This weird notice about deleting references to "reputation risk" in I guess supervisory guidance - the documents that were amended did not accompany the notice - is a testament to the banking regulators' ability to make policy without doing notice and comment rulemaking. 1/2
I'm not surprised that the banks think Coinbase setting up paycheck direct deposits is "audacious." I am surprised that they didn't mind when Walmart did it. https://t.co/Hpfh81wBmA
Getting rid of considerations of reputational risk when scrutinizing a bank balance sheet is fine. The effort to take subjectivity out of evaluating the management of a bank is an effort to take the discretion out of bank supervision, and I've got doubts. https://t.co/krQc6lLvVP
As I’ve said before, the @CFTC has the expertise and responsibility to defend its exclusive jurisdiction over commodity derivatives.
That's exactly what we've done today by demanding Rhode Island cease its attempts to preempt federal regulation of prediction markets.
🗞️ Read more 👇
The conventional wisdom is that central banks should ignore shocks and respond to price level rises, and I guess the question is when one becomes the other.
Incoming data increasingly suggest that the energy price shock is feeding into broader inflation developments, Executive Board member @Isabel_Schnabel tells @Reuters. Given the size and persistence of the shock, looking through is no longer an option.
https://t.co/8Li4mA2AXy
New episode! David Zaring on Skinny Charters and the Future of Banking
@ZaringDavid and @DavidBeckworth discuss the role the Great Financial Crises played in FinReg Scholarship, how he came up with the term “skinny” in the new skinny Fed Master Accounts, the tumultuous road of Custodia vs. the Fed, a reimagined way to look at Federal Bank Charters, whether commerce and banking are actually still separate, Fed independence and how it functions in a more corporatist model, and much more.
https://t.co/vSc9EZGk2N
Delighted to have @ZaringDavid join the show to discuss skinny Fed master accounts, the future of OCC trust charters, why financial regulation looks very different from the rest of the administrative state, and more! (1/2)
https://t.co/7Z436mxazA
The new "we're taking stakes" approach by the government could be about rescuing dying firms, or natsec, or something else, but it isn't obvious to me that announcing that the government is buying in would be a 12% increase in the share price. https://t.co/ps8oOm6fFA
The NHL MOU is about sharing information on manipulated prediction market bets, and fair enough. But I'm ready for a "law of MOUs" paper, they are how international regulatory cooperation gets done, and aren't reviewable in court. 2/2 https://t.co/UkCdlDmZ9G
The CFTC executed an MOU with the NHL, signed by its commissioner (!), and very different from the other MOUs it executes. It does international MOUs all the time - 10 with British regulators in the last 20 years alone. And with US regulators, including a big one with the SEC.1/2
This executive order, directing banks to do immigration enforcement, has MQD and "is this really what the Bank Secrecy Act was about?" issues, but it explicitly directs the independent financial regulators to do something for the executive, that's new. https://t.co/O17Ze0eH53
Of course, the trust charter has been around for centuries, so it isn't novel, though the fintech use of the charter clearly is. 2/2 https://t.co/ZL6iqC0nSE
The trust charter is a skinny charter of the kind in vogue these days - it's a deposit only charter that promises access to the Fed's payment rails. 11 fintechs have received one since December 2025 (that's the end of the Biden administration). Skinny charters on the march! 1/2
My paper on last term's blow to the nondelegation doctrine is up on SSRN, and you should download it. Also addressed: of the 100 appeals that most discuss Kisor, the deference to agency regs case, 73 found for the agency, and 59 concerned crim/sentencing. https://t.co/6pdcVE1aJA