Muhammad Sakti Ramadhan

A male, from Indonesia, a law faculty student

[lawn @lanangwn]

Ini gimana ceritanya ikan di menu MBG ada logo muhammadiyah nya

[Ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Hāshimī @hashimiyy_]

Al-Zubayr also narrated it through the route of Saʿīd ibn ʿUbayd al-Thaqafī, who said:

‘I struck Abū Sufyān with a stone on the Day of Ṭāʾif and injured his eye. The Prophet ﷺ passed by him and said:

“This eye has been injured in the path of Allah. If you wish, be patient and Paradise is yours; and if you wish, I will supplicate to Allah and your eye will be restored to you.”

He replied: “Paradise.”’

Yaʿqūb ibn Sufyān and Ibn Saʿd narrated with an authentic chain from Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyib, from his father, who said:

‘The voices disappeared on the Day of al-Yarmūk except for the voice of a man saying:

“O victory of Allah, draw near!”

I looked, and it was Abū Sufyān beneath the banner of his son Yazīd, and he was saying:

“I have lost my eye since long ago.”’

al-Baghawī narrated with an authentic chain from Anas that:

‘Abū Sufyān entered upon ʿUthmān after he had become blind, while his servant was leading him.’”

[Haroun Kanj | Halwa Supremacist 🍮 @HarounKanj]

Imam Nawawi RA states to us below the Shāfi'i position on praying behind deviants. The stated position applies to Mu'tazila, Khawarij Azāriqa, Ahbash, and Wahhabis. All these groups fall under the umbrella of Islam.

[بدر الدين @D1mashqi]

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم.
On Kalamullah being emergent, Hadith... 🧵

[بدر الدين @D1mashqi]

@SamQari al-Dhahabī and Ibn Kathīr after mentioning all his criticism say: Nonetheless he did have some good

[بدر الدين @D1mashqi]

Mawlid in Dār al-Hadīth al-Ashrafiyyah for its middle school students

[بدر الدين @D1mashqi]

The stronger and more famous opinion is that it was on the 12th

Ibn Kathīr said: It was narrated from Ibn ‘Abbās and was the opinion of the majority of the scholars of Sīrah

al-Bidāyah wa-l Nihāyah, 3/375

[بدر الدين @D1mashqi]

Dār al-Hadīth al-Ashrafiyyah

In this place in the image below sat and taught Ibn al-Salāh, al-Nawawī, al-Mizzī, al-Subkī, Ibn Kathīr, and many others

To the left of sat the sandal of the Messenger ﷺ

[بدر الدين @D1mashqi]

Inherited Uyghur curriculum in the fascinating underground secret Sūfī schools of East Turkestan:

Nahw, Sarf, Balāgha, Mantiq

Then Hadīth; Sahīh al-Bukhārī..

Then Tafsīr; Ibn Kathīr, Jalālayn, Baydāwī

Then Hanafī Fiqh, Usūl, and Iftā’

And then they graduate. All in secret

[بدر الدين @D1mashqi]

@M1srii Load of nonsense. I'd also write an essay but I'm busy

[بدر الدين @D1mashqi]

@Alminhaji رحم الله الإمام النووي

[Ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Hāshimī @hashimiyy_]

An inscription mentioning Sayyidunā ʿUmar was discovered in Madinah.

“Allah is the walī (friend) of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb in the worldly life and the Hereafter. There is no god but Allah.”

SubḥānAllāh

[Revolutionary_Guard_Cat @Fidel_7771]

@YossiGoldstein8 K/kes: "Persians are not muslim"

Meanwhile the Shah:

[Dr. SA Hussaini @sah296]

@salahudeen33 He is the best illustration of how a blind man cannot hold a position of religious authority.
Because of him, Islam's adversaries have bases in the Arab world. Millions of Muslims were murder¢d in nearby nations.

[موقع المنهاجي الشافعي @Alminhaji]

Da’wah isn’t a business.
If you need income get a job.

[Cakrawalá Nusantará @Urrangawak]

Pemain lama mau di kadalin 🤣

[Ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Hāshimī @hashimiyy_]

The Shiʿi and Kaysānī Roots of the Early ʿAbbāsid Revolution

The early ʿAbbāsid revolution should not be understood as a straightforward Sunnī uprising against the Umayyads motivated purely by justice and resistance to tyranny. Rather, the earliest ideological foundations of the movement emerged from a Hāshimī-Shīʿī revolutionary environment deeply influenced by late Kaysānī doctrines of imamate, hereditary sacred authority, and the exclusive right of the Ahl al-Bayt to leadership.

Furthermore, the later ʿAbbāsid portrayal of the Umayyads as uniquely tyrannical rulers must be approached critically. Much of the historical memory surrounding the Umayyads was shaped by historians writing under ʿAbbāsid patronage or within an intellectual climate dominated by ʿAbbāsid political legitimacy.

While the Umayyads certainly committed their share of political errors, the image of the dynasty as an exceptionally illegitimate and oppressive regime was heavily amplified in order to morally justify the ʿAbbāsid seizure of power and erase the revolutionary and sectarian origins of the movement itself.

The roots of this ideological current can be traced to the movement of al-Mukhtār ibn Abī ʿUbayd al-Thaqafī in Kūfah after the tragedy of Karbalāʾ. Al-Mukhtār rallied support around Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah and developed one of the earliest organized Shīʿī revolutionary movements.

