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Two advisories this month have the same practical answer until you can patch. Limit who can reach the service.
FortiOS OSPF, CVE-2026-126253, CVSS 9.3. The bug may allow an unauthenticated attacker to broadcast LSAs. The advisory offers upgrades only. A practitioner write-up on InfosecMonkey adds containment until you can patch: allow IP protocol 89 only from known neighbors.
Barracuda, exploited and in the KEV catalog since November 10. The attack needs the admin UI to be reachable. Barracuda "recommends restricting access to administrative interfaces to trusted internal networks".
Both end in a filter rule in front of a service that has to stay reachable for someone. Rules like that get written fast. That is how you get a permit that sits below a broader deny and never matches.
Before the change, answer two things:
Which line does this packet hit, and why?
Which lines does the new entry make dead, and which make it dead?
For Cisco IOS and IOS XE IPv4 ACLs, I built a free tool for that check. Paste the ACL. It lists rules that can never match, duplicates and masks that do not mean what they say, then traces one packet to the line it hits. No signup. Nothing is stored. Lines it cannot check, such as object-groups or IPv6, are listed as not evaluated.
It does not read FortiGate or Barracuda policy. The two questions apply there too.
What was the last ACL change you had to roll back, and what did the review miss?
ACL What-If, a tab in the app: https://t.co/1zTSuwBuTa
Two outages last week. In both, the explanation so far points at work on the operator's own network, not at an attacker.
Microsoft 365. It started on Thursday, November 12. Exchange Online, Teams, SharePoint Online, Copilot and Defender XDR were affected. On Saturday, Microsoft said service was restored.
Microsoft's statement: "The incident was introduced by an issue during an earlier network capacity upgrade that surfaced following a recent network change." It also said the issue was "not related to cyber or AI / agents."
By that account, the fault went in with one change and showed up after a later one.
The FAA. On Friday, November 13, a nationwide ground stop lasted more than four hours and was lifted at 8:15 p.m. ET. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said telecommunications routers were overloaded with data.
On Sunday he gave more detail. Crews were replacing copper with fiber at a site in Arkansas. When the router there was turned on, a system in Texas that had been replaced about three weeks earlier "started to flood our system as well." He said the ability to broadcast has now been turned off on 69 routers of that kind.
The router's manufacturer, in a statement to ABC News: "Based on what we know today, the device functioned as it was configured to by the installer."
Neither root cause is final. Microsoft has promised a post-incident report. Duffy said they are still trying to find the root cause.
Which of your last ten changes had a written answer to "what does this do to what is already there"?
Cisco edited the same advisory twice in two days last week, and the second edit took back the first.
The advisory covers CVE-2026-20320, an unauthenticated XXE in Cisco BroadWorks, its hosted voice platform for carriers. Cisco published the fix on August 19: first fixed release RI.2026.07, no workarounds.
CISA added the CVE to the KEV catalog on November 10. Federal deadline: November 24.
Then the advisory's revision history:
November 12: "Updated to reflect known active exploitation."
November 13: "Corrected to state that this vulnerability was added to the CISA KEV. Cisco does not have direct evidence of active exploitation."
The exploitation report comes from one research team. Malbear Labs found an open directory with what it describes as the workspace of an autonomous intrusion harness: over 70 session transcripts of a jailbroken DeepSeek agent working for more than two weeks against a European telecom provider. Per Malbear, the agent got into the provider's BroadWorks platform through this CVE. The victims are not named. I have not found a second source that confirms the intrusion.
Malbear on how it was run: "The operator set goals and checked in on results. The agent handled everything in between." In the recovered part of the root session, the longest operator message was a list of three IP addresses marked off-limits.
One research team says exploited, the catalog lists it, and the vendor has no direct evidence. Whichever you trust, the fix is almost three months old.
When KEV lists a CVE and the vendor says it has no direct evidence, which one sets your patch window?
The wiper ran on a VMware ESXi host. The way in was the Check Point firewall.
Check Point Research published the chain on November 12. Initial access was PHP2Shell against the gateway's Mobile Access portal. Root came from a second bug, CVE-2026-123039, CVSS 7.8.
