I know these kinds of observations are trite, but just take a second to imagine the reaction in the finance world had someone in a Kamala Harris administration talked about "Bloomberg Terminal bros" amidst this big selloff in Treasuries.
"If the 30-year must trade at 5.5% to clear, that isn’t a crisis. It is the market’s expectation of the average overnight interest rate set by the Fed for the next three decades.”
If you want to watch a half-drowned Matt Damon realizing he can never go home and thus re-finding his identity in exotic locations in Europe, The Bourne Identity has it over the Odyssey in every respect other than the scale of special effects.
Good!
Less flippantly: the idea that we can all just adopt the Danish model is delusional. You want flexicurity, so flexible hiring/firing, generous unemployment benefits, and active labour market policies? You will need high union density, strong collective bargaining coverage, a tradition of corporatist negotiation, high social trust, and a tax base capable of sustaining transfers. You need all of the coordination mechanisms, and you need them in a homogenous society with a particular political economy and suitable historical path dependencies (this evolved over decades!).
Otherwise you end up cherry picking and just crushing protections without the 'security' part which is pretty what happened with the Lisbon Strategy.
You don't want to end up like the anglo countries or with some miserable hybrid mess like Italy with the worst both worlds.
Between 1974 and 2014, only 0.1% of publications in the top 50 economics journals were replication studies.
That's 40 years. Thousands of papers. Almost none replicated.
We've built careers on findings no one has verified.
When economists finally replicate studies, 40-67% fail depending on the study.
Federal Reserve (2015): Only 49% of 67 papers from top journals successfully replicated — even with the original authors' help.
Most papers? Never checked at all.
Here's the worst part: Papers that don't replicate get cited MORE than papers that do.
And after a failed replication is published, only 12% of subsequent citations mention it.
The profession rewards interesting findings, not true ones.
Remember Reinhart-Rogoff (2010)? "Debt above 90% GDP kills growth."
Herndon, Ash & Pollin found a spreadsheet error. Results didn't hold. But by then, it had shaped austerity policy across Europe and the US.
How many other canonical papers have Excel errors?
We replicate recent papers, but canonical findings from the 1970s-90s? Nobody touches them. Too famous. Too foundational.
The older the paper, the less scrutiny it gets. Yet these are the studies we cite most.
Maybe we should replicate backwards.
Start with the most-cited papers from 1975-2000. See what holds up.
https://t.co/AjpGF2Mrv9
remarkable how everyone forgets central banks turned to QE for structural reasons - the rise of shadow banking and the systemic role of Treasuries collateral
https://t.co/DFT9SMAp10 via @ft
Sehr hörenswerte Folge, vorallem wegen der Aufarbeitung der ideengeschichtlichen Bildung der Grünen ab 25:45 von @bertpsch. Die Technokratie hat die Ideen abgelöst. Dieser Wandel prägt Politikerbiografien aller Parteien und lässt sich auch an den Curricula der Unis ablesen.
On curbing the French deficit, Macron has been like God - busy elsewhere.
Also liked @DavideOneglia framing that the bond market reflects France losing its exorbitant privilege in the EU.
@rohangrey Then it (at least) isn't wrong, but maybe just not precise enough. But even then, if this is true for private money, it is also true for public money. And the taxes part just explains why we chose a specific currency, but it's not the decisive fact that makes it money.
@JHillje@Ricarda_Lang@HeleneBubrowski@piperverlag@DPZ_Berlin Klingt Spannend! Frage zum Untertitel. Warum wird hier populismus als negatives Gegenbeispiel genannt & nicht als politische Richtung die mit Affekten & Emotionen spielt (à la Mouffe). Wäre es nicht eher richtig zu sagen, den Populismus nicht den (Rechts-)extremen zu überlassen?
Die Euro-Aufwertung (aber auch Aktienmarktreaktion und Zinskurve) nach der Einigung von Dienstag sprechen für höhere Wachstumserwartungen als Faktoren hinter dem Zinsanstieg auf Bunds. In jedem Fall muss man genauer hingucken. @MartinGreive
Danke @farzado
👇🏻👇🏻
GS upgrades Germany and Eurozone GDP growth after spending announcements.
Germany GDP
2025: +0.2% to 0.2%
2026: +0.5% to 1.5%
2027: +0.6% to 2.0%
Eurozone GDP
2025: +0.1% to 0.8%
2026: +0.2% to 1.3%
2027: +0.3% to 1.6%
Dass wir einen Wahlkampf erlebt haben, in dem man einfach so tun konnte, als hätte der Staat kein Finanzierungsproblem und anderthalb Wochen später werden Sondervermögen von rund einer BILLION diskutiert, ist übrigens auch ein brutales Versagen des politischen Journalismus.
Trotzdem finde ich es richtig, jetzt über eine Reform der Schuldenbremse oder Sondervermögen zu sprechen. Aber dabei ist klar: nur für Verteidigung geht nicht. Wir müssen mehr in unsere Sicherheit investieren. Doch dasselbe gilt für Klimaschutz und Infrastruktur. Wenn wir an die Schuldenbremse ran gehen, dann auch dafür.
=> The country with THE safe EUR asset has managed to create massive fiscal uncertainty through its negligent and ideological dealing w fiscal rules. Time to get serious about fiscal policy. /e
Martin Wolf as always formidable. He methodically dissects the drivers of once high and now low growth rates in Europe. What opportunities beckon?
“For the EU, the opportunity is to implement the Draghi report in full.”
For the UK…. 1/2