Rahima Mahmut

Singer, translator, human rights activist. Executive Director @UyghurStop. Tweets in a personal capacity.

[Rahima Mahmut @MahmutRahima]

Happy Eid ❤️
There will come a day when we celebrate Eid in our homeland of East Turkistan for which we all fight and pray!
Live recording from a casual Uyghur dance performance at the Kurultaj 2018, Bugac, Hungary. @UyghurProject @lukedepulford @UyghurCongress @benedictrogers

[Rahima Mahmut @MahmutRahima]

Thank you, @lumli_lumlong for this deeply moving tribute to Rahile Omer. A childhood stolen, a young life lost. She deserved a future filled with love, freedom and hope, not nine years of imprisonment. May her soul rest in peace, and may justice one day prevail. 🕊️💔
@ipacglobal

[Lumli Lumlong 淋漓淋浪 @lumli_lumlong]

In memory of Rahile Omer, a Uyghur girl imprisoned in a #DetentionCamp by the #CCP at 14, who died at 23.
May justice and compassion embrace her soul.🕊️

記念拉希萊・奧馬爾。這位維吾爾少女14歲被監禁，23歲離世。願公義與慈愛抱著她的靈魂。

@MahmutRahima
@UyghurStop
@UyghurCongress

[Winston Sterzel @serpentza]

If you can cheat, then cheat 能骗就骗 is a well known saying and philosophy in mainland China, unfortunately the bad eggs who practice this way of life have moved all around the globe and practice it to its fullest. This time in Tokyo where a Chinese national has just been caught disrupting cellular networks to scam the public. If you can cheat… then cheat

[Gustavo Cardenas @gustav0cardenas]

La espía china no solo quería los secretos de Nvidia, sino también a su CEO Jensen Huang.

Estuve leyendo la historia completa y es de película: la inteligencia de Estados Unidos concluyó que una ejecutiva china, Alice Huang, fue reclutada por el Ministerio de Seguridad del Estado para acercarse al CEO de Nvidia, el hombre que dirige la empresa más valiosa del mundo en plena guerra de los chips.

Alice Huang no es pariente de Jensen Huang, aunque compartan apellido. Era directora gerente de Megaspeed International, una empresa de centros de datos de Singapur, cliente de Nvidia y socia de su red de nube. Se conocieron por negocios: hay fotos juntos en un bar de Taipéi en junio de 2024, y los vieron de nuevo tras una cena en mayo de 2025.
Según el New York Times, la vigilancia electrónica sobre Alice reveló su contacto con un estadounidense, y al identificarlo resultó ser Jensen Huang. La conclusión de inteligencia: ella pasaba información a Pekín, y su misión incluía recabar datos sobre los chips de IA más avanzados de Nvidia y tratar de que Huang presionara para que se enviaran GPU avanzadas a China.

En paralelo corre la otra trama: Megaspeed ya estaba bajo investigación del Departamento de Comercio desde finales de 2024, cuando un funcionario encontró equipos de Nvidia todavía en cajas en un centro de datos en Malasia. Su filial malasia compró al menos 4.800 millones de dólares en equipos con chips Nvidia entre junio de 2024 y febrero de 2026. El caso pasó al Departamento de Justicia en 2026. Nvidia dice que investigó y no encontró desvío. Comprar mucho no prueba por sí solo que los chips terminaran en China.

El estallido llegó el 29 de octubre, cuando el Times publicó la historia. China lo negó todo. Singapur aclaró que nunca investigó a Alice Huang como espía (la investigación sobre Megaspeed como empresa sí sigue abierta). Tres presidentes de comités de la Cámara pidieron una sesión a puerta cerrada para el 18 de noviembre.
Y el domingo 8 de noviembre llegó la confirmación personal: Jensen Huang escribió a los empleados admitiendo que fue infiel a su esposa, sin nombrar a nadie. El consejo de Nvidia abrió una investigación independiente y dice no tener motivos para creer que se comprometieran secretos o la seguridad nacional. Trump lo llamó una persona honorable. Las acciones cayeron alrededor de 3% fuera de horario.

Aquí hay que separar dos cosas. La infidelidad la confirmó el propio Huang. El espionaje, no: es una evaluación de inteligencia basada en fuentes anónimas y un memorando clasificado que nadie ha visto. No hay cargos contra nadie, no hay detenciones, y no se ha hecho público qué información pasó Alice Huang, si es que pasó alguna.

Lo que sí queda claro es el cambio de época: la guerra por los chips ya no se libra solo con aranceles y controles de exportación. Ahora el objetivo es la persona. El CEO de la empresa más valiosa del planeta era el blanco, y ni siquiera lo sabía.

[Gordon G. Chang @GordonGChang]

Jensen Huang should step side as Nvidia CEO while the company’s investigation continues. The investigation, if it exonerates him, will appear tainted if he does not take a leave.

