I talk to thousands of LPs every year. Here's what I'm seeing right now when it comes to how they're approaching VC.
1) Late-stage co-investments have never been hotter. The top 5-7 names have effectively *unlimited* demand. And that supply/demand imbalance has created three real issues:
First, the question of *true* access. Many of the SPVs floating around for these companies are not sanctioned by these companies. Buyer beware. These companies are tight on their cap tables, and access can be gated beyond just capacity.
The fee creep is getting egregious. Someone shared with me recently that for a top AI lab, a group was charging 15% upfront, 20% carry, and 30% over a 2X. At those economics, you can take what would be a generational company but a bad investment. Fees are the silent killer of returns in late-stage co-invest, and this risk is now being focused on the logo, but ignoring the fee effects.
Additionally, for those who aren't getting access to the top companies must go a tier (or two) below. Very dangerous in a high-intensity / valuation market for AI. As I've mentioned, there will be a lot of expensive mistakes made as we figure out what winners will look like in the future.
2) Capital is flowing to large, established brands. This is the clearest trend right now. LPs are concentrating on the top multi-stage and Series A firms. The logic is straightforward: these are easier to underwrite, and given how extreme the power law has become, investors want exposure to the trophy assets soon after investing. If you're a top 10-20 brand, you're oversubscribed, sometimes in multiples. If you're not, the fundraising environment is a different world.
3) Emerging and emerged managers are in the toughest spot, with a notable exception. Spinouts from top firms and operators with strong brands are moving fast and generally very oversubscribed.
For everyone else, the bar has never been higher. I think this is actually where the opportunity is for LPs If they have the time/expertise to do so.
The issue isn't that LPs don't know this. Most do. The problem is twofold: the time and difficulty of sourcing and diligencing emerging managers is real, and the hangover from 2019-2021 is still very present. A lot of people tried VC during that era who probably shouldn't have, and the failure rate on those Fund 1s has made the entire segment harder to navigate. Matching supply and demand here has become nearly impossible. Supply (Managers) far exceeds demand due to the issues noted.
Tomorrow, Anthropic insiders cash out. Retail investors buy in.
Insiders walk away with fortunes. Retail walks away holding the bag.
This could be the greatest bagholder event in stock market history.
@E_Bruxxx Weathergage no longer is deploying (haven't raised a new fund and don't plan to).
On the @joinallocate platform, we've had 35+ EMs since 2021 on the platform (and funded). Also would add Pattern Ventures.
But most groups are only VERY selectively adding new names. And there is a lot of consensus EM (sounds like a paradox, but it's not as spin-outs often are the main ones) investing.
Outside of a small % of FO's and High Net Worth folks, investing in just directs and co-investments during frothy periods usually doesn't end well.
Time has shown co-investments can be a great way to augment fund investments, and often better when you have a LP position (where more alignment is likely on relationship)
Right now, the amount of co-investment out there is massive, and greed / incentives are creating an environment that, without access to a smaller select group (at fair economics), people will massively underperform ---- And then blame the asset class afterwards and abandon it when the market resets (which is another issue).
We’re back to 2020–2021. But yes, this time IS different.
Wealthy individuals, family offices, and LPs are once again convinced they can invest directly in startups and outperform venture funds.
Some will. I suspect most won’t.
Everyone thinks they have better access, better judgment, and better deals. We’ve seen how that plays out when the market turns.
But here’s the BIG difference.
In 2020–2021, those same investors were ALSO backing emerging VC managers. Money was flowing into funds, SPVs, and startups simultaneously.
Today, more LP capital is bypassing smaller funds entirely and going straight into direct deals and SPVs.
Meanwhile, emerging managers are launching their own SPVs to generate upfront fees, attract LPs, and survive.
The result?
Total capital invested 📈
Capital concentrated in fewer startups 📈
Number of deals 📉
Capital flowing to emerging managers 📉
More money. Fewer deals. Fewer managers getting funded.
The irony is that the very investors who once funded the next generation of VCs are now competing with them for allocations.
This isn’t another 2021 boom where everyone benefits.
It’s a capital concentration cycle disguised as a venture boom.
And when the music stops, we’ll find out who actually knew how to invest.
No no no. A $1B valuation/exit is 10000% a success. So is a capital efficient or bootstrapped $100M exit. Building a business is super hard, and saying this is a reflection of using <.1% of companies as a proxy and distorting what VC's may hope for today versus what is successful. FFS.
