EV going to be next big theme and lot of hope stories building around🏎️
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Insights from Samhi Hotels Q4 concall on why FCF [Free Cash Flow] is the new scorecard:-
1.The metric shift nobody is talking about
A) Management has stopped leading with RevPAR [Revenue Per Available Room - the traditional hotel KPI] and is now anchoring the narrative on FCF generation
B) Current FCF base: INR 300-315 crore, underwritten on a tough year - not a peak year.
2.The compounding math is what matters
A) Committed pipeline alone gets you to INR 3,000+ crore cumulative FCF over FY27-31
B) This is a 10x journey on the FCF base - achieved with zero new leverage or equity dilution.
3.The valuation disconnect hiding in plain sight
A) Market Cap today: INR 3,765 crore - the FY27-31 FCF pipeline alone is nearly equal to the entire current market cap
Bonus - Stock is sitting at INR 169, well below its 52-week high of INR 254.50, while the fundamental FCF story is only getting stronger from here
What does FCF mean for a hotel company?
Unlike PAT [Profit After Tax], FCF tells you how much real cash the business generates after maintaining and growing its assets - it cannot be manufactured by accounting.
When a hotel company shifts its investor narrative to FCF, it is usually because the number is finally worth talking about.
@LearningEleven@NeilBahal
(2/2)
A) The most surprising data point: Vi added ~70,000 BTS (Base Transceiver Stations - the physical equipment that transmits mobile signals) in 12 months but network opex grew only 0.8%. This was driven by electrification of towers and reduced diesel dependence. CFO Tejas Mehta acknowledged some inflation is likely from FY27 as this efficiency base laps out.
B) Data consumption tells the real network story: total data at 83 PB/day (+30% YoY). Average data per 4G/5G subscriber at 20.2 GB/month (+27.2% YoY). Non-stop Hero (unlimited data proposition) growing 25% sequentially for 3 consecutive quarters.
5.The churn problem - Vi’s biggest operational risk hiding in plain sight
Current churn rate is approximately 4% - Abhijit Kishore explicitly confirmed this is “significantly higher than other operators.” 47% of all Indian telecom customer acquisitions happen via MNP (Mobile Number Portability - switching operators while keeping your number).
Vi’s share of MNP gains: only ~20%, or approximately 3 million out of 14 million monthly MNP switchers. 1.1 Cr customers shift between only the other 2 operators every month - Vi is not a meaningful participant.
A) The fix is network-led: in circles where Vi has deployed more capex (Maharashtra, Gujarat, Kerala, UP East), churn has visibly dropped and subscriber addition has improved. Management is targeting 0.5%-0.6% reduction in overall churn rate - that alone adds meaningful subscribers without competing for market share.
B) 33% of Vi’s base (roughly 63 million subscribers) is still on 2G/feature phones - the highest 2G overhang of any operator. This is simultaneously the biggest risk (revenue per user near zero) and biggest opportunity (upgrade to 4G = immediate ARPU jump from sub-Rs 100 to Rs 190+).
Bonus - ICRA upgraded Vi to BBB with Positive Outlook even before AGR resolution
ICRA assigned a BBB rating with Positive Outlook to Vi’s long-term fund-based term loans in March 2026, before the AGR reassessment was even concluded. This is the first credit rating upgrade in years and is an important enabler for Vi to access the SBI-led Rs 25,000 Cr debt facility it needs for capex. Without the bank debt closing, the 3-year cash math does not work.
What is ARPU and why does the gap between Vi and Airtel matter so much?
ARPU (Average Revenue Per User) is the revenue a telecom company earns per subscriber per month. Vi is at Rs 190, Airtel is at Rs 245+. On 192.8 million subscribers, every Rs 10 of ARPU gap is roughly Rs 23,000 Cr of annual revenue that Vi is leaving on the table versus a peer. That gap cannot close on pricing alone - it requires better network quality to retain high-value customers, lower churn, and upgrading 2G subscribers to 4G.
