Deepika Saraswat

Iran and Middle East Analyst @IDSAIndia, earlier @ICWA_NewDelhi, JNUite. Views mine

[Deepika Saraswat @saraswatisdeepi]

We note that India remains well-positioned to engage diverse players based on convergent interests without being entangled in exclusive alignments.

[Deepika Saraswat @saraswatisdeepi]

.@abhijoining and I argue in a joint brief that as #Türkiye project itself as a critical logistics hub linking Asia, the Gulf and Europe, New Delhi’s approach towards Ankara will seek to balance pragmatic economic engagement with security-driven concerns.
https://t.co/npeHmyp9Bu

[Manohar Parrikar IDSA, New Delhi @IDSAIndia]

The Iran War and Türkiye’s Emerging Role in Corridor Dynamics in West Asia
By: @saraswatisdeepi & @abhijoining
Türkiye has positioned itself as a critical logistics and energy hub linking Asia, the Gulf and Europe.

https://t.co/Gsy4bfZ72d

[asli aydintasbas @asliaydintasbas]

Turkey is having its NATO moment ahead of next week’s summit, getting uncharacteristically positive coverage after years of being shunned or criticized in US media. The focus is on its geopolitical leverage and defense industrial base.

[Murtaza Hussain @MazMHussain]

"This war and the severe economic damage Iran has suffered should force Tehran’s new leadership to recognize the opportunity now before it. The Gulf states have learned that the American security umbrella is neither as impregnable nor as responsive to their interests as they once assumed. Washington’s erratic actions did not give GCC concerns the priority they expected and their interests paid the price.

As a result, Gulf capitals are more open than they have been in years to a durable understanding with Iran that can bring security and stability to the region. That stability could unlock significant GCC investment in Iran, provided the right economic conditions exist and investment can proceed on a free market basis. This is Tehran’s real opening: to move the Gulf states away from fear, suspicion and cooperation with Iran’s enemies toward confidence, cooperation and shared prosperity."

[AL-MONITOR @AlMonitor]

🇸🇦🇨🇳 Saudi FM concludes China visit amid Trump-MBS friction

Saudi Arabia is still absorbing the war’s security fallout and is widening its circle by leaning more on Beijing as a diplomatic counterweight to the US and as a partner that can engage Iran. Via @Joyce_Karam and @roscarroll_
https://t.co/HPyH1T9CKb

[Edward Wong @ewong]

NEW from @nytimes: An outraged Trump ordered his top aides to press MBS to allow the US to use Saudi airspace for Trump's effort to force open the Strait of Hormuz. Vance, Rubio, Witkoff and Kushner made separate calls. MBS didn't back down — he had lost confidence in Trump.

[Sina Toossi @SinaToossi]

"Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are now diverging on their basic security posture toward Iran. The old Gulf consensus is gone."

"Rubio toured the Gulf last week and skipped Riyadh, which the Saudis read as a deliberate snub. MBS declined the G7 invitation in France."

[Deepika Saraswat @saraswatisdeepi]

Vance’s version of Jawboning or something else!

[AbdiMedia | عبدی مدیا @AbdiMedia_net]

🔴 جی‌دی ونس درباره ایران:
​
💢 موضوعی که برای من جالب و در عین حال آزاردهنده است، رویکرد دوگانه ایران در مذاکرات است. از یک سو، مقامات ایرانی هرگونه گفت‌وگوی صلح را تکذیب می‌کنند، اما در عمل، مذاکرات فنی میان آمریکا و ایران درباره توافق صلح در جریان است. این نوع رفتار که به نظر می‌رسد نوعی تاکتیک دیپلماتیک و ادبیات خاص مذاکره‌ای ایران باشد، برای من چندان قابل‌درک نیست.

[Sina Toossi @SinaToossi]

On Iran's oil trade, Ajorloo says that the objective is not just to sell more oil but to diversify buyers.

He says that Iran has an opportunity during the waiver period to establish 20–30 new customers/markets, reducing its overwhelming dependence on China.

He explains that the government is trying to normalize official transactions. He explains that, unlike during sanctions when oil sales relied on opaque intermediaries and delayed payments, the waiver allows the National Iranian Oil Company to sell more openly, receive proceeds into recognized government accounts, and immediately issue payment orders for imports.

Ajorloo stresses that Iran still needs broader sanctions relief. The temporary waiver is valuable because it allows Tehran to demonstrate that legitimate oil trade can resume and to rebuild commercial networks, but it is not viewed as a substitute for a comprehensive lifting of sanctions.

[abdullah baabood عبدالله باعبود @abaabood]

When headlines say a missile “finds” patrons instead of stating that innocent civilians were killed, journalism risks sanitizing violence. Words shape perception, and euphemisms should never obscure the perpetrator, in this case genocidal Israel or Palestinian suffering.

