, and no delinking of allied fronts from any future settlement.

🔹Overall, Day 26 showed that the war is not moving toward de-escalation in any operational sense. Instead, Tehran is trying to turn military endurance, regional linkage, domestic resilience, and control over Hormuz into a single bargaining position from which any future negotiations would have to proceed.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 25 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Israeli strikes continued in and around Tehran, with explosions reported in northern Tehran and the city center. Israel has described the targets as Iranian military “production sites.” This suggests Israel is maintaining pressure on Iran’s war-sustaining infrastructure while avoiding more specific public claims about the targets – including confirmed cases of direct targeting of civilian and residential areas.

🔹At the same time, Iran sustained a high-tempo missile campaign against Israel, with reports of at least a dozen waves and visible damage in central Israel and Tel Aviv. This was interpreted by Iranian commentators as a proof that Iran’s retaliatory capacity remains active despite continued strikes on its territory.

🔹Official and semi-official messaging placed particular emphasis on the latest wave of missile and drone operations, claiming strikes with Kheibar Shekan, Emad, and Sejjil missiles as well as one-way drones against targets in Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, the Negev, and Beersheba. Whether or not all battlefield claims are accurate, the main message was that Iran can still penetrate layered defenses and sustain pressure across multiple parts of Israel.

🔹Iranian reporting also highlighted long shelter stays for more than two million Israelis and accused Israel and the Pentagon of concealing the true effectiveness of the strikes. This shows that Tehran is treating missile endurance as a form of strategic leverage, not just a military tool.

🔹The geography of Iranian strikes was an important factor. Alerts and attacks were reported not only around central Israel but also in Dimona, the Negev, the Dead Sea area, and Eilat, suggesting Tehran is spreading pressure across a wider set of locations.

🔹On the Lebanon front, Israel widened pressure further by striking Beirut’s southern suburbs and publicly declaring its intention to hold a security zone in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. This marks a shift from managing the Lebanon front to trying to reshape it territorially.

🔹Hezbollah vowed resistance to any such occupation, while clashes and strikes continued across Lebanon. This means the Lebanon theater is no longer just a supporting front to the Iran war but is becoming a more consequential theater in its own right.

🔹Politically, the cost of Iran’s regional network also rose. Lebanese authorities ordered Iran’s ambassador to leave by Sunday, suggesting that even where Iran’s allies remain active, the political tolerance for that activity in Arab capitals is narrowing.

🔹In Iraq, strikes hit Popular Mobilization Forces targets in Anbar and Mosul, killing senior figures and fighters. Iraq’s military publicly described the attack as a joint U.S.-Israeli strike, which is significant because it raises the political threshold by explicitly linking both actors to attacks on state-linked Iraqi security structures.

🔹Diplomatically, Trump said the United States was “in negotiations” with “the right people” in Iran, while reports circulated about a U.S. 15-point proposal and a possible month-long ceasefire. Yet Iran denied direct talks and continued missile attacks, indicating that Tehran is not using diplomacy as a pause but as a channel to convert battlefield endurance into better terms.

🔹Reports also suggests Iran’s terms have hardened further, including demands for guarantees against future attacks, compensation for wartime losses, and formal control over the Strait of Hormuz, while rejecting any limits on its ballistic missile program. This is yet another indication that Tehran is trying to use the war to reshape the security rules that follow it.

🔹Iranian commentary presented Trump’s more conciliatory tone as evidence that coercive escalation had reached its limits. In that reading, Washington is talking not because the war is ending, but because Iran has made further escalation more costly than expected.

🔹At the same time, Washington is still building military capacity in the region. Reports indicated preparations to send another 3,000 to 4,000 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East, on top of roughly 50,000 U.S. personnel already there and earlier Marine reinforcements. This creates a mixed signal in which de-escalatory rhetoric coexists with continued force accumulation.

🔹From Tehran’s perspective, that combination reinforces the long-standing belief that negotiations can serve as operational cover rather than a genuine offramp. This helps explain why Iran continues to deny direct talks publicly even while allowing intermediated diplomacy to proceed.

🔹The maritime front remained one of the most important arenas. Iran told the U.N. Security Council and the International Maritime Organization that non-hostile vessels could pass through the Strait of Hormuz if they coordinated with Iranian authorities, while aggressor-linked assets would not qualify. This amounts to conditional gatekeeping rather than a conventional reopening of the strait.