[Tom Tugendhat @TomTugendhat]

Huang’s honey trap is a warning: China’s MSS will stop at nothing in gaining business and military supremacy.
Who is next?
https://t.co/3n3HmYSCJq

[Luke de Pulford @lukedepulford]

I’m sorry WHAT?

A company run by a Chinese spy funded private intelligence efforts to develop kompromat on MPs and Peers sanctioned by China?

And they’re finding out via the Daily Mail?

https://t.co/cPTERfTPAv

[Stop Uyghur Genocide @UyghurStop]

Rahile Omer, the youngest person identified in the leaked 2022 Xinjiang Police Files, has died in prison aged just 23. Chinese authorities detained her when she was only 14.

In her memory, we ask you toscreenshot her portrait and change your profile picture.

@MahmutRahima

[Gordon G. Chang @GordonGChang]

In China, people almost all the time fear the regime and obey. Sometimes, however, they explode. Anger builds up in repressive societies.

[Rahima Mahmut @MahmutRahima]

The power of music transcends borders and gives voice to stories that must be heard.

Through our musical collaboration with Professor Erdem Özdemir and his extraordinary band, we tell the stories of my Uyghur people.

Join us tonight at 22:45 (Türkiye time) on TRT Müzik!❤️💐🎉

[Luke de Pulford @lukedepulford]

Joshua Wong has been robbed of his youth by an insecure regime, forcing him to serve time twice for the same “offences”.

Meanwhile the UK, who, with China promised to uphold Hong Kong’s autonomy, will allow Joshua to pay the price for their failure. “Very concerned”.

[Stop Uyghur Genocide @UyghurStop]

🚨 BREAKING: The UK Government has committed to legislating against forced labour in supply chains, including removing forced-labour goods from GB markets.

A welcome step, but the £350m threshold risks leaving loopholes for smaller businesses.

@MahmutRahima

[Kenneth Roth @KenRoth]

Where is UN rights chief @volker_turk on this case? Or does his policy of never criticizing Beijing for their treatment of Uyghurs mean he'll ignore the fate of these two men too?

[Free Tibet @freetibetorg]

UK Parliament's 1st report on doing business with #China concludes that govt has failed to deliver on its 2024 promise of a new, strategic, long-term, consistent UK approach to China https://t.co/fmqm4D6Ici 1/2

[Zumretay Arkin @ZumretErkin]

Mission affichage en cours ✅

Merci à tous nos bénévoles qui sont venus nous donner un coup de pouce!

@blocquebecois @forumjeunessebq

#lauriersaintemarie #electionpartielle

[Yalkun Uluyol @YalkunUluyol]

Thailand has kept Uyghurs in inhumane detention for years and then complied with Beijing’s demands to send them to China, where they were forcibly disappeared. Now, two Uyghurs are at imminent risk. Thai authorities should halt returning them to harm’s way.https://t.co/tqMUcZKXEz

[Lord (David) Alton @DavidAltonHL]

As Cyber Bill Amendment 164 goes to @HouseofCommons for ping pong, I urge Ministers to read @liambyrnemp Report.

What I said in @UKHouseofLords: “So why do I support Amendment 164? (With @TimClementJone1 @NickMarkham @JonathanCamrose )?Part 4 of the Bill rightly equips the Secretary of State with formidable powers to issue directions in the interests of national security. Yet, as the Bill stands, those powers risk operating in a strategic vacuum. If we are to empower Ministers to intervene decisively to protect our essential services and our critical supply chains, that intervention must be anchored to an objective, statutory assessment of who threatens us. We cannot defend what we value against an adversary whom we refuse to formally identify. Amendment 164 provides that essential statutory spine by establishing a clear, maintained register of foreign powers that pose an acute risk to our critical network and information systems—something that came home to us last week when so many of our systems nationally were attacked. We do not necessarily know by whom, but we can no doubt guess.
We certainly know that in the past the NHS was subjected to attacks by the regime in North Korea. Critically, this is not a political blacklist. It is not subject to diplomatic whim; it is an intelligence-led mechanism rooted in the hard, objective assessments of GCHQ. Where our intelligence agencies have confirmed that a foreign state or its proxies have perpetrated attacks against our essential services within the last seven years, or where they issue clear warnings of imminent peril, that state must be listed.The definition must be clear-eyed about modern authoritarian governance. In the People’s Republic of China, for instance, the state, the military and the Chinese Communist Party are inextricably fused. To assess state-backed cyber threats while ignoring the governing political party that directs them would be wilful blindness.This amendment closes that semantic loophole once and for all.
Furthermore, Amendment 164 demands that we confront our own domestic vulnerabilities. It requires the Secretary of State to review not merely attacks launched from across oceans but the profound risks inherent in foreign-owned or foreign-controlled infrastructure situated on our own soil. For far too long, across successive Administrations,our critical national infrastructure has been treated with commercial naivety rather than strategic discipline. By requiring the Government to conduct this review and lay a coherent action plan before @UKParliament within 6 months,this amendment ends the era of bureaucratic drift.
Let me end by referring to the inquiry that I chaired on behalf of @HumanRightsCtte into transnational repression. Our domestic policy’s failure is illustrated by the reluctance to act on the recommendation that the committee made unanimously to place China,the state we found was the most responsible for transnational repression in the UK, even more than Russia or Iran, in the foreign influence registration scheme’s top tier. Unlike with those two other countries,we have failed to do so.
When @eliz_lloyd comes to reply can she give us any information about whether @DanJarvisMBE , -responsible for security issues-who promised to continue to keep this issue under review,has done anything further to act on our committee’s recommendations & those raised by the Intelligence & Security Committee,led by Lord Beamish (see reply below).
Strategic ambiguity has been the order of the day. It does not deter authoritarian regimes; merely invites opportunistic aggression. If we are serious about building genuine national cyber resilience,replace vague administrative discretion with an empirical,transparent and accountable framework.I urge @_Government_UK to embrace this vital measure & accept Amendment 164 Short summary here:
https://t.co/GrV0tmPPSo @andyburnham @KemiBadenoch @EdwardJDavey @TomTugendhat @ShabanaMahmood

