Tim Richardson

Diplomacy. Nerdom. Once a journalist. I know the difference between cloaks and capes. Views, such as they are, my own.

[iOSuptodate @iosuptodate]

Who’s waiting for iOS 27 Public Beta 1?

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

@gtconway3d Ultimately, it’s not even about USMNT winning. It’s about him taking credit for it.

[Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 @IAPonomarenko]

Call me nuts, but I'm starting to suspect that if a "think tank" or someone with a blue check on social media spends five years parroting the same "Ukraine will fall within 30 days" narrative (and is still doing so while Moscow is burning, occupied Crimea is under blockade, the front line has been deadlocked since 2022, and there's a massive fuel crisis reaching fucking Siberia), they might not be the most reliable source of information on the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Or, God forbid, they might even be acting in bad faith.

[Jay Bookman @jaysbookman]

The Texas screwworm story is a version of this. The Reflecting Pool fiasco is a version of this. The Iranian war is a very large and ongoing version of this.
Everywhere you look, incompetence is having its natural consequences, with more to come. Much more, I'm afraid.

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

@elfary74 @LuftkoppTim @HennaVirkkunen Apple Accounts are country specific. I’ve had to create separate accounts for Belgium and Germany to download specific apps that were only available in the app stores for those respective countries.

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

@elfary74 @LuftkoppTim @HennaVirkkunen This can be a bit of a pain. You will need to sign out of your current Apple Account and create a new one. Make sure to back your device up first. Then create a new Apple Account and select US as your region.

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

@LuftkoppTim @elfary74 @HennaVirkkunen Can confirm. I live in Germany and purchased my most recent iPhone here. I have a US Apple ID and get access to every feature unavailable in the EU. Looking forward to the Siri public beta.

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

I see the Reflecting Pool as a metaphor for the handling of the Iran war: shallow, costly, and unresolved, with a foreign power still in control of a significant body of water.

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

@AlanEyre1 In the context of USD xx billon in taxpayer funds in return for oil and gas or other concessions steered to some preferred US entity, it makes sense.

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

I won’t be surprised if the spin being put on the MOU with Iran and suggestions of a new relationship is simply driven by an interest in getting a stake in Iranian oil and gas development. It always comes back to money.

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

@DanielBShapiro Not only has the U.S. exhausted any credible threat of force, but every poll that indicates Democratic gains in the midterms is going to put more pressure on Trump to make concessions to make the war go away. The Iranians well understand the leverage they have.

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

We needed all those World Cup fans discovering America and the Knicks bringing a championship to New York to remind us who we are as a country and who we can be again.

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

This is a different tone for WWDC, with no immediate dive into the latest and greatest but restatement of Apple’s principles. I like it. #wwdc26

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

@markgurman With the transition from Tim Cook to John Ternus, they’ve got a second chance to get AI right going forward. Not just showing meaningful progress in giving users what they want but also better managing expectations.

[William Courtney @courtneywmh]

"A negotiating process is still missing ... (Moscow) would like it institutionalized ... more than a couple of envoys talking to Putin.”

For this, expert diplomats would be needed. But the Administration disdains & distrusts professionals.
https://t.co/fv7CTlgQUW

[Tim Richardson @ThatcatTim]

@markgurman I bought a MacBook Pro with a Touch Bar out of curiosity. With little Apple development support, it never evolved to being more than a novelty for me. The irony is I now work mostly an on iPad Pro, in part because of the touchscreen.

[Brett Erickson @BrettErickson28]

Trump now finds himself in an entirely new situation with the War in Iran.

He doesn't hold the cards. He has no notable leverage. And he can't simply declare bankruptcy for the seventh time and move on.

And it shows.

Donald Trump is not a statesman. He is not a diplomat. And I think, in many ways, this is what endeared him initially to many of his voters. He was businessman that accumulated billions of dollars of personal wealth through casino's, real estate, television, golf courses, and a multitude of endeavors.

You can say what you will, but at the end of the day, you don't accrue a net worth well beyond a billion, or even hundreds of millions of dollars, without being "successful", so let's put that partisan argument to the side for now.

But all throughout Trump's life, he's held the upper hand. He grew up wealthy. He received significant financial assistance from his father. And he had an effectively unlimited financial safety net in the event of failure. These are not points meant to be political hits, nor are they able to be refuted. They are simply the facts. Reality.

