@DrewCohenMoney A discussion about Costar. Your thoughts on segmentation of https://t.co/2wCuqvzAGV into residential. Is management obfuscating homes data?
We broke all of this down (with full valuation + downside scenarios) in the deep dive.
It’s usually behind the paywall — but it’s open right now:
https://t.co/dbrxF7GEic
🧵Let me take you back to August 1990. Three weeks ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait, oil prices have surged, and the FOMC is meeting to decide how to respond. The economy looks wobbly. Payrolls just recorded a small decline. Greenspan talks about a credit bubble that has started to deflate. There's more than a few credit cockroaches. But nobody thinks the US economy is sliding into recession. The Maestro urges stoicism. Nobody knows what’s going to happen in the Middle East, central banks cant really alter the outcome, so its best to provide stability – by doing nothing.
You are right that these aren't bad assets and there was a strategic rationale, but that is a different question than whether investors were left better off from the acquisition.
I am probably generally more pessimistic than you about the nature of bureaucratic businesses and the institutional imperative. This is largely why I favor founder-led companies and managers who have skin in the game.
There was strategic merit to the idea that they could bolster their fixed income offerings with iBoxx, iTraxx, CDS, and ABX (probably some of the stronger assets acquired) plus move into private assets with iLevel as a head start. I don't believe, though, that S&P has superior offerings to competitors like Bloomberg—what they do best is different and competition still exists.
EDIN and the upstream physical asset data do improve the Commodities Insights Segment (now called Energy), but they also dilute the Platts pricing assessment business, which again is far higher quality.
IHS also didn't have any distribution and they thought the Market Intelligence platform could be a new source of monetizing existing data feeds.
The importance of ROIC cannot be understated though. Shareholders return over the long-run always gravitates towards the returns of the underlying business.
If you are diluting ROIC by paying $44bn for assets that 5 years out have an earnings yield of 4%, then overall shareholder returns will fall. (Earnings yield math below).
I get your point on the intangibles on their books distorting the figures, but it isn't just an accounting treatment. This was effectively money put back into the business (in the form of shareholder dilution and assumed debt).
You can back out the intangibles to get a sense of what the ROIC of those assets are, and they are high, but the SPGI shareholders paid up for that, which is what the balance sheet is reflecting.
Instagram, in contrast, would show an extremely high ROIC, despite the $1bn of intangibles Facebook would have added to their Balance Sheet.
Ultimately, $SPGI shareholders had to give away a third of a truly fantastic businesses (credit rating, index's, Platts) in order to buff up offerings in their lowest margin and most competitive segment...
I don't disagree that there was a strategic reason, but I just think they were focusing on the wrong game.
What would leave shareholders better off?
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For year end 2021, IHS had $1.2bn in earnings. Even if we give them full credit for the revenue and cost synergies ($600m + 350m), they paid basically 23x times 5 year out earnings.
By analyzing $4 trillion of shipments between January 2024 and November 2025, researchers found that foreign exporters absorbed only about 4% of the burden of last year’s U.S. tariff increases by lowering their prices, while American consumers and importers absorbed 96%.
The tariffs had a significant effect on trade volumes: Facing higher U.S. tariffs, Indian exporters maintained their prices but reduced the volume of shipments to the U.S. by 18%-24% relative to the European Union, Canada and Australia, the report found.
Rather than acting as a tax on foreign producers, the tariffs functioned as a consumption tax on Americans. The $200 billion in additional U.S. tariff revenue last year “was paid almost exclusively by Americans.”
https://t.co/ORN8xsgyk8
For over a decade, $UBER was the world’s most famous "bad business."
As an asset-light, marketplace with no incremental costs to booking an additional ride, their profitability should have come easily.
However, it took them 14 years to become profitable!
Let me explain 🧵