A surprising thing in the APT31 indictment is that there is no dedicated infrastructure subteam. Instead, the suspects seem like multi-taskers. Surprising,since their infrastructure looks quite consistent. Maybe a documented team playbook or tooling for setting up infrastructure?
@HemayaGroup @BIACsaudi أتقدم بالشكر لكم على هذه الفرصة الطيبة وتقديم الفرصة لنا لمشاركة القليل من المعرفة، وهذا أقل جهد نستطيع تقديمه للمساهمة في جهودكم المميزة
This is why you should always control outgoing web access. Only allow servers internet access on a per-case basis with a whitelist of allowed domains. There are a lot of ways to reduce the risk of outbound HTTPS beaconing/C&C.
I'm generally a pretty positive person, but it's Festivus, so let's blow off some steam and air our #threatintel grievances. Threat intel feeds are just data feeds, they're not threat intel. Please stop naming groups after malware, it's confusing AF.
#ICYMI: You can view the recording of yesterday's SANS Emergency Webcast regarding the #Solarwinds incident led by @MalwareJake here:
https://t.co/oHTPET6Cvo
#solarigate
Your CTI program should always include information on IT Supply Chain attacks, even if you do not have any software/services targeted. The goal is to expand possible detection measures and architecture modifications, based on understanding supply chain attacks TTPs.
This is why you should always control outgoing web access. Only allow servers internet access on a per-case basis with a whitelist of allowed domains. There are a lot of ways to reduce the risk of outbound HTTPS beaconing/C&C.
So you want to talk about the massive software supply chain intrusion & the most carefully-planned, complex espionage I’ve ever helped uncover?
Start here: https://t.co/m1nJG5UlVk 🤩
But then what?? Let’s talk about some post-compromise techniques...