As a result, Donald Trump always had the leverage. He was a trust fund baby. Again, this is simply the truth. It is reported that Fred Trump left his children around a billion dollars when he passed away in 1999. Trust me, if you know beyond a shadow of a doubt you are set for life regardless, you live life differently.

What this means is that Donald Trump, throughout his business career which WAS hyper-successful, never HAD to succeed. He could also walk away if a deal was not in his favor. He, by definition, always held the cards. Generational wealth.

And don't get me wrong, President Trump was savvy in his exploitation of this reality. You'd be a fool to enter a deal you didn't think was highly beneficial to you if you didn't have to make a gamble. That'd be stupid.

In every transaction, every business dealing, it was either in his favor, or he walked.

Because. He. Could.

And when business endeavors failed to pan out? Bankruptcy could be declared. Again, save me the partisan takes, Donald Trump declared bankruptcies on his businesses six times. And he was RIGHT to do so. That's the correct financial decision... but it's an off-ramp. A quick fix.

These same realities - holding all the cards, being able to walk away, having a legal escape valve - do not exist in the quagmire he finds himself in with the Iran War.

The reality facing Donald Trump is one that he has never had to navigate before. Iran does not care that he is wealthy. It's irrelevant. Trump can't simply walk away because Iran would retain control of the Strait of Hormuz and it would destroy Trump's legacy. There is no emergency "bankruptcy-equivalent" escape valve here.

Now, Donald Trump has to sit on the other side of the table at a time when the stakes are the highest they have ever been in his entire life. No training wheels. No safety net. Trump's been thrown right into the deep end with perhaps the most savvy negotiators in the world.

President Trump holds effectively zero leverage with Iran.

There is not a modicum of domestic American support for this war. It was never sold to the American people. Many see this as Israel's war that is not "putting America first". The goals and objectives have changed by the day. For this reason, alongside the unlikely chance of success in the first place, a large-scale ground invasion is not a serious suggestion being put for by anyone with an above room temperature IQ.

Iran holds insurmountable "escalation dominance". If the United States targets Iran's energy infrastructure? Iran will retaliate massively across the Gulf. GCC countries have already made it abundantly clear to Trump that they fear Iran. That they don't trust the US-bought military equipment to protect their infrastructure or civilians. Iran can cut undersea cables. Iran could close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and further cripple maritime shipping. Anything the US can do to hurt Iran, Iran can do tenfold to hurt the global economy.

Reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force? We tried that under Operation Freedom, and it was so ridiculous and stupid that it was canceled within 48 hours. Some are suggesting we try again, but seem to entirely misunderstand reality (as they have throughout the entire conflict). What? Is the United States supposed to effectively occupy the Strait of Hormuz until the end of time? How many vessels per day would be able to navigate the Strait of Hormuz with US naval escorts? What would the costs of this be? Can we adequately protect our sailors? Why wouldn't Iran, again, utilize their escalation dominance and shut down the Bab al-Mandeb or strike Gulf infrastructure? It. Doesn't Work.

The unfortunate reality is that President Trump holds no cards. He has no meaningful leverage. His ONLY option is making concessions at the negotiating table...

Is this something Trump is even capable of navigating in the first place though? A President, one who has made perhaps the gravest mistake in the history of American foreign policy, one who has never experienced these constraints before, one who has a litany of allies ready to turn their backs on him the second he capitulates... A man who's entire legacy will not be, "Trump the Businessman", nor will it be "Trump the President". It will eternally become, "Trump the Failure".

But it's his only choice. The Iran Hawks and Israeli Lobby that surrounds him, and they do, are prepared to claw him to shreds on Fox News and Newsmax. We saw this exact situation play out just this past weekend when initial terms of a potential Memorandum of Understanding was leaked. His so called "allies" in the United States turned their back on him immediately, leaving him with almost nobody remaining. Not after the Epstein Files. Not after this Iran War debacle.

Donald Trump now finds himself in an entirely unfamiliar situation. He doesn't hold the cards. He has no escape valve. And there is no realistic scenario where he can credibly claim victory... The only path forward is the one that will permanently destroy his legacy.

But it's the only way to end this war.

