Honestly, 30 is such a good age to start over. You know yourself better now, you’re less afraid to choose differently, and you finally understand what you actually want. 30 is not the deadline, babe. It’s just another beginning.
i hate large crowds, but i really love concerts. i hate loud noises, but i love loud music. i hate talking to people, but i'm the most talkative person when i'm comfortable. i hate change, but i love trying new things. it feels weird, but i love it.
It’s always fun to throw people off with your duality. You can be mysterious but also honest about your lived experiences. Funny but strict. You can be multiple things at once. Life is more fun that way when you have a multidimensional and layered personality.
i’m a professional figure it out person.
i’ll worry ofc because i have anxiety and some perfectionism issues but at the end of the day, i always figure it out.
How can you not be anxious or depressed with the state of this country! The physical, mental and emotional toll is enough to unground you. Grace to us all! The burden is heavy. 💔
Many African leaders will call for permanent Security Council seats and the veto for Africa at the UN General Assembly High Level Debate in 2 weeks. But have they assessed the implications? A permanent seat won't be a charitable donation. With power comes responsibility. There are few, if any, African countries with the financial resources and a strong enough argument to convince their citizens that it's good value for the money. Let's do a back-of-the-envelope calculation. In time, @NYUCIC will publish a policy paper on this subject so please treat this post as an initial foray that contributes to the spirited reception to yesterday's speech by @USAmbUN Linda Thomas-Greenfield at @CFR_org.
Reflecting their special responsibility, the P5 pay more than half of the UN's peacekeeping budget, which in 2023-24 is $6.1 billion. The US pays 26.94%; China: 18.68%; the UK: 5.35%; France: 5.28%; and Russia: 2.28%. To match Russia's share would cost almost $140 million. It doesn't stop there.
To wield the veto is to be a global diplomatic player. The P5 each have over 250 diplomatic representations worldwide, including embassies, high commissions, and consulates. Egypt and South Africa have Africa's largest diplomatic footprints, but their numbers are less than half of those of the P5. Suffice it to say, an African permanent member would need to at least double and probably to quadruple its diplomatic service. For the East African country I know best, this would require a budget of at least $600 million annually.
Don't forget the intelligence efforts required. The veto power applies globally, not just to your neighbors. The intelligence used to make decisions as a permanent member cannot be found solely on the evening news. It would require the collection of signals and human intelligence far beyond what any African country is doing at present. As a yardstick, France and the UK spend the least among the P5. Public records, which likely undercount the amount, show that the more parsimonious of them spends at least $1 billion a year on their external intelligence arm.
Paying for the responsibility does not stop there. You cannot be a permanent member with veto power while receiving food aid — especially not from your counterparts! Today, a fair number of the citizens of 33 African countries survive on aid. The African member would need to be completely food self-sufficient, meaning that economic transformation is essential.
It would also require the member to resolve the major political divides that increase its risk of major civil unrest or insurgency. Otherwise, the wrong vetos could lead to regime change operations from the global or regional power whose toes you are stepping on. In other words, almost every African country will need major political reengineering to be ready to step up to the plate.
Simply put, to occupy a permanent seat as a country, unanchored from regional integration, the new member must be a true power; otherwise, it will be a mere proxy of other members, constantly under threat and displaying to the world its lack of autonomy. It would start off as a strutting peacock before steadily declining into a plucked chicken!
So far, we are talking about a minimum of $1.5 billion annually, and probably closer to double or triple that figure. For what? What exactly would be the return on this investment domestically?
While the costs are enormous, the potential for reshaping global power dynamics in favor of African interests justifies the investment. But it would only be doable as part of a regional project, which would demand bold realignments and reforms of the @_AfricaUnion. The changes would need to be far-reaching enough for the majority of countries on the continent to anticipate clear benefits.
President @PaulKagame's proposal for a permanent chair for the AU, along with one that rotates among countries, is a great starting point for the conversation. His delivery of the @AfCFTA has given the continent the opportunity to develop the economic leverage needed for greater empowerment. Geopolitics is driven by geo-economics, and vice versa.
What is needed now, to make this a truly world-changing project, is a Pan-Africanist political vision, connected through a series of sequenced steps toward the realization of a continental free trade area. For example, political seniority regarding the continent's first representative as a permanent Security Council member could be determined by a country’s level of economic integration with the rest of Africa. This would build on Agenda 2063, implemented with deliberate and innovative action.
The AU Commission has a critical role in supporting the emergence of these strategies and tactics. Choosing the next chairperson wisely is essential. Otherwise, the continent could face 10 wasted years of dithering and misdirection.
Practice runs can start soon, with African heads of state and government deciding that one of Africa’s 3 current positions on the UNSC will be subject to the decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council, requiring countries vying for election to commit. The seat would revolve every two years and, while lacking veto power, would hold immense moral authority as the embodiment of AU decisions. The permanent representative can come from the elected country, while the delegation's staff would be seconded from the AU Commission via the @AfricanUnionUN.
