Food for thought.
Reagan’s North American Bargain and the Deal Trump Would Actually Sign
The old North American trade bargain was never just about tariffs. It was about reciprocity: the United States got secure access to Canadian energy and natural resources, and Canada got preferential access to the U.S. market, still the most dynamic economy in the world.
President Reagan understood that clearly. In 1987, he said a free trade agreement with Canada would improve American security through additional access to Canadian energy supplies while opening Canada’s market to U.S. manufacturing, agriculture, high technology, and financial services.
That strategic logic was later reinforced by NAFTA’s proportionality clause. If Canada restricted energy exports, the clause gave the United States the opportunity to preserve a proportionate share of Canadian supply based on recent export levels. In plain English, Washington had a built-in energy advantage.
CUSMA removed that clause. Ottawa has been explicit that eliminating proportionality reaffirmed Canada’s sovereignty over its energy resources. That was a real shift in leverage, but it did not erase the larger continental reality: the United States still needs dependable nearby supply, and Canada still has what America wants most, oil, gas, potash, electricity, uranium, critical minerals, and a logistical advantage no overseas supplier can match.
That is why a new deal is not only possible, but likely. If President Trump can secure reliable access to Canadian resources at prices below global replacement cost, he gets a genuine strategic win. He can present it as exactly what he values most: lower input costs for American industry, stronger supply chains, and greater economic security for the United States.
Canada, for its part, gets something just as valuable. It gets preferential access to the world’s most dynamic economy and, more importantly, reinforces its status as an insider in a continental production system. That is already true in autos, energy, and important parts of manufacturing. The right deal would deepen that insider status rather than leave Canada exposed as just another foreign supplier.
This is where both Trump and Carney have room to succeed. Trump understands leverage and the importance of securing critical supply chains on favorable terms. Carney understands that Canada’s resource base is most valuable when it is converted into long-term strategic advantage, investment, stable access, and a larger role inside North America’s industrial core. Those are not opposing goals. They are complementary ones.
That is why a deal is there to be had. Reagan set the foundation by recognizing that North American trade worked best when each side received something essential from the other. Trump can update that bargain by locking in secure North American supply. Carney can modernize it by turning Canada’s resource strength into durable insider status in the American economy.
The politics may be noisy, but the incentives are aligned, the architecture already exists, and the logic is stronger now than it was in Reagan’s day.
If President Trump wants secure North American resources and PM Carney wants preferential access to the U.S. economy, the answer is not confrontation. It is a deal.
Canada is a textbook case of how bad policy turns a resource‑rich nation into a declining one: attack energy, overtax work, bury business in regulation, and then act surprised when growth stalls and separatism rises.