The entire Vi investment thesis is a bet that Rs 45,000 Cr of network capex over 3 years closes enough of this gap to make the cash math work before FY36 when the heavy AGR payouts begin. @AnilSinghvi_
Insights from Vodafone Idea Q4 FY26 concall (Abhijit Kishore, CEO & Tejas Mehta, CFO, May 18, 2026) on Indian telecom’s most watched turnaround story:-
1.AGR settlement - Rs 23,649 Cr written off, Rs 51,970 Cr profit manufactured in one quarter
The DoT committee finalized Vi’s AGR (Adjusted Gross Revenue - dues owed to the government for spectrum usage, calculated on disputed definitions of “gross revenue”) dues at Rs 64,046 Cr, down from the frozen amount of Rs 87,695 Cr. The existing financial liability of Rs 80,502 Cr on the books was derecognized and replaced with a revised present value liability of Rs 24,880 Cr.
A) The difference of Rs 55,622 Cr was credited directly to the P&L as an exceptional item. Result: Vi reported a net profit of Rs 51,970 Cr in Q4 FY26 alone and Rs 34,552 Cr for the full year - a company that has been operationally loss-making for years just printed India’s largest ever single-quarter telecom profit, entirely on an accounting adjustment.
B) The repayment structure is back-loaded: Rs 100 Cr annually from March 2032 to March 2035, then Rs 10,608 Cr annually for 6 years (March 2036 to March 2041).
Nothing material owed before FY32. This is a lifeline on cashflows for the next 6 years.
2.The Rs 1,05,000 Cr cash math - Vi’s CFO Tejas Mehta laid it out live on the concall
Total 3-year cash obligations: Rs 45,000 Cr capex + Rs 49,000 Cr spectrum payments (Rs 7,000 Cr + Rs 15,000 Cr + Rs 27,000 Cr across FY27-29) + Rs 5,000-6,000 Cr debt servicing = Rs ~1,00,000 Cr.
Cash sources: Rs 60,000 Cr cumulative cash EBITDA (FY27-29, targeting 3x from current Rs 9,217 Cr) + Rs 25,000 Cr funded bank debt (SBI-led consortium of PSU, private and foreign banks) + Rs 10,000 Cr non-funded LC facility + Rs 10,000 Cr from CLAM settlement and income tax refunds + Rs 3,500 Cr opening cash balance = Rs 1,05,000 Cr+.
A) The math works on paper, but it is entirely dependent on tripling EBITDA within 3 years and closing the SBI-led debt facility - neither of which has happened yet. The margin for error is thin.
B) Aditya Birla Group committed an additional Rs 4,730 Cr equity infusion. KM Birla himself took charge as Non-Executive Chairman in May 2026 - a significant signal of promoter commitment that the market had been waiting on.
3.Operational performance - first net subscriber addition since merger, ARPU at 19-quarter high
Q4 FY26 revenue: Rs 11,332 Cr (+2.9% YoY). Full year FY26 revenue: Rs 44,873 Cr (+3% YoY). Q4 EBITDA: Rs 4,889 Cr (+4.9% YoY), EBITDA margin improved 80 bps to 43.1%.
Cash EBITDA margin currently 20.5% vs. Airtel at ~55% and Jio at ~50%+ - the gap is the story.
A) ARPU grew from Rs 175 in Q4 FY25 to Rs 190 in Q4 FY26 (+8.3% YoY), growing for 19 consecutive quarters. Q4 FY26 was the highest average daily revenue in the last 6 years. But Vi’s ARPU is still significantly below Airtel’s Rs 245+ - the gap reflects the subscriber quality difference, not just pricing.
B) Subscriber base stabilized at 192.8 million in Q4 FY26 - first time since merger. First positive net subscriber addition since merger came in February 2026 and continued into March. Gross additions deliberately reduced from 21.8 million (Q2) to 19.1 million (Q4) - CEO Abhijit Kishore confirmed this was “by design” to improve customer quality over quantity.
https://t.co/JphNvyxrhH - 70,000 BTS added in 12 months, network opex grew only 0.8%
Over 6 quarters, Vi deployed Rs 16,000 Cr, added ~30,000 unique broadband towers, 126,000+ new broadband layers, expanded 4G capacity by 27%, and now covers 86% of India’s population on 4G.
