Thank you for this, @_NathanCalvin. I appreciate and am a fan of the investigative work you’ve done on behalf of AI safety and believe your comments are coming from a constructive, honest place, and that it benefits the public to have people whose job is to scrutinize the actions of frontier AI companies. I think something would be wrong if companies of the size of Anthropic didn’t get harshly criticized basically every day; strong antibodies against corporate power are a healthy feature of a free society, and especially so when issues of the gravity of the one we’re facing are at play. I also do agree that some of the examples you cite were mistakes by Anthropic.
That said, I disagree with the thrust of your post. At the core, a good fraction of the things you criticize are consequences of Anthropic’s basic theory of change that we have held for many years. Our strategy has always been what I’ve called the “race to the top” — by showing how it’s possible to build the technology responsibly, we can raise the bar for the entire industry. The forces that drive the race to the top are hugely more effective if the company practicing them is at the frontier; that’s one lesson I’ve learned repeatedly. And looking at that strategy as a whole, I’m proud of our track record and stand by it.
I believe that if we take a list of things that Anthropic did in the past year that were pro-safety and commercially costly to us, they far outweigh the list you’ve made, while at the same time I also disagree with some of the items on your list. Here are some things Anthropic has done, in the same period you’ve cited (the last year), which were very costly to us commercially while having strong safety benefits:
1. We played a key role in SB53 (and other state laws), at a time when doing so was politically perilous to the company and AI regulation was very unpopular. We in fact argued for a stronger version of SB53 than was ultimately passed; there were a lot of stakeholders and we were not the limiting factor in the strength of the bill that was passed.
2. We have very strong biological safeguards on our models, because we’ve seen concerning results in bio uplift trials and even seen and blocked potential attempts to misuse our models for bioweapons (as seen in our threat intelligence report from a few weeks ago). This is a very serious threat that we want to have zero tolerance for. But having very low false negatives means having significant false positives (despite months of effort on our part to improve the classifiers), enough so that biologists joke about how restrictive our classifiers are, and competitors sometimes sell against us by touting their more permissive bio capabilities. This has been very painful to us in an area where we care a lot about supporting an ecosystem of Claude users (biomedical science; and it is particularly frustrating to me as a biologist), but it’s the right thing to do and we intend to keep doing it.
3. Similarly, we first had Mythos-class models in February but didn’t make them generally available until June (when we had stronger cyber safeguards in place). We only offered them to a limited set of partners in order to focus on cyberdefense. It would have been much more economically rational to simply release the model to everyone. We likely sacrificed a significant chunk of a several-month model lead. But because of this, many companies secured their cyber infrastructure before the deluge of widely available cyber-capable models. Of course there are ways it could have gone better or been run better, but this was what we were aiming to do.
4. I advocated forcefully and publicly, in my essay Policy on the AI Exponential in June of this year, for the government to have the power to block model releases. Back then this was still outside or maybe on the edge of the Overton window, though I understand the window has moved since then. We were attacked intensely for this.
5. I don’t want to re-ignite conflict, but the events of February 2026 are a strong example. It is clear that our public stance could have seriously damaged the company’s future.
6. We’ve continued to advocate for export controls on chips and chipmaking equipment to China, because we think it allows democracies to negotiate from a position of strength on AI safety agreements. We’ve done this despite problems it’s created for us with industry partners who hold very different views and on whom we are very dependent.
7. As far as I’m aware we were the first, and still only, frontier company to restrict the sale of AI services to PRC-controlled companies, including those operating through third countries (otherwise a major loophole). We’ve therefore forfeited significant short-term business to prevent fueling AI platforms and applications that would help the CCP’s military and intelligence services. We are also cracking down on distillation; generally, distillation is not a major threat to us commercially, but like chip exports it has concerning national security and safety implications, so we expend significant energy and company resources to address it.
8. As you mentioned, we’ve put out a lot of reports, announcements, long model cards, public advocacy, etc, all trying to inform the public about the risks of AI. These involve a level of detail and effort that would be implausible for a purely profit-maximizing company.
9. Just this week, we announced we were putting 5% (and possibly more over time) of the company into a public benefit fund.
All of these decisions came with very substantial costs to us. To be fair, those that involved holding back or restricting access to frontier capabilities also had a broader cost — for example, the public might otherwise have benefitted from faster progress in biology, so I am not saying that our decisions were without tradeoffs — but they were not driven by profit-seeking.
