@dcmjid I need google closed testers, so if you have a google account on your Android phone i would prefer if you became a tester. Is that possible? If so PM me with your email and i will add you.
A few hours later, with the already reversed protocol, i now have a Android App for WCH BLE Analyzer Pro. Soon on Google Play Store for Internal Testing, if anyone have the device and a OTG cable. Let me know and ill sign you up.
I started coding a Debian/Linux GUI for the XGecu T48 / T56 / TL866II+ universal device programmers. At the moment it can read/write/verify/erase/save/load binary firmwares for some 29K common eeproms. https://t.co/jPDzWUEoDN
It has a UI that shows what chip-form, where to connect it. It can detect chips that has IDs and a basic hexeditor allowing you to edit blobs before flashing.
Fun fact, that chip i am writing here is 34 years old, so that's why it look vintage ;)
I reversed engineered the @RolandGlobal MC-707 as i suspected i could enable Linux support, but after updating my kernel it seems i solved a non-issue. Where do i pivot to from here? Whats peoples common complains about #mc707 when playing live? What could we improve?
Someone just poisoned the Python package that manages AI API keys for NASA, Netflix, Stripe, and NVIDIA.. 97 million downloads a month.. and a simple pip install was enough to steal everything on your machine.
The attacker picked the one package whose entire job is holding every AI credential in the organization in one place. OpenAI keys, Anthropic keys, Google keys, Amazon keys… all routed through one proxy. All compromised at once.
The poisoned version was published straight to PyPI.. no code on GitHub.. no release tag.. no review. Just a file that Python runs automatically on startup. You didn’t need to import it. You didn’t need to call it. The malware fired the second the package existed on your machine.
The attacker vibe coded it… the malware was so sloppy it crashed computers.. used so much RAM a developer noticed their machine dying and investigated. They found LiteLLM had been pulled in through a Cursor MCP plugin they didn’t even know they had.
That crash is the only reason thousands of companies aren’t fully exfiltrated right now. If the code had been cleaner nobody notices for weeks. Maybe months.
The attack chain is the part that gets worse every sentence.
TeamPCP compromised Trivy first. A security scanning tool. On March 19. LiteLLM used Trivy in its own CI pipeline… so the credentials stolen from the SECURITY product were used to hijack the AI product that holds all your other credentials.
Then they hit GitHub Actions. Then Docker Hub. Then npm. Then Open VSX. Five package ecosystems in two weeks. Each breach giving them the credentials to unlock the next one.
The payload was three stages.. harvest every SSH key, cloud token, Kubernetes secret, crypto wallet, and .env file on the machine.. deploy privileged containers across every node in the cluster.. install a persistent backdoor waiting for new instructions.
TeamPCP posted on Telegram after: “Many of your favourite security tools and open-source projects will be targeted in the months to come.. stay tuned.”
Every AI agent, copilot, and internal tool your company shipped this year runs on hundreds of packages exactly like this one… nobody chose to install LiteLLM on that developer’s machine. It came in as a dependency of a dependency of a plugin. One compromised maintainer account turned the entire trust chain into a credential harvesting operation across thousands of production environments in hours.
The companies deploying AI the fastest right now have the least visibility into what’s underneath it.
@rfvilarinho@ScottApogee@Apogee_Ent Probably msdos 6, desqview for multitasking, additional 16550 cards to handle multiple nodes. In the 486 days, i hosted 3 nodes on a dx66. Two for dialin, one for local logins.
@ScottApogee@ryched@Apogee_Ent Not to mention other countries or continents. I was dialing like a mad man and had my computer and modem confiscated by my parents..