@AAASmember Why don't you emphasize how insecure internet voting is? I don't object to its use for AAAS elections, since I assume that there is little incentive to hack a AAAS election. But the same is hardly true for governmental elections!
@jennycohn1 @jojot_wilkie @philipbstark The AAPD, of which Dickson was VP, did receive contributions for their gala from ES&S, Hart Intercivic, and Sequoia (Broken Ballots, p 225). There is a lot more information in Ch. 9 of Broken Ballots.
@jennycohn1 @jojot_wilkie @philipbstark There is no evidence that Dickson received funding from Diebold, and he has denied that he ever did. I believe him. The NFB, not Jim's organization, which was the American Association of People with Disabilities (Broken Ballots, p 227), received a $1M gift from Diebold.
Quoting from the article, "Instead of holding the custodian of the data responsible for not protecting it, the people who find the flaw are attacked, he said." Exclusive: Georgia’s Voter Registration System Like ‘Open Bank Safe Door’ - WhoWhatWhy https://t.co/aN81fDBIGC
@RepRutherford@jhalderm @LarryNorden @philipbstark@duncanbuell@rad_atl@essvote Extremely concerned! Paperless voting machines are fundamentally insecure. It is impossible to verify results, because there cannot be a recount. They should be replaced immediately with voter marked paper ballot systems + statistically sound manual post-election ballot audits.
We still don't know if some election management systems contain remote access software. Inexcusable. Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access Software on Systems Sold to States https://t.co/G0Qt9lf93k via @motherboard