🇸🇦🇨🇳 Saudi FM concludes China visit amid Trump-MBS friction
Saudi Arabia is still absorbing the war’s security fallout and is widening its circle by leaning more on Beijing as a diplomatic counterweight to the US and as a partner that can engage Iran. Via @Joyce_Karam and @roscarroll_
https://t.co/HPyH1T9CKb
NEW from @nytimes: An outraged Trump ordered his top aides to press MBS to allow the US to use Saudi airspace for Trump's effort to force open the Strait of Hormuz. Vance, Rubio, Witkoff and Kushner made separate calls. MBS didn't back down — he had lost confidence in Trump.
"Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are now diverging on their basic security posture toward Iran. The old Gulf consensus is gone."
"Rubio toured the Gulf last week and skipped Riyadh, which the Saudis read as a deliberate snub. MBS declined the G7 invitation in France."
🔴 جیدی ونس درباره ایران:
💢 موضوعی که برای من جالب و در عین حال آزاردهنده است، رویکرد دوگانه ایران در مذاکرات است. از یک سو، مقامات ایرانی هرگونه گفتوگوی صلح را تکذیب میکنند، اما در عمل، مذاکرات فنی میان آمریکا و ایران درباره توافق صلح در جریان است. این نوع رفتار که به نظر میرسد نوعی تاکتیک دیپلماتیک و ادبیات خاص مذاکرهای ایران باشد، برای من چندان قابلدرک نیست.
On Iran's oil trade, Ajorloo says that the objective is not just to sell more oil but to diversify buyers.
He says that Iran has an opportunity during the waiver period to establish 20–30 new customers/markets, reducing its overwhelming dependence on China.
He explains that the government is trying to normalize official transactions. He explains that, unlike during sanctions when oil sales relied on opaque intermediaries and delayed payments, the waiver allows the National Iranian Oil Company to sell more openly, receive proceeds into recognized government accounts, and immediately issue payment orders for imports.
Ajorloo stresses that Iran still needs broader sanctions relief. The temporary waiver is valuable because it allows Tehran to demonstrate that legitimate oil trade can resume and to rebuild commercial networks, but it is not viewed as a substitute for a comprehensive lifting of sanctions.
When headlines say a missile “finds” patrons instead of stating that innocent civilians were killed, journalism risks sanitizing violence. Words shape perception, and euphemisms should never obscure the perpetrator, in this case genocidal Israel or Palestinian suffering.
Pashinyan seems to be focused on normalisation and opening borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Not keen to be dragged into the Turkey-Israel rivalry, hence this interesting phrase "weaponisation of the Armenian genocide'
I told Aljazeera that the Lebanon issue will negatively impact the MoU because Hezbollah was not on board and the Lebanese government’s previous ceasefire deals with Israel have been repeatedly violated.
Iran has found tremendous leverage with the Strait of Hormuz, treating it as a “golden card”, as the disruption to oil exports has heavily impacted markets and made the war unpopular among many, including in the US.
They are using that leverage to the max and not going back to the status before the war, pretending like no war happened. Iranian authorities and the IRGC have sought to centre themselves in the process of coordinating transit through the strait.
They’re saying they want traffic to go through in coordination with them, and I think they will be able to exert that kind of power.
https://t.co/0QBF61r74r
Israel's air and ground operations in Lebanon have hit UNESCO-listed Roman ruins in Tyre, pummeled the Mamluk-era market in Nabatieh and razed centuries-old towns along the southern border https://t.co/cVMpPSom1E
“Oman is caught between a rock and a hard place trying to maintain a balancing act between Iran and the US…Doing so has more or less worked in the past. But with the two sides at war and constantly trying to outmaneuver one another, this Omani behavior will bite them eventually.” https://t.co/9cTrfTnC19
This won't solve the problem. Iran is likely to respond, and those responses will inevitably affect the Strait of Hormuz.
The U.S. administration has to make a strategic choice. Additional strikes are likely to trigger further Iranian retaliation, and Tehran is unlikely to allow commercial shipping to resume as if nothing has changed, particularly along the route adjacent to Oman that it disputes.
Whether Washington doubles down, walks away from a deal, or simply ignores this reality, the underlying problem remains the same: there is a return to the pre-war status quo in the Strait of Hormuz.
The administration cannot realistically expect both unrestricted freedom of navigation in the Strait and a sustainable agreement with Iran without addressing Tehran's core position on the issue. The current Iranian leadership has consistently shown that it is unlikely to back down on what it sees as a matter of sovereignty and deterrence.
#IranWar
US aircraft struck ten targets in Iran--military installations, comms and radar equipment, and drone storage, per reporting--following another Iranian attack on shipping.
Iran is currently retaliating against US bases in Bahrain and Kuwait.
Traffic in Hormuz has dipped in light of the violence.
Iran attacked two tankers on the Oman route.
US responded with two waves of strikes on Iran.
Meanwhile, the Oman route has gone silent--likely ships are moving through dark, but very little has gone through with AIS on.
What we are witnessing today no longer appears to be simply the management of a crisis with Iran. It increasingly resembles a systematic effort to strip Tehran of its key sources of regional leverage.
In Lebanon, pressure is mounting to reach Israeli Lebanese arrangements that would reduce the influence of Iran and Hezbollah. In the Strait of Hormuz, efforts are underway to diminish Tehran’s ability to influence maritime traffic through the designation of shipping routes coordinated with Oman and the International Maritime Organization, keeping vessels within Omani territorial waters and farther from Iranian waters, alongside strikes targeting Iran’s capabilities to control strategic sea lanes.
Meanwhile, Iran’s response targeting Bahrain despite the presence of U.S. naval assets close to the Iranian coast, which suggests that Tehran still views the Gulf primarily as a strategic pressure card rather than as a neighborhood of regional partners.
If this trajectory continues, the core of the conflict is no longer just the nuclear issue. It is increasingly about reshaping the regional balance of power by systematically removing Iran’s leverage one card at a time. This is a particularly dangerous phase, because states that believe they are losing their negotiating assets are often tempted to use whatever leverage remains before it disappears altogether.
The seafarers feel forgotten. Whenever they turn on the news, they listen to the conflict negatively impacting global eco, fuel price. Not much attention on innocent seafarers: @IMOHQ chief @IMOSecGen tells me
I report @PTI_News
https://t.co/FZRNbYJfPc @IndiaUNNewYork@Anchansv