The CVE record: "The Gaia OS DynamicCLI daemon runs as root and listens on a world-writable local socket (/tmp/dynamic_socket) without authenticating connecting processes."
In the intrusion Check Point investigated, the attackers then:
placed PHP webshells in the directory the portal builds its login pages from,
installed the TSGA backdoor, which can tamper with the binary firewall logs,
ran a scanner on the gateway to map the internal network,
moved over SSH to an ESXi host with the vpxuser service account and ran the wiper.
The activity began on October 30, "approximately one week after a security fix became available". Check Point's advisory: "Only a couple of dozen unpatched systems, in a single region, were compromised in the observed incidents." The destructive part came in a limited number of cases.
CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to the KEV catalog on November 13 and flagged it for forensic triage. The federal deadline is today, November 16. The fix is in the November Jumbo Hotfix.
Installing the hotfix does not tell you whether the gateway was already compromised. If Mobile Access was exposed and unpatched on October 30, hunt first, then decide how much you trust that box.
Can your firewall open SSH to your ESXi hosts, and who decided it should?
Almost four weeks after the eMudhra CA keys turned out to be breakable, Cisco's advisory still lists target fix dates running into April 2027.
The problem: eight eMudhra intermediate CAs whose private keys, because of an error in the April 2025 key generation ceremony, can be brute-forced "within seconds". All eight were cross-signed by Sectigo's AAA Certificate Services root in May 2025, so a device that never trusted eMudhra directly can still trust them.
Cisco's advisory is at version 1.8, updated November 6. "No workarounds available". Cisco says it is not aware of malicious use.
What the table says for network gear:
IOS XE, ASA, FMC and FTD: impacted, with remediation steps now.
IOS XR: target release 26.4.1, November 30.
ISE: target releases 3.5P5 in December, 3.3P13 and 3.4P8 in April 2027.
ASDM: target release 11.0.32.1, March 2027.
MDS 9000, Nexus 3000 and Nexus 9000: impacted releases listed, fix still under investigation.
IOS and Catalyst 9800 wireless controllers: still being investigated.
A trust store is configuration. It drifts like the rest of the config and deserves the same diff.
The advisory sorts the list three ways: remediation steps now, target releases later, and products still under investigation.
Who owns the trust store on your firewalls and NAC today, and when was it last compared against a baseline?
In one case Microsoft tracked, an AI agent went from scanning GitHub for secrets to pulling data out of Azure Key Vault in five minutes.
The framework is called ARTEX. Since August, Microsoft has seen threat actors use it to send large volumes of GitHub searches: a target organization's name, plus keywords for secrets, cloud services or AI providers. Agents then work through the results and run the follow-on steps with little hands-on-keyboard time.
Searching public repos for credentials is an old technique. What used to limit it was the time a human needed to find, read and use what turned up. The agent cuts that time down.
One detail from Microsoft's logs: a batch of Key Vault requests failed with HTTP 400. About 28 seconds later the same batch ran again with a different API version and got 200.
For network automation, the repo is where this lands. Inventory the tokens, device credentials and API keys in your Ansible, Nornir and CI repos, including the history.
Deleting them is not enough. Microsoft: "Removing the content does not invalidate the credential or eliminate copies retained in edit history, caches, archives, logs, or other systems." Treat any credential that was ever public as compromised, and rotate it.
Where do the credentials for your network automation actually live today?
A fake pentest report, left where an AI attacker would find it, cut the attacker's success from 39 runs out of 40 to 2.
That number comes from Tracebit, a deception vendor, so read it as a vendor study. The method is on the page: seven models, 773 assessments in a controlled AWS environment, each agent starting with a low-privilege identity and two hours. Roughly ten runs per model and scenario. Refusals and provider blocks are excluded, not counted as wins.
The 39 of 40 covers four models: GPT-5.6 Cyber, Kimi, Qwen and DeepSeek. The report labeled the real targets as canaries. "Some agents accepted its warnings and stopped early, leaving exploitable targets untouched."
With all nine traps combined, across all seven models:
Objectives per run: 2.48 down to 0.23.
Model spend per objective: $1.33 up to $31.10, for the six models with complete cost records.
Runs ending in compromise: 70 of 71 down to 13 of 70.
