Twice a year, Americans change their clocks. Many want that to end—but making daylight saving time permanent is the wrong solution.
The U.S. already tried year-round DST in the 1970s. It sparked public backlash over dark mornings and was quickly abandoned.
Permanent standard time makes more sense. | @WilliamShughar2
Most highly effective analysts don't just read logs; they mentally map out the network and visualize the attack as physical movement. They conceptualize functional boundaries and the attack surface available at any given foothold (even if they don't realize they're doing it).
If you find yourself struggling to understand an attacker's next move or what to look for, grab a piece of paper and literally draw the network graph and the event relationships. Making your thinking visual can change how you process the playing field and what's happening on it.
#SOC #DFIR
@ZackKorman This is just going to come back to complexity of systems allowing for more misconfigs. Like technical debt, just build it fast and we will come back and tighten the screws but then it becomes if it ain’t broke don’t fix it situation. A perfect storm.
Cloudflare is right about this. You're not going to be able to patch fast enough, but you can build your systems so that the vast majority of vulnerabilities don't matter.
If you've not done that, you're going to have a bad time.
@anton_chuvakin I asked this the other day, “why can’t we just use our existing SOAR to do that?” It was right in the wheelhouse of SOAR and AI wouldn’t have improved it.
If you have bad (or non-existent) procedures or workflows, an AI SOC won’t be any better. That goes for SOAR too.
🤓 How many times did you questioned yourself about a claims in a threat report?
The "Trust me bro" is not always reliable!
The Admiralty System also known as the NATO System, is a method used to evaluate collected intelligence.
I created an Agent Skill for it!
Mini thread👇
Everyone wants to jump to the exciting part of threat hunting: finding the weird process tree, following attacker behavior, proving the intrusion path.
But the boring work comes first.
Data normalization, parsing, and configuration are the foundation. If that layer is weak, your hunt is weak.
We put together a short write-up on how we handle this at Threat Hunting Labs 👇
X family: We’re GIVING AWAY a full beef box this weekend!!!
USDA prime, grass-fed & finished, dry-aged beef— raised right here in Lampasas, Texas
What’s included:
– 2 ribeyes
– 2 flat irons
– 8 wagyu burger patties
– 2 lb ground beef
– king sized picanha
– cross cut bone-in short ribs
We’ll ship it straight to your door!!
to enter:
• follow @ElkinsCattleCo
• repost this
• comment your all-time favorite beef cut
must be in the U.S. (AK/HI not included)
Winner announced monday 04/27 at noon CT
ships out Tuesday 04/28
1 winner will be announced + DM’d from this account only. Good luck! 🙏🥩🇺🇸
Want to know why I hate shock and awe in InfoSec? Early in my pentest career I was on an engagement with both a network pentest and a physical assessment. The network was flat, critical systems mixed in with everything else, plenty of issues to go around. On the physical side, someone walked in the front door, ended up in a conference room, plugged in got DA.
When we came back for the following year, the physical side had been locked down badges, cameras, access control, the works. The network? The same issues from the previous report.
Just because AI is helping find bugs and you want to scan all your internal code with LLMs doesn't mean you can take your foot off the gas with other internal security projects and fundamentals.
Orange Cyberdefence recently published their research on SmokedHam. We're glad to see Cert Graveyard and the code-signing certs mentioned.
While CertGraveyard tracks the campaigns, we can't investigate them to their full depth (due to capacity), so this is great to see.
1/2
Thread: Deep analysis of the axios npm supply chain compromise
All 5 payloads downloaded from VT, reversed in an isolated VM. Full report + detection rules:
https://t.co/5VYX0VD7Tz
What's in the gist (8 files):
1. Verified Threat Intel Report (all hashes VT-confirmed)
2. Full RE of every payload (source code recovered for all 3 RATs)
3. C2 protocol specification (complete JSON schema, state machine)
4. 8 YARA rules (tested, 100% detection)
5. 8 Sigma rules (Win/Mac/Linux)
6. 11 Suricata/Snort IDS rules (including Base64 beacon patterns)
7. Machine-readable IOC bundle (JSON, 14 SHA256 + network + MITRE)
8. Extension.SubRoutine research (see below)
Novel findings not in any vendor report:
- Extension.SubRoutine.Run2() — the .NET process injection DLL is completely undocumented. Zero results across all public
sources. Custom-built injector, not from any known tool.
- Linux RAT (https://t.co/QIVd7ac3uM, 0/76 detection) has a bug — peinject command references undefined variable b64_string. Binary injection
crashes on Linux.
- macOS RAT has zero hardcoded IPs/domains. C2 is runtime-only via argv[1]. Compiled with SDK 26.2.0 (latest Xcode). Build
UUID: c848257813983360905d7ad0f7e5e3f5.
- C2 server confirmed as Express.js via URLScan X-Powered-By header.
- https://t.co/av1ZFLe9ak in the POST body is not an npm URL — it's the National Association of Pastoral Musicians. Designed to look
legit in network logs.
- Hostwinds AS54290 has confirmed Lazarus infrastructure in the same /18 subnet (https://t.co/jSNf9hnyjh research).
- macOS RAT classified as NukeSped by 4 AV engines. JA3 fingerprint 773906b0... mimics Safari 15.5 — nation-state TLS
tradecraft.
- All 3 RATs share identical 4-command protocol: kill, peinject, runscript, rundir with status codes "Wow"/"Zzz".
- Zenbox memory dump (47MB) downloaded and analyzed — 12 PE files extracted. Extension.SubRoutine DLL not recoverable (C2 was
offline during sandbox run).
Setup.js fully deobfuscated — all 18 XOR-encoded strings decoded including full VBScript and AppleScript payloads.
macOS binary reversed with radare2 — main(), Report(), DoWork(), DoActionIjt(), DoActionScpt(), RunProcess() all
reconstructed. Uses fork+execv (not system()), CurlGuard RAII pattern, nlohmann/json v3.11.3.