[Lord (David) Alton @DavidAltonHL]

CCP Persecution: Check out some of the people persecuted in China for their faith @HRWFint produce regular reports and say that a “ huge number of believers of all faiths are arrested and imprisoned for years: thousands of Falun Gong practitioners and Church of Almighty God members + 1-2 million Uyghur Muslims reeducated in camps.
A Database of Uyghur Muslim Prisoners is run by https://t.co/xqESnrof5m and contains over 61,000 documented cases.
A Database of Political Prisoners is also run by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database with Archives stopping in October 2019.
HRWF also has archives off-line.
The number of documented cases below is merely illustrative and is just the tip of the iceberg.
CHINA: Christians (Catholics – Protestants) – 62
CHINA: Buddhists (Tibetans) – 94
CHINA: Muslims – 193
CHINA: Falun Gong – 194
CHINA: Church of Almighty God – 264
CHINA: Unspecified Believers – 11 .Read in full - See CHINA: Religious persecution and issues – Bimonthly Digest October 16-31 | Human Rights Without Frontiers https://t.co/X9hwGcp4vZ And https://t.co/GU9YXX9B24

[Stop Uyghur Genocide @UyghurStop]

This Islamophobia Awareness Month, we stand in solidarity with all those facing religious discrimination and persecution.

Stay tuned to SUG’s social media channels and website throughout the month as we highlight the importance of this month of solidarity.

@MahmutRahima

[Laura Harth @LauraHarth]

Must read. https://t.co/Dtos1jj8j2

[维吾尔人权项目 @UHRP_Chinese]

两名中国公民受中国情报机构指使，拍摄了美国海军征兵站和导弹核潜艇基地。两人各被判处30个月监禁。

10月30日，奥克兰的一名联邦法官对40岁的赖利仁（Liren “Ryan” Lai，音译）和39岁的陈远策（Yuance Chen，音译）作出判决，认定他们充当了中国国家安全部（MSS）未注册的代理人。赖利仁居住在中国，持访问签证进入美国；陈远策则是居住在俄勒冈州“快乐谷”（Happy Valley）的美国绿卡持有者。两人均已认罪。刑满释放后，他们还将面临三年的监管期。

法庭文件显示，赖利仁最迟于2021年5月将陈远策招募至麾下。此后，陈远策拍摄了位于华盛顿州的基察普海军基地（Navy Base Kitsap）——这是美国弹道导弹核潜艇的重要基地。他还拍摄并录制了南加州一处海军征兵站内的新兵和水兵，其中包括一块列有新兵姓名及家乡的公告板；据报道，名单上的许多人与中国有关联。

陈远策还保存了所谓的“目标档案包”（targeting packages）——即针对被视为潜在招募对象的军事人员所整理的详细个人资料，其中包含了一名海军雇员的个人信息。调查人员在其位于俄勒冈州的家中发现了这些资料。

其所采用的手段十分典型。2022年1月，有人将一个装有约1万美元现金的背包放置在加利福尼亚州利弗莫尔（Livermore）的一处日租储物柜中，作为“死信投递”（即秘密交接点）。2023年3月，赖利仁交给陈远策一部用于与中国国家安全部进行秘密联络的手机；陈远策称该手机涉及“国家机密”。2025年，赖利仁再次乘机抵达美国，协助完成了另一笔约2万美元的现金支付。

2025年6月27日，在美国联邦调查局（FBI）的一次联合行动中，两人被捕。该罪名最高可判处10年监禁，最终两人各被判处30个月监禁。

美国助理司法部长形容此举为一项“规模庞大且肆无忌惮”的行动，旨在支持中国的情报工作，并在美国境内进行招募活动。

他们针对的目标并非机密文件，而是年轻的水兵，以及那些未来某天可能被说服去泄露机密的人。