alcueca

Previously: @optimism - @yield - ERC4626 (Tokenized Vaults) - ERC3156 (Flash Loans) - ERC7266 (Oracles) - Judge @ Code4rena, Cantina

[alcueca @alcueca]

@cal_nix I was planning to have the LLM prepare the campaign, but not be the dungeon master

[Merlin Egalite 🕛 @MerlinEgalite]

my pov:

-> security is cat and mouse game. always has been (check early internet days)
-> security holes were already there, it's just became cheaper to exploit
-> it will become cheaper to fix as well
-> security tools are going to catch up very soon
-> most recent hacks are opsec related not SC related ( @flipdazed pulled the numbers recently)
-> we need to level up on opsec :for sure:
-> we see noncustodiality and risk isolation has 2 key very important design choice to limit hack impacts
-> more LOC = larger attack vector so simplicity is paramount
-> i've never seen a more exciting time to build stuff than today

[alcueca @alcueca]

@PatrickAlphaC @GalloDaSballo @shealtielanzz I said that once as a judge, and C4 staff told me to not do that.

Of course, they were right. But still, fuck.

[alcueca @alcueca]

@code4rena Thank you for all your hard work. You had an enormous impact on blockchain security.

[alcueca @alcueca]

@GalloDaSballo Sad, but I'm glad I was part of it

[alcueca @alcueca]

@hosseeb Word.

However, as CTO of a protocol that I myself wrote and that had a less-than-graceful shutdown, it's not so easy.

Graceful shutdown is a feature that needs to be planned from the very beginning, and it's difficult to prioritise when you are just trying to make it.

[alcueca @alcueca]

The team at @veda_labs are talented, ambitious, and pragmatic. We are building the future of finance, and we will all win.

[TuongVy Le 🏀 @TuongvyLe12]

So excited to welcome @alcueca as Head of Onchain Security at @veda_labs - a legend in DeFi security and co-inventor of ERC-4626, the standard that made DeFi vaults composable and legible. Not a bad person to have designing the security model for the next generation of onchain markets 🙂

[alcueca @alcueca]

During my time at @Optimism, I led the development of the SaferSafes tools, a Liveness Module and Timelock Guard designed to provide deep security on Gnosis Safes.

This article provides the reasoning for developing precisely those two tools.

https://t.co/RoiGO5ucYX

[alcueca @alcueca]

https://t.co/51J2Jd9k2A

[alcueca @alcueca]

https://t.co/51J2Jd9k2A

[alcueca @alcueca]

@ShilldoBaggins @omgcorn Those were fun times, though

[alcueca @alcueca]

@omgcorn Would you do it as part of a bug bounty?

@Optimism includes their upgrade transactions in the bug bounty. If you catch a critical in there it's up to $2M.

[alcueca @alcueca]

This sounds like a worthy program to come out of a chain foundation, which would help setting security standards.

@ethereum, what's your take on this?

[Solana Foundation @SolanaFndn]

Solana was built for security. As the ecosystem scales, so does our investment in the tools, standards, and support.

Today that commitment deepens with a new security program, active monitoring, formal verification for top protocols, and a new crisis response network.

Learn more 👇

[alcueca @alcueca]

The level of sophistication on the Drift Protocol hack is truly next level. It's reasonable to think that many others are being targeted in the same way. For your own sake, if you run a successful crypto protocol, read on.

[Drift @DriftProtocol]

https://t.co/qYBMCup9i6

[Tay 💖 @tayvano_]

@metaproph3t I’ve been screaming this since before 2020 how are people still asking this question

A SMART CONTRACT AUDIT WONT SAVE YOU FROM THE BIGGEST, MOST PREVALENT RISKS IN THIS ECOSYSTEM.

THEY DONT EVEN TRY TO SAVE YOU!!!!!

[alcueca @alcueca]

I wrote an article on threat modelling after the Resolv hack, not very long ago. Yesterday, the biggest DEX in Solana gets again hacked through a multisig compromise.

It is possible to assess your risks and come up with targeted mitigations to avoid hacks like these.

Read this:
https://t.co/uIStqX2wjb

[Neodyme @Neodyme]

Drift Protocol on Solana just got drained. It's looking like a multisig member compromise -- and the story starts at least a 20 days before the attack. Here's the breakdown:

[alcueca @alcueca]

@jack__sanford Chainanalysis reported that "the attacker compromised Resolv’s cloud infrastructure to gain access to Resolv’s AWS Key Management Service (KMS) environment where the protocol’s privileged signing key was stored."

https://t.co/X30jnIkkCT

[alcueca @alcueca]

https://t.co/R5PRboLgsF

[alcueca @alcueca]

Those are all valid mitigations, but the question is how to prioritise those eight against the rest of the risks that a company faces. Manpower is not infinite, and a pre-product-market-fit company has different security needs from a $10B TVL protocol.

The point of the article is that instead of shooting a list of generic mitigations to implement, just because there is a permissioned account, you can look at the protocol with more detail, and tell which ones are critical right now, for this protocol, at this time, and which ones are best implemented later when some milestones are achieved.

Otherwise, all of them get ignored, as with Resolv. Or you get a random set implemented, which might not protect you the way you need.

[alcueca @alcueca]

https://t.co/uIStqX2wjb

Once again, a protocol is hacked in a completely avoidable way.

Everyone knows to audit their code, and to run a bug bounty, but beyond there, confusion is the norm.

Threat modelling protects your protocol as a whole: infrastructure, code, processes, people.

[alcueca @alcueca]

https://t.co/R5PRboLgsF

[alcueca @alcueca]

@0xRajeev That is because they don't get a clear view of the centralization risks, and what are the actions that they should take.

It's not enough to tell them that they have centralization risks, not everyone can build a permissionless protocol.

[alcueca @alcueca]

@devtooligan It's great to be back :)