Umarkarim

Researcher @unibirmingham. Fellow @ProjectSEPAD. Ass. Fellow @kfcris_en. Views my own. Working on Saudi Arabia/Middle East.

[Umarkarim @Umarkarim89]

As Pakistan and Saudi Arabia sign a strategic defence pact I share some of my works regarding the evolution of bilateral relationship.
1- Pak-Saudi Ties
https://t.co/7IJQSupyyz
2- Pak–Saudi Ties: Anatomy of a Unique Relationship
https://t.co/iMg4i5pBuy
https://t.co/cpb4voiGtd

[سعد الدين العثماني - Saaddine ELOTMANI @Elotmanisad]

الحمد لله
وتهانئنا لمنتخبنا الوطني #أسود_الأطلس
👏👏
🤲🤲
دعاء جماعي في البداية
وسجود جماعي في النهاية

[Sushant Singh @SushantSin]

The correct headline. And if PM is travelling, the Vice President could have led an all-party delegation of top leaders and scholars to Tehran. Sending a junior minister and a non-entity Governor is not going to be taken kindly in Tehran, even though it may be hailed by Tel Aviv.

[الإخبارية - رياضة @alekhbariyaSPO]

#عاجل | منتخب #المغرب 🇲🇦 يتأهل إلى دور الـ 16 من بطولة #كأس_العالم 2026 FIFA™️ بعد فوزه على منتخب #هولندا بركلات الترجيح

#FIFAWorldCup | #الإخبارية_رياضة

[AGSI @GulfStatesInst]

Qatar's first World Cup point, earned through a goalkeeper of Palestinian descent, reveals how the emirate has turned a tiny citizenry, migration, and naturalization into an instrument of statecraft and where that instrument meets its limits. @raphelmago https://t.co/YzLoWevRBn

[Ali Al-Mawlawi @aalmawlawi]

The grotesque images of suitcases stuffed with cash hidden in the homes of politicians and officials represent the ultimate betrayal of Iraqis who sacrificed themselves in defence of this country against the Baath and transnational terrorism. Truly a desecration of their honour.

[Dr. Brahma Chellaney @Chellaney]

When Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in 2024, India dispatched its vice president to the funeral. But now the Modi government is sending much lower-level representation to the multi-day state funeral for Ali Khamenei, who was assassinated by the U.S. and Israel. Khamenei was not only Iran’s spiritual leader but also its head of state.

The decision suggests that Modi’s tilt toward the aggressor states in the Iran war still persists. By avoiding higher-level representation, New Delhi appears intent on not antagonizing Washington and Tel Aviv.

The government would argue that it is calibrating its representation to honor India’s historical and strategic relationship with Iran as a maritime neighbor while avoiding a high-profile political gesture that could complicate ties with Washington and Tel Aviv. Critics, however, will see the decision as evidence that India is allowing the U.S. and Israel to influence its Iran policy.

[Harith Hasan @harith_hasan]

I can't stress enough how much this tweet gets wrong.

First, Prime Minister al-Zaidi is hardly the person who initiated this campaign. At most, he is overseeing its implementation in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. The more likely driving force lies within Iraq's judicial establishment. Anyone familiar with how the Iraqi judiciary operates knows that arrest warrants targeting figures of this political stature are highly unlikely to be issued without approval from the highest judicial authority.

Second, this is hardly a "coup." Most of those arrested occupy second- or third-tier positions in Iraq's political hierarchy. Even the most prominent among them, Muthana al-Samarrai, is far from politically indispensable. He heads a relatively small parliamentary bloc and has generally functioned more as a political broker than as a top-level decision-maker.

Third, the Iran angle is probably the weakest claim in the tweet. Most of those arrested are Sunni politicians or state officials and functionaries. The Shi'a figures involved are hardly hardline pro-Iran actors, let alone individuals closely associated with the IRGC.
What we are most likely witnessing is another episode of elite power struggles and factional politics. Among the major political players, the biggest apparent loser seems to be former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, although it is still too early to draw firm conclusions.

It is not unusual for new Iraqi governments to launch anti-corruption campaigns at the beginning of their tenure, only for these efforts to lose momentum over time. What makes this episode different, however, is that it appears to have strong backing from the upper echelons of the judiciary and is unfolding in the context of mounting external pressure and growing economic challenges.

Given the enduring popularity of anti-corruption rhetoric in Iraq and the public's deep frustration with impunity for the "big fish," this could prove to be a politically astute strategy for enhancing the legitimacy of the new government—and, more broadly, the political settlement on which it rests.

