Brian Haig

Psyc Prof UCanterbury | research methodology, theoretical psychology, applied philosophy of science

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@BorsboomDenny @YouTube Fantastic! Fran and I loved it. Impressive to see a wordsmith displaying one of his other talents - particularly in a non-verbal medium.

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

A recent commentary of mine on a target article in Theory & Psychology (2024) challenges the recommendation that psychology should abandon Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism and adopt Roy Bhaskar’s critical realist philosophy of science.
https://t.co/Z1megU8hf3

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@JamesSteeleII Huge congratulations, James!!! I hope that means you're Melbourne bound.

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@FredOswald @APA_Journals Congratulations, Fred. I'm sure the journal will thrive under your leadership.

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@JamesSteeleII Many thanks for your positive remarks about my book, James. It's reassuring to learn that we have the same view of scientific inference.

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@BD_Zumbo Thank you, Bruno. 🙂

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

A recent commentary of mine on a target article in Psychological Inquiry (2023, 34, 261-266) makes use of selected historical and epistemological scholarship in order to correct some common misunderstandings of three major behaviorist psychologists. I argue for the following: 1/

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

Edward Tolman’s purposive behaviorism, and its attendant idea of cognitive maps, is best understood as a realist interpretation of cognitive learning theory that was an influential forerunner of modern cognitive psychology. It was not an empiricist precursor to it. 2/

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

Clark Hull was a realist from the outset who took theoretical terms, such as ‘habit strength’, to designate causal mechanisms, which comprised part of the internal structure of the organism. 3/

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

Plausibly, B. F. Skinner was not a 20th century (anti-realist) positivist empiricist, but a nonrealist, who was skeptical about the value of deep-running cognitive theories in his time, but open to increasing degrees of realism with advances in relevant scientific knowledge. 4/

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

Skinner’s value as a psychological theorist can be more fully appreciated by viewing elements of his work as comprising a coherent global theory. As such, his theoretical work should be prized, despite its proscription of postulational theories. 5/

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

The relevant historical scholarship about behaviorism suggests a complex intertwining of different realist and nonrealist strands of thinking, and a view of the evolution of mid-20th century American psychology as theoretically pluralist, or multi-paradigmatic, in character. 6/

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@EikoFried Wimsatt's (1994) work on the ontology of complex systems is wonderfully suggestive. It's good to see its value recognized.

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@FredOswald So true Fred. I had the privilege of serving as an editorial board member of AJP under his wise editorship. An underappreciated fact about the astonishing breadth of Robert's scholarship was his published work in theoretical psychology, often in collaboration with John Capaldi.

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

My article, 'Repositioning construct validity theory: From nomological networks to pragmatic theories, and their evaluation by explanatory means', is now available online, with open access, in Perspectives on Psychological Science. https://t.co/OdH6B9Gp5S

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@lakens Yes. Brian Cox said of scientists, more generally: "The idea that scientists are some kind of priests that have unique access to knowledge about nature is nonsense – in many ways I see it as the codified application of common sense. It’s like plumbing." (Guardian, 14 June, 2015).

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@JamesSteeleII @paulrconnor The distinction is of major importance. It's a common mistake to think statistical Hs have direct implications for scientific Hs. Moreover, statistical Hs are subservient to scientific Hs, & play a lesser role in science. On this, see Bolles, Meehl, & Mayo, for example.

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@PassionResearch @_danielaschmidt For a related piece on this topic, see my book chapter, Big Data Science: A Philosophy of Science Perspective, 2020. It discusses the place of inductive and abductive inference in big data research. (Text available on ResearchGate). https://t.co/3war2gpNSc

[Brian Haig @BrianHaig]

@annemscheel The Translators' Note says "The translation was prepared by the author, with the assistance of Dr Julius Freed and Lan Freed."