The surge in rooftop solar adoption in Pakistan is undeniable and largely driven by market forces—high electricity tariffs combined with falling PV costs. However, describing this as an “energy revolution” that has strengthened the national power system risks overstating the case.
What we are witnessing is less a systemic transformation and more a consumer-led migration away from the grid. As higher-paying consumers install rooftop solar, grid demand declines during daylight hours, but the system’s fixed costs remain unchanged. This dynamic risks further weakening distribution company finances and exacerbating circular debt.
Moreover, solar penetration does little to address Pakistan’s evening peak demand, which still requires dispatchable generation.
The real story may therefore be decentralisation driven by affordability pressures, rather than structural reform of the energy sector.
@sindhwildlife I can’t but only appreciate the efforts behind developing content for this handle. In a material society, this is nothing less than national service
I am somewhat appalled to read this. In my humble view, we’re sending mixed signals in the power (and gas) sector. On one side, discounted tariffs to stimulate demand. On the other, load shedding to suppress it. This isn’t contradictory by accident—it reflects a deeper issue:
We’re not managing energy. We’re managing cash flow. Load shedding is targeting non-paying segments.
Relief is aimed at paying, productive demand. In theory: cut “bad demand”, grow “good demand”.
In practice:
-Demand shrinks faster than it grows
-Supply remains unreliable
-And incremental load is sometimes met with furnace oil, while efficient RLNG plants sit idle That’s not optimisation—it’s distortion. Pakistan’s problem is no longer capacity.
It is system discipline:
Merit order. Fuel allocation. Distribution efficiency.
Until those are fixed, we will keep oscillating between suppression and stimulation—without solving either
I am somewhat appalled to read this. In my humble view, we’re sending mixed signals in the power (and gas) sector. On one side, discounted tariffs to stimulate demand. On the other, load shedding to suppress it. This isn’t contradictory by accident—it reflects a deeper issue:
We’re not managing energy. We’re managing cash flow. Load shedding is targeting non-paying segments.
Relief is aimed at paying, productive demand. In theory: cut “bad demand”, grow “good demand”.
In practice:
-Demand shrinks faster than it grows
-Supply remains unreliable
-And incremental load is sometimes met with furnace oil, while efficient RLNG plants sit idle That’s not optimisation—it’s distortion. Pakistan’s problem is no longer capacity.
It is system discipline:
Merit order. Fuel allocation. Distribution efficiency.
Until those are fixed, we will keep oscillating between suppression and stimulation—without solving either
Energy security ≠ self-sufficiency.
Pakistan is structurally import-dependent—and exposed to global price shocks.
Japan and Germany import most of their energy, yet remain highly secure. Why?
Diversification. Storage. Strong systems.
The goal isn’t to eliminate imports.
It’s to manage risk.
Resilience > self-sufficiency.
Since the start of hostilities, I hear a lot of experts equating energy security with complete indigenisation at all costs. Energy security is critical—but it is not unique. It sits alongside food security, human capital securty, health, environment and political security, as well as the security of other essential commodities.
If every country chose to fully “indigenise” all of these, global trade would collapse—and with it, efficiency, competitiveness, and growth.
Security does not mean self-sufficiency at all costs. It means resilience:
• diversified supply sources
• strategic storage where feasible
• flexible infrastructure
• and well-functioning markets
For Pakistan, the objective should not be to replace imports at any cost, but to manage risk intelligently—balancing domestic development with reliable participation in global markets.
Energy security, like all economic security, is best achieved through diversification—not isolation.
Recent discoveries in Neshpa and Mari fields are encouraging—but history reminds us that discoveries alone do not create value. Markets do. Big gas fields, including Sui and Mari, only realized their full potential after sustained investment in transmission and distribution creating a reliable, scalable gas market. That foundation now appears to be weakening. Pricing distortions, sub-optimal sectoral allocation , and growing system inefficiencies have created affordability challenges; thus constraining demand and reducing offtake—at a time when the system lacks storage flexibility.
Policy signals also remain misaligned. Provisions such as third-party sales (35%) still require enabling reforms in network access and governance to become commercially meaningful.
For upstream investors, the fundamentals are clear: market certainty, efficient evacuation, viable pricing, and payment discipline. Persistent circular debt and curtailments undermine all four. If exploration success is to translate into energy security, restoring market functionality must be a priority.
You are applying the energy security lense although “ affordability “ is an integral part of energy security. The war would end sooner or later but the economy needs to grow which fuels on affordable gas amongst other sources. Due to a multitude of policy decisions our local gas wouldn’t be as inexpensive as it now. Some analysts forecast a cheaper imported gas than locally produced.
@SkmMustafa@MiftahIsmail My interpretation based on experience is different. If the upstream party (QE) invokes FM, it usually travels all the way down to end consumer.
Another consideration: Recent discoveries such as Neshpa and Mari are encouraging—but history reminds us that discoveries alone do not create value. Markets do. Big gas fields, including Sui and Mari, only realized their full potential after sustained investment in transmission and distribution creating a reliable, scalable gas market. That foundation now appears to be weakening. Pricing distortions, sub-optimal sectoral allocation , and growing system inefficiencies have created affordability challenges; thus constraining demand and reducing offtake—at a time when the system lacks storage flexibility.
Policy signals also remain misaligned. Provisions such as third-party sales (35%) still require enabling reforms in network access and governance to become commercially meaningful.
For upstream investors, the fundamentals are clear: market certainty, efficient evacuation, viable pricing, and payment discipline. Persistent circular debt and curtailments undermine all four. If exploration success is to translate into energy security, restoring market functionality must be a priority.
Miftah — good note. A couple of observations:
We are assuming a gas shortage, whereas in reality there isn’t one in the conventional sense. The loss of 8 LNG cargoes (due to war) translates to roughly ~800 MMcfd. If we reverse the curtailment of ~350 MMcfd of local gas, the theoretical shortfall reduces to ~450 MMcfd.
However, this is arithmetic in theory. In practice, the system cannot absorb even existing supply—evidenced by choked linepack and forced curtailment of local production. This points not to a supply shortage, but to a demand destruction problem.
Demand has been deliberately suppressed through:
i.punitive pricing,
ii.sub-optimal gas allocation,
iii.off-grid captive levies,
iv.and inefficiency costs embedded in the system.
As a result, even a supply shock is unlikely to be strongly felt in what is already a contracting gas market.
The shift toward solar and wind has not been policy-led but default-driven, arising from unaffordable and unreliable grid power and gas. While this transition is often celebrated, it is not a substitute for firm, 24/7 industrial energy—unless industry invests in prohibitively expensive battery storage.
Before taking pride in rising solar penetration, policymakers should reflect on the distortions that forced this transition.
Finally, the push to expand local coal generation needs to be reconciled with the government’s stance on “climate justice.” Unlike the US, China, or India, Pakistan remains donor-dependent, and this creates a structural contradiction:
👉 You cannot simultaneously rely on climate financing and aggressively expand coal.
Bottom line:
The issue is not gas shortage—it is policy-induced demand collapse and system inefficiency, with broader contradictions emerging in energy strategy.
@IshtiaqLahori Sir..there's a hint in Iqbal's justification for making a buffer state between Soviet Russia and British India. Ironically it came true in the wake of aftermath of World War 2. Would you agree?