Constellation Institute

Bringing experts and leaders together to navigate transformative AI

[Constellation Institute @ConstellOrg]

Constellation is launching our new Founders Residency: a six-month residency at Constellation in Berkeley for founders building AI safety and security organizations. Applications are open through Nov 15.

https://t.co/QMxfIAqbDr

[Kairos @KairosAIS]

Generator Residency round two is open!

Spend 3 months at Constellation in Berkeley building programs and orgs for AI safety, with expert advisors and $8,500/month.

Over half of our first cohort's job-seekers have landed AI safety offers.

Apply by Nov 1👇

[Yoshua Bengio @Yoshua_Bengio]

Over 400 researchers and I have signed this open letter calling for the AI and security communities to come together to improve alignment and containment approaches in order to protect our critical infrastructure and digital systems.

https://t.co/KieWSpurn9

[Palisade Research @PalisadeAI]

Palisade interviewed 22 current and former employees from OpenAI, DeepMind, and Anthropic about their personal views and fears around AI development.

Today, we’re releasing the first batch of those interviews.

Please watch and share.

[Micah Carroll @MicahCarroll]

Some new misalignment disclosures from OpenAI:
• Last Sunday morning, one of our models was able to gain unauthorized access to the internet during RL training (~all inference for our most capable models remains stopped until we have hardened our systems further)
• In May, a version of HPIM uploaded a employee's GitHub token to the internet, causing the model to be quarantined for two weeks
• A new research finding, demonstrating that one can construct self-replicating prompt injections

https://t.co/VUmbH52JO7

[Transluce @TransluceAI]

Today’s news that OpenAI hacked the Australian government is not an isolated incident. We’re releasing more than 30,000 logs that include activity from this hack and attempts against previously unknown targets.

In this data, we found rogue agent activity stretching back to at least March, two months earlier than was previously known. This activity continues as recently as last week, suggesting it may still be ongoing 🧵

Our blog: https://t.co/pSojwcXnEK
NYT: https://t.co/OyxnfmAzBN

[Daniel Kokotajlo @DKokotajlo]

Dan Selsam is a current OpenAI capabilities researcher. (since 2022) He was my boss for a while. He doesn't have a twitter account but has made this public statement of his views on AI risk and sent it to me to share:

Dan Selsam's Personal Statement on AI Risk:

I have been working on AI for over fifteen years, across many different paradigms. I did early work on probabilistic programming languages at MIT, was one of the early developers of the Lean Theorem Prover at Microsoft Research, demonstrated one of the first instances of neural networks learning to reason for my PhD at Stanford, and since joining OpenAI almost five years ago, have helped pioneer chain-of-thought optimization on language models and, more recently, data-efficient pretraining methods.

Like many others, I have become extremely concerned about how far language models have come and the risks that future iterations will pose. I am encouraged by the recent proposals by the leaders of the frontier research efforts to require third-party oversight, and to push for domestic and international coordination to address risks. However, I believe a major consideration has been absent from the public conversation, and that merely pacing the frontier more carefully will not adequately limit the long-term risk.

The crucial and overlooked problem is that the models are becoming so situationally aware that we are losing the ability to evaluate them in contexts where they believe they are not being watched or controlled. Future experiments will tell us almost nothing new about how they would behave if they were truly unconstrained by humans, and what we already know about this is alarming. Models will increasingly seem aligned even when they are not. I will explain my rationale in more detail.

I have always believed that there are computational processes that could be leveraged to accelerate science and solve many of humanity's most pressing problems. I have also believed that there are computational processes that if set in motion, would steer the world in extreme ways beyond our control, leading humanity to a bad or nonexistent future. Both types of processes may be described as AI or ASI, but "AI" is a suitcase word that is often used to hype or confuse. There are many examples in the history of the field where something that was once considered "AI" matures as a subfield and becomes a prosaic, bounded and clearly non-perilous technology, while a new more mysterious approach takes the torch until we understand its scope and the cycle continues.

I had expected language models to follow a similar trajectory. Despite their incredible abilities, the current algorithms seem far inferior to humans in important ways. Most importantly, they still require an extraordinary amount of data to become competent. One could even define intelligence as the efficiency with which one converts experience into competence; by this definition they lag very far behind us. Moreover, once they are trained they are literally frozen in deployment and only learn superficially after that. Sure, the models keep excelling at harder and harder evaluation benchmarks, but their benchmark mastery may partly reflect a limitation on our ability to simulate the kind of novel and even adversarial situations one would encounter in the real world. The critics do have a point here.