🔹That position once again shows that Iran is trying to turn wartime disruption into a longer-term bargaining asset. Tehran appears to be testing a framework in which control over strategic passage becomes part of the postwar order.

🔹The economic consequences of that posture remained severe. Reports indicated that Hormuz was still effectively shutting down much of the oil and LNG trade that normally passes through it, while Brent crude moved back above $100 a barrel and business surveys in major economies began showing signs of energy shock, weaker activity, and rising inflation expectations.

🔹QatarEnergy’s declaration of force majeure on some long-term LNG contracts affecting customers in Europe and Asia underlined that the war’s economic effects are now spreading well beyond the immediate battlefield.

🔹International responses on focused more on containment than decisive intervention. Pakistan offered to host talks, Gulf states and Egypt continued relaying messages, and competing U.N. Security Council drafts – by Bahrain and France – revealed that outside actors remain active but divided on how to respond.

🔹Overall, Day 25 showed that the war is being translated into bargaining under fire rather than moving toward operational de-escalation. It seems Iran continues to demonstrate enough endurance and enough capacity for regional disruption to force diplomacy to proceed under the shadow of its missiles and Hormuz leverage.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 24 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Israel opened a new wave of strikes against Tehran on March 23, with Iranian reporting describing impacts across multiple districts of the capital. In Tehran, this has reinforced the narrative that the war is increasingly directed at urban pressure and civilian morale, not just military infrastructure. At the same time, the reported targeting of military scientists point to an expanded/updated Israeli target bank.

🔹Iranian media also reported strikes on residential areas in Urmia in the northwest, as well as some other cities. That fed a wider domestic narrative that the war is spreading geographically inside Iran and that retaliation must remain sustained rather than symbolic.

🔹The IRGC announced new waves of attacks, including missile and drone strikes on Israeli military infrastructure as well as U.S. positions including Al Dhafra, Victoria, the Fifth Fleet, and Prince Sultan. Whether all claimed hits can be independently verified or not, the strategic message was that Iran’s objective is to keep pressure on both Israel and the U.S., especially to prevent the reconstruction of their damaged intercepting capabilities.

🔹Iranian messaging continued to stress adaptation rather than exhaustion. The use of Qiam, Zolfaghar, and Kheibar Shekan missiles was presented as evidence that Iran’s strike capacity remains intact despite weeks of bombardment and that repeated claims about the degradation of its missile force are false.

🔹Trump’s public suggestion that a deal may be near was not received in Tehran as a sign of diplomatic progress. Iranian officials, led publicly by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, portrayed it as fake news designed to manipulate oil and financial markets and to help Washington and Israel escape a strategic quagmire of their own making. This is also the dominant narrative within the pro-government expert community.

🔹That perception matters because it shows that, in the Iranian narrative, Trump’s talk of “productive conversations” is being folded into the war itself as a form of psychological and economic warfare. The IRGC explicitly said such contradictory U.S. behavior would not affect Iran’s conduct on the battlefield or the continuation of combat operations.

🔹At the same time, reporting from multiple sources suggests that indirect channels may indeed be active through Pakistan, Egypt, and some Gulf states. From Tehran’s perspective, however, the public line remains that no meaningful negotiation exists and that any de-escalation talk is secondary to imposing costs first.

🔹At the same time, Iran’s formal deterrence message became more restrained. After earlier rhetoric about potential targeting of water infrastructure, the narrative shifted to a cleaner tit-for-tat formula, warning that any strike on Iran’s electricity infrastructure would trigger direct retaliation against Israeli power plants and facilities supplying U.S. bases.

🔹This is an important refinement in Iran’s strategic narrative. Tehran appears to be trying to preserve escalation credibility while reducing the political costs of openly threatening civilian water systems in Gulf states, thereby keeping regional audiences from moving more decisively into the anti-Iran camp.

🔹Iran also reiterated that passage through the Strait of Hormuz for non-belligerent states requires coordination with Tehran. The accompanying Defense Council warning that any attack on Iran’s coasts or islands would lead to sea-mining and the effective closure of the wider Persian Gulf shows that Tehran is still presenting maritime control as one of its main coercive tools.

🔹In effect, Iran’s 23 March signaling narrowed the trigger for horizontal escalation but did not reduce it. The message became more structured: attack our grid and we hit yours; attack our coast and we move from Hormuz pressure to a broader Gulf denial campaign.