The Committee of Ten (C-10) Heads of State and Government on the reform of the @UN Security Council plus other leaders need to be equal to the task: @PresidentBio@KagutaMuseveni@CyrilRamaphosa@officialABAT@AlsisiOfficial@HHichilema@WilliamsRuto@DrNangoloMbumba
Timeline of key events before Ghana defaulted on their debts leading to serious pain and inflation
Interestingly it begins with Moody and Fitch ratings.
10 months to defaulting , Moody's downgraded Ghana from B3 to Caa1, saying Ghana had a "very high credit risk", this was after early January Fitch rating dropped to B- from B.
For those that are keen, a few days ago, Moody’s downgraded Kenya’s ratings to CAA1, two days ago Fitch Ratings downgraded Kenya to 'B-' from 'B'. Just the same way Ghana was downgraded before things started worsening.
That Kenya will default is not a matter of if but when ....
Here is a timeline of events.
* February 2022 - Credit ratings agency Moody's downgrades Ghana's credit rating from B3 to Caa1, saying the country had a "very high credit risk", after Fitch cut its Ghana credit rating to B- from B in January.
* March 2022 - Ghana's central bank hikes interest rates by a record 250 basis points to 17% in a bid to stem rocketing inflation and a weakening currency.
* April 2022 - The cocoa producer's parliament approves an "e-levy" tax on electronic payments.
* May 2022 - Ghana's then-finance minister Ken Ofori-Atta says it will manage its debt without International Monetary Fund (IMF) help.
* July 1, 2022 - Ghana's government changes its mind and asks the IMF for a loan, amid street protests against growing economic hardship.
* July 20, 2022 - Ghana's parliament approves a $750 million loan from the African Export Import Bank as it scrambles to avoid default.
* August 2022 - Ghana's central bank delivers another record interest rate hike, as inflation continues climbing.
* Dec. 5, 2022 - Ghana launches a domestic debt exchange in a bid to deal with spiralling debt payments.
* Dec. 12, 2022 - Ghana and the IMF reach a "staff-level agreement" on a $3 billion rescue package, with debt restructuring one of the conditions.
* Dec. 20, 2022 - Ghana says it will default on most external debt.
* Dec. 22, 2022 - Local pension funds are exempted from the domestic debt exchange after unions threaten a general strike.
* January 2023 - Ghana requests a debt restructuring under the G20's Common Framework process, set up in response to the COVID-19 pandemic to include China, India and other creditor countries not in the traditional Paris Club of wealthy lending nations.
* February 2023 - Ghana's finance ministry says the domestic debt exchange closed with about 85% of "eligible" bondholders on board, after five deadline extensions. The country's official bilateral creditors start talks to form a committee.
* March 2023 - Ghana's government and a group of holders of about $13 billion in international bonds start debt restructuring talks via their respective advisers.
* May 2023 - Ghana's official creditors form a committee co-chaired by China and France and commit to restructuring their loans to the country. These "financing assurances" pave the way for the IMF board to approve the $3 billion rescue loan, five days later.
* June 2023 - Ghana sends a restructuring proposal to official creditors, as it aims to cut $10.5 billion in interest payments over the following three years.
* October 2023 - Ghana and the IMF reach a staff-level agreement on the first review of the $3 billion loan programme, with a second $600 million payout contingent on agreeing a debt rework plan with official creditors. The finance ministry proposes a 30-40% haircut to bondholders; bond prices sink in response.
* January 2024 - Ghana reaches a deal-in-principle on Jan. 12 to restructure $5.4 billion of debt to its official creditors, with the IMF subsequently approving the next loan payout a week later.
The government tells overseas bondholders that it wants a simple debt restructuring, rather than using any "state-contingent debt instruments", which link payouts to variables such as economic growth or commodity prices.
* February 2024 - Ghana's president replaces Ken Ofori-Atta as finance minister with his deputy Mohammed Amin Adam, who pledges to keep the IMF programme on track.
* March 2024 - Ghana and the international bondholder group kick off formal talks.
* April 2024 - Ghana and its bondholders fail to strike a deal, with the government saying the proposals put forward were not extensive enough to cut its debt to a level that the IMF would judge as sustainable.
* May 2024 - Ghana's government confirms that a draft memorandum of understanding has been received from its bilateral creditors. Once signed, the MoU will formalise the $5.4 billion agreement reached in January with the likes of France and China.
* June 2024 - Ghana and its international bondholders reach an agreement in principle on restructuring of its dollar bonds.
I get this question a lot. “What’s the end game with you guys?” So I wrote an article about it. Democracy is not a spectator sport, it requires active participation. @Eastleighvoice