5G launched in March 2025 in Mumbai and is now live in 80+ cities across all 17 circles with 5G spectrum.
(1/2)
Ahmedabad is so boring that:
→ Parents actually let their daughters drive at midnight without panic attacks
→ People apologize after small accidents instead of starting WWE auditions
→ Most conversations end with “jamva aavjo” instead of road rage
→ You can build businesses without spending 4 hours daily in traffic
→ Families still sit together for dinner instead of inhaling AQI 900 air
→ Even outsiders eventually become “Amdavadi” without feeling excluded
No drama.
No fake hustle culture.
Just safety, entrepreneurship, food, and peace.
Maybe that’s exactly why people quietly keep moving here :)
Ahmedabad is a hopelessly boring Tier 2 city. Please don’t move here.
Living here is an absolute nightmare:
• Zero Adrenaline: Women are just casually roaming around at 2 AM eating ice cream without fearing for their lives or dodging intense police naka bandis. Where is the survival thrill?
• No Linguistic Pride: If you don't speak Gujarati, nobody even threatens to beat you up or smash your shop's signboards. They just awkwardly reply in broken Hindi. Absolutely no passion!
• No Traffic Trauma: The roads are so wide and well planned that you actually reach your destination in 20 minutes. How am I supposed to finish my audiobooks or rethink my life choices during a 3 hour bumper to bumper commute?
• Missing Action: Someone bumps into your vehicle, and they just say sorry and pay you instead of pulling out a hockey stick. No street fights, no "Tu jaanta nahi mera baap kaun hai." So dull.
• Zero Aesthetic Culture: No underground drug or Udta Punjab vibes. Just boring, safe, sober families existing everywhere.
Honestly, it’s unbearable. Please stay in your happening metro cities, enjoy spending half your life in traffic and keep breathing that sweet AQI 1000 air.
(2/2)
A) Current productivity: 0.6 loans per person per month. Target: 2+ loans per person per month. This single metric alone drives a massive structural compression in cost-to-income ratio as fixed senior management costs get amortized over a far larger disbursal base.
B) Between March and April 2026 alone, productivity already jumped 2x. Q1 FY27 disbursals expected to be 50-60% higher than Q4 FY26. Management is guiding Q1 as base and then 30-40% growth on top of that each quarter.
6.Scale roadmap - INR 2 lakh crore AUM, 1,600 branches, 20,000 employees by FY30
Branch network to grow 5x (current 240 branches to 1,600). Employee base to grow 5x (8,000 by end FY27, targeting 20,000). Borrower base to grow 10x. Book value per share to go from INR 160 to past INR 200.
A) Portfolio mix guardrails: 80% retail, 60% secured (mortgages + gold), 20% semi-secured or unsecured. CRE project loans to be done only on 10-15% co-originate pari-passu structure with credit funds - no credit guarantee exposure on Sammaan’s books.
B) FY27-28 disbursal split: 80% existing products (mortgages, LAP). By FY30: 50% mortgage-backed, 50% new products (gold loans, unsecured business loans, personal loans). Gold loan branch setup cost: INR 20 lakh per branch, takes ~3 years to hit full productivity.
Bonus - Recovery of INR 7,000 Cr baked into projections
Sammaan expects to recover close to INR 7,000 Cr from provisioned credit costs - already included in all FY27-30 projections. On past ARC (Asset Reconstruction Company) sales, recovery rates were 70-80%. This is a hidden P&L kicker most analysts are not pricing in today.
What is an NBFC and why does cost of funds matter?
An NBFC (Non-Banking Financial Company) lends money but cannot accept savings deposits like a bank. It borrows from banks, bond markets, and mutual funds to fund its loans.
The difference between what it earns on loans and what it pays on borrowings is its NIM (Net Interest Margin - the profit spread). A lower credit rating forces the NBFC to borrow expensive - even 100 bps higher borrowing cost on INR 50,000 Cr of debt is INR 500 Cr of extra annual interest expense.