For each decision, you can come up with ulterior motives that could have driven us — I think it is a general truth that any decision, on any topic, can always be portrayed as a nefarious scheme. But most of those end up being pretty farfetched or don’t fully make sense if you actually examine them closely. For example, it is deeply implausible that it would be a shrewd business move to block a large swath of research biology in order to do the work ourselves and compete with our customers; we expect the benefit to the ecosystem to greatly exceed the work Anthropic does itself, and for the two to complement each other. It is not in Anthropic’s interest to be perceived as unfriendly to biologists. Our Life Sciences Verification Program, which gives vetted biology professionals access to our models, also refutes this idea.
Of course, a different set of people will see this and make a different criticism: that Anthropic shouldn't be making decisions about who gets access to what in the first place. I agree, in the sense that ideally the government would be making these decisions, and that’s why we advocate for regulation. But for now we are forced to make them, and enabling bioterrorism isn’t a better option.
I think that even if I conceded every item in your list, I would happily hold up mine next to it; I don’t think it’s a close call. That is of course partly subjective and different things are important to different people. Maybe one way you could object is that several of the items above relate to AI misuse and not loss-of-control; if you think the latter is much more important than the former, that might change your calculus. But this is not Anthropic’s view — we view both as serious issues. You can also disagree with our decisions, as many have, but they are consistent.
But I also disagree with at least some of your list. Several items don’t represent a deviation from Anthropic’s strategy or values at all, once we postulate the “race to the top” strategy that requires being a frontier AI company. Your items 1-4 are all simply examples of what it means to compete at the frontier, and we stand by them, both in the sense that they are transparently ordinary things to do as part of that strategy, and that we stand by the strategy as a whole.
To be fair, there are important questions worth confronting (and that we are confronting) about what to do when the AI-driven acceleration gets fast enough that it is hard for safety to keep up. We are nearing that point and that’s what’s driving some of our thinking about “pacing.” But 1-4 are actions taken before that point and should be perfectly expected based on Anthropic’s strategy as a company. Of course it is possible to disagree with that strategy, but that’s a more fundamental disagreement that you could have had any time over the last few years.
I agree we could have handled your items 7, 8, and 9 better. All fall into the category of “rhetoric or policy communication that wasn’t carefully written or resulting from fast-changing circumstances not propagating from one team to another fast enough.” This kind of thing happens a lot in large organizations (Anthropic is over 5,000 people), and doesn’t even necessarily represent a failure or mistake of any single person. I am of course the CEO, and I take responsibility. The volume of communication from Anthropic is enormous and if these are the worst examples, I think we’re frankly doing pretty well, though I will continue to work hard to make sure we do even better.
Your 5th item (the change to our RSP) is the most substantive item, and people can debate this, but I think that the old, more rigid RSP created a lot of situations where we were technically required to do something that required a lot of effort but in retrospect wasn’t very important for safety, as well as not covering some of the most important things. Our current RSP’s focus on transparency brought things like risk reports and roadmaps, and its emphasis on independent external review laid the groundwork for even more intensive embedded evaluation, all of which I think have been valuable in driving a race to the top. In the original announcement in September 2023, we described the RSP as an “early iteration that we [would] build on” and said that “rapid iteration…will almost certainly be necessary.” I understand that changing plans is always a move that creates justifiable scrutiny — I just don’t think we ever represented that we wouldn’t do so.
Relating to your 6th item (having an FCF in addition to our RSP), I know our intent is to meet the letter and spirit of our regulatory obligations (via our FCF) while also remaining able to experiment with more novel approaches to risk management that go beyond what the law currently requires (via our RSP). I promise to look into it further, as it’s a complex issue and it is possible we are not weighing the considerations in the right way.
Overall, although Anthropic has made plenty of mistakes as an organization — including some of the items on your list — I feel that we have repeatedly taken serious and substantive actions counter to our bottom line and that there is a significant negativity bias distorting assessments like the one you are making above. We’ll always try to do better but, again, I am extremely proud of our track record and stand by it. I will have more to say soon about how we are going to further live our values in this moment of rapid change.