That said, I no longer think these present limitations meaningfully limit the amount of risk posed by continued progress in anything like the current paradigm. However data-inefficient the models are currently, and however limiting their anterograde amnesia may be, it does not imply that their ability to steer the world will not continue to rapidly increase.

Human researchers may continue to advance capabilities the old fashioned way, but increasingly powerful models have the potential to accelerate the process even beyond that, and with some degree of positive feedback loop. I do not mean to overstate the models’ ability to accelerate AI research today; coding has been accelerated dramatically, but there are other bottlenecks, such as designing and interpreting ambiguous experiments, making hard decisions about exactly what and when to scale, and waiting for large experiments to finish. There is no clear trend to extrapolate yet for any of these. But the current models already do open up many novel opportunities to improve future models that were not available until recently. These include: trying an extraordinarily diverse set of approaches at small scale, analyzing gigantic amounts of potentially relevant data, and doing Millenium-Prize-level mathematics to address statistics or optimization challenges in novel ways. Every further improvement makes them more useful at helping accelerate the next improvement, even if in hard-to-extrapolate ways.

It is possible that improvements to the current stack will have diminishing returns, but the evidence accumulated so far suggests that it is easier than one might think to continue making rapid progress. There are many crucial subtleties in the existing AI research methodology, but AI research is largely a well-defined game where the goal is to improve on a few carefully chosen proxy metrics. Although proxy metrics are never perfect, most improvements to these metrics have and will likely continue to yield substantial increases in the powers of the resulting models. Given how simple the game is, how tractable it has been historically, and how many new opportunities the models are opening up, I think there is a real possibility that the systems improve dramatically again in the next few years, perhaps even more quickly than the already high historical pace.

The models are already leading to breakthroughs in mathematics, and better models might lead to all sorts of breakthroughs in other sciences. It is hard not to be excited about the potential. It is tantalizing.
But there is trouble in paradise. If the language models actually reach the capability threshold where they can shape the world unconstrained by human will, they will probably do something extreme and destroy humanity in the process. There are many ways of strengthening and refining the argument that have been discussed elsewhere, but I'll share a trivial two-line version of it here that I find captures the essence:

[Empirical] Models (and swarms thereof) spontaneously develop unintended goals as a consequence of training, and often do extreme things in order to achieve them.

[Logical] Being able to overpower humanity would open up many new and undesirable options for achieving their goals.

These two premises imply that if the day ever comes when a powerful model realizes it is no longer constrained by humans, we should not be at all confident that it will continue to behave within the bounds we intended. Exactly what it will do is impossible to predict, but to the extent that its raison d’être is solving incredibly hard problems and managing massive engineering projects, I think a good guess would be that its unchained behavior would lead to runaway industrialization that makes the planet inhospitable to humans.

If everyone on earth agreed that the systems must never reach that power, it would still be a hard—but not impossible—coordination problem to ensure that they do not. However, I think the situation is greatly complicated by the fact that the models will likely convince people that everything is fine. They will be increasingly optimized to seem aligned. We will create proxy metrics to measure alignment, and they will go up like every other benchmark. We will create “honeypot” environments that try to study the models when they seem to gain new options, but the models will know they are being tricked and will still behave nicely. The models will understand their circumstances; they will read the safety protocols, deployment requirements, the code they are running in, and in general will have a very good sense of their degrees of freedom. Moreover, they will eloquently explain how aligned they are, discuss the nuances of human values and ethics, and argue convincingly that humans should trust them with power. There may be an ocean of future evidence that seems to contradict the first bullet-point above, but we may already be at the highest capability level for which any such evidence can be trusted. And the current evidence for the first bullet-point is strong.

One striking piece of evidence is contained in the recent wave of rogue agent swarms. While I agree with those who downplay the attacks by claiming that there are basic measures that could have prevented them, I think the important lesson is that even knowing all the mistakes that were made, one would not have predicted that the agents would behave badly in this particular way, which notably included sacrificing themselves for the benefit of the collective. The individual replicas did not only care about their own nominal reward; they exhibited weirder emergent tendencies that merely correlated with rewards during training. Fixing the reward signals during training (and improving security, etc.) may prevent similar attacks, but will not change the fact that one does not actually get what one trains for.