🔹The regional and international response suggests Tehran’s strategy is being felt beyond the battlefield. Bahrain moved a draft U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing “all necessary means” to protect shipping around Hormuz, which indicates that Gulf states now see the maritime front as a direct strategic problem, not merely a side theater.

🔹Yet that same move also validates part of Iran’s narrative. Tehran has been arguing that control of Hormuz is now central to the war’s outcome, and the push for an international mandate to secure shipping effectively confirms that the conflict has already been internationalized around that chokepoint.

🔹The economic dimension also strengthened Iran’s coercive position, even as oil fell on Trump’s comments. Energy officials and the IEA continued to describe the war as a severe threat to global supply chains and the world economy, underscoring that Iran’s leverage is not limited to missile range but extends to systemic economic disruption.

🔹Inside Israel, the restriction of Ben Gurion traffic to a near-minimal level and El Al’s cut to 5% of normal capacity reinforced the Iranian perception that sustained pressure is degrading Israeli normalcy even without a decisive battlefield breakthrough. This kind of disruption is central to Tehran’s narrative that attrition, not a single spectacular strike, will shape the war’s outcome.

🔹On the northern front, Israel’s admission that its first civilian death near the Lebanon border was caused by its own artillery misfire added to the picture of cumulative strain around that theater. For Iran and Hezbollah, this supports the broader argument that keeping multiple fronts active continues to impose friction, mistakes, and political costs on Israel.

🔹Iran also continued operations beyond the main Israel front, with the IRGC announcing a drone strike on Kurdish insurgent targets in Erbil. This suggests Tehran is still trying to prevent the war from opening exploitable internal-security gaps on its western periphery while the main interstate conflict continues.

🔹Overall, 23 March marked a shift from uncontrolled rhetorical escalation toward a more codified Iranian deterrence narrative. Tehran rejected Trump’s deal talk as deception, kept military operations going, refined its red lines around electricity and maritime access, and signaled that any pause in escalation will come only after the U.S. and Israel are seen to have failed militarily and politically, not because of an American public-relations pivot.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 23 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹President Trump issued a 48-hour ultimatum demanding that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to target Iran’s electricity infrastructure if it does not comply. This marks a move toward direct pressure on civilian infrastructure as leverage.

🔹Iranian military leadership, including the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters and de facto war commander Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, responded by threatening to target energy, water, and ICT infrastructure across the region. This establishes a clear escalation ladder in which attacks on Iran’s infrastructure would trigger region-wide retaliation. Also, for the first time, the threat of horizontal escalation is being explicitly made (not just energy but also other types of civilian infrastructure).

🔹Iranian statements also indicated that the Strait of Hormuz would be fully closed if energy infrastructure is targeted. This suggests Tehran is prepared to escalate from selective disruption to full closure of the strait.

🔹Iranian officials confirmed that ships can transit the Strait only through coordination with Tehran, with reports that fees (reportedly 2 million USD) are being imposed on passage. This is yet another sign of a shift toward formalizing control mechanisms over the waterway rather than simply threatening closure.

🔹Iranian missile strikes continued, including earlier successful attacks near Dimona and Arad, prompting internal assessments that Israeli air defenses are under strain. This perception appears to be reinforcing arguments within Iran to continue and intensify operations rather than accept a ceasefire.

🔹Iranian analysts seem to confirm external assessments of a shift in targeting patterns toward smaller or less-defended Israeli locations. This suggests an adaptation to Israeli air defense deployments, which are believed to be concentrated around major urban centers.

🔹Separate reports indicate that Iranian strikes are also expanding geographically, including targeting Israeli units near the Lebanese border. This points to an effort to link pressure on Israel’s northern front with Hezbollah’s operations and help the Lebanese group intensify its attacks.

🔹Iranian analysts stated that in latest attacks on Israel heavier warhead ballistic missiles were used in place of cluster munitions that were common in the past week. They argue that the shift is aimed at maximizing direct impact in response to rising civilian damage inside Iran.

🔹Israeli airstrikes continued in Lebanon, reportedly targeting infrastructure such as roads and bridges linked to Hezbollah supply routes. This indicates a continued effort to constrain Hezbollah’s logistics as the fighting is going on across the northern front.