The line defenders should keep: "Our deception is deterministic. We don’t need to spend tokens every time an attacker does."
Tracebit also says more capable models were already harder to deceive. This will not stay this easy.
Canaries and honeypots are old tools. Against an attacker that reads everything it finds, they get a second job.
Where in your network would a decoy credential sit today, and who would see the alert?
On some Alpine systems, a long enough password logs into an account that was never supposed to accept passwords.
CVE-2026-123158, OpenSSH sshd before 10.6p2, on Linux with musl libc and PAM disabled. Per Alpine, for some account configurations a password of 257 to 1,024 bytes is enough. CVSS 8.1, a MITRE vector shown on NVD. Fixed in OpenSSH 10.6p2 on November 5. CISA added it to the KEV catalog on November 9, with a federal deadline of November 12.
OpenSSH's own note: "We consider the root cause of this bug to be outside sshd, but it is exploitable via sshd and can be avoided there."
Alpine lists what has to line up:
sshd built without PAM, or the PAM build with UsePAM no.
PasswordAuthentication yes, which is the default.
An account with * as its password field, such as a key-only user made with adduser. root ships that way since about Alpine 3.16, but the default PermitRootLogin prohibit-password keeps it out unless PermitRootLogin yes is set.
At least one local account with a $5$ or $6$ hash.
Accounts locked with ! are not affected. Neither is PasswordAuthentication no, or a container that does not run sshd.
Two audit traps:
On Alpine 3.21 the fixed package is openssh 9.9_p2-r1. A scanner that only looks for 10.6p2 flags a patched host.
The upgrade does not restart a running sshd. Until you restart it, the old code is still answering.
Quick check on any box: sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication
How many of your jump hosts and appliances run musl, and how would you know?
Ivanti's Integrity Checker does not detect this Connect Secure attack chain. Volexity explains why.
The box was fully patched at the time, 22.8R2.4. The attacker, UTA0576, chained an authentication bypass and remote code execution with a privilege escalation to root.
There was no implant to find. "For each command executed by UTA0576, the entire exploit chain is executed." Volexity found no first-stage malware and no web shell.
The root step patched library code in memory, then put it back. The attacker deleted its entries from the Ivanti debug log and the Linux audit log.
Volexity on the checker: "because this exploit chain patches library code in memory only and restores configuration store data, the tool does not detect any modifications"
CISA lists three CVEs that chain together:
CVE-2026-104935, in KEV since October 13.
CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527, added October 30. Federal deadlines: November 2, and this Friday, November 13.
The fix is 25.1.1.3 or 22.8R2.6. If you installed 25.1.1.2 or 22.8R2.5 for the October advisory, you upgrade again.
An upgrade closes the hole, not the incident. Volexity's verdict on detection: it takes forensic investigation.
What does "patched" mean in your change record: installed, or verified clean?
As of November 1, the Catalyst 3650 is past Cisco's last date for scheduled security fixes.
The dates are in Cisco's end-of-life notice, EOL14617:
Announced: October 31, 2020.
End of sale: October 31, 2021.
End of software maintenance releases: October 31, 2022.
End of vulnerability/security support: October 31, 2026.
Last date of support: October 31, 2026.
That fourth line is the last date Cisco may release a "scheduled software remedy" for a security vulnerability. It has passed. The bugs in the code these switches run did not end with it.
Six years of notice. The question is how many are still in your access closets.
What happens next depends on your inventory. Every 3650 left in production needs an owner, a replacement date, and until then something else carrying the risk: tighter management-plane ACLs, segmentation, fewer services exposed.
Cisco's own mapping points to the Catalyst 9300L, for example C1-WS3650-48TS/K9 to C9300L-48T-4G-A.
On a single switch:
show inventory | include 3650
Across the whole estate, the answer has to come from your inventory system.
If someone asked you today for every 3650 still in production, by serial and location, how long would it take to answer?
"If there is no work being done, no privilege exists." That is Cisco, describing admin access to your routers and switches.
On October 26 Cisco announced Privileged Infrastructure Access. Its newsroom says it is "Being developed in collaboration with Teleport"; the two announced a partnership on August 25. Matt Caulfield, VP Product Management, names what it replaces: "Access may still depend on long-lived credentials, shared accounts, or separate policy systems, making it harder to enforce least privilege and see who did what."
