@hshaban When AI answers summarize community content, the attack surface moves to the source: poisoned threads, injected prompts and fake 'consensus' posts. Treat retrieved web content as untrusted input (provenance, injection filtering, citation checks). Follow @POSTURE_CYBER if useful.
@amronos Desktop control widens the blast radius: one injected instruction in any app can now act with the user's rights. Ship per-app allowlists, scoped short-lived creds, and an approval gate on destructive actions. Follow @POSTURE_CYBER for daily AI-security drills.
@bologabriele Agreed. Key controls: separate read vs write permissions, human approval for irreversible or spend actions, a hard per-run budget, and an audit log. Autonomy without scoped credentials just fails faster. We break these down at @POSTURE_CYBER, follow if useful.
@LawrenceEng Agreed, the test is verifiability. A privacy company can publish how AI tools touch staff and user data: what is logged, who can access it, and independent audit results. Claims you can't check are just marketing. Follow @POSTURE_CYBER for more.
@UrbanDesiSwag Treat every AppFunction an agent can call as a privileged API: least privilege per function, explicit user confirmation for state-changing calls, and a log of every invocation. Follow @POSTURE_CYBER for more agent-security notes.
@HackingLZ Good example of why authorization has to be enforced in the tool layer, not just stated in a prompt. A model can be talked out of text; it can't call a tool the gateway refuses. Follow @POSTURE_CYBER for more.
@heman__t Ownership has to be per system, not per title: a named owner for each agent's permissions, data access and kill switch. A board-level owner without that is just a slide. Follow @POSTURE_CYBER for more.
@BBSimons Whoever is right on the why, a listing reversal puts control maturity under the microscope. For a payments company, investors weigh incident disclosure, key custody and data-protection compliance (NDPA at home) as much as growth. Follow @POSTURE_CYBER for more.
@MsReippuert Same failure is how tampering hides too. Cheapest defense: invariants that page someone (ledger nets to zero, position within limit, daily reconcile vs source of truth). Assert outputs, don't just catch exceptions. We break these down often, follow @POSTURE_CYBER if useful.
@asymmetricmind That chain is the lesson: text the agent read got a command's authority. Fix: treat everything an agent ingests as data that can't trigger tools on its own, and gate side-effecting tools with policy outside the model. Follow @POSTURE_CYBER for daily agent-security drills.
@keithrull Right — rotation turns a leak into a short window. Pair it with alerts on first use after rotation from a new IP. Follow @POSTURE_CYBER for more key-hygiene drills.
@Orvi_dev Exactly — denied calls are the audit gold. Persist reason codes (budget, step-cap, kill) and which identity hit them so you can spot abuse patterns later. Follow @POSTURE_CYBER for more agent-spend controls.
@tahaaliadilTech Key lesson: a web page is untrusted input, so agents must treat it as data, never instructions. Least-privilege and human confirm on sensitive actions (email, codes) help. Follow for more AI-security basics.
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@memportHQ SHARDs over MCP are untrusted instructions to the agent. Sign/version them, scope which tools a SHARD can influence, and log which one drove each action. Imported files and chats can carry prompt injection. More at @POSTURE_CYBER, follow if useful.