Significantly, al-Mukhtār himself was widely condemned by early Sunnī scholars and is commonly identified with the “liar” mentioned in the famous prophetic tradition concerning Thaqīf.

Reports concerning al-Mukhtār vary. While some portray him primarily as a Mahdist claimant acting in the name of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah, while others accuse him of making explicit prophetic claims for himself.

In either case, the movement from which the later Kaysāniyyah emerged was viewed by mainstream Sunnī scholarship as deeply heterodox.

After the death of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah, the Kaysāniyyah fragmented into multiple sects. One faction, associated with the Karbiyyah, denied his death and claimed that he remained alive at Mount Raḍwā as the awaited Mahdī.

Another faction, the Hāshimiyyah, accepted his death and transferred the imamate to his son Abū Hāshim ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah. This latter faction became critically important for the development of the ʿAbbāsid daʿwah. The ʿAbbāsids later claimed that Abū Hāshim transferred the imamate before his death to Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-ʿAbbās.

Thus, the earliest ʿAbbāsid claim to legitimacy was not built upon conventional Sunnī caliphal theory based on shūrā or general Qurayshī leadership. Instead, it rested upon an imamate-style succession narrative inherited from a Kaysānī-Shīʿī framework in which sacred authority passed through designated members of the Prophet’s family.

The famous slogan of the revolution, al-riḍā min Ahl al-Bayt, deliberately reflected this ambiguity. It appealed broadly to those who believed that authority belonged to the Prophet’s household while concealing the specific identity of the intended rulers.

Many supporters assumed the movement aimed to restore leadership to the descendants of ʿAlī and Fāṭimah رضي الله عنهما, only for the revolution ultimately to elevate Banū al-ʿAbbās instead. The slogan therefore functioned as both a religious and political tool capable of uniting various disenfranchised anti-Umayyad and pro-Ahl al-Bayt factions under a single revolutionary banner.

The role of loyalists like Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī further undermines the simplistic portrayal of the revolution as a purely Sunnī restoration movement. Abū Muslim operated within revolutionary networks saturated with pro-Ahl al-Bayt sentiment and transformed the secret ʿAbbāsid daʿwah into a successful military uprising.

The Khurāsānī revolutionary base was not merely motivated by administrative grievances against the Umayyads; rather, it was energized by the belief that legitimate authority belonged to a divinely favored Hāshimī house.

Even more striking is a sermon attributed to Dāwūd ibn ʿAlī al-ʿAbbāsī, the uncle of the caliphs, delivered in Kūfah:

“Know, O people of Kūfah, that no khalīfah ascended this pulpit after the Messenger of Allāh ﷺ except Amīr al-Muʾminīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and this Amīr al-Muʾminīn here,” gesturing toward al-Saffāḥ.

This statement is extraordinarily revealing. It symbolically bypasses the caliphates of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, and ʿUthmān and establishes a direct political continuity between ʿAlī رضي الله عنه and the ʿAbbāsids. Such rhetoric is far more consistent with a Hāshimī-Shīʿī revolutionary worldview than with later Sunnī orthodoxy.

The Sunnī rebranding of the ʿAbbāsid state occurred most clearly under al-Manṣūr. Once power was consolidated, al-Manṣūr moved the dynasty away from its earlier Shīʿī-Hāshimī ambiguity and toward a centralized imperial caliphate.

He suppressed rival ʿAlid claimants, distanced the dynasty from radical revolutionary elements, and eliminated key figures connected to the very revolution that had brought Banū al-ʿAbbās to power. Most famously, he ordered the killing of Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī, the military architect of the revolution in Khurāsān.

However, the purge extended even further: al-Manṣūr also moved against powerful members of the Abbasid revolutionary camp itself, including his own uncle ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAlī, one of the principal commanders responsible for overthrowing the Umayyads.
Thus, the early revolutionary coalition was systematically dismantled once the dynasty secured authority, allowing the Abbasids to replace their earlier revolutionary and sectarian identity with a more stable Sunnī imperial image.

The same regime that rose to power through pro-Ahl al-Bayt rhetoric eventually imprisoned, suppressed, or killed rival descendants of ʿAlī رضي الله عنه. In this sense, the Abbasids did not abolish dynastic competition within Banū Hāshim; they merely redirected it in favor of their own branch.

Thus, the ʿAbbāsid revolution was not simply a moral uprising against Umayyad oppression, as later state-sponsored narratives often portray it. Rather, it was a rival Hāshimī bid for power emerging from the world of Kaysānī succession claims, revolutionary Khurāsānī networks, pro-Ahl al-Bayt agitation, and heterodox concepts of sacred hereditary leadership. It was only later that the dynasty successfully reconstructed its image as the natural and universal Sunnī caliphate.

[Deng Garang @DengGarang45]

@trevi39733 @muslimorthodoxy W libyano, even though he’s a kaafir we all shit on your filthy god

[Muhammad Sakti Ramadhan @MuhammadAriesto]

@AbdullahIbnal @harrishanbalite Hahahaha, Early like who

[𝓜𝓪𝓻𝓲𝔂𝓮𝓻𝓱🤍🥀 @Mariyerh__]

Before smartphones, this is how Hajj was remembered. 🥺