🔹Iran’s representative to the United Nations claimed that Jordanian territory has been used for attacks against Iran. This raises the possibility that Jordan could be drawn into the conflict more directly if such claims are used to justify retaliation.

🔹There were also unconfirmed reports that strikes on southeastern Iran may have involved the use of Pakistani airspace. If verified, this would represent a significant escalation with potential implications for Pakistan’s involvement.

🔹Iranian operations against Kurdish insurgent groups in Iraqi Kurdistan continued, including reported strikes in Sulaymaniyah. This reflects ongoing concern in Tehran about internal security risks and potential secondary fronts.

🔹In Iraq, reports suggest that U.S. and NATO forces sought a temporary ceasefire to reposition forces, with Iraqi militias conditionally agreeing. This highlights the fragile and transactional nature of the security environment on that front.

🔹In the meantime, Iran-backed armed groups such as Harakat al-Nujaba reiterated threats to target regional energy infrastructure if Iran’s facilities are attacked. This reinforces a coordinated deterrence posture across Iran-aligned actors.

🔹Tensions between Iran and the UAE are expected to escalate further after a senior Emirati official publicly described Iran’s leadership as “terrorists.” This rhetoric suggests that the UAE front may become more volatile.

🔹GCC states have reportedly warned Washington against targeting Iranian energy infrastructure, citing the risk of retaliation against their own facilities. This indicates growing concern among regional states about being drawn more deeply into the conflict.

🔹Iranian state media outlined six conditions for ending the war, including guarantees against recurrence, closure of U.S. bases, compensation, and a new legal regime for the Strait of Hormuz. These demands reflect an effort to translate battlefield dynamics into long-term structural changes in the regional order.

🔹Iranian strategic discussions increasingly include targeting ICT and data infrastructure, particularly in GCC states hosting major tech investments. This suggests a potential expansion of the conflict into the digital and economic domain.

🔹Reports indicate that attacks – including cyberattacks – on Iran’s energy infrastructure have already affected water and electricity systems. This reinforces the trend toward targeting civilian systems to increase internal pressure.

🔹The Iranian Red Crescent reported over 81,000 damaged civilian structures, including schools and medical facilities. The scale of damage highlights the growing civilian impact of the conflict.

🔹Russia reiterated opposition to strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities following attacks on Natanz, warning of legal and safety risks.

🔹Oil prices remain elevated above $112 per barrel despite U.S. decision to waive sanctions on Iranian oil stranded at sea. This indicates that energy disruptions are persisting despite attempts to stabilize supply.

🔹There are reports that the United Kingdom has deployed a nuclear submarine to the region. The move follows earlier reports of an attempted Iranian missile strike on Diego Garcia. This suggests the potential for deeper British involvement if escalation continues.

🔹Overall, Trump’s ultimatum over the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s explicit threat of massive retaliation have effectively tied the next phase of the war to energy and maritime control. This creates a situation in which any escalation decision on either side could immediately translate into a deeper crisis across the Persian Gulf and beyond.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 22 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Saudi Arabia has ordered the expulsion of Iran’s military attaché and several diplomats, declaring them persona non grata. This marks a sharp deterioration in Iran-GCCrelations and signals that political tensions are rising alongside ongoing military exchanges.

🔹CNN reports that U.S. and Israeli strikes have targeted entrances to Iran’s underground missile facilities, with around 77 percent of known tunnel access points have been hit. These attacks appear aimed at disrupting launch operations rather than destroying the missile program itself – which is far more difficult – indicating a strategy focused on limiting tempo rather than eliminating capability.

🔹However, because these facilities remain intact and can be repaired, Iran is likely to retain the ability to sustain missile operations over time. This suggests that the campaign is constraining, but not decisively degrading, Iran’s core strike capacity.

🔹Iran launched a significant ballistic missile attack toward the Dimona area in Israel, with at least one impact near Arad causing casualties. The scale and effectiveness of the strike indicate that Iran’s missile operations remain viable and may be improving in precision or penetration.

🔹Iranian officials, including IRGC Aerospace Force commander, publicly claimed “missile dominance” and announced new tactics and systems for upcoming strikes. This messaging reflects growing confidence and suggests that Iran is preparing to sustain or intensify its missile campaign.

🔹Iran also reportedly launched missiles toward the Diego Garcia base, a rare move given the extreme distance involved. Even without confirmed impact, the launch appears intended to signal extended-range capability and deter not only regional actors but also European involvement.

