@zetalyrae Bargaining theory might be the right tool to talk about this. The generalization of Violence∨Work is 'ability to impose costs on the other party', and generalizing it allows one to explain how priests exercise power.
@alomenopee@nickcammarata@HellenicVibes I'm not into meditation, but I've heard that progressing too quickly has its risks. Do you happen to know about that? If so, how did you manage it?
@NathanpmYoung I didn't like punching and getting punched, and enjoyed grappling. BJJ felt like playing chess, in that I had to use my head all the time, but it was more embodied and dynamic. The learning curve was very nice and you feel the progress with every class. Haven't tried judo tho.
@nickcammarata@HellenicVibes Any tips on how to get it into a good basin for this? Or is it better than most meditation teachers even while in the default basin?
@lymanstoneky Schelling points get formed around shared knowledge and predispositions. The framing of the question is part of this, and changes what answers we converge to. This is rational.
@morallawwithin These are not pure 'standard' game theory problems, because the agents have a set of shared assumptions and goals. In these cases, coordination will happen around Schelling points, which depend on the superficial details and how people feel about them.
@baektoparadise Hm. This seems to be a topic where we can (thankfuly) seek evidence.
According to a study I found (PMID:39594397), the absence of a father accounts for ≈6% of well-being. This tracks with similar results for disabled people, which shows that people can adapt to bad things happe
@baektoparadise@TundraboiCarti@Chaikiro1 I feel like most people without dads end up with well-lived lives. While it is obviously a horrible thing to have happened, it would surprise me if these people didn't think their lives were worth living.
Still, Jotaro shouldn't have had a child just to abandon her
@NathanpmYoung@PGtzsche1 Still, I don't see why this line of thought would imply mere degrowth and not full-on antinatalism. It is probably not what OP believes.
@NathanpmYoung@PGtzsche1 He could think that the welfare would be counterfactually higher, but that the welfare of not-yet-existent beings is morally irrelevant, such that we are not obligated to create them
While I think this position has other issues (like the repugnant conclussion), I find it coherent