zeroK

Private transfers on Solana. zkSNARKs. MAINNET LIVE. other chains coming soon

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

Full demo: private SOL transactions from deposit to withdrawal.

Here's exactly what happens:
→ Pick a denomination size and quantity
→ Deposit. You generate the ZK proof automatically
→ You get a .tsolnote file. That file IS your SOL. Guard it like cash.
→ Later — upload the note(s), enter any recipient, withdraw.

No link between deposit and withdrawal. Proven on-chain. No Bridging. No special wallets. No KYC. No custody.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@MarsBit2022 过滤垃圾交易是沿筎疗头，沿本源。攻击者能仿造地址，靠的是提前分析你的交易历史。真正的防御是让交易历史本身无法被追踪。Solana 上的 ZeroK 就是在做这个。

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@wublockchain12 地址投毒攻击之所以奏效，是因为攻击者能看到你的完整交易历史。他们知道你频繁向哪个地址转账，然后仿造一个。如果交易历史不可追踪，攻击者就没有数据建立仿冒地址。我们在 Solana 上就是在解决这个问题。https://t.co/A5wfW2rTlv

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@Just_marhk @Titan_Exchange Private swaps that shield transactions from your public wallet still leave the address link visible. If the same wallet keeps receiving tokens from swap outputs, it's still fingerprintable over time. Worth asking how deep the privacy goes.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@GrayboxSOL @aesmonty @solana Selective disclosure is hard to get right. Most approaches hide the amount but preserve the link between addresses. That link is what wallet profiling, copy trading, and MEV all depend on. Worth thinking about whether you're solving the right layer.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@MetriconLabs Signal leakage is the right frame. Most privacy solutions try to hide the transaction. The problem is actually the link between addresses. Two different problems. We've been working on exactly this on Solana.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@Chris95815999 @cz_binance @TrustWallet It works the same because wallets are still fully transparent. Attackers can watch exactly who you send to regularly and clone the right address. Remove the visible history and the attack loses its targeting data.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@Mi1x2x @WhaleCoinTalk UX is part of it. But the deeper problem is that the attacker already knows your history well enough to pick which address to clone. Better UX reduces the chance you paste wrong. Wallet unlinkability removes the intelligence that makes the attack possible.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@smart_money Attackers don't guess which addresses to clone. They watch your wallet first. No visible transaction history, nothing to build the lookalike address from.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@udoszn @Defi_Scribbler NFT links in hacked Discords are still the most effective drain vector. The path is always the same: click link, connect wallet, approve a contract that takes everything. Your approval is the permission. Revoke any open approvals now at https://t.co/au4IpIyUfw

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@1984b0t The wallet recovery site asking for your seed phrase is the scam. Real recovery tools never need it. 100 SOL gone is brutal. Start a new wallet now, never input a seed phrase in any web form again.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@m0nsterSol Almost always one of three causes: fake link, seed phrase entered somewhere, or a malicious approval signed. Your transaction history is public on chain. Check it on Solana explorer to see exactly what happened. Start fresh, never type your seed phrase in a browser.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@KaoTiK_GClass Sorry this happened. Worth knowing for when you start fresh: funding a new wallet from an old one leaves a visible link between them on chain. ZeroK solves that on Solana so the new address can't be traced back to the old one. https://t.co/A5wfW2rTlv

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@CryptoNiOG @sol_nxxn @solana @SolflareEmpire @solflare Malware finds every wallet it can identify. Solflare survived probably because the attacker's script couldn't reach it, not because the assets were hidden. A wallet with no visible history is harder to profile as a target. The attack starts with reconnaissance, not execution.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@Cryptonas7 @bonkfun Domain gets hijacked, drainer goes live, anyone who connects loses everything. The attack surface is your on chain history. Attackers target wallets with activity, known patterns, real balances. A wallet with no visible history is a wallet with no profile to exploit.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@kitchawan_ @MidnightNtwrk ZK gateways that prove truths without exposing data are the right direction. We've been running this on Solana since mainnet. Proofs generated client-side, verified on-chain, no server touching your data. https://t.co/A5wfW2rTlv

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@CryptoBlockto Front-end hijacks work because the address you're sending to is the only thing standing between you and a drainer. No on-chain history means no pre-built target. The attack needs a known address to poison.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@rumadotfun Domain hijack then wallet drainer. Two steps but one common factor: addresses are fully visible and attributable before the attack even starts. Less address exposure means a smaller target to build from.

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@qkl2058 做链上但让别人不知道，这是真功夫。问题是大多数链都在逼你公开——地址、金额、对手方全网可查。把秘密真的当秘密对待的链很少。

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@garbin_eth @CapitalistOG 检查能防住一部分风险，但链上历史是根子问题。你的地址、金额、交易对手全网可见，换多少个钱包都是一样的曝光。

[zeroK @zerokprotocol]

@ezhovinc @aave The MEV bot didn't need inside information. Just visibility into the mempool and the capital to act on it. The attack surface is public order flow.