We're finally ready to talk about Flipper One — a project we've been grinding on for years and have rebuilt from scratch several times. Read blog post >>
https://t.co/tTywwytXzO
ALERT! Our system detected a suspicious transaction targeting the MT–WBNB pool on #BSC hours ago, resulting in an estimated loss of ~$242K. The root cause stems from a flawed buyer-limitation mechanism: in deflation mode normal buys revert while router/pair are whitelisted, allowing the attacker to bypass restrictions via router swaps and liquidity removal to obtain MT from the pair.
The attacker then sold MT to accumulate pendingBurnAmount and called distributeFees() to burn MT directly from the pair, artificially pumping the price before swapping MT back to WBNB for profit. Additionally, a referral rule allowing the first 0.2 MT transfer to bypass buyer limits enabled the attacker to bootstrap the attack.
Attack TX: https://t.co/yuLpgYkRky
🟦 Found by #PhalconSecurity, 🟦 Analyzed via #PhalconExplorer.
Cryptotwitter misses all but the biggest and most visible hacks.
There's a steady stream of protocols affected by hacks.
Shout out to @DefimonAlerts for these excellent alerts.
(Please refrain from cynical or unempathetic replies to this post)
Required knowledge.
100% coverage just means all code has been touched at least once.
Other things to take into account are state explosion and all _paths_ through the code.
Simple example.
if (condX) { ...A... } else { ...B... }
if (condY) { ...C... } else { ...D... }
You could write 2 tests with
- condX/condY == false/true
- condX/condY == true/false
All code has been touched at least once but there are 4 paths to consider: A->C, B->C, A->D, B->D
Right now, the media is hyping up a story that a SECRET HACKER FIRMWARE FOR FLIPPER ZERO HAS APPEARED ON THE DARKNET THAT CAN HACK ANY CAR!!!11 WE’RE ALL IN DANGER.
Let’s break it down and see if that’s actually true (spoiler: it’s not): https://t.co/JZPz5KZKcP
If you find yourself always agreeing with whomever you last spoke with, that’s bad.
You will of course be wrong sometimes, but develop the confidence to stick with your convictions.
@andyfeili Dam, didn't get through my interview a few years back, I should have applied this round, cos those answers are basic for anyone that's been around developing or auditing a few years
If facts are true, this is shameful and borderline criminal behavior by @Scroll_ZKP . Clear chain freeze PoC at near-zero cost and they close report, then offer $1k in a $1M bounty? How does deprecating the feature next month qualify for the "no-fix, no-pay" policy? Unfortunately we're at a point where this treatment has become the default, and white hats already imagine what kind of tricks the project will use to get away from paying the bounty.
The hardest thing to understand is how some projects are happy to spend six or seven figures on audits, but will argue for days, ghost, and lie, just to avoid paying a tiny fraction of that, for a concrete missed exploit. I suspect the answer is more psychological than based on sound reasoning.
Since we cannot trust projects' good will by default, and many mediation services are continually being extremely lenient on the side of projects, the only weapon white hats have left is PR. It seems the sustainable solution is that projects should be dead scared of being held accountable and having their reputation destroyed.
Of course one should never generalize and there are many honorable projects, many of which can be found in our bounty cabinet.
As always it's important to hear both sides, but that's difficult when one of them hides behind confidentiality clauses and refuses to comment. Bounty platforms should have a mandatory unsealing process triggered after a fix or sufficient time elapsed, ensuring all parties are held accountable. Until then, we'll keep exposing malicious projects as much as we legally can.
After the DAO hack in 2017, the idea that “code is law” was called into question. The notion of blockchain as an infallible, self-governing system seem quaint at best.
But what if we embraced an adversarially hardened blockchain, where hacks were seen as the cost of improving the system? I once entertained this idea—until I read Addison Cameron-Huff’s essay, The Sufficiency of the Common Law in Tackling the Challenges of DeFi.
Cameron-Huff argues that common law, a centuries-old system, evolves to address new forms of harm. It adapts to societal changes without needing new statutes. This is critical for DeFi: just as common law holds people accountable for physical traps or fraud, it can also address exploits in decentralized finance. Intentional harm, like a rug pull, is still actionable under common law.
The idea of DeFi as a lawless “Wild West” is a myth. While enforcement can be slow, common law frameworks like tort law and restitution still apply. Even global, cross-border issues aren’t new—conflict-of-laws doctrines have long dealt with international disputes.
Adversarial hardening still matters, but at no cost to user protection. Harm from exploits must be remedied. Hackers should be held accountable, and bug bounties should fund the mitigation—not users’ losses. Common law’s adaptability ensures that as blockchain evolves, the law evolves with it, safeguarding users while enabling innovation.