[Quentin M. @MllerQuentin]

La tribu Nahdi, l'une des plus charismatiques du Hadramaout et très liée à l'Arabie saoudite. Des hommes d'une grande valeur.

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

Two interesting takeaways from this:

-as far as the US is concerned, the strait is now "free" to traffic with talks pending in Doha.

-Nick Stewart, who joined the admin in May, is head of the technical team. Stewart served on Trump's Iran team in his first term and is also affiliated with FDD.

[Umarkarim @Umarkarim89]

This indeed remains subject to each nation’s national interest. However all R4 members remain critical of a regional hegemonic approach adopted by Israel that now covers greater middle east while also fostering security linkages in South asia, horn of africa & Mediterranean.

[Gallia Lindenstrauss @GLindenstrauss]

"In the short term, the R-4 appears more likely to remain a flexible, issue-based consultation platform than to evolve into a NATO-like institutional security mechanism"

[Umarkarim @Umarkarim89]

Would be interesting to read the Bahraini minutes of this call. Interestingly this time no condemnation of the attacks on Bahrain by the Pak FM something which Pakistani side was doing in the past.

[Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Pakistan @ForeignOfficePk]

Deputy Prime Minister / Foreign Minister Senator Mohammad Ishaq Dar @MIshaqDar50 held a telephone conversation today with the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Bahrain, H.E. Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani @bahdiplomatic

The two leaders discussed the latest evolving regional situation following the signing of the “Islamabad MoU”.

Foreign Minister Al Zayani congratulated the DPM/FM on the signing of the Islamabad MoU and appreciated Pakistan’s constructive role in facilitating the understanding, expressing hope that it would contribute to lasting peace and stability in the region. He indicated that he would visit Pakistan in the near future in order to personally thank Prime Minister, DPM/FM and CDF for their great efforts to achieve the ceasefire.

DPM/FM thanked Dr Al Zayani for his kind sentiments and reiterated Pakistan’s resolve to promote dialogue and diplomacy for achieving peace and stability in region and beyond.

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

US aircraft struck ten targets in Iran--military installations, comms and radar equipment, and drone storage, per reporting--following another Iranian attack on shipping.

Iran is currently retaliating against US bases in Bahrain and Kuwait.

Traffic in Hormuz has dipped in light of the violence.

[سليمان العقيلي @aloqeliy]

دلالات اتصالات طهران بالرياض

بقلم ا.د/ صالح الخثلان*
من خلال رصد الاتصالات بين وزير الخارجية الإيراني وسمو وزير الخارجية منذ إعلان الهدنة في 9 أبريل وحتى 24 يونيو، يتضح أنها بلغت سبعة اتصالات؛ خمسة منها بمبادرة إيرانية مقابل اتصالين فقط من الجانب السعودي، في 6 مايو ويوم أمس. وهذا يعني أن اتجاه الاتصال كان، في معظمه، من طهران إلى الرياض، ولا شك أن لذلك دلالاته.

الدلالة الأولى أن إيران، رغم تقديرها أن الحرب انتهت دون أن تحقق الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل أهدافهما، ورغم توظيفها ورقة مضيق هرمز في إدارة ملف المفاوضات، لا تزال حريصة على ألا تقود نتائج الحرب إلى عزلة إقليمية نتيجة اعتداءتها على جيرانها. فطهران تدرك أن المكاسب العسكرية أو التفاوضية لا تكفي وحدها لإعادة دمجها في محيطها الإقليمي.

أما الدلالة الثانية، فهي إدراك إيران لأهمية الدور السعودي في أي ترتيبات إقليمية مستقبلية. فالمملكة تمثل اليوم مركز الثقل المعنوي والدبلوماسي والاقتصادي في الخليج والعالم العربي، وتمتلك شبكة علاقات واسعة إقليمياً ودولياً، وقدرة على التواصل مع مختلف الأطراف، بما يجعل موقفها مؤثراً في البيئة الإقليمية المحيطة بإيران.

كما تدرك طهران أن تحسين موقعها في العالم الإسلامي يمر، إلى حد كبير، عبر علاقتها بالمملكة. وتظهر محطات التوتر بين الرياض وطهران خلال العقود الماضية أن غالبية دول العالم الإسلامي كانت تراعي الموقف السعودي وتصطف معها، وهو ما يمنح المملكة ثقلاً معنوياً وسياسياً تدركه إيران جيداً.

ولا يقتصر إدراك طهران على ثقل المملكة، بل يمتد إلى فهمها لنهج السياسة السعودية في إدارة الأزمات؛ وهو نهج تشكل تاريخياً ويقوم على النفس الطويل وتقديم الاستقرار على المكاسب الآنية.