This is why Sammaan’s rating upgrade story is not just a headline - it is directly the earnings story. AAA-rated NBFCs borrow at sub 7.5% today. Sammaan is currently well above that. Closing that gap is the entire investment thesis.
Insights from Sammaan Capital Q4 FY26 concall (Gagan Banga, MD and CEO, May 20, 2026) on NBFC turnaround and UAE capital entering Indian financial services:-
1.IHC’s USD 1 billion bet - India’s largest inbound NBFC promoter acquisition
IHC (International Holding Company - 1,300 subsidiaries, operates in 100+ countries) has taken a strategic promoter stake in Sammaan Capital (formerly Indiabulls Housing Finance). INR 5,652 Cr ($592M) already received via equity shares and 25% upfront warrant payment. Balance INR 3,200 Cr ($335M) to come within 18 months on warrant conversion, taking IHC’s stake from 28.5% to 43.5%.
A) This is IHC’s first promoter-level investment in India - not a passive portfolio bet, but a full governance takeover with nominee director (Group CFO Alwyn Crasta appointed May 15) and board subcommittee oversight.
B) The investment was highlighted by the Ministry of External Affairs during PM Modi’s UAE stopover and cited again by the UAE Minister of Foreign Trade on May 20 - geopolitical signal, not just a financial one.
2.Triple credit rating upgrade in 50 days - the fastest institutional re-rating in recent NBFC memory
Within 50 days of IHC’s investment, all 3 domestic rating agencies upgraded Sammaan. CRISIL upgraded April 9, CARE upgraded May 12 (+2 notches), ICRA upgraded May 20 (day of the concall itself). Sammaan is now a consensus AA+ rated credit.
A) Domestic bonds have already appreciated ~100 bps since IHC acquisition announcement (Sep 2025). International bonds appreciated ~250 bps. Gagan Banga confirmed marginal cost of funds should decline 160 bps purely from this upgrade cycle.
B) Total cost of funds improvement guided at 270 bps over the full AA to AAA journey - split roughly 120-150 bps at AA to AA+ (already happening), and another 120-150 bps on AA+ to AAA migration. AAA is the stated destination.
3.Fortress balance sheet - 0 gross NPA, 0 net NPA on INR 53,160 Cr opening AUM
Sammaan starts its growth chapter with an opening AUM of INR 53,160 Cr carrying zero gross and zero net NPA. No incremental net provisions required. Annualized credit cost across INR 3.6 lakh crore of cumulative disbursals (over the full history of the book) works out to 1.9% - healthy and fully terminal.
A) Net worth of INR 19,000 Cr. Capital adequacy at 20.2% current, pro forma for warrants = 29%. Gearing to be capped at 3.5x-4x with liquidity maintained at higher of 6 months of repayments or 10-15% of borrowings.
B) This is also the company that ran the single largest deleveraging program in corporate India - borrowings stood at INR 1.35 lakh crores in Sep 2018 and INR 1.3 lakh crores was serviced on a net basis over 8 years. The opening AUM is cash flow tested and battle-hardened.
https://t.co/irXpTjTAHY projections - NIM doubles, cost-to-income halves, ROA quadruples by FY30
FY27 disbursals target: INR 30,000 Cr. PAT target FY27: INR 1,400 Cr.
NIM starts at 3.5% in FY27, guided to ~8% as cost of funds declines 150 bps over 3 years plus leverage kicks in. Cost-to-income ratio currently at ~50%, targeting 26% by FY30. Dividend payout policy: minimum 25%, targeting 40%.
A) ROA trajectory confirmed on concall: FY27 - 1.8%, FY28 - 3.7%, FY29 - 4.4%, FY30 - 4.4%.
(Note: FY30 number in original presentation had a typo showing 8%+ - Gagan Banga corrected it live to 4.4% on the call itself.)
ROE target: high-teens (18%).
B) Return on managed assets (ROMA - includes sold-down book) currently at 1.5%, guided to ~3% at scale. This is the real metric to watch since 30% of incremental disbursals will be under co-lending or direct assignment.
