To the Microsoft employees desperately trying to bring Outlook back online, please don’t push yourselves too hard. Your health matters more than any deadline. Take a long weekend, relax, and come back Monday feeling refreshed. You’ve worked hard enough this week, and I promise those 400 unread emails aren’t going anywhere.
@edinsoncode Built a LangGraph agent that triages work for 14 teams in production. It routes tickets, opens ServiceNow incidents and alerts Slack.
Hardest bug: retries created duplicate records because two writes raced on the same blob and both landed.
Underrated life advice: Bet on yourself at least once. Apply to the job nobody thinks you'll get. Ask the girl who's "out of your league". Move to a new place where you don't know anyone. Worst case, you learn a ton. Best case, a new world opens up and your whole life changes.
@chasewoolard Hi Chase, I'm an AI engineer in Bengaluru (India) building production LLM agents. Would you consider a candidate willing to relocate to NYC or SF at their own expense, if shortlisted?
Hackers who carried out a cyberattack on a hospital have apologized and offered the patients up to $2,500 each
The group said they have "morals" and didn't realize they targeted machines helping people in real time
very weird thing happening rn
technical people are sad, they think their skills are now useless
non-technical people are desperately wishing they were more technical so they could use agents better
I am done with this shit. It is over. The state of engineering right now is horrible. It has been half a month since I started a new role at a big company. Nobody knows anything here. The specs, code, tests, PRDs, tickets, resolution of those tickets, reports, etc., everything is made by Claude Code. Nobody on my team likes this. They are being forced to ship as much as they can. I have heard multiple times from higher management that pushing code is not a bottleneck, so why are we slow? People are working 12 to 13 hours a day just to press enter. Nobody is reading anything. Humans in corporate are doing nothing on their own. Everyone, literally everyone, from an L1 to an L7 engineer here is doing the same thing. Talk to Claude. There is no sense of victory. Nobody is resolving bugs. In reality, nobody is thinking anymore. Everything is done by LLMs. It is so soul-sucking. I would not mind it, to be honest, if we were at least given the time to check out the code and see what is going where. But no, the goal is to just ship. No matter what happens.
On July 25, we hacked OpenAI.
Two bugs let us take over ChatGPT/Codex accounts of OpenAI employees (+some unaffiliated users) and reach connected services: Outlook, Slack, GitHub, etc.
We proved it with a PR in OpenAI’s internal codebase . It took us <72h. 🧵
I resigned from Anthropic today. I spent the last three years doing pretraining research at both OpenAI and Anthropic. Neither company is acting responsibly. They are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives. More thoughts below.
System Design Playbook
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Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack.
Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords.
LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm.
Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks.
Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages.
Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.