Yes, the overall returns of the industry are less relevant to this discussion. A $1B exit can return a decent amount to a smaller fund if ownership is 5% at exit.
But it's a bit non-sequitur to my point that success of a company and the founder is not correlated simply to whether it provides a VC a great fund return.
No no no. A $1B valuation/exit is 10000% a success. So is a capital efficient or bootstrapped $100M exit. Building a business is super hard, and saying this is a reflection of using <.1% of companies as a proxy and distorting what VC's may hope for today versus what is successful. FFS.
Anthropic obviously missed the golden IPO window.
Originally shopped at $2T in mid-October. Then the pricing was revised down to $1.5T a week ago, but they still had trouble getting enough interest. Now it's down to $1.1 - 1.3T.
Wonder where it'll finally land (if they go public at all).
1/ Yes, follow-on funding is hard right now for non-AI / hyper growth companies
2/The bar for funding only on 10-10-5 growth is a transient phenomenon. Companies with real durability of revenues will be exposed within 12-24 months. And the 10-10-5 can create toxic byproducts on creative accounting.
3) That said, companies are getting funding with good fundamentals. Investors only focused on companies in the #2 bucket are going to have an awakening (lessons from the past often get forgotten too easily in our business).
Net-Net: Build a great company focused on durability; don't worry about the noise right now. Just adjust to the realities of funding.
OH from a GP last night:
“I have a company doing $15m revenue and I can’t raise capital. It is going to be a zero.”
And:
“ triple triple double double doesn’t get the Series A meeting anymore. I want 10-10-5.”
Founders: the bar for follow on capital has never been higher. If you don’t have the outlier traction that others are delivering get to profitability as fast as you can.
And compound some advantage
The AI sell off is definitely a classic "in the short term, the market is a voting machine; in the long run, it acts as a weighing machine" example. We should expect a ton of volatility in short term (<12 months), but medium-long term, things like midterms, etc. are not going to fundamentally change the shape of AI influence and value capture. A correction is needed, but today definitely the sign of uncertainty creating overreactive panic.
The reality is that the classic definition and model of venture capital describes about 10% of managers today. While it's not meant as a negative, the fact that LPs still bucket all tech investors that are minority investors is grossly outdated.
For Emerging GPs: If you are talking to wealth advisor firms or large institutions, it's less about talking about how small VC firms can have an extreme right tail outcome. Of course thats true.
The thing you need to show is 1) Why you won't present career risk for them 2) How you will allow them to scale over time (sidecars, co-investments, future funds), and 3) Why you are committed to building a firm.
You cannot just focus on "Small is better", "We are unique". If you don't understand the buyer incentives, it won't matter.
For Emerging GPs: If you are talking to wealth advisor firms or large institutions, it's less about talking about how small VC firms can have an extreme right tail outcome. Of course thats true.
The thing you need to show is 1) Why you won't present career risk for them 2) How you will allow them to scale over time (sidecars, co-investments, future funds), and 3) Why you are committed to building a firm.
You cannot just focus on "Small is better", "We are unique". If you don't understand the buyer incentives, it won't matter.
Using this an example for individuals to pivot into the private markets is interesting to say the least (and not a knock on the company but the market froth is unsustainable and i think we are close to another hit the wall correction).
Instinct is currently raising @ $30b.
$100M → $500M → $2.5B → $10B → ~$30B in sub 1y.
If you're still not inside the private market this should be a good signal to pivot aggressively.
Wealth creation is going to be heavily skewed toward private investors over the coming decade.
@iamjakestream of @btv_vc wrote a salient synopsis on the venture market. Blog in the replies
I agree with everything in it, especially with the theme that consensus investing is creating a very real risk bubble (financial).
I see it on both sides of the table, LPs and GPs. Increasingly, Jake is right that career risk is being optimized over financial risk and the pursuit of asymmetric, right-tail outcomes.
It's safer to be wrong with everyone else than to be right alone. That's a dangerous dynamic for an asset class built on finding outliers.
A few takeaways I really agree with.
