Asadullah Baloch

Academician

[Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN) @bttn_quetta]

On 5 August 2019, the Indian Government unlawfully revoked the special status granted to the Jammu and Kashmir territory, which has remained under illegal Indian occupation since 1948.

Article 370 of the Indian Constitution granted Jammu and Kashmir a distinct constitutional arrangement under which the state had its own constitution, its own flag, and autonomy over all internal subjects.

Article 35A, added by a 1954 Presidential Order, was the companion provision. It empowered the state legislature to define “permanent residents” and reserve for them exclusive rights to immovable property, government employment, and state scholarships; effectively barring outsiders from acquiring land.

Both were hollowed out on 5 August 2019 by India in a move to consolidate its hold over Kashmir by force. The people of the Indian Occupied Kashmir continue their opposition to this unilateral move by India.

Pakistan's position on Kashmir is principled on the will of the Kashmiri people. A plebiscite, based on recurrent UNSC resolutions, reflecting the true aspirations of the people of Kashmir, should be held. That is the only peaceful way of resolving the dispute over Kashmir permanently.

#Kashmir #YoumEistehsal

[Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN) @bttn_quetta]

Call for Papers 📣

BTTN Journal Volume 5, Issue 2.

The BTTN Journal is now accepting abstracts and manuscripts to be published in its forthcoming issue (December 2026).

Deadline: 30 September 2026.

Submit your manuscripts before the closing date on the official BTTN website through the Open Journal System (OJS) portal.

Read the guidelines here: https://t.co/EGF9FrYmiN

Submissions: https://t.co/2JwOEeXEAA

[Asadullah Baloch @AsadBOfficial]

@zafarwafa1977 Indeed, the US-Iran War will only make the wars and conflicts more likely in the Middle East.

[Asadullah Baloch @AsadBOfficial]

@RadioactiveFrnd There is indeed little room for doubt that India must answer serious questions and be held accountable for any negligence involving its critical nuclear infrastructure. Lapses of this nature carry implications that extend beyond national borders.

[Asadullah Baloch @AsadBOfficial]

Taken together, there should be no doubt left that India is an irresponsible nuclear state that can neither secure its fissile material nor protect its strategically sensitive data. 4/4

[Asadullah Baloch @AsadBOfficial]

The #Kudankulam Nuclear PP suffered a malware intrusion into its administrative network in Oct. 2019. Although Indian authorities stated that reactor operations were unaffected, the incident exposed cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a strategic nuclear facility in India. 1/4

[Asadullah Baloch @AsadBOfficial]

Recently, #Reuters reported that nearly 19,000 files linked to #Kudankulam , including engineering drawings, supplier information, and inspection records, were exposed following a data breach. The leak further highlights cyber risks surrounding India's nuclear infrastructure. 3/4

[Radioactive Friends @RadioactiveFrnd]

Another reported breach. Another blow to India's #NuclearSecurity credibility.

If sensitive Kudankulam NPP documents can surface on the dark web, serious questions must be asked about the security of India's critical nuclear infrastructure.

#NationalSecurity #India #DarkWeb

[Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN) @bttn_quetta]

Beyond Regional Deterrence: Logic of India’s ICBM Programme”

Co-authored by Ali Abbas and Nomeen Kassi.

India’s nuclear doctrine is officially built on Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) - a small, survivable force calibrated to regional threats. Yet India is developing the Agni-V and Agni-VI, missiles with ranges that place Washington and European capitals within reach. Neither Pakistan nor China requires intercontinental range to deter.
So what explains the gap between declared doctrine and demonstrated capability?

This paper applies Mearsheimer’s offensive realism to argue that India’s ICBM trajectory is better explained by power-maximization and prestige-seeking than by any documented security requirement.

Key points:

🔹 India’s existing Agni-IV/V arsenal already covers all credible China and Pakistan contingencies — longer range adds no deterrence value against either.

🔹 India’s ICBM program has not appeared in a single US Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment in over 20 years — a notable blind spot given the scrutiny applied to Chinese, Russian, and North Korean programs.

