Zero-click means the victim does nothing and the attacker still wins.
When the only defense is patching after exploitation, the window is already lost.
🚨 Google confirms Pixel phones targeted in zero-click zero-day attacks
Google has patched CVE-2026-58704, a high-severity vulnerability in Pixel phones' cellular modem that the company says was already under "limited, targeted exploitation."
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The flaw is caused by a logic error that can allow an attacker to bypass permission checks and escalate privileges beyond the modem's isolated environment.
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Most importantly, exploitation requires no interaction from the victim.
No malicious link needs to be clicked and no file needs to be opened, making it a zero-click attack.
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Google has not disclosed:
• Who carried out the attacks
• How many Pixel owners were targeted
• How the victims were selected
• What tools or spyware may have been deployed
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CISA has added CVE-2026-58704 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and set a September 19 remediation deadline for affected federal systems.
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Google says Pixel devices with the September 5, 2026 security patch level or later are protected.
Pixel owners should update their devices immediately.
@martinetlee An allowlist that checks the shape of a call but not its arguments is not an allowlist.
caller_supplied pool address means the attacker picks the destination.
The detector behind this asks one question. Does anything constrain the value that decides the call, anywhere on its path to that call?
A require elsewhere in the function does not answer it.
New Pre-Mortem from @KFerles
The detector behind this asks one question. Does anything constrain the value that decides the call, anywhere on its path to that call?
A require elsewhere in the function does not answer it.
New Pre-Mortem from @KFerles
An interesting "pre-mortem" this week. See how running continuous checks on your code can help you catch bugs even in the cases where you deem an external audit is not necessary.
@joranhonig the fuzzing parallel is good
once the baseline rises, the edge moves from finding shallow bugs to proving the absence of whole bug classes
that's where the next status symbol lives
"AI has been a ‘net negative’ for crypto"
AI is making attackers faster. Your audit cadence hasn't changed.
Quarterly reviews can't outpace automated exploit generation.
A function that forwards caller-supplied calldata into a low-level call can perform any operation the target's interface exposes.
Nobody designed that set. No auditor reviewed it.
New Auditor's Take from @FormallyJon covers the class.
https://t.co/JQPRc9kmVF
@storming0x every security dollar looks like a cost until the exploit turns it into a ransom negotiation
prevention is priced in minutes when recovery is priced in weeks & reputation
@storming0x The sad reality is the incentive math.
A published bounty of even 5% would've cost a fraction of 600 BTC, and it would've been agreed before the funds were ever at risk.
@MerlinEgalite The TAM half is right. The "you don't need humans" half is where teams get burned.
AI expands coverage and speed.
It does not replace the judgment that decides whether an underconstrained circuit is exploitable or benign.
@nateholiday@Microsoft@NVIDIAAI if ai compliance runs on zkproofs, then the audit surface moves from the model to the circuit!
every constraint gap becomes a silent way to prove a false claim
@KFerles: A defender has to find every vulnerability. An attacker needs one.
AI just made finding that one cheaper. Point-in-time audits cannot keep pace with that. Exploits climbed in the first half of this year.
Continuous validation is the only way defenders catch up.