Martin @MartinLogicing - Twitter Profile

Pinned Tweet

2 days ago

THE CATEGORY ERRORS AT THE HEART OF PRO-ABORTION LOGIC Let us begin with a clarification of terms: whatness pertains to what a thing is, and whereness pertains to where a thing is, and aliveness pertains to whether a thing is alive, and iusness pertains to the legal right of a thing. In discussions of abortion, those in favour commonly present arguments in which whereness is taken to determine whatness., e.g: 1. The unborn are not human beings until they are born. 2. The unborn are not persons until they are born. 3. The unborn are not alive until they are born. These arguments are predicated on the logic that: if thing A passes from spatial location X to Y, then A becomes B. On the contrary, the motion of change is a change in whereness, but not whatness. Consider, then, a thing A situated at place X at time t0, should it move from place X to Y at time t1, it remains the same thing A. The change at time t1 belongs to the category of whereness: ∑ [t=1 to 2] ΔWhereness(t) > 0 Let us posit that whatness is not derived from where a thing is, but on the hylomorphism of a thing, e.g., if thing A has the hyle (substance) of human, and the morphe (form) of an individual of the species homo sapiens, then A is a human being regardless of it’s spatial location. If a thing is a human being for any moment of it’s existence, then it is a human being for all moments of it’s existence, even after death until decomposition causes it’s material form to cease to exist. There is no measurable change of motion in the whatness: ∑ [t=1 to 2] ΔWhatness(t) = 0 The event at which a human being comes into existence takes place as a single event: h = { 0 (non-human), 1 (human )}, Δh The event that takes place at Δh can only occur once in the things existence, and cannot take place more than once, i.e., when two haploids fuse to form a diploid organism, i.e., conception (source: Carnegie stage 1a development). You cannot add more humanness to a human to make it more human, and you cannot take away humanness from a human to make it any less human. A thing is either an individual of the species homo sapiens, or it is an individual of another species. ∀x(HumanBeing(x) v ¬HumanBeing(x)) It is fallacious to claim that becoming a human being is a gradual change: ∫(gestation -> birth) humanness(t) dt = (false) Rather, it is the case that: ∫(gestation -> birth) age(t) dt = (true) ∫(gestation -> birth) whereness(t) dt = (true) In regards to the premise of personhood, this refers to the iusness of a thing, but not the whatness of a thing. Using iusness as a premise in an argument causes the argument to collapse into relativism, as whether a human prenate is a person is relative to what country you are in. - At time t1 person A in country X posits that a human prenate is not a person. - At time t1 person B in country Y posits that a human prenate is a person. Both arguments are true and false at the same time, which violates the law of non-contradiction; thus, the truth of the argument is relative rather than certain. In regards to the claim that a human prenate is not alive until birth: this claim presupposes that life can come from non-life. On the contrary, life can only come from life. There exists three types of material pertaining to life: ⎧ 1 (inanimate) s = ⎨ 2 (alive) ⎩ 3 (dead) Substance s1 has no potential to be anything other than s1, i.e., it can never be actualised into s2 or s3. Substance s2 has the potential to (a) create more of s2, and (b) become s3. The potential to create more s2 is actualised at reproduction, and the potential to become s3 is actualised at death. Substance s3 has no potential to be anything other than s3, i.e., it can never be actualised into s1 or s2. Therefore it is the case that: - At time t0 (conception), a thing A of s2 is caused to exist at spacial location X as a consequence of two haploids of pre-existing s2 fusing. Thing A has the potential to move from spatial location X to Y. - At time t1 (gestation), the thing A of s2 continues to exist at location X. - At time t2 (birth), the thing A of s2 is moved from spatial location X to Y. The thing A is alive from the moment of it’s existence at all times t0 to t1, and from all spatial locations X to Y. The motion of change is whereness, not aliveness. Conclusion, the whereness, iusness and aliveness of a thing do not determine the whatness of a thing.

2

1

0

1

144

Martin

@MartinLogicing

Last Seen Users on Sotwe

Trends for you

Most Popular Users