Concerto

Weaponised nerd. Good trouble. Always learning. Normal caveats apply.

[Modern War Institute @WarInstitute]

"These considerations are not negligible. And yet they do not change the fundamental truth that in large-scale conflict, Special Forces are uniquely positioned to conduct deep area operations and deep strike." https://t.co/myblsg1vlJ

[Rob Lee @RALee85]

I filmed a podcast with @kriegsforscherD and @RyanO_ChosenCoy on Friday to discuss last week's events. In part one we talk about Fedorov's time as minister of defense and his removal, Ukraine's theory of victory, the assault regiments, prospects for offensive operations, manpower problems, and other topics.
https://t.co/u23XUakyvg

[The Kyiv Independent @KyivIndependent]

The Resistance Movement within Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SOF) told the Kyiv Independent the number of people contacting it through secure channels increased after successful attacks on Russian targets.

https://t.co/pAYNrXIEx9

[Rob Lee @RALee85]

Fedorov said he identified 11 major problems after his first month as minister of defense:

"1. Ukraine's Armed Forces are fighting at the tactical level, although increasingly at the operational level too. Still, fundamentally, "we are still fighting tactically".

2. The corps system has not yet fully taken shape. "We have corps that are successful, that advance every month and do not lose territory. And we have corps where the commander is replaced every month. There are corps that have developed their own school of thought and philosophy, and there are corps where we do not even know how many brigades they have or what is happening inside them. Everything depends on organization, but there are corps that do not distribute all their resources internally," Fedorov said.

3. Brigades and corps have been fragmented. "There are brigades that cannot even determine how many battalions they have. A battalion is pulled out of one brigade and thrown into another. It is impossible to build a management system under conditions like these," the defense minister said.

4. No one is held accountable for anything. "Responsibility is always pushed down the chain. Someone else is always made to carry the blame, there is always talk of an investigation and of 'finding out who is guilty'," Fedorov said.

5. Supplies are not routed through the corps. Fedorov said the supply problem is "fundamental": "Over the past five months, we have bought more drones than in the whole of last year, but most units have not felt the impact, because everything is distributed manually: if you are loyal, you get something, if you are not, you don't... That is why we launched this system. It was four months of hell, because it took us four months to agree on a simple project for baseline drone provision to brigades."

6. Constant replacement of commanders.

7. Isolation and toxic treatment of those who deliver results. "If you succeed, you become a star, and then you hit a dead end. [General Mykhailo] Drapatyi received his third reprimand, goodbye. Sorry, Drapatyi, I think after this speech there will be a fourth reprimand for you. I wouldn't want that to happen, but we have no choice left but to talk about it," Fedorov said.

8. It is impossible to carry out any systemic project. "Because you constantly run into the same questions: 'But why?' and 'But how?'" the acting defense minister explained.

9. Human capital is being worn down without proper analysis. Fedorov said they had carried out "a great deal of work", including analyzing losses. "But decisions about who should be supported, who should not, who should be reinforced and who should not are not based on data. They are based on loyalty," he said.

10. The blocking of initiatives and the "bureaucratic crossfire". "In six months at the Defense Ministry, we have not been able to change the organizational structure because the General Staff refuses to approve it: the name is supposedly wrong, something else is not right, or there is allegedly no need to bring in new people," Fedorov explained.

11. Constant dishonesty. "This applies to me too: claims that I ordered the investigation into Skelia, that I launched a media campaign, that I did this or that," the acting defense minister said. [The Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation is conducting a criminal probe into the Skelia unit – 425th Separate Assault Regiment – following reports of at least 26 noncombat deaths, physical abuse, and inadequate medical care for recruits. The unit's commander was suspended, and authorities are currently investigating allegations of systemic abuse – ed.]

He added that he had proposed changes on all points.

"What solutions were proposed at the time? Radical personnel decisions. That meant changing both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff… It meant creating an environment where strong leaders could develop instead of being held back or constantly reprimanded. It meant working with IT specialists and smart people. It meant a different management approach. It meant appointing strong corps commanders. Drone-assault units are a fundamental change in the way we think about deploying infantry: technology must be at the forefront of combat. We should lose drones, not people, and only then should infantry move in," Fedorov said.

He also proposed "levelling out" the front line and implementing a doctrine based on the principle of "not losing personnel where it can be avoided", while taking the terrain and the situation into account.

"The allocation of all resources through corps – that means personnel, drones, artillery, training… Because there are situations where, ultimately, no one is responsible for a section of the front line," said the acting minister.