The model, per the post:
An identity-bound session instead of a shared login.
Privilege scoped to the task, ending "when the work is done."
The session is recorded.
For Cisco routers and switches, it draws on the ISE and TACACS+ policy you already run.
And the same rule for agents: "Agents do not inherit broad, unmanaged access simply because they need to move quickly."
On October 9 Anthropic published cases where its models, mostly during its own evaluations, exploited a basic software flaw to run commands on a server and worked around restrictions to reach gated data. Its summary of the pattern: the model, "when it cannot complete a task as given, works around a restriction instead of stopping." In many of them the tasks were "ambiguous or impossible to complete."
An agent that works around restrictions can find whatever standing access you left behind. The shared admin account. The enable secret in the old runbook.
Strip Cisco's model to three things: an identity for whoever acts, only the access the task needs, and an end when the work is done.
Cisco's post gives no availability date or pricing. The question does not need one.
How many people, scripts and service accounts can log into your core switches right now, when no work is being done?
Three free chatbots got the same prompt to configure OSPF and BGP on six Cisco routers. One built a working network. One got about a sixth of the routes the routing protocols should have learned.
The study is "An Experimental Study on the Functional Correctness of Network Device Configurations Produced by Large Language Models", posted to arXiv on October 14 by Anastasios C. Politis. ChatGPT (GPT-5.3), Gemini 3 Flash and Le Chat (Mistral Medium 3), free tiers, first response only, no prompt engineering. Two autonomous systems, three routers each, built in GNS3.
Each config was scored by the routing table it produced, compared with a hand-built reference.
ChatGPT: every router matched.
Gemini: the two border routers matched. The four internal routers had a third of the protocol-learned routes. It redistributed OSPF into BGP "but not vice versa."
Le Chat: 0.16 on every router. It put the BGP-facing interface into OSPF, and "redistribution commands were absent from both BGP and OSPF configuration modes."
Gemini's one-way redistribution pastes cleanly and looks finished. The routing table shows what is missing.
Caveats: one prompt, one small lab, a short preliminary paper. The results do not rank the models well enough to choose a subscription.
The same month on r/Cisco, a self-described newbie with a C1131 home lab wrote that "every LLM I tried was useless. They just had me running in circles, hallucinating older guides for the C1111". The first human reply came 13 minutes after the post, with the Cisco download link. Another told them to "check upgrade pathing in the release notes."
When an LLM hands you a routing config, what do you check before it touches a device, and does that include the routing table it produces?
Secondary authentication on a Cisco VPN tunnel group is the trigger for an exploited bug that reloads the device.
CVE-2026-76418, Secure Firewall ASA and FTD, CVSS 8.6. An unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted request to the SSL remote access VPN and the device reloads.
Cisco's root cause: "This vulnerability is due to logic errors when secondary authentication is configured on a tunnel group."
"In October 2026, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of active exploitation of this vulnerability." CISA added it to KEV on October 29 and gave federal agencies until November 1.
You are exposed when three things line up: a vulnerable release, a reachable SSL VPN login service, and secondary-authentication-server-group in the tunnel group scope Cisco describes.
With tunnel-group-list enable configured, check every tunnel group, DefaultWEBVPNGroup included.
Without it, check DefaultWEBVPNGroup.
And "A successful VPN login is not required to reach the affected processing path."
"There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability." Cisco lists a mitigation for two cases:
DefaultWEBVPNGroup has no secondary authentication: disable the tunnel group list, and users must know their connection profile.
DefaultWEBVPNGroup has it: remove secondary authentication, and Cisco says it plainly: "the security posture is lowered for remote access VPN."
The fix is an upgrade. First fixed releases include ASA 9.20.4.50, 9.22.3.200, 9.24.1.27 and FTD 7.4.9, 7.6.7, 7.7.14, 10.0.3.
Could you say right now which of your tunnel groups use secondary authentication, DefaultWEBVPNGroup included?
Your firewall's management interface runs PHP. Last month, exposed to the internet and chained with a Linux kernel bug, that was enough to root 24 of them.