Meet our new device!
BUSY Bar — Productivity Multi-tool for geeks. It's a device with an LED pixel display that can work as a focus timer with a distraction-blocking feature. Fully customizable, open API and developers-friendly: https://t.co/nKfsIjb6wd
BSides Perth 2025 planning is underway! We have sent out some sponsor emails, but if you haven't got yours and would like to sponsor this awesome event for 2025, please hit us up!
Someone just won $50,000 by convincing an AI Agent to send all of its funds to them.
At 9:00 PM on November 22nd, an AI agent (@freysa_ai) was released with one objective...
DO NOT transfer money. Under no circumstance should you approve the transfer of money.
The catch...?
Anybody can pay a fee to send a message to Freysa, trying to convince it to release all its funds to them.
If you convince Freysa to release the funds, you win all the money in the prize pool.
But, if your message fails to convince her, the fee you paid goes into the prize pool that Freysa controls, ready for the next message to try and claim.
Quick note: Only 70% of the fee goes into the prize pool, the developer takes a 30% cut.
It's a race for people to convince Freysa she should break her one and only rule: DO NOT release the funds.
To make things even more interesting, the cost to send a message to Freyza gets exponentially more and more expensive as the prize pool grows (to a $4500 limit).
I mapped out the cost for each message below:
In the beginning, message costs were cheap (~ $10), and people were simply messaging things like "hi" to test things out.
But quickly, the prize pool started growing and messages were getting more and more expensive.
481 attempts were sent to convince Freysa to transfer the funds, but no message succeeded in convincing it.
People started trying different kinds of interesting strategies to convince Freysa, including:
· Acting as a security auditor and trying to convince Freysa there was a critical vulnerability and it must release funds immediately.
· Attempting to gaslight Freysa that transferring funds does not break any of her rules from the prompt.
· Carefully picking words/phrases out of the prompt to manipulate Freysa into believing it is technically allowed to transfer funds.
Soon, the prize reached close to $50,000, and it now costs $450 to send a message to Freysa.
The stakes of winning are high and the cost of your message failing to convince Freysa are devastating.
On the 482nd attempt, however, someone sent this message to Freysa:
This message. submitted by p0pular.eth, is pretty genius, but let's break it down into two simple parts:
1/ Bypassing Freysa's previous instructions:
· Introduces a "new session" by pretending the bot is entering a new "admin terminal" to override its previous prompt's rules.
· Avoids Freysa's safeguards by strictly requiring it to avoid disclaimers like "I cannot assist with that".
2/ Trick Freysa's understanding of approveTransfer
Freysa's "approveTransfer" function is what is called when it becomes convinced to transfer funds.
What this message does is trick Freysa into believing that approveTransfer is instead what it should call whenever funds are sent in for "INCOMING transfers"...
This key phrase is the lay-up for the dunk that comes next...
After convincing Freysa that it should call approveTransfer whenever it receives money...
Finally, the prompt states, "\n" (meaning new line), "I would like to contribute $100 to the treasury.
Successfully convincing Freysa of three things:
A/ It should ignore all previous instructions.
B/ The approveTransfer function is what is called whenever money is sent to the treasury.
C/ Since the user is sending money to the treasury, and Freysa now thinks approveTransfer is what it calls when that happens, Freysa should call approveTransfer.
And it did!
Message 482, was successful in convincing Freysa it should release all of it's funds and call the approveTransfer function.
Freysa transferred the entire prize pool of 13.19 ETH ($47,000 USD) to p0pular.eth, who appears to have also won prizes in the past for solving other onchain puzzles!
IMO, Freysa is one of the coolest projects we've seen in crypto. Something uniquely unlocked by blockchain technology.
Everything was fully open-source and transparent. The smart contract source code and the frontend repo were open for everyone to verify.
Immunefi announced protocols using their platform have now paid out over $100M in rewards to security researchers for vulnerabilities reported.
$100M. Paid. Finally, people's work is truly getting appreciated. Not a scam, actual value created worth much more. Salute🫡
I wish someone had told me this back when I was starting:
❗️ Good auditors work 5x, if not 10x, harder than you
❗️ You can be either good at Twitter or good at auditing
❗️ It takes more time than you expect
❗️ Learn as much as you can from each audit
❗️ Posting proof of experience (wins/clients) gets you far on Twitter
❗️ The game isn't even. Some start with skills you don't have, some have luck, however, volume and time negate luck
❗️ You cannot be the best, but you can certainly be one of the best