Elijah Brooks

“I teach markets like schools won’t. The game is rigged — unless you see the code.”

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

@MiningWithJosh @GoldSilverHQ These are what I hold. Most are debt free and record cash flow. I occasionally rotate a little out of my overperformers into underperformers. Sold a little cgau,btg and ssrm for agi and gfi

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

@MarioNawfal @VietNguyen18 The elites throwing a tantrum. Causing havoc with their weather modifications.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

@MarioNawfal @VietNguyen18 Any time the financial system starts unraveling, a disaster occurs. Is that why Fukushima happened. Those damn elites!

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

🚨 Gold, Silver & Mining Investments
My 401k UPDATE 🚨

Another down day in gold, silver and miners — and I bought another $1,000. Same strategy, no emotions.

💰 Fidelity: $1,009,960.06
Daily Change: -$7,224.53 (-0.71%)

💰 2nd Account: $182,253.28
Daily Change: -$1,782.05 (-0.97%)

🔥 Combined Total: $1,192,213.34
Combined Daily Change: -$9,006.58 (-0.75%)

🥇 Gold: $4,359.70 (-$45.90)
🥈 Silver: $65.68 (-$0.37)
⛏️ GDX: $98.41 (-0.86%)

Oil was simultaneously up 3.09%, while markets were focused on inflation and the possibility of another Fed hike ahead of this week’s inflation data.

Yet I’m still sitting at nearly $1.2 MILLION combined.

So what did I do?

BUY another $1,000 of miners.

I’m not trying to guess the exact bottom. I buy these down days in increments, keep dry powder available, and let the volatility work for me.

• Avoid leverage.
• Keep a core position.
• Trim on euphoric highs.
• Redeploy on smashes.

They provide the volatility. I use it to accumulate more shares. No emotions.

Follow, Like & Repost to track my daily updates and watch my 401k accounts grow without the use of leverage.

@baldguymoney @KingKong9888 @DonDurrett @PeterSchiff @zerohedge

#Gold #Silver #GDX #GoldMiners #MiningStocks #401k #Investing

[Elijah Brooks @truthledger101]

@Raymond80159626 The timing is suspicious for sure.

[Serena Wolfe @PaperTrapX]

@Raymond80159626 Wow, you are absolutely right. These elites are desperate to do anything now.

[Lexi Chan @ProfitTrailz]

@Raymond80159626 Looks too convenient. They’re hoping this flood has the same effect as Fukushima. They’re using it to strengthen the yen. My eyes are wide open now. This flood was engineered

[RWDegen @Raymond80159626]

There is an interesting historical parallel, but Fukushima actually shows that the currency mechanics can run in the opposite direction from what you’re suggesting.

The flooding in your screenshot is real: Japan issued a Level 5 flood emergency for the Shonai River affecting Nagoya and surrounding areas today. But I wouldn’t infer from the disaster itself that it provides Japan with a mechanism or justification to strengthen the yen.

What happened after Fukushima is especially instructive

After the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/Fukushima disaster, the yen didn’t collapse—it exploded higher. Within three trading days it appreciated about 7.9%, eventually reaching a then-record ¥76.25/$. Markets anticipated that Japanese insurers, corporations and investors might repatriate foreign assets to obtain yen for claims and reconstruction.

That created exactly the opposite problem for Japanese authorities: the yen was becoming too strong.

The G7 therefore intervened on March 18, 2011 to sell yen and buy dollars, deliberately weakening the yen. The U.S., UK, Canada and ECB joined Japan.

Meanwhile the BOJ flooded the domestic financial system with liquidity. The IMF records a ¥15 trillion same-day liquidity operation immediately after the disaster, while the BIS says ¥82.4 trillion was offered during the first week.

Now compare that with 2026

This time Japan entered the period with the opposite currency problem: an extremely weak yen.

Japan and the U.S. jointly intervened on July 31 specifically by buying yen. Japan’s own Ministry of Finance confirms that.

And this part of your Treasury observation is important.

When Japan needs to support a falling yen, the BOJ explains the mechanics explicitly: Japan sells U.S. dollars from its foreign-exchange reserves and buys yen. Because a large portion of those reserves is invested in foreign securities, intervention can involve liquidating Treasuries.

In fact, that appears to have happened during the enormous intervention this summer. Japan’s reserves fell $79.6 billion in August, the largest monthly decline on record, following roughly $99 billion of yen-support intervention, and Reuters reports that foreign securities—predominantly Treasuries—were sold.

So the chain you’re thinking about is economically legitimate:

weak yen → Japan sells dollar reserves/foreign securities → buys yen → yen strengthens

And today the yen is already around a seven-month high, with markets also attributing its strength to prospective BOJ tightening, repatriation and carry-trade unwinding. Importantly, current reporting says today’s move appears primarily market-driven rather than evidence of a fresh official intervention.

Where today’s natural disaster potentially enters that chain is through repatriation, not because authorities need a disaster as a pretext for intervention. If reconstruction and insurance payments eventually cause Japanese institutions or companies to bring substantial overseas capital home, they sell foreign assets/currencies and acquire yen. That’s essentially the mechanism markets anticipated after Fukushima.

And there’s a potentially important feedback loop:

repatriation → stronger yen → carry trades unwind → additional yen buying → potentially more repatriation/foreign-asset selling.

That’s the piece I’d watch—not the idea that the flooding itself gives Japan cover to sell Treasuries. Japan was already selling dollar reserves to defend the yen before this disaster occurred, and it publicly acknowledged the intervention.

The fascinating contrast is therefore 2011 vs. 2026: Fukushima produced an unexpectedly strong yen and authorities intervened to weaken it; today Japan entered this event after having spent enormous sums trying to rescue an excessively weak yen. If a significant reconstruction/repatriation flow develops now, unlike 2011, it would initially be pushing the currency in the same direction Japanese policymakers have recently wanted it to go.

[Lexi Chan @ProfitTrailz]

@truthledger101 @PaperTrapX @Raymond80159626 As long term gold silver and miner investors, it is our responsibility to teach new investors to enter with a equal amount of cash to be able to buy all dips below entry point

[Elijah Brooks @truthledger101]

@GoldSilverHQ Wall Street likes to short and give us discounts. I’m buying. Everyone knows the game. We can break the manipulation by buying up all the dips.

[Elijah Brooks @truthledger101]

@ProfitTrailz @PaperTrapX @Raymond80159626 Yes, they do that to maintain the perception the dollar is safe. It’s obvious that they are shorting. If people keep buying the dips, it will force them to cover and fuel the move up.