1. Consensus has made its way into seed. Increasingly, the same founder pedigrees, sectors, and narratives attract capital, particularly from multi-stage firms. Seed investors are taking note of what is likely to get funded by a Tier-1 investors at large markups, and the the result is passing on non-obvious and focusing on what likely gets a strong follow on. This of course means higher prices, as consensus deals (AI in particular) 30-50%+ higher in price.
I worry a lot of this ends badly. Too much capital, too early, can artificially accelerate companies before they've figured out what actually works. Instead of carefully navigating toward product-market fit, they're pushed into a trajectory that can end with hitting a wall.
2. We're creating a funding gap for durable businesses. I've talked about the 3/3/3/2/2 companies before. Businesses that compound steadily, build real value, and have strong underlying economics.
Many are being orphaned by the venture ecosystem. They're not growing fast enough for multi-stage VC, but they're too early for traditional PE or larger growth investors. And when growth capital is available, the valuation expectations don't always make sense.
These companies need a capital source. Not every great outcome needs to be a $50B company, especially for a smaller niche firm.
3. Founders are feeling the pressure to manufacture consensus. When the market rewards certain growth narratives above everything else, behavior changes.
We're seeing increasingly creative interpretations of metrics. Calling something $3.65M in ARR because you generated $10K in revenue on a single day and multiplied it by 365 is not ARR.
At best, it's misleading. At worst, it crosses into deliberate misrepresentation. I worry we're seeing more of the latter as founders feel compelled to demonstrate hypergrowth at all costs.
4. This too shall pass. I suspect the next 12 months will bring a reckoning. Capital will become more discerning, growth claims will face more scrutiny, and we'll find out who's been swimming naked.
That said, I believe this is one of the best times in history to build a technology company and invest in innovation. The amount of value that will be created over the next 10–15 years is going to dwarf anything we've seen before. But the current dynamics aren't sustainable for much longer.
@iamjakestream of @btv_vc wrote a salient synopsis on the venture market. Blog in the replies
I agree with everything in it, especially with the theme that consensus investing is creating a very real risk bubble (financial).
I see it on both sides of the table, LPs and GPs. Increasingly, Jake is right that career risk is being optimized over financial risk and the pursuit of asymmetric, right-tail outcomes.
It's safer to be wrong with everyone else than to be right alone. That's a dangerous dynamic for an asset class built on finding outliers.
A few takeaways I really agree with.
1. Consensus has made its way into seed. Increasingly, the same founder pedigrees, sectors, and narratives attract capital, particularly from multi-stage firms. Seed investors are taking note of what is likely to get funded by a Tier-1 investors at large markups, and the the result is passing on non-obvious and focusing on what likely gets a strong follow on. This of course means higher prices, as consensus deals (AI in particular) 30-50%+ higher in price.
I worry a lot of this ends badly. Too much capital, too early, can artificially accelerate companies before they've figured out what actually works. Instead of carefully navigating toward product-market fit, they're pushed into a trajectory that can end with hitting a wall.
2. We're creating a funding gap for durable businesses. I've talked about the 3/3/3/2/2 companies before. Businesses that compound steadily, build real value, and have strong underlying economics.
Many are being orphaned by the venture ecosystem. They're not growing fast enough for multi-stage VC, but they're too early for traditional PE or larger growth investors. And when growth capital is available, the valuation expectations don't always make sense.
These companies need a capital source. Not every great outcome needs to be a $50B company, especially for a smaller niche firm.
3. Founders are feeling the pressure to manufacture consensus. When the market rewards certain growth narratives above everything else, behavior changes.
We're seeing increasingly creative interpretations of metrics. Calling something $3.65M in ARR because you generated $10K in revenue on a single day and multiplied it by 365 is not ARR.
At best, it's misleading. At worst, it crosses into deliberate misrepresentation. I worry we're seeing more of the latter as founders feel compelled to demonstrate hypergrowth at all costs.
4. This too shall pass. I suspect the next 12 months will bring a reckoning. Capital will become more discerning, growth claims will face more scrutiny, and we'll find out who's been swimming naked.
That said, I believe this is one of the best times in history to build a technology company and invest in innovation. The amount of value that will be created over the next 10–15 years is going to dwarf anything we've seen before. But the current dynamics aren't sustainable for much longer.
Lots of VCs kindof sound like this: "Your basketball team doesn't have a moat, any healthy human can throw the ball into the basket thingy. "
People who have not run companies before don't understand how much the team matters more than some imagined structural moat.