Matan Hamilis

Co-Founder & CTO @sodot_hq | Web3 MPC Key Management Infrastructure | Cryptography Ph.D student @ Reichman University

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@alinush This is similar to PRGs, which have an upper bound on their stretch so a safe API would prevent a user from stretching too much.

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

Great discussion by @alinush
one missing point: people compare protocols, treating them as if they were standalone, black-box objects.
They are not.
The hardest part isn't getting the cryptography math right but ensuring that a user doesn't end up shooting his own foot.
🧵

[alin.apt @alinush]

Would be nice if someone did a literature review of all threshold ECDSA protocols, attacks and argued for what should be the safest & fast-enough choice for production.

Is it Cait-Sith (https://t.co/480Fi4Og8z)?

Is it DKLs23 (https://t.co/qGtLHB8oJa)?

Heck, maybe it is a generic MPC VM-based one (@badcryptobitch)?

@cryptodavidw has a list of some recent protocols but his blog is not prescriptive, unfortunately (https://t.co/cRVlm5QcWf)

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@alinush In any case: Presigs are like nonces so reusing them == loss of key. So people need to be very careful when consuming them unless the code exposes a safe API that prevents the user from shooting his own foot.

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@alinush For dishonest majority I really like DKLs due to its modular description and I think with presignatures compatibility of the DKLs23 it has great practical potential.
For honest majority, a much simpler task which Thorchain may consider, KU'23 is pretty neat and straightforward.

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

I think MPC implementations (but NOT academic protocol descriptions) should care much more about footgun-free APIs and abstractions before considering second order matters such as latency.
This facet of applied crypto is often missing in the academia-centric MPC space.

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

Putting the responsibility on the end user to terminate globally parallel sessions is a fragile abstraction of the cryptography.
Much like expecting a user to never reuse a nonce.
Limiting parallelism is also too leaky and restrictive.

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@EliBenSasson @CarolineDPham @KeithGrossman @ivanhodl Thanks Eli!

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@CarolineDPham @moonpay @sodot_hq Let's go!

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@moonpay 🤙❤️

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@DanielBachmat גילוי מעניין לא פחות (ולדעתי אף יותר) שלו הוא ה-Oblivious Transfers, שווה קריאה

[Sodot @sodot_hq]

𝗜𝗻𝘀𝘁𝗶𝘁𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗸 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗼𝘄𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝗸𝗲𝘆𝘀. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗱𝗼𝗻’𝘁.

For years, the focus was on custody risk. But as workflows move to automated execution across vendors and platforms, execution risk has become the bigger threat.

Our co-founder &. CTO, @MHamilis, breaks down why this shift matters in his latest @TechTimes_News article:

🔗https://t.co/fcpNF08fYs

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@gakonst For Rust Claude is pretty good for generic code / boilerplates. When crypto dependecies are involved it's meh.
With std::simd, it is barely generating code that compiles, at least for me.

Note: Claude is still the best model out there for my use cases so far.

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@veorq Wasn't the hack on Solana which uses Ed25519?

[Ethan Buchman (🐝,🦇) @buchmanster]

@luhelminger yes i should have said, i all the time have say 3-node MPC+TEE in mind as a major improvement

[Matan Hamilis @MHamilis]

@buchmanster @luhelminger Agreed! Let alone three nodes deployed on three distinct cloud platforms (say AWS, Azure & GCP) with three distinct TEE stacks (SGX, AMD-SEV SNP, Nitro).

From experience I can share it gets tricky though to achieve sufficiently low latency due to positioning of the data centers.