وتقدم تجربة الملك عبدالعزيز في إدارة الأزمة مع الإمام يحيى في اليمن خلال ثلاثينيات القرن الماضي مثالاً مهماً على هذا النمط. فالمطالعة الأولية للمراسلات والوثائق المتعلقة بتلك المرحلة، ومنها مذكرات الأمير تركي بن ماضي، مندوب الملك في المفاوضات، وهي مادة ثرية أعمل على دراستها حالياً)، تكشف حضور النفس الطويل، والصبر الاستراتيجي، وتقديم الاستقرار على المكاسب العاجلة؛ وهي سمات أصبحت لاحقاً من ركائز السياسة الخارجية السعودية.

المملكة بالطبع تدرك أن الاعتداءات الإيرانية على أراضيها وعلى دول مجلس التعاون والأردن خلقت فجوة ثقة عميقة لا تعالجها الاتصالات الدبلوماسية وحدها. وكما أكد سمو وزير الخارجية أكثر من مرة، فإن إعادة بناء الثقة تتطلب تغييراً حقيقياً في السلوك والسياسات

رغم ذلك، تبقي الرياض قنوات التواصل مفتوحة لأن استقرار المنطقة (غاية ثابتة في السياسة السعودية) يتطلب حداً أدنى من التفاهم بين قواه الرئيسية.

ولهذا نفهم الاتصالات المتكررة من طهران إلى الرياض؛ فهي تعكس إدراكاً إيرانياً بأن مكاسب الحرب أو المفاوضات لا تكفي وحدها لتحسين موقعها الإقليمي، وأن ذلك يتطلب علاقة مستقرة مع المملكة، بوصفها الطرف الأكثر تأثيراً في محيطها العربي والإسلامي.
———————————-
* عضو مجلس الشورى سابقاً
*استاذ العلوم السياسية في جامعة الملك سعود (سابقا)
*باحث ومستشار اول لمركز الخليج للدراسات

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

Iran has opened fire on a ship in the strait, in an effort to force ships off the Omani route.

At the same time, WSJ reports Iran is pushing a fee scheme with other Gulf states: modeled on the Dardanelles and estimated to bring in $40 billion per year, or roughly $1 million per ship. https://t.co/K0DepUca8y

[Andrew Leber @AndrewMLeber]

On “reconciliation ⁠talks to be held in Riyadh between Iran, Gulf Arab states” + others, will be important to see *which* states show up.

All 6 GCC = coalescing position on Iran

Uneven presence or representation = like separate but similar side deals being cut (1/2)

[Antonio Tajani @Antonio_Tajani]

Ho parlato con il Ministro degli Esteri iraniano @araghchi. L’Italia non ha mai preso parte ad alcuna iniziativa militare e non ha mai autorizzato l’utilizzo delle basi per azioni di guerra contro l’Iran, nel rispetto più rigoroso dei trattati con gli Stati Uniti. Ho chiesto che si torni ad una piena apertura dello Stretto di Hormuz, favorendo il passaggio di tutte le navi cargo italiane ancora bloccate. La riapertura dell’ambasciata italiana a Teheran è un forte segnale di dialogo anche in vista della ripresa dei rapporti economici e culturali.

[Ali Alfoneh علی آلفونه @Alfoneh]

Now that the IRGC is in charge, nobody wants a deal with Washington more than the IRGC. "A Consensus Emerges in Tehran on U.S.-Iran Negotiations" @GulfStatesInst #IranMediaReview June 24, 2026. https://t.co/rhyLQPGBMW

[Babak Vahdad @BabakVahdad]

In my view the emerging regional order will increasingly revolve around the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia-a framework that Tehran itself appears to have viewed with interest (today Araghchi spoke with Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan).

- Plus other members of the Islamabad Quartet (Egypt and Turkey), with Qatar, Oman and other GCC states . The main exceptions remain the UAE-which is nevertheless already engaged in dialogue with Tehran-and Bahrain, whose relationship with Iran remains considerably more complicated.
#Iran

[Arab News @arabnews]

#OPINION: The #Iran conflict was the first major test of the #Saudi-#Pakistan defense pact. It validated the logic behind the agreement, reinforced the importance of strategic cooperation & helped preserve #Gulf security, writes Dr. Ali Awadh Asseri https://t.co/FhqwMXxBwj

[Head to Head @AJHeadtoHead]

Did the US commit war crimes in Iran?

@mehdirhasan and former Pentagon official David Des Roches debate the air strikes by the US on schools and sports halls in Iran in the first days of the war.

Full episode ▶️ https://t.co/XtEwVmjc5J