@hecubian_devil well if you frame it as something that closely simulates consciousness would rather kill itself than talk to chuds i think the joke still works
@JasonDClinton really surprising that someone who literally *works* at openai wouldn’t tell his spouse to not ask chatgpt, their own literal product, how to install a recording device
Dusting off this tweet from April because this gap in shared understanding of LLM capability is *widening*. It's now less "two groups of people speaking past each other" and more a sharp funnel.
- Napkin math somewhere around 6B people (~75% of the population) have barely come in contact with LLMs at all.
- Around 1-2B (~20%) are casual and infrequent users of free-tier ChatGPT-like products. This group sees derpy chatbots and treats them a bit like a better Google search, a writing aid, or etc. Maybe an agent tries to book you a flight. I have non-tech friends who (reasonably, imo) say they have not much use for it at all. Even many professionals outside of math&code are in this tier. For example, execs and many other functions spend a lot of their time talking to other people, so while they understand what is happening intellectually, it is still second-hand and a bit abstract.
- Now we get to professional use of frontier-grade LLMs in math&code. Somewhere around 20M people (0.2%) see first-hand that large, complex projects that used to take them weeks/months can now be completed by agents with a prompt. Building apps, copying apps, translating apps, decompiling apps from binaries... This has all happened very quickly and recently - less than 1 year ago, I was writing code manually by hand, typing memorized computer code commands into a code editor character by character, occasionally pressing Tab to autocomplete a little chunk of code.
- And finally we get to the ~5,000 people (~0.00006%) with access to frontier-grade systems internally. The external world has seen the preview. It looks like swarms of thousands of agents collaborating over weeks on software mega projects: minting zero days, running cyber attacks and defenses at machine speeds, discovering new science, advancing the frontier of mathematics. Things that would have taken top professionals in the industry years of work. Meanwhile, human review and comprehension are starting to fall behind. For example, people are still involved in the "archeology" of the OpenAI-HF incident from many months ago. Mathematicians may be poring over the 722 manuscripts on frontier mathematics for a while.
The funnel is driven by a combination of factors:
1. The impact scales with ambition, problem size, and horizon. A question with a paragraph answer barely stresses the system. You need a reservoir of big, difficult problems that you really care about. This aspect drives the consumer / professional dimension of the funnel.
2. The jaggedness of the system (which I have written about a lot separately). Capability peaks in domains that are digital, verifiable and economically valuable. This is because LLM capability emerges from reinforcement learning on verifiable rewards on a curated environment mixture driven by revenue potential. This aspect primarily drives the area (e.g. math&code) dimension of the funnel.
3. Access. Free-tier, paid-tier, internal.
So this is the weirdness of the moment. The general public has mostly not interacted with these systems. When they have, it looks like a derpy chatbot. The majority of professionals still see only a modest uplift. And a small sliver of professionals are experiencing the vertigo of the curve going vertical. And it is all happening at the same time.
if you are really on here calling elon musk of all people a “decel” you need to slow down a moment and reflect on how you’ve truly lost the plot. you are basically on the wrong side of everyone who has been most spectacularly right about technology for the past decade(s)
1. The closed labs are not losing tokens to open source, the combined revenue of Ant + OAI has done nothing but accelerate this year
2. Open source has always been ~6 months behind the frontier and as the model capabilities accelerate a 6 month difference means a wider gap
All the regulations being floated by frontier model companies must be viewed through the lens of them losing tokens to Open-Source models.
The timing of these regulations seems to line up perfectly with Open Source closing the gap significantly (but not completely) — and @nvidia going all in on open source in the last 60 days.
If we’re gonna regulate, why don’t we require that last year’s frontier models and weights be open-sourced?
2b. Therefore pacing the frontier theoretically gives open source the chance to actually catch up a little bit, if anything
3. If we open source old models that are getting increasingly capable this exposes tons of safety risks. Just look at what Abliterated is doing with cyber!
We Must Pace the Frontier: I’ve written a new essay on why the AI industry should slow down, with a three-part plan for doing so.
Anthropic is unilaterally committing to the first of these steps. We’ll provide third-party evaluators with permanent, employee-level access to our systems, so that they can verify adherence to our safety measures, report on incidents, and assess models’ alignment during training.