[Alan Eyre @AlanEyre1]

Key points to keep in mind:
1) Iran can't unilaterally open the SoH: only the maritime insurance industry can. And it won't as long as a nuclear deal remains unnegotiated, as the threat of renewed military strikes remain.
2) In other words, best case it will still take months for the SoH to get back to pre-February 28 levels.
3) The US negotiating position has to shift from all stick to some stick/some carrot, because we've tried the stick alone and it wasn't enough to coerce strategic capitulation. And that carrot for Iran is $$$, either from unblocked assets or an easing of sanctions.
4) An Iranian commitment to 'never have a nuclear weapon' is about as dependable as a USG commitment not to attack Iran again. Any worthwhile nuclear deal needs IAEA w/Additional Protocol as a starting point.
5) Israel isn't going to stop in Southern Lebanon.
6) Iran is not going to let the US participate in digging out the HEU.

[Steve Rosenberg @BBCSteveR]

From today’s Russian papers: “The number of Russian regions with restrictions on the sale of fuel is multiplying.” The reason given? “Unscheduled repairs at oil refineries.” #ReadingRussia

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The Collapse of Deterrence Against Iran?

Paradoxically, one of the most serious consequences of this campaign may be the erosion of deterrence vis-à-vis Iran, specifically, the loss of the implicit sword hanging over Tehran as it considers whether to move toward nuclear weapons capability.

For years, one of the main factors restraining the Iranian leadership under Khamenei from openly advancing toward a bomb was the fear that doing so could trigger a large-scale military campaign aimed not merely at damaging Iran’s capabilities, but at threatening the regime itself.

From Tehran’s perspective, however, Iran has now endured precisely such a confrontation and survived it.

More importantly, the conflict exposed the significant limitations facing both Israel and the United States in any future campaign against Iran: the reluctance to commit ground forces, constraints on available munitions, and Israel’s deep operational and strategic dependence on the United States.

At the same time, Iran may have concluded that its ability to threaten or disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, thereby inflicting severe damage on the global economy, gives it a level of coercive leverage that the West is ultimately unwilling to challenge decisively.

It is important to acknowledge that Iran withstood an unprecedented military assault in terms of the scale of firepower directed against it, yet the regime remained intact and did not capitulate. That reality may lead Tehran to conclude that the deterrent credibility of both Israel and the United States has been fundamentally weakened.

This perception could become even stronger after the U.S. elections and under future American administrations, many of which may be even less willing to enter into direct confrontation with Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, Iran’s resilience during the conflict may have shattered the aura of overwhelming Israeli-American deterrence.

Paradoxically, deterrence may have been more effective when it remained ambiguous and untested. Once military power was actually employed, it may have demonstrated the limits, rather than the strength, of Western coercive capacity against Iran.

This is a deeply consequential development. One indication is that Iran reportedly adopted tougher positions in post-war negotiations than it held before the conflict began. The loss of the deterrence card could ultimately convince the Iranian leadership that this is precisely the moment to move toward nuclear weapons capability, believing that neither Israel nor the United States possesses either the will or the ability to stop it.

The core problem is that neither Israel nor the United States was prepared, or perhaps even capable, of going all the way in a confrontation with Iran. Instead, they appeared to rely on external variables, whether Kurdish unrest, internal regime instability, or hopes for political fragmentation inside Iran by supporting Ahmadinejad, as substitute mechanisms that could spare them the enormous manpower requirements and the prospect of a campaign stretching over months or even years.

Once those assumptions collapsed, what remained was essentially an air campaign. While tactically impressive, its achievements may ultimately pale in comparison to the strategic damage caused by exposing the actual limits of Israeli and American power in Iranian eyes.

From Tehran’s perspective, the war may have revealed not overwhelming Western dominance, but rather the boundaries of what Israel and the United States are truly willing and able to do militarily against Iran.

That, in itself, may become one of the most damaging long-term consequences of the entire campaign. This should force both Israel and the United States back to the drawing board. They will need to reassess how deterrence against Iran can be rebuilt under the current circumstances.

That will not be easy. Restoring deterrence after it has been tested , and, in Tehran’s eyes, exposed as limited, is far more difficult than maintaining an ambiguous threat that has never been put to the test. Most importantly, the conflict likely helped Iran better understand its adversaries through direct friction and real-world confrontatio.

#IranWar‌
#iran