5.37 AI use cases already built - productivity from 0.6 to 2+ loans per person per month
Sammaan has developed 37 AI use cases in collaboration with IHC’s tech ecosystem. Agent productivity targeted to rise 30%. Loan turnaround time on secured mortgages to shrink from 5-7 days to 2-3 days. Fraud detection rates to improve meaningfully.
(1/2)
A) Product registration audits for Peru and Zimbabwe were completed successfully in the 20 days before this call - both passed. This indicates active pipeline building for semi-regulated markets, which typically offer better pricing than pure tender-driven domestic government business.
B) The SVP (Small Volume Parenteral = sterile injectable products in volumes under 100 ml, including ophthalmic drops and inhalation solutions) new manufacturing line is being commissioned between October-December 2026. 20 products are in the development pipeline across inhalation and preservative-free ophthalmic categories, targeting commercialization in FY27-28. CRISIL has already upgraded the credit rating by one notch to BBB, with a further upgrade expected once project implementation phase ends.
Bonus -
Amanta has a structural pricing moat that most people overlooks.
Hospitals and nursing homes charge INR 500-1,500 per IV fluid bottle administration. The INR 6-10 premium that SteriPort commands over conventional containers is irrelevant to the hospital’s economics.
Management raised prices by 5-6% in late April to recover the 60-70% polymer cost increase and reported zero customer resistance after 20-25 days. This is pricing power that most pharma companies cannot demonstrate - and it comes from clinical differentiation, not market dominance.
What is an IV fluid container and why does the type of container matter in healthcare?
IV fluid (= Intravenous fluid = saline, glucose, or drug-infused liquid administered directly into a patient’s bloodstream through a drip) must be stored in sterile, chemically inert containers that do not leach any material into the fluid.
Conventional plastic bottles (polyethylene, nipple-head) can only maintain sterility for a fixed period, have limited drug compatibility, and are difficult to use in closed-system infusion therapy.
A two-port closed-system container (with one port for the IV drip set and another for injectable drugs) eliminates air ingress, reduces contamination risk, extends drug stability from 1 hour to 30-40 hours in some oncology drugs, and is the global standard in critical care.
For an investor, the key insight is that once a hospital or ICU switches to two-port systems, switching back is nearly impossible - clinical staff are trained on it, hospital protocols are built around it, and the cost difference per administration is negligible against the total bill.
This is why Amanta’s customer retention is near-100% and why they can pass through cost increases without resistance.
(2/2)
Insights from Amanta Healthcare Q4 & FY26 Concall (May 19, 2026) on the IV Fluid & Sterile Packaging Sector:-
1.Amanta Healthcare is a small but high-margin niche pharma company - FY26 revenue at INR 288 Cr (5% YoY growth), EBITDA at INR 63 Cr with 22% margin, and PAT at INR 15 Cr annualized (42% YoY growth from INR 10.5 Cr last year). Q4 PAT margin hit 7% - highest in company history.
A) The 42% PAT growth on only 5% revenue growth is the story - it is entirely driven by debt replacement and finance cost reduction, not volume. 90% of borrowings are now at single-digit interest rates, down from significantly higher rates previously. Finance cost currently stands at INR 21 Cr annually and management expects it to drop by approximately half in the next 12-18 months.
B) Debt-to-equity has improved from 3x to approximately 1x over 3 years. Actual debt as of the call date (May 19) was INR 204 Cr, already lower than the INR 234 Cr on the March 31 balance sheet - the difference is a Bajaj Finance bridge loan that was repaid in the first week of April and was not visible at year-end.
2.SteriPort (= a proprietary two-port IV fluid container made using ISBM = Injection Stretch Blow Molding technology, offering dual ports for IV set and injection, full collapsibility, superior temperature resistance up to 121.1°C, and zero fungal contamination track record across 30 crore bottles) is the core growth engine - it contributes 42% of revenue today.
A) Capacity is doubling from 6.6 crore bottles per year to 12 crore bottles per year through new Line 3, which is commissioning around June 20, 2026. Management confirmed on the call that line 3