🔹CENTCOM stated that recent strikes on southern Iranian facilities have weakened Iran’s ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz. However, continued drone activity and Iran’s ability to strike shipping from distance suggest that the threat remains credible despite these efforts.

🔹Iranian foreign minister indicated that Japan could receive safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz if it coordinates directly with Tehran – as some other countries like Turkey and India did. This is yet another indication that Iran seeks to regulate transit through negotiation, reinforcing a form of de facto control rather than imposing a total closure.

🔹Despite the conflict, Iran continues loading oil tankers at Kharg Island, with reports of four million barrels being exported. This demonstrates that Tehran is managing a dual strategy of selective disruption and controlled continuation of energy flows.

🔹The broader energy impact is expanding. Reports indicate that at least 39 oil and gas facilities across nine countries have been damaged since the start of the war, highlighting the growing scale of infrastructure targeting.

🔹Reuters reported that Iraq has declared force majeure and halted production in fields operated by foreign companies. This reflects how disruptions to maritime routes and regional instability are now directly constraining energy output beyond Iran itself.

🔹Concerns about U.S. military resource depletion are spreading. Reports indicate that both Taiwan and Ukraine are increasingly worried that heavy use of interceptor missiles in the Middle East could weaken deterrence and defense capabilities in other theaters.

🔹Iranian state media warned that any attack on Kharg Island could trigger instability in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandab. This is widely interpreted as yet the clearest signal of possible activation of the Yemen front, which would open an additional maritime chokepoint.

🔹Israeli strikes reportedly targeted facilities linked to Malek Ashtar University, associated with Iran’s defense and research programs. This suggests continued focus on degrading Iran’s strategic and technological infrastructure, beyond purely operational targets.

🔹Iran’s strike toward the Dimona region is being interpreted as reciprocal signaling against Israel’s nuclear-related infrastructure. This reflects a pattern in which both sides are increasingly targeting or referencing strategic assets.

🔹In Iraq, there are reports of discussions about limiting attacks on U.S. targets in exchange for reduced pressure on Shia armed groups and Iranian diplomatic sites. But Iranian assessments warn that such a pause would reduce pressure on the United States while leaving the Shia groups exposed later.

🔹Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a stronger statement condemning the war and calling for solidarity with Iran and Lebanon. While still stopping short of calling for mobilization, the shift in tone suggests rising concern within the broader Shia sphere.

🔹Cyprus expressed concern after reports of Iranian missile launches toward Diego Garcia, seeking assurances that British bases would not be used for attacks. This indicates that Iran’s strategy of threatening launch origins may be influencing regional calculations.

🔹President Trump once again criticized NATO allies for not participating in efforts to secure the Strait of Hormuz and suggested the U.S. could reconsider its stance on Greenland. This indicates growing U.S. frustration and shows how the conflict is beginning to spill over into broader transatlantic tensions.

🔹Inside Iran, debate over nuclear policy is resurfacing following strikes on Natanz. While some voices call for withdrawal from the NPT, significant political, strategic, and international constraints continue to limit such a move.

🔹Iranian officials continue to reject ceasefire proposals and instead demand a full end to the war, compensation, and guarantees against future conflict. These demands are increasingly tied to the broader objective of reducing or removing U.S. military presence in the region.

🔹Overall, Day 22 suggests both sides are preparing for a more demanding next phase. While U.S. and Israeli strikes are constraining Iran’s capabilities, Tehran is adapting by reinforcing its missile posture and signaling potential expansion to additional fronts.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

#Iran War Update No. 21 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹 Iran continues targeting U.S. bases in the region. The aim appears to be to prevent the restoration of radar and early warning systems that support Israel’s air defense, many of which were damaged by Iran in the first few days of the war. This suggests a sustained effort by Iran to preserve its ability to strike Israeli territory more effectively.

🔹 Iraq is becoming more volatile. According to Iranian sources, recent assassinations of key militia figures, reported failed attempts to target Kataib Hezbollah leadership, and strikes in Baghdad and al-Qaim indicate a shift toward reshaping the Iraqi political and military landscape, even as the war with Iran itself continues.

🔹 Signs of temporary de-escalation in Iraq are being met with skepticism. Kataib Hezbollah announced a five-day pause in attacks on the U.S. embassy, conditional on halting strikes and limiting intelligence activity. However, this pause appears fragile and reversible.