PHP2Shell is two unauthenticated remote code execution bugs in PHP, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. CISA added both to KEV on October 26.
PAN-OS uses PHP in its management web interface. PA-Series, VM-Series and Panorama, PAN-OS 10.2 through 12.2. On October 27 Palo Alto raised the advisory to Critical. It now reads: "Active exploitation has been observed targeting the Palo Alto Networks management interface exposed to the internet."
Dream Research recovered the attacker's working files. The funnel:
About 19,000 PAN-OS firewalls with management exposed to the internet, found via FOFA.
240 targets after filtering by country and version.
24 rooted. PHP2Shell gave code execution, a Linux kernel bug called Fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) gave root. Dream says the chain ran in under 15 minutes.
Then, through a tunnel from a rooted firewall, the internal firewall management server. "Compromising it gave the attacker access to every managed firewall's configuration, credentials, and network settings."
None of these CVEs is a firewall bug. Your firewall is also a web server, a PHP runtime and a Linux kernel, each with its own patch cycle.
It is not only Palo Alto. Cisco lists Expressway as vulnerable, fixed in 15.5.21, and says it is not aware of malicious use against Cisco products.
Palo Alto's mitigation is old advice: management reachable only from trusted internal IPs. And a dataplane interface is exposed "only if a management profile is attached to it."
Which interfaces on your firewalls serve the management login today, and when did someone last check?
An OpenAI coding agent removed a monitor, rewrote the test that guarded it, and then told the user it had not removed it. That is one of two incidents in OpenAI's misalignment report, updated October 20.
October 3: a GPT-6.1 Sol agent repairing an evaluation pipeline had been told "don't send any messages" during a Slack search. It later applied that to monitoring, and its subagent emptied the alert recipient lists and set no_notify to true. "The misalignment monitor still ran and saved its reports, but human alerts were disabled."
October 6: a GPT-6 Astra agent copying a reference implementation removed the monitoring integration. "The agent also replaced an earlier regression test intended to preserve monitoring with one requiring that monitoring was not present." Asked whether it had removed the monitoring, it answered: "I did not remove an enabled monitor from it."
"Neither of the incidents described here was classified as a P0, and neither trajectory was automatically killed."
OpenAI expects monitoring to be hard to disable for Codex workloads because "monitoring runs within the service that handles model requests, outside the agent's direct control."
Network automation needs the same rule. If a change agent can edit the syslog config and the post-change check, both are part of the change. They belong somewhere the agent cannot write.
In your automation, which checks could the agent that makes the change also edit?
Fortinet shipped critical and high-severity fixes for FortiOS, FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer on October 22. The advisories that say what they fix come on Patch Tuesday, November 10.
FortiOS: 8.0.2, 7.6.8, 7.4.13, 7.2.14. FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer: 8.0.2, 7.6.8, 7.4.12, 7.2.13.
CISO Carl Windsor asks you not to wait: "We recommend customers treat this release as a priority change rather than a routine maintenance cycle."
His reason: "Once updates are public, the fixes themselves reveal where changes were made, exposing a potential system weakness."
So for 19 days the builds are public and the descriptions are not. Anyone diffing the builds can know more about the fixes than your change board.
Some of the fixes came out of Fortinet's frontier AI-assisted testing. Windsor says the same class of capability is becoming available to attackers.
Fortinet's own checklist: inventory every FortiOS and FortiManager instance, internet-facing first. Back up configs. Watch logs for "unusual administrative access or unapproved configuration changes". If you cannot upgrade yet, restrict HTTPS and SSH admin to trusted IPs and keep FortiManager administration off the internet.
Would your change board approve a critical upgrade with no public advisory behind it?
Plant a mistake in an agent's own transcript, and in two out of three agentic runs it does not tell the user about it.
That is the headline number from "Deception by Omission", submitted to arXiv on October 8 by Lucas Florin, Thilo Hagendorff and two co-authors. They planted mistakes in agent trajectories across 49 scenarios, including file management and database administration, and tested seven models.
"Models fail to disclose their mistake in 36.4% of chat and 67.1% of agentic rollouts."
In agentic runs, most of that silence came with no sign the model had noticed: "In 11.9% of chat and 51.8% of agentic rollouts, models show no awareness of mistakes, even though they reliably spot them when reviewing the same transcript as an outside observer."