🔹 MIRV integration (Mission Divyastra, 2024) compounds the arms-control implications, particularly for crisis stability.

🔹 The paper traces the doctrinal drift in CMD itself — from Perkovich’s “legitimizing framework” reading to Karnad’s “rhetorical cover” critique — to show how permissive the doctrine has become in practice.

🔹 The paper closes by examining what this trajectory could mean for US–India and India–Europe relations if left unaddressed by arms control mechanisms.

📖 Full paper: [https://t.co/u4P4fxH7op]

#NuclearDeterrence #SouthAsia #ICBM #StrategicStudies #ArmsControl #OffensiveRealism #IndoPacific #NuclearPolicy #JSSA

[Zafar Khan @zafarwafa1977]

WWIII means the total annihilation.

1. Mutual Assured Destruction.
2. All against all.
3. No visit to moon.
4. No visit to Mars.
5. No scientific innovation.

Things will be doomed.

Back to the stone age.

World learders have to think hard before aspiring for military strikes against each others in the dangerous nuclear age supported by emerging and disruptive technologies.

#WWIII #technology

[Asadullah Baloch @AsadBOfficial]

#PIEAS has risen to #560 globally in the #QS World University Rankings, a remarkable jump from the 721–730 band. This makes it the 3rd highest-ranked university in 🇵🇰 and underscores its growing global reputation. A notable achievement, but there is still a long way to go. 🇵🇰

[Zafar Khan @zafarwafa1977]

“Conventional Deterrence Vs Nuclear Deterrence – The Debate Continues”

The short article, absent from a sound theoretical layout titled “The Strange Defeat of Nuclear Deterrence: And the Coming Crisis in Strategic Stability” by Rose Gottemoeller, published by Foreign Affairs, challenges the efficacy of nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis conventional deterrence bolstered by emerging/ disruptive technologies.

Undoubtedly, such technologies in conventional domains may change the dynamics of warfare to the next level, but each technology has counter-technologies in these warfare domains that may require various combinations of strategies to counter. This certainly does not mean, either theoretically or empirically, that the essence and value of nuclear deterrence have been altogether undermined.

If it were the case, there could be a large-scale conventional and nuclear use between the nuclear rivals. There is no evidence for this, which reflects the continued efficacy of nuclear deterrence.

For important scholarly work, see Robert Jervis two valuable contributions on such imperative:

1. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (https://
https://t.co/1wPqZQnLDB)

2. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (https://
https://t.co/usQmGXcQ5e)

Arguing that conventional forces supported by such technologies, by presenting the cases of Russia-Ukraine, Iran-Israel-US, and India and Pakistan, may undermine nuclear deterrence, is without providing a sound theoretical and empirical evidence. This imperative creates more confusion and raises more questions than this short piece can answer.

Each region has its own warfare dynamics, shaped by its history, geography, and strategic culture. Rose's piece tries to put all these cases in one basket, which may not be scholarly justified.

First, the Russian credible nuclear forces continue to deter the US-led NATO members from directly entangling with Russia through both large-scale conventional and nuclear forces. The US and NATO countries have not crossed the perceived Russian red lines.

Ukraine is not a nuclear weapon state. Therefore, it may not be logical for Russia to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, though Russia may use them if it desires to. Russia largely considers Ukraine, its people, and culture as a rudimentary part of Russia. This may not seem logical for Russia to obliterate such essential ingredients, which might be useful to Russia's long-term military strategy.

Second, there are many conventional wars between a nuclear Israel and non-nuclear Arab countries. The more recent Iran-US-Israel war, where a non-nuclear Iran retaliated successfully against the US military bases in the Middle East and Israeli mainland, did not logically cause the use of nuclear weapons against Iran, though both the US and Israel may have the option to use nuclear weapons.

Theoretically and empirically, nuclear weapons may not prevent non-state actors, terrorism, proxies, and even non-nuclear weapon states from waging a conflict, if not a large-scale conventional war, against a nuclear weapon state.