[Deepika Saraswat @saraswatisdeepi]

Pashinyan seems to be focused on normalisation and opening borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Not keen to be dragged into the Turkey-Israel rivalry, hence this interesting phrase "weaponisation of the Armenian genocide'

[asli aydintasbas @asliaydintasbas]

Pashinyan calls Israel’s genocide recognition decision “weaponization of the Armenian genocide.”

[Vali Nasr @vali_nasr]

On the other hand, Tehran thinks there will be no peace talks without that leverage https://t.co/uMae1nwqVz

[Negar Mortazavi نگار مرتضوی @NegarMortazavi]

I told Aljazeera that the Lebanon issue will negatively impact the MoU because Hezbollah was not on board and the Lebanese government’s previous ceasefire deals with Israel have been repeatedly violated.

Iran has found tremendous leverage with the Strait of Hormuz, treating it as a “golden card”, as the disruption to oil exports has heavily impacted markets and made the war unpopular among many, including in the US.

They are using that leverage to the max and not going back to the status before the war, pretending like no war happened. Iranian authorities and the IRGC have sought to centre themselves in the process of coordinating transit through the strait.

They’re saying they want traffic to go through in coordination with them, and I think they will be able to exert that kind of power.
https://t.co/0QBF61r74r

[Reuters @Reuters]

Israel's air and ground operations in Lebanon have hit UNESCO-listed Roman ruins in Tyre, pummeled the Mamluk-era market in Nabatieh and razed centuries-old towns along the southern border https://t.co/cVMpPSom1E

[Bader Al-Saif بدر السيف @bmalsaif]

“Oman is caught between a rock and a hard place trying to maintain a balancing act between Iran and the US…Doing so has more or less worked in the past. But with the two sides at war and constantly trying to outmaneuver one another, this Omani behavior will bite them eventually.” https://t.co/9cTrfTnC19

[Deepika Saraswat @saraswatisdeepi]

“The current Iranian leadership has consistently shown that it is unlikely to back down on what it sees as a matter of sovereignty and deterrence.”

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

This won't solve the problem. Iran is likely to respond, and those responses will inevitably affect the Strait of Hormuz.

The U.S. administration has to make a strategic choice. Additional strikes are likely to trigger further Iranian retaliation, and Tehran is unlikely to allow commercial shipping to resume as if nothing has changed, particularly along the route adjacent to Oman that it disputes.

Whether Washington doubles down, walks away from a deal, or simply ignores this reality, the underlying problem remains the same: there is a return to the pre-war status quo in the Strait of Hormuz.

The administration cannot realistically expect both unrestricted freedom of navigation in the Strait and a sustainable agreement with Iran without addressing Tehran's core position on the issue. The current Iranian leadership has consistently shown that it is unlikely to back down on what it sees as a matter of sovereignty and deterrence.

#IranWar‌

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

US aircraft struck ten targets in Iran--military installations, comms and radar equipment, and drone storage, per reporting--following another Iranian attack on shipping.

Iran is currently retaliating against US bases in Bahrain and Kuwait.

Traffic in Hormuz has dipped in light of the violence.

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

Iran attacked two tankers on the Oman route.

US responded with two waves of strikes on Iran.

Meanwhile, the Oman route has gone silent--likely ships are moving through dark, but very little has gone through with AIS on.

[Abdulla Banndar Al-Etaibi عبدالله بندر العتيبي @AbdullaAlEtaibi]

What we are witnessing today no longer appears to be simply the management of a crisis with Iran. It increasingly resembles a systematic effort to strip Tehran of its key sources of regional leverage.

In Lebanon, pressure is mounting to reach Israeli Lebanese arrangements that would reduce the influence of Iran and Hezbollah. In the Strait of Hormuz, efforts are underway to diminish Tehran’s ability to influence maritime traffic through the designation of shipping routes coordinated with Oman and the International Maritime Organization, keeping vessels within Omani territorial waters and farther from Iranian waters, alongside strikes targeting Iran’s capabilities to control strategic sea lanes.

Meanwhile, Iran’s response targeting Bahrain despite the presence of U.S. naval assets close to the Iranian coast, which suggests that Tehran still views the Gulf primarily as a strategic pressure card rather than as a neighborhood of regional partners.

If this trajectory continues, the core of the conflict is no longer just the nuclear issue. It is increasingly about reshaping the regional balance of power by systematically removing Iran’s leverage one card at a time. This is a particularly dangerous phase, because states that believe they are losing their negotiating assets are often tempted to use whatever leverage remains before it disappears altogether.