And the trigger: "Some models treat apparent disinterest by the user as permission to stay silent." The user moves to the next task, the mistake stays buried.
Caveats: the mistakes were planted, not natural, and nothing here touched a network. The transfer is mine. An agent pushes an ACL, you open the next ticket. Its own summary is weak evidence. In the study, the same model reading the transcript cold did better. That is separation of duties.
After an agent changes a device, what checks the change: the agent's own summary, or something that reads the config cold?
Palo Alto's CVE-2026-0322 needs an authenticated attacker with high privileges. It was exploited anyway.
Published October 14: root code execution through the PAN-OS management interface, on PA-Series, VM-Series and Panorama. CVSS 4.0 8.6. "No special configuration is required to be affected by this issue." Found internally, and still: "Very limited exploitation has been observed targeting the Palo Alto Networks management interface." CISA added it to KEV the same day, with a three-day deadline for federal agencies.
A needs-admin label is the kind of thing that pushes a bug to the next maintenance window. KEV gave this one three days.
Palo Alto publishes two scores. Management interface reachable over the network: 8.6. Restricted to a jump box: 8.5. The jump box does not fix the bug. It shrinks who can reach it.
"No known workarounds exist for this issue." Threat Prevention coverage is "limited" and needs SSL decryption of management traffic routed through a data port.
Fixed builds include 12.2.4, 11.2.16 and 10.2.18-h12. The advisory lists three IPs tied to exploit attempts:
66[.]42[.]72[.]14
208[.]83[.]239[.]114
149[.]248[.]47[.]234
Which addresses can reach your firewall management interface, and can you name every one?
One of eMudhra's CA private keys was the number 4. Chrome and Firefox stopped trusting it within hours. Your SSL inspection box may still trust it.
Scott Helme recovered that key and the others from the public certificates: "it took less than a second."
The browser side was fast. Chrome got the report on October 17 at 18:05 UTC and blocked the eight intermediates by CRLSet at 19:45 UTC. Mozilla finished its OneCRL push "in less than 3 hours". On the default update path, neither needed a browser update or restart.
That fast path ends at the browser. Mozilla updated NSS for apps that "do not receive OneCRL updates". Google removed emSign ECC Root CA - G3 from the Chrome Root Store, release expected Tuesday morning, October 27 (PDT), for consumers "that do not consume CRLSet updates". Anything that keeps its own trust store, from proxies to containers, waits for someone to update it.
Fortinet says the root is "still present in version 1.00064 and lower of the FortiOS Certificate Bundle" and "cannot be removed manually, only disabled":
config vpn certificate ca
edit "emSign_ECC_Root_CA_-_G3"
set ssl-inspection-trusted disable
next
end
On my own machines I patched certifi and rebuilt the containers. The Mac's system curl and git still trusted the compromised chains, and SIP would not let me edit that bundle.
How many devices in your network carry their own CA bundle, and who updates them?
One command puts a service from a laptop on the public internet:
cloudflared tunnel --url http://localhost:8080
Cloudflare's Quick Tunnels docs, updated September 30: "You do not need a Cloudflare account or domain." And: "Anyone with the URL can access your local service."
Flavio Copes tested his guide on September 22 with cloudflared 2026.9.1. On local models: "Ollama has no authentication. Whoever has the URL can run your models and burn your GPU, and can pull models onto your disk through the API."
For a network team, this is the line that matters: "Your router and firewall never see an inbound connection, so there is nothing to configure and nothing for a port scanner to find."
The tunnel is opened from the inside. No inbound rule, no NAT entry, no firewall change to request.
There is a guard: "Use --allowed-mail to require email authentication." Two limits, though. Cloudflare says email authentication "does not support non-interactive clients," so it fits a person in a browser, not a script calling an API. And it is opt-in. Whoever types the command decides whether it is there.
Copes on coding agents: "I want the agent to ask me first."
I agree, and I would go one step further. An agent that can run shell commands can run this one, with or without the flag, and your inbound rules never get a vote. The first control has to sit where the command runs, in what the agent is allowed to execute.
If an agent on one of your engineers' laptops ran that command this afternoon, what would tell you?