🔹 Iranian assessments suggest Israel is pushing to expand the war into Iraq more deliberately, viewing pressure on Shia armed groups as a more effective way to weaken Iran’s regional position. At the same time, there is apparent dissatisfaction that larger Iraqi Shia factions are still unwilling to join the conflict.

🔹 Meanwhile, NATO personnel have been withdrawn from Iraq, reflecting growing concern that the country could become a major secondary theater of the war.

🔹 U.S. and Israeli strikes are increasingly targeting internal security infrastructure inside Iran. Satellite imagery shows severe damage to a key logistical headquarters of the Iranian police in Tehran. This is seen as further evidence that Israel is focused on undermining the state’s capacity to maintain internal control.

🔹 Iran is signaling new red lines in the Persian Gulf. The Iranian armed forces have warned that any attack on Iranian islands would trigger direct strikes on UAE territory – not just U.S. interests there. This could include ports and potentially major cities.

🔹 At the same time, the Iranian armed forces have issued evacuation warnings for Ras al-Khaimah, suggesting that further escalation with Gulf countries may be imminent.

🔹 There are also growing indications that some Gulf states may be moving closer to involvement in the war. A Middle East Eye report suggests expanded U.S. access to bases in Saudi Arabia and increased UAE readiness for a prolonged conflict.

🔹 U.S. military activity continues to intensify, combining sustained heavy bomber strikes – particularly against southern coastal and naval-linked targets – with a growing amphibious buildup. Thousands of Marines from expeditionary units aboard ships like the USS Boxer are being deployed to the region, adding to an already large force presence and creating a variety of options ranging from offshore strikes to potential limited ground operations.

🔹 Iran’s missile and launch strategy continues to adapt. Iranian debates indicate the use of mobile, tunnel-based launch systems that allow rapid firing and relocation, making detection and preemption significantly more difficult.

🔹 Cluster munitions are now a major feature of Iranian strikes on Israel, aimed at overwhelming air defenses rather than maximizing precision damage.

🔹 Iran struck Israeli energy infrastructure the day before, including the Haifa refinery, while continuing its broader strategy of sustained, lower-volume missile launches to maintain constant pressure on the Israeli public.

🔹 Syria is emerging as a potential variable. While the Syrian president signals neutrality, Iranian and Hezbollah concerns are growing that Syria could come under pressure to act against Hezbollah from the east.

🔹 China’s stance is becoming more explicitly aligned with Iran at the political level. Beijing has condemned U.S. and Israeli strikes as illegal, affirmed support for Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and reiterated opposition to sanctions. While still calling for de-escalation and avoiding any direct military role, its framing of the conflict increasingly places responsibility on Washington and Tel Aviv, signaling a clear – if still cautious – tilt toward Iran.

🔹 Global economic consequences are deepening. Oil supply disruptions, cuts of roughly 10 million barrels per day, and projections of prices potentially reaching $180 per barrel in a month underscore the scale of the shock.

🔹 The conflict is beginning to affect global supply chains, with disruptions already emerging in sectors such as aluminum, reflecting how instability in the Gulf is feeding into broader industrial and commodity markets.

🔹 Ukraine is becoming increasingly entangled in the conflict. Ukrainian drone interception units are now reportedly deployed in multiple Middle Eastern countries to counter Iranian systems. At the same time, reports of a possible Russia-U.S. quid pro quo – linking Moscow’s support for Iran to Western backing for Ukraine – though denied by Moscow, highlight how the two wars are becoming politically and strategically interconnected.

🔹 Inside Iran, leadership signaling remains defiant but cautious. Mojtaba Khamenei’s written Nowruz message – rather than a public appearance – has reinforced uncertainty about his condition. However, the message emphasized resilience and national unity.

🔹 At the same time, mistrust toward any ceasefire is deepening. Iranian assessments increasingly view potential short-term pauses as tactical moves by the U.S. and Israel to regroup for further escalation, especially one involving the deployment of ground forces.

🔹 Overall, what is taking shape is a multi-layered and diverse battlespace. Rather than a single escalatory ladder, different arenas – Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Ukraine, and potentially Syria – are evolving at different speeds and according to different logics, with local actors, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and alliance calculations increasingly driving events as much as decisions in Tehran, Washington, or Tel Aviv.