In all such instances depicted in this article, neither Russia, the US, Pakistan, India, nor even Israel faced an "existential threat" from such changing dynamics of conflict, where drones and small-scale missiles were used here and there.

Obviously, because of the issue of “commitment trap”, nuclear weapons may not be used against non-state actors/ proxies/ terrorism, etc., that may not pose an existential threat. Such threatening forces may demand counter-military strategies to confront, fight, deny, and defeat them.

Nuclear weapons are used to deter and deny both large/ limited-scale conventional and nuclear use by nuclear rivals. All nuclear rivals, small or large, are prevented from doing so.

Therefore, it is not logical to argue that nuclear deterrence/ nuclear weapons are undermined because of the non-nuclear rivals’ use of disruptive technologies as part of conventional forces here and there against a nuclear rival without even posing an “existential threat.”

Third, there is no evidence of a large-scale or even a limited-scale conventional and nuclear use between India and Pakistan in both the 2019 and the May 2025 conflict (not a conventional war). Pakistan’s nuclear weapons successfully prevented India's large and limited-scale conventional and increasing nuclear forces from invading Pakistan. It remained a short conflict. The conflict ended quickly, and the international actors, especially the US, played a third-party role, helping to prevent the dangerous escalation to a nuclear level.

Nuclear deterrence is lurking in the background of all military crises in South Asia.

Nuclear deterrence remained intact, preventing India from wrongly perceiving counterforce strikes enabled by disruptive technologies against a credible nuclear Pakistan.

Conventional deterrence or conventional defenses (both cheap and expensive) could fail if both India and Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. In other words, if Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, a nuclear India in possession of 7 to 8 times bigger conventional forces could have invaded Pakistan a long time ago, and perhaps even used nuclear weapons against Pakistan. What could Pakistan do then? Rose’s article is silent on this.

However, in fact, Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence, falling within the ambit of Credible Minimum Deterrence, deters India at the operational, tactical, and strategic levels. This also broadly covers Pakistan's conventional deterrence and the conventional force development vis—à—vis India. Nuclear deterrence has been the primary echelon deterring both limited and large-scale war, including preventing India from using its nuclear forces against Pakistan. It cannot be the second to conventional deterrence.

Historically, conventional deterrence has failed many times. See the seminal work of John Mearsheimer on “Conventional Deterrence”: https:// http://
https://t.co/spD89462yZ

Conventional deterrence is expensive. Deployed defenses (at the large or small scale) give a false sense of security and can be defeated by effective countermeasures.

Therefore, it cannot be justified to replace nuclear deterrence with conventional forces/ deployed defensive forces in a situation when a state has to confront a rival that is 7 to 8 times stronger.

@ForeignAffairs
@ForeignPolicy

#deterrence #nuclear #conventional #conflict #war #India #Pakistan #Russia #US #China #Iran #IranWar‌ #Israel

[Zafar Khan @zafarwafa1977]

https://t.co/sBXyyhaVtt

“Conventional Deterrence Vs Nuclear Deterrence – The Debate Continues”

The short article, absent from a sound theoretical layout titled “The Strange Defeat of Nuclear Deterrence: And the Coming Crisis in Strategic Stability” by Rose Gottemoeller, published by Foreign Affairs, challenges the efficacy of nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis conventional deterrence bolstered by emerging/ disruptive technologies.

Undoubtedly, such technologies in conventional domains may change the dynamics of warfare to the next level, but each technology has counter-technologies in these warfare domains that may require various combinations of strategies to counter. This certainly does not mean, either theoretically or empirically, that the essence and value of nuclear deterrence have been altogether undermined.

If it were the case, there could be a large-scale conventional and nuclear use between the nuclear rivals. There is no evidence for this, which reflects the continued efficacy of nuclear deterrence.

For important scholarly work, see Robert Jervis two valuable contributions on such imperative:
1. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (https://t.co/ZxqK7YRRN0)
2. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (https://t.co/fkn0geHCsm)

Arguing that conventional forces supported by such technologies, by presenting the cases of Russia-Ukraine, Iran-Israel-US, and India and Pakistan, may undermine nuclear deterrence, is without providing a sound theoretical and empirical evidence. This imperative creates more confusion and raises more questions than this short piece can answer.

