What if the west isn't the villain they told you it was?
We’ve spent years accepting accusations about racism, intolerance, and slavery without challenging the bigger historical reality:
The societies most condemned today are also the ones that led the world in ending slavery, expanding rights, and building the most tolerant nations on earth.
That’s the conversation nobody wants to have.
This is why RedHat makes like over $6 billion a year by the way. For anyone wondering what the fuck RedHat does, its basically: take the free chips on the side of the road, validate them, and sell the supply chain contract.
James Carville, lead strategist for Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign, famously said in 1993/1994:
"I used to think that if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or as a .400 baseball hitter. But now I would like to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody."
The German media are reporting that €10bn of the recovery fund money earmarked for Spain ended up in the country’s pension system. This is how the good idea of a eurobond gets killed. Mistrust is not only present. It is justified. This example also goes to show that a eurobond can only work as a sovereign debt instrument of a unified state. If you really care about a eurobond to fortify a capital markets union and the euro as a global currency, you should talk about political union first. Don’t make this a technical discussion.
https://t.co/xhrTyJS1Hq
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Food for thought.
Many Keynesians complain they “can’t get a read” on Kevin Warsh’s monetary policy views. The problem isn’t that Warsh is opaque. It’s that their map is wrong.
For a generation trained to see macro only through output gaps and fiscal multipliers, Warsh’s combination of balance‑sheet hawkishness, institutional conservatism and supply‑side optimism simply does not compute. How, they ask, can someone berate quantitative easing, warn about fiscal dominance – and still countenance lower policy rates? The answer is that Warsh is not playing the standard IS‑LM game. He is rebuilding the regime. Thank god!!
His starting point is institutional, not technocratic. Price stability and central‑bank credibility are treated as constitutional constraints, not flexible policy preferences. Independence is something to be earned by doing less, not a licence for balance‑sheet experimentation. A swollen central‑bank portfolio, in this view, is not benign plumbing. It is a quiet drift into credit allocation, fiscal dependence and an expectations regime in which asset prices are conditioned on the next round of official largesse.
Hence the first plank of what might be called a Warsh doctrine: QE is for emergencies, not for lifestyle. The Fed’s balance sheet should be smaller, duller and clearly separated from the fiscal authorities. That is not nostalgia for a pre‑crisis world; it is an attempt to re‑establish a hard budget constraint on money and the state itself. Only once that is restored can the policy rate recover its signalling power.
The second plank is an unapologetically supply‑side reading of the cycle. Where the Keynesian mainstream still treats productivity as a residual – the fudge factor invoked when the output gap misbehaves – Warsh takes innovation and AI seriously as drivers of potential growth. A world of rising productivity can sustain stronger real activity, lower unit labour cost pressure and, therefore, lower nominal rates without reigniting inflation. Monetary policy need not be perpetually restrictive if the supply side is genuinely shifting outward.
Seen through this lens, the apparent contradictions melt away. Shrinking the balance sheet is not “tightening for tightening’s sake”; it is clearing space for a future in which the Fed can cut without fuelling speculative excess. Openness to lower rates is not a covert plea for demand stimulus; it is a recognition that with credibility restored and potential growth higher, the neutral rate may itself be lower than the models assume.
The final plank is a deliberate retreat from central‑bank omniscience. Warsh’s scepticism of elaborate forward guidance and dot‑plot choreography is often misread as vagueness. In fact, it is a demand for humility: fewer promises about distant paths, more conditioning on realised inflation and financial conditions, less theatre built on models that repeatedly miss regime change.
Keynesians who say they “can’t read” Warsh are really confessing something else: they lack a vocabulary for a framework in which money, institutions and productivity matter more than another quarter‑point tweak to aggregate demand. Warsh is legible enough. It is the post‑crisis consensus that has become unreadable.
@Lidia_Undiemi Quindi l'unico modo per stabilizzare i prezzi quando l'offerta subisce una riduzione dei volumi e un aumento dei costi di produzione è ridurre comprimere la domanda, ne conosce altri?
There is never going to be a Treasury market crisis. At the end of the day, the Fed can always buy it all and set rates to whatever it wants. However, there can be an FX crisis.
population has grown ~9x in 200yrs, while poverty trends to 0
people act as though capitalism is a zero sum game, but it’s actually the only system that creates positive sum outcomes
the average person today is far richer than most kings in days past