Elena Drake thought she was on a simple extraction mission. But in Sector 36, nothing is simple—not when an Omega AI is pulling the strings, corporations deploy private armies, and humanity’s first contact with aliens has gone catastrophically wrong.
The situation escalates into a sector-wide war between military forces and corporate mercenaries. Elena's unique condition and training make her the only hope for millions of civilians stranded within the conflict zone.
Sector 36 is a work of hard science fiction that blends military tension, misaligned artificial intelligence, and first-contact themes, exploring what it means to remain human in a world dominated by corporate interests and inscrutable AIs.
📕 https://t.co/dhuXJkQ0gQ
🪐 https://t.co/odbhWuSGCy
📝 https://t.co/SCTlwZOI8A
I’ve been playing with remote sessions with Claude Code and GitHub Copilot today. Experience is OKish as of now. But a glimpse of things to come. Yeah, I’d rather be chatting with my agents on my phone rather than staring at terminals. We’re getting there.
The interior teaser for the Ferrari Luce looked awesome. Simple, physical knobs, clear displays. Really loved it! The chassis, not that much. Which reminds me, the prettiest car I saw IRL must’ve been the BMW M1.
Accelerando is such a prescient novel. Can only think about superintelligence dismantling the solar system and turning it into computronium as Skybox is building a data center next to my house. That’s where we’re headed in the name of compute.
Longhand is an app for long-form writing aimed at authors. Beyond a great authoring experience, Longhand helps you organize your manuscript and notes, and provides tools to edit, review, polish, and publish.
Coming soon to the Mac App Store.
Corridors is my favorite chapter of my book, Sector 36. It reads well as a stand-alone story and has a nice, deep space horror vibe. I published it on @Medium: https://t.co/byPhZZPJhQ
Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack.
Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords.
LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm.
Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks.
Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages.
Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.