Each region has its own warfare dynamics, shaped by its history, geography, and strategic culture. Rose's piece tries to put all these cases in one basket, which may not be scholarly justified.

First, the Russian credible nuclear forces continue to deter the US-led NATO members from directly entangling with Russia through both large-scale conventional and nuclear forces. The US and NATO countries have not crossed the perceived Russian red lines.

Ukraine is not a nuclear weapon state. Therefore, it may not be logical for Russia to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, though Russia may use them if it desires to. Russia largely considers Ukraine, its people, and culture as a rudimentary part of Russia. This may not seem logical for Russia to obliterate such essential ingredients, which might be useful to Russia's long-term military strategy.

Second, there are many conventional wars between a nuclear Israel and non-nuclear Arab countries. The more recent Iran-US-Israel war, where a non-nuclear Iran retaliated successfully against the US military bases in the Middle East and Israeli mainland, did not logically cause the use of nuclear weapons against Iran, though both the US and Israel may have the option to use nuclear weapons.

Theoretically and empirically, nuclear weapons may not prevent non-state actors, terrorism, proxies, and even non-nuclear weapon states from waging a conflict, if not a large-scale conventional war, against a nuclear weapon state.

In all such instances depicted in this article, neither Russia, the US, Pakistan, India, nor even Israel faced an "existential threat" from such changing dynamics of conflict, where drones and small-scale missiles were used here and there.

Obviously, because of the issue of “commitment trap”, nuclear weapons may not be used against non-state actors/ proxies/ terrorism, etc., that may not pose an existential threat. Such threatening forces may demand counter-military strategies to confront, fight, deny, and defeat them.

Nuclear weapons are used to deter and deny both large/ limited-scale conventional and nuclear use by nuclear rivals. All nuclear rivals, small or large, are prevented from doing so.

Therefore, it is not logical to argue that nuclear deterrence/ nuclear weapons are undermined because of the non-nuclear rivals’ use of disruptive technologies as part of conventional forces here and there against a nuclear rival without even posing an “existential threat.”

Third, there is no evidence of a large-scale or even a limited-scale conventional and nuclear use between India and Pakistan in both the 2019 and the May 2025 conflict (not a conventional war). Pakistan’s nuclear weapons successfully prevented India's large and limited-scale conventional and increasing nuclear forces from invading Pakistan. It remained a short conflict. The conflict ended quickly, and the international actors, especially the US, played a third-party role, helping to prevent the dangerous escalation to a nuclear level.

Nuclear deterrence is lurking in the background of all military crises in South Asia.

Nuclear deterrence remained intact, preventing India from wrongly perceiving counterforce strikes enabled by disruptive technologies against a credible nuclear Pakistan.

Conventional deterrence or conventional defenses (both cheap and expensive) could fail if both India and Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. In other words, if Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, a nuclear India in possession of 7 to 8 times bigger conventional forces could have invaded Pakistan a long time ago, and perhaps even used nuclear weapons against Pakistan. What could Pakistan do then? Rose’s article is silent on this.

However, in fact, Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence, falling within the ambit of Credible Minimum Deterrence, deters India at the operational, tactical, and strategic levels. This also broadly covers Pakistan's conventional deterrence and the conventional force development vis—à—vis India. Nuclear deterrence has been the primary echelon deterring both limited and large-scale war, including preventing India from using its nuclear forces against Pakistan. It cannot be the second to conventional deterrence.

Historically, conventional deterrence has failed many times. See the seminal work of John Mearsheimer on “Conventional Deterrence”: https:// https://t.co/spD89462yZ

Conventional deterrence is expensive. Deployed defenses (at the large or small scale) give a false sense of security and can be defeated by effective countermeasures.

Therefore, it cannot be justified to replace nuclear deterrence with conventional forces/ deployed defensive forces in a situation when a state has to confront a rival that is 7 to 8 times stronger.

