@bnielson01 Sequence 1 (you/Deutsch): explanatory universality -> (increased human mimicry?) -> culture
Seq. 2 (Henrich?): purported mimicry ability -> culture -> increased intelligence (presumably including E.U.)
(and then the separate qn of which of these links is causal)
Fair summary?
Enjoyed this post from Joseph Heath. There is a section which seems to run counter to @DavidDeutschOxf 's view of human evolution:
https://t.co/ZjuxHsdzHm
"Human infants got really good... at mindlessly copying others β repeating the exact behaviours that they observe.
@bnielson01 It sounds like you agree with Deutsch to the extent that the order of events was the other way round. Henrich's view is at least a lens I hadn't considered before.
@bnielson01 Thanks!
So you/Byrne agree that what animals lack is not understanding/insight in an absolute sense.
This then would be compatible with Henrich's view that humans are distinctive in greatly increasing behavioural mimicry (between your 2nd and 3rd leaps)...
@bnielson01 On Heath's/Henrich's view, culture came before specifically human intelligence. Whereas I think Deutsch says that specifically human intell. (ie. explanatory universality) is what allows for human culture.
(I just saw that Brett Hall has posted about this along the same lines)
@bnielson01 My read of Heath: humans blindly copy behavior of peers, but mimicry is precisely their strength, bc it lets them absorb the surrounding cultural knowledge, w/out needing to derive it from first principles.
Animals don't have complex culture bc they're not imitative *enough*
"This created the possibility for more complex culture...by freeing it from the bottleneck [of] by individual intelligence. Chimps...observ[e] others...then use their own intelligence to reproduce the performance...Humans, by contrast...copy others even [without understanding]."
@JakeOrthwein Don't you think what he ought to say is that people want entertainment without having to think too hard?
Or maybe that is the implicit criterion of good vs. average movies: thought-provoking vs entertaining.
@Plinz Did Aristotle think the soul is "independent of the substrate", ie. it could be instantiated in different matter? My understanding is that for him, the soul just is the structural-functional organisation of a particular configuration of matter (ie. a body). So not independent?
But for organisms without a self-model, there is no perspective to take; there is no "thing" experiencing, there is just experience, free-floating as it were. And the apparent absurdity of this notion leads some to conclude that such organisms therefore cannot be conscious.
To an organism with a world-model that doesn't include a model of *itself as an agent in that world*, what would conscious experiences be like?
Take aversion, for eg. What is aversion when there is no agent to discriminate between good and bad, between aversive and pleasant?
This is why the common definition of consciousness, whereby something is conscious if there is "something it is like" to be that thing, is problematic. It tempts us to ask whether something is conscious by taking on that thing's perspective, and imagining the result.