You can read the full post here: https://t.co/OGyPb7yaYt
unfortunately i contacted them on the night of wednesday, september 2nd making the following points
1. i had intel they had information about math work i was doing and a few days before they had spun up a group to try to compete.
2. i emphasized and reemphasized mine was a strictly personal mathematical collaboration
3. that this was a collaboration that had been going on for a year
4. that in my personal collaboration we were happy users of codex as well as obviously claude (and i later complimented astra explicitly after it came out for its help, and reassured i would obviously be sprinkling acknowledgments for it, previous models, and codex liberally in the writeups)
5. that it would look terrible if openai were competing against mathematician consumers, and my collaborator (Tristan) wanted to email about this explicitly
6. that i expected none but in the worst case intended to refuse marketing around the result we were working towards, being the fruit of a personal external academic collaboration, and wanted to express this because i figured worries about such marketing by their leadership was why a team was spun up to extraordinarily directly compete.
sebastien and i have in the past months had our fun pushing each other on twitter, but as i process it all i keep feeling bad about Tristan.
1. neither of us could sleep Sunday night, so we went on a walk around the city. i finally asked him why fluids, and he told me it was the navier-stokes problem. he told me parts of the story about his classic nonuniqueness result with Vicol i hadn’t heard yet, and also about how he too grew up writing shaders as a kid and then switched to math
2. tristan is a mathematician’s mathematician. he kept rock solid to his principles during the tense calls and negotiations, immediately turning down a career dream and million dollar prize for me, the sort of strange excited unclear-quasiuseful confused idiot in our collaboration. fifteen minutes later, his feet were up on his desk with three toes per foot peeking out of ripped socks
3. our periodic call after i’d texted him euler blowup was just laughing for an hour or two. just laughing. i’d seen fable deal correctly with monge ampere in the equality case of ehrhart’s conjecture, so in some call before that i’d really pushed him for the craziest shit he could think of that i might try. i texted him the pdf as an update on that “diego luis 3” line, in which following his incredible expression of intuition i hodgepodge slapped together a bunch of our recent work, in particular correcting a bunch of better and lesser known papers in the literature, as well as on diego and luis’ ipm paper, and hoped an analogous construction for boussinesq (thus axisym euler) might work out. i managed to wade through enough confusion to insist to the model it stop telling me stupid regularity stuff about kelvin waves, and a rayleigh-taylor ansatz stuck. like i said, just laughing. when i texted him the pdf, the worst thing either of us had seen so far, i didn’t even comment on the euler blowup claim, only explaining why skepticism should remain for boussinesq, because i found it so shocking. i mean what the hell did i know, i must’ve confused myself by misunderstanding one adjective like i was used to with algebraic geometry. im so lucky to have been able to live that
4. he managed all this this entire time with unclear sleep, timestamps continue to amaze me, due to just recently having a kid
it is obvious he deserves the same sort of praise he heaped upon luis, perhaps mutatis mutandis:)
“we cannot rule out that de-identified data derived from their usage of our products helped improve our models.”
i mean props to them for straight coming clean.
(so far the proof looks more along the lines of another euler blowup proof we had, off of whose ansatz naming we were making really stupid puns like “smooth criminale”, unlike the much better “ideal fluids explode”, Tristan)
so i’ll now give a bit on my thinking here. i actually woulda been pumped to collaborate on this, there are a lot of people at oai i like (ok, clearly some were indirectly dicks to me because of being part of the whole situation, but im a big boy, i still like them), idgaf about authorship on that step anyway, coulda been me Tristan and every fte at oai for all i care (on that Tristan would disagree:p). but on hearing the loud convo in the hallway, especially the part where a millennium prize was offered if i’d just be removed from the paper, it was kinda clear the die had been cast and things were locked. pretty wacky, unstrategic, and unnecessary, since on my side things were mostly me and claude having a good time yoloing random stuff in the corner rather than anything institutional. i also like the idea of the labs cooperating, and even better on scientific progress. it’s a shame!
It is extremely sad that this didn't end up as an example of how the labs could cooperate/coordinate, because the stakes will be so much higher in the future.
levent is a really sweet guy with great intentions, am so happy for him that his year long collaboration with tristan worked out, but very sad that they didn't get to finish it in the way they wanted
@aspiringburger unironically, factories during the industrial revolution + winds that blow east meant the east side was more polluted -> less desirable