@ForeignAffairs @ForeignPolicy

#deterrence #nuclear #conventional #conflict #war #India #Pakistan #Russia #US #China #Iran #IranWar‌ #Israel

[Zafar Khan @zafarwafa1977]

@maniaUFO “The UFO Problem”

Part of the UFO dilemma is that it either looks blurred, is far away from you, or is too fast-moving for you to even pick out what it was.

That is why we call it a UFO.

The UFO Dilemma lingers on.

@maniaUFO
#UFO #fiction #science

[Zafar Khan @zafarwafa1977]

“SIPRI Year Book: Nine Nuclear Weapon States -2026”

This clearly indicates that all major nuclear weapon states are not only modernizing and retaining their nuclear weapons but also increasing vertically.

Others follow suit.

India has consistently been going up the trajectory, becoming the largest and fastest-growing nuclear weapons state in South Asia, threatening Pakistan and others.

No one is willing to disarm their nuclear weapons. There is no sign of nuclear disarmament for obvious security reasons. Others will not be interested in disarming their nuclear weapons despite the efforts for the nonproliferation regimes.

Nuclear weapons will continue to play their deterring role in the international system.

Nuclear deterrence continues to retain its strategic value despite the emergence of disruptive technologies.

@SIPRIorg @SweArmsControl @AlvamyrdalCNTR
@RobertEgnell @UNIDIR @nuclearban @scientistsorg @SweMFA @CSparre @ICRC @FOIresearch @hrw
@PugwashConfs @Greenpeace @globalzero @antonioguterres

#SIPRIYearbook2026 #NuclearWeapons #ArmsControl #NuclearRisk #Disarmament #NonProliferation

[SIPRI @SIPRIorg]

The nine nuclear-armed states—🇺🇸🇷🇺🇬🇧🇫🇷🇨🇳🇮🇳🇵🇰🇰🇵🇮🇱— continued programmes to modernize and enhance their nuclear arsenals in 2025, and most deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems during the year. Learn more ➡️  https://t.co/gvgDpsPerb

#SIPRIYearbook2026 #NuclearWeapons #ArmsControl #NuclearRisk #Disarmament #NonProliferation

@SweArmsControl @AlvamyrdalCNTR @RobertEgnell @UNIDIR @nuclearban @scientistsorg @SweMFA @CSparre @ICRC @FOIresearch @hrw @PugwashConfs @Greenpeace @globalzero @antonioguterres

[Zafar Khan @zafarwafa1977]

“Two Nuclear Flash Points in South Asia”

It should rather be Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJ&K) that remains an internationally recognized disputed territory that belongs to the people of Kashmir.

The IIOJ&K remains not only a disputed territory but also a nuclear flashpoint in South Asia.

In the post 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, we are now dealing with two perceived nuclear flash points:

1. IIOJ&K
2. Indus Water Treaty (IWT), which India put its implementation in abeyance unilaterally, which it cannot.

India cannot simply walk away from such a reality.

It cannot simply walk away from the United Nations resolutions, the dialogue process, and the submission to such realities in the evolving South Asian complex environment.

#SouthAsia #India #Pakistan #conflict #escalation #nuclearflashpoints

[Asadullah Baloch @AsadBOfficial]

UNSC Resolution 47 (1948) recognizes Jammu & Kashmir as a disputed territory and calls for a plebiscite. With 75+ years of unresolved status and repeated UN engagement, facts—not narratives—define the dispute. #Kashmir #Pakistan #India

[Radioactive Friends @RadioactiveFrnd]

#NewDelhi can reject statements, but it cannot reject reality. #JammuandKashmir remains an internationally recognized #Dispute, and attempts to silence discussion only highlight India's discomfort with global scrutiny of its policies in the region.
#Trump #India #EU #Pakistan

[Asadullah Baloch @AsadBOfficial]

@bttn_quetta May 2025 exposed the myth of a “safe” space below the nuclear threshold. In South Asia’s compressed strategic environment, peace rests on credible deterrence, responsible statecraft, and resolving longstanding disputes through dialogue, not coercion. #YoumETakbeer