انستیتو واشنگتن به فارسی

انستیتو واشنگتن را به زبان فارسی دنبال کنید.

[Robert Satloff @robsatloff]

By luck probably more than design, @POTUS war against #Iran could still trigger his original objective - regime change. My @WashInstitute colleague @AmbDennisRoss’ view in @PostOpinions

https://t.co/poNHxcokcO

[Mike Jacobson @MikeJacobsonCT]

Egypt's pound has lost up to 14% of its value since the Iran war began, with each $10/barrel oil rise adding ~$2.5B to Cairo's import bill — stress-testing a currency already down 80%+ over the past decade. https://t.co/SROl22uq35

[Andrew J. Tabler @Andrewtabler]

My latest on the realities impacting Syria’s dream of becoming the next Strait of Hormuz - or at least part of it. https://t.co/y8irxQlFkZ

[The Telegraph @Telegraph]

'If Trump embraces dictators in other countries, it was no surprise that he would do the same with Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei'

Catch up on Iran: the latest's recent special episode, 100 days of Iran war: the winners and losers, where @venetiarainey and @RolandOliphant host a discussion with retired US Army commander Ben Hodges and Iran analyst Holly Dagres to discuss the learnings of the war

👇 Let us know your thoughts below

🎧 Listen to the full episode now https://t.co/vG3aWjivY9

[Dennis Ross @AmbDennisRoss]

Using force to signal, as Trump does now, can back diplomacy if the other side wants a deal and fears escalation. Iran may want this to end as much as Trump does, but its leaders still believe they can outlast him. The Qatari draft may allow both to climb down, but not there yet

[Farzin Nadimi, PhD فرزین ندیمی @FarzinNadimi]

Iranian authorities have just banned their own fishing and cargo vessels from operating in the PGSA zone in the Strait of Hormuz. This is a clear deconfliction signal that Tehran is clearing the area for potential military escalation — most likely mining operations that would render the strait unusable for commercial traffic.

Yesterday, the IRGC declared the SoH closed to all maritime traffic and warned the shipping to remain in anchorage and avoid approaching the strait or they would be shot at. Interestingly, they blamed their decision on lack of safety and security at the strait. Some Iranian smuggling boats have come under drone attacks off the Omani Khasab coast today, and nobody knows by who.

The IRGC move comes amid intensifying escalation: recent downing of an Apache helicopter by an Iranian anti-aircraft loitering munition and the US retaliatory strikes, US and Iranian increasingly deadly attacks and counterattacks targeting ships that try to run the competing blockade, Iran’s oil exports being effectively strangled, and President Trump’s explicit threats regarding a military takeover of Kharg Island. Prospects for a “deal” are gloomier than ever.

At the same time, the White House announced that substantial volumes of oil have successfully cleared the region with direct US assistance and protection. If accurate, this makes Iran’s PGSA project to impose a new navigation regime and control the strait, completely irrelevant, and they are getting angry, as the US is losing patience. The risk of triggering a full closure that would spike global energy prices and invite far stronger responses is high.

[David Makovsky @DavidMakovsky]

Worth remembering when assessing Tehran’s negotiating strategy:
Iranian FM Araghchi literally wrote The Power of Negotiation (2025). His advice: “maximize what is received and minimize what is given” (p. 24). He also extols “repetition, repetition, and repetition” until the other side “gets numb” and consents (p. 185).
He may be referring to a belief claiming the US doesn’t have the stomach for a protracted negotiation and some will wonder if Iran is counting on Trump being distracted with other issues. Araghchi writes: “The Iranian negotiation style is generally known in the world as the ‘market style,’ which means continuous and tireless bargaining… he who gets tired and bored quickly will lose.”

[Hanin Ghaddar @haningdr]

On Lebanon, Israel, and the IDGC, here are the three things I’m watching 👇

[Washington Institute @WashInstitute]

As Iran continues its chokehold over the Strait of Hormuz, policymakers and investors “are searching for ways to reduce dependence on one of the world’s most vulnerable maritime chokepoints,” writes @Andrewtabler. But history suggests that pipelines crossing through Syria “are not merely economic assets—they are also strategic vulnerabilities.” https://t.co/6BvpilaW38

[Washington Institute @WashInstitute]

“The real trick is to get something that is good enough to satisfy enough people that you can call it a success, in a sense, and I think that’s extraordinarily difficult,” Michael Singh told @thehill about the U.S.-Iran negotiations. https://t.co/bxmtIc5GuI

[Washington Institute @WashInstitute]

“I think both sides want to project that when necessary, they're willing to use military force regardless of the negotiations. And I think that's what's happening here,” Michael Singh told @NPR about why the U.S. and Iran might use military strikes to try to strengthen their negotiating positions.  https://t.co/H0cjvWZWOr

[Washington Institute @WashInstitute]

“There were surely better ways to exacerbate the contradictions within the Islamic Republic. But Trump’s war of choice may yet prove to be one that led, in time, to genuine change in Tehran,” writes @AmbDennisRoss in @washingtonpost. https://t.co/g3gIaDxikc

[Matthew Levitt @Levitt_Matt]

In one of the two cases, which appear to be intertwined, 1 suspect told authorities there he believed their recruiters planned attacks in Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Myanmar, Thailand & Malaysia, where they received training on explosives, the sources said. https://t.co/5912mdfk3e

[Washington Institute @WashInstitute]

So far, the Houthis have stayed on the sidelines of the Iran conflict, but “Washington should not mistake restraint for passivity,” writes April Longley Alley in @latimes. https://t.co/w39SRQC2EW

[Washington Institute @WashInstitute]

In March 2023, @WashInstitute launched the Islamic State Select Worldwide Activity Map, a project spearheaded by @azelin. Three years later, the picture provided by this map has changed in ways that both confirm and complicate the trends identified at its one-year mark. https://t.co/mdfQZvh2OC

[Washington Institute @WashInstitute]

“I think there’s extreme nervousness inside the government of Israel” about a potential U.S.-Iran deal, said @robsatloff.

Watch the full webcast: https://t.co/J48kTZHcpR

[Noam Raydan @NoamRaydan]

All the details on Iran's latest attack on the container ship MSC Sariska V ( IMO 8715857) in Iraqi waters have been uploaded to our @WashInstitute map that tracks maritime attacks in the MENA region since 2017. This is not the first Iranian attack on an MSC-owned/linked vessel in the Gulf amid the Iran war.

On April 22, the IRGC Navy attacked and seized the MSC Francesca (IMO 9401116) as it attempted to exit the Strait of Hormuz. A second container ship was also attacked and seized, and some shipping databases showed that MSC had been the third-party operator for the past few years ( the Epaminondas (IMO 9153862)).

Here’s the link to the map: https://t.co/INAOspYqNu
(Use on a computer monitor; not yet adapted for phone screens.)

This is why I spend a lot of time with this map I co-created with an incredible team at the @WashInstitute. Every time it shows me a story, a pattern I missed. I'm glad to have one product that brings together so much of my analysis, and I hope you'll find it useful for your own research as well.

#OOTT #Shipping #IranWar‌

[Holly Dagres @hdagres]

Iran’s Central Bank said the consumer price index reached 77.2% and inflation in daily and general needs rose 113.8% since last May.

A private economic think tank in Iran described the figures as “an unprecedented rate since World War II.”
https://t.co/gQn4ocLjIi

[Washington Institute @WashInstitute]

Iran’s drone ecosystem cannot be destroyed though airstrikes alone, writes @FarzinNadimi. In the medium-term postwar period, that means the U.S. should pursue a counter-drone strategy around these principles:

🔹Put unrelenting pressure on Iran’s domestic regeneration network;
🔹Counter Iran’s use of cryptocurrency to procure drone components;
🔹Pressure foreign supply chains leading into the Iranian drone program;
🔹Directly confront Russian and Chinese assistance for Iran’s drone ecosystem;
🔹Prepare for the future; and
🔹Work with Gulf and European partners to launch a classified defection program for Iranian personnel working on drones https://t.co/ilKuNMOtQn

[Washington Institute @WashInstitute]

Disarming Hezbollah is still crucial, but Washington will have to address the group’s broader ability to restore itself so long as it retains Iranian support and key allies and government posts in Beirut, writes @haningdr. That will mean:

🔹Delinking Iran and Lebanon
🔹Offering carrots to Beirut, not just sticks
🔹Targeting Hezbollah’s allies and engaging its Shia base
https://t.co/MsqKGjEtk1