@CotswoldsQC@martinmbauer The answer is to give up on falsification, not to pretend science dev is still a rational enterprise. Again see Quines point in naturalized vs rationalized epistemology. There is nothing to save, but tell Popper that.
@CotswoldsQC@martinmbauer Ah yes, logically impossible in the Duhem-Quine sense. But even then, his attempt to save “empirical falsification” falls short. This is where Lakatosh’s refinements are critical. And quines greater critique on naturalized vs rationalized epistemology still stands.
@hakflo@martinmbauer Indeed. Many lack the fundamentals required to understand Hegel correctly, and so they either misuse, or avoid him entirely. But similar to Neitzsche, his ideas were ground breaking and extremely formative for modern thinking
@naval@FutureJurvetson Unfortunately Observations are theory laden, so they don’t act as a separate authority to absolutely “falsify” theories. But they can re-sort our credence in various theories. Newton wasn’t falsified, he was subsumed. Read Hegel, Lakatosh, Quine etc to understand poppers error.
@hakflo@martinmbauer This is why people need Hegel. Newtonian physics was not falsified, it was subsumed. What we use today is still largely an outgrowth of Newtonian physics. We don’t “absolutely falsify” earlier theories, we evolve them
@Philip_Goff So, most physicalists wouldn’t say that once you read the physics about basketball, you “fully know” how to play basketball. But this is relatively obvious and doesn’t invalidate physicalism. So maybe Mary’s red room advocates are exploiting a mischaracterization of physicalism
@ouroborossun@MacrinePhD@JagersbergKnut Agreed, just saying that it’s not obvious independent of having a good science of perception. These studies help refine our confidence in exactly when and how in the neural processing chain the more significant categorizations occur
@ouroborossun@MacrinePhD@JagersbergKnut Hume would have thought differently (categorization happens by the mind after raw perception of sense impressions, lines are out there in the world, etc)
@MacrinePhD Kant argued that for epistemology to make sense, sensations must pass through the categories before they are perceived as phenomena. He didn’t have neuroscience, but was responding to Humes problem of induction, arguing even space and time are categories of the mind
@mike__wiest@StuartHameroff This would involve things like casting tubulin in different assembly conditions to reproduce coherence in benchtop, using DFT and molecular orbital theory to argue for strong enough coupling to allow coherence, etc. if there is anything like this, I would love to see it
@mike__wiest@StuartHameroff Thats not the point: There is no plausible MATERIALS basis based on the experimental evidence, I’ve already stated this. I never stated the theory must be proven. One should supply a plausible materials basis, not just general plausibility and hand waving
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"Impressive, but that's a tower."
[Later]"What about this bird?"
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[Later]"This one reaches the stratosphere, higher than any bird."
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"Bah! Stop moving the goalposts! How high must it reach convince you?"