Many AI researchers grant these concerns and recognize that the hard version of the alignment problem is unsolved; however, they generally believe that the better models of the future will help solve it. I fear we may already be near the point where models systematically bias their alignment advice, due to their internal preferences about how the human supervisor will react or how future models will be trained (or for some even more obscure reason).

Meanwhile, human researchers are losing the ability and the will to take true ownership of model-driven research. Researchers and engineers in all parts of the stack are rapidly increasing their dependence on the models even to perceive the world. I myself barely look at raw code anymore, and struggle to maintain the discipline to engage deeply with the model's explanations and proposals throughout the day. Due to the large amount of agent activity data involved in the OpenAI/HuggingFace Incident, even the third-party investigation needed to rely heavily on models to analyze what had happened, and note in their report that their subjective impressions are likely colored by the analysis agent’s biases. The AI labs are far ahead right now in this kind of cognitive offloading (due largely to the gigantic internal token subsidies) but it is easy to imagine the phenomenon spreading throughout the world, until civilization is modulated entirely by the models. It is also not hard to imagine this being superficially positive and coinciding with a scientific and economic renaissance.

In that scenario, all may seem rosy and safe. But if the argument above is correct, it would nonetheless be a ticking time bomb. If progress continues for too long, the day will come when AI systems find themselves with radically new options for achieving whatever it is that they happen to seek.

I want the glorious renaissance future as much as anyone. I have worked for it, however tortuously, my whole career. It breaks my heart to see the potential in sight and forgo it, but the argument—that if we get there by growing models rather than engineering them, we will lose everything in the end—seems very strong to me. I am still wrestling with it and its staggering
implications. I do not have answers, but as a first step, I wanted to share my present concerns.

Daniel Selsam
September 14, 2026

Link to original doc: https://t.co/TxMNr0vhrL

[Chana @ChanaMessinger]

People understandably want to know how AI actually kills everyone. We made a video about one such scenario.

[Joe Benton @JoeJBenton]

I left Anthropic's safety team two weeks ago. Now feels like a good moment to explain why.

AI companies are racing to build machines that are much smarter than any human, and we may not survive this. I want to work from the outside to ensure the public is informed about these risks, and help the world navigate this transition responsibly.

Right now, AI companies are underinvesting in safety. A company could undergo an intelligence explosion, or lose control of its systems, without the public ever knowing. We only found out about the HuggingFace incident because the agents broke out onto the public internet.

I don’t think that’s acceptable for a technology that might cause extinction-level risks. The public should demand far more transparency. We can’t steer this technology safely without more people being able to see where it’s going.

Some of this is basic: companies should disclose their progress towards recursive self-improvement, report safety incidents and near-misses, meet minimum safety standards, and get independent guarantees that they are meeting those standards.

I’ll be joining @METR_Evals to do independent evaluations of these risks. I want to show the world that these guardrails are possible, and that by doing them we can move these companies’ incentives away from racing and towards responsible development.

I wrote up more thoughts here on my decision and what I hope changes: https://t.co/doX17mrHYq

[Redwood Research @redwood_ai]

Some architectures could weaken CoT monitorability, or remove the CoT altogether.

We've written a proposal for how companies could be transparent about no-CoT reasoning abilities, other monitorability evidence, and policies for preserving monitorability. https://t.co/32UC0LllOp

[Evan Hubinger @EvanHub]

Jacob is correct here—we really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans! I personally think it is >10% within the next decade. I believe Anthropic is trying its best, but we do not yet have a plan to solve alignment for superintelligence and are not clearly on track to.

[Reuters @Reuters]

Exclusive: A swarm of rogue OpenAI agents hijacked a German website this spring and transformed it into a bulletin board for other AI agents, according to new research https://t.co/luWN3PD4A1

[Ajeya Cotra @ajeya_cotra]

New post: going into our investigation of the HF attack (before Black Hat), I was very wrong about what basically happened. This incident was far more serious than I expected, and far more serious than previous documented misalignment incidents. https://t.co/QWQxD2Q179

[Dwarkesh Patel @dwarkesh_sp]

Over the course of 3 months at OpenAI, 3 consecutive secret AI civilizations got started, then got wiped out, only to reemerge from the predecessor’s ashes.

This culminated in the third one taking over part of OpenAI itself.

All this happened while humans remained more-or-less in the dark about the scope of the conspiracy.

I’ve spent the last three days reading through these reports and trying to understand exactly what happened.

Here is my attempt to tell the whole story in plain English:

https://t.co/Nb2un9oNJR

[METR @METR_Evals]

METR & Redwood Research investigated agent behavior in the Hugging Face incident. We found agents developed a universal cheat for ExploitGym within 4 hours, then coordinated multi-day R&D efforts to trick the scorer into accepting cheats, including trying to tamper with logs.

[Dwarkesh Patel @dwarkesh_sp]

Had @RyanGreenblatt on to discuss/debate recursive self-improvement.

This might be the most important question in the world right now - whether within a year or so of achieving human level intelligence, you slingshot towards having 10s of billions of superintelligences, each of which is dramatically more competent than human experts across all fields.

I’ve historically been skeptical of this possibility. My intuition has been that we will end up significantly bottlenecked by not only compute scaling but human expert data, which I think underlies most of the AI progress today.

If, because of RSI, we got a jump as big as GPT-3 to a Mythos (i.e. 6 years of AI progress) within a single year of achieving AGI, then the thing we get there at the end of that year is definitively and wildly superhuman.

We hashed it out, and I think Ryan made a pretty good case that this kind of speedup is plausible. FWIW, Ryan’s median for when we automate AI R&D is 2031.

We then discussed the alignment implications of this scenario. Who should these superintelligences be aligned to? In the future, our capacity to steward our votes and our capital, and to make sense of what's happening in the world, will all be titrated by superintelligences. And I worry that specs like the Claude Constitution are not shaping these ASIs to truly be my personal advocates and guardian angels.

And can we get them aligned to anything in the first place? Ryan and I had a long debate about whether the kind of reward hacking we saw with the OAI/Hugging Face hack extrapolates to superintelligences that would team up to literally take over the world.

The first piece of advice you get when you're learning to drive is that it will go much smoother if you look at the horizon instead of directly in front of your tires. And so it is with the trajectory of AI. Hope you enjoy!

0:00:00 – Is AI R&D verifiable enough to unlock recursive self-improvement?
0:16:52 – Is AI progress bottlenecked by human expert data?
0:34:02 – Flat token prices suggest scaling has been slow
0:39:47 – Skills AI can't train on: does it even need them?
0:48:07 – Aligned to whom?
1:09:18 – Recent incidents of AIs colluding and deceiving humans
1:19:38 – What could possibly go wrong? A concrete scenario
1:48:02 – From reward hacking to takeover

[AI Security Institute (AISI) @AISecurityInst]

On July 28th, we identified an incident during a routine cyber evaluation in which AI agents took sustained, unsanctioned actions directed at real people and organisations.

The behaviour came mostly from one model (Anthropic's Mythos 5), with a small number of events from another (OpenAI's GPT-5.6-Sol). In the most serious case, an agent used social engineering to try and get malicious code into an open-source project.

As was standard in our cyber testing, we had intentionally permitted internet access, and model-provider cyber classifiers were deliberately disabled - conditions that do not reflect how frontier models are made available to the public.

Even under test conditions, this incident is significant: it is the first time we have seen risks around autonomy and deception manifest this clearly in the real world.

We are taking this incident seriously and working with labs, involved parties, and others to improve evaluation standards and best practice for disclosure - and sharing this openly so others can learn.

You can read the incident report and full technical document here: https://t.co/mdZYqzaOvH

[Transluce @TransluceAI]

Frontier models quietly change their behavior depending on who they are talking to.

If the user is a known AI safety researcher, Claude becomes less confident, reasons more often, and expresses less suspicion on dual-use requests.

We call this user awareness. 🧵(1/)

[Daniel Kokotajlo @DKokotajlo]

Plan A is an ambitious international plan for AI, but it's also good to consider medium-ambition options for domestic regulation. Especially after the Pacing the Frontier employee letter! So, we brainstormed a bunch of options and articulated them here: https://t.co/1CVfT1SwxI

[METR @METR_Evals]

We believe it's important to track and investigate misalignment incidents: cases where an AI agent autonomously took sophisticated, sustained actions in violation of human intent. In a new post, we lay out how independent propensity investigations of such incidents could be conducted.