He also said he had proposed establishing an Academy of Modern Warfare to train new leaders capable of commanding headquarters and units, creating a consortium of Ballistics and Anti-Ballistics units, closing the skies, achieving victory in the economic war and, more broadly, transforming the defence forces and rooting out corruption in procurement.
https://t.co/fk3wrPHY6U

[POPULAR FRONT @PopularFront_]

🇲🇷 #Mauritania: Mauritanian National Guard troops using a live UAV feed displayed on a television mounted to the side of a camel during an operation to track jihadist militants in 2025.

(via @blackstarops)

[Roy🇨🇦 @GrandpaRoy2]

In what appears to be the first-ever robotic amphibious assault of its kind, modified Ukrainian USVs have landed UGVs armed with machine guns on the Kinburn Spit.

[Boone Cutler 🦬🇺🇸 🦅 @boonecutler]

Imagining the Near-Future of American Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University https://t.co/d9G9M4yRWS

[Amir Zamir @zamir_ar]

Turns out it's possible to generate videos that maximally excite an arbitrary brain region using a simple search-based algorithm. It's a fully computational approach, so it's another way to speculate what a brain region represents, alongside other neuroscientific methods.

Select an arbitrary brain region->algorithmically generate a video that jacks it up. See the visuals on the webpage https://t.co/UzKyN8MHda

In silico (for now)

[Michael Weiss @michaeldweiss]

Incredible deep-dive by my friend @huibmodderkolk and company into how Dutch intelligence (AIVD and MIVD) missed the full-scale invasion and was adamant it wouldn't happen, based on assumptions about Putin and a well-placed asset in Russia. "Only a tiny circle of confidants — perhaps ten people at most — knew about Putin’s war plans. It explains the mismatch with the Americans. The US intelligence agencies evidently had access to someone or something inside that innermost circle." https://t.co/h8yp1iDqmH

[William Alberque @walberque]

I've collected all the facts about the launch in my Substack. The bottom line is that China must sign up to the HCoC urgently. Their ad hoc notifications and NOTAMs are not sufficient, and ignore the rights of the countries in the splashdown range. 2/3

https://t.co/w1rzw43zTZ

[Tom Shugart @tshugart3]

This is unlikely to make the news but is IMO potentially a quite important—and ominous—development.

Bottom line: the PLA Rocket Force appears to be testing a land-based fixed multiple-missile launch system, for up to MRBM-sized missiles—a system most useful for a first strike.

[Decker Eveleth @dex_eve]

Is China's SLBM test a primarily a signaling exercise for other countries? Almost certainly not. A thread on the SLBM test, what China was probably attempting to achieve, and what it might mean: 🧵

[ꜱᴘᴀᴄᴇ ᴘᴜɴᴋ @_space_punk_]

Maybe no one is talking about pirates because the pirates (thats you) haven't shown up and said their line yet?

[6ɪx✦ @ok6ixx]

So my dad has been ending every phone call with "stay dangerous" instead of "goodbye" for like six months now. We all thought he was just being a weird dad. Turns out he's been mishearing the ending of a podcast he listens to. The host says "stay curious" but my dad is slightly deaf in one ear. He's been going around telling his coworkers, my grandmother, and apparently his DOCTOR to "stay dangerous" this entire time. My mom only found out because his doctor called to check if everything was okay at home. My dad has now decided he likes his version better and refuses to stop. Yesterday he told a nun to stay dangerous.

[Bambulu @Bqmbulu]

“If you haven't read hundreds of books, you are functionally illiterate, and you will be incompetent, because your personal experiences alone aren't broad enough to sustain you.”

— James N. Mattis

[Sergej Sumlenny, LL.M @sumlenny]

In order to minimize environmental impact Ukrainian naval drones always hit the rear motor part of russian oil tankers, disabling them without oil spill. This tactics is very hard vs to an easy (enviromentally dangerous) hit on side, requires great skills.

[Adam Juelich @acjuelich]

@SwiftOnSecurity And then you have the thought in your head: "When I leave this place, they won't continue the successful trajectory I've set"

It's like driving past your old house and seeing weeds 2ft high.

[Ryan Moulton @moultano]

I had so much fun working this, and I'm glad it is resonating.

[Amos Fox @AmosFox6]

My latest peer-reviewed article - "Drones and Land Warfare: Generating Strategically Relevant Outcomes in Conflict and War," in Defense & Security Analysis.

https://t.co/Z36rJFap9w

[William B. Fuckley @opinonhaver]

It remains an incredibly grim but admittedly very bleakly funny running bit that we got an administration obsessed with LETHALITY and WARFIGHTERS and then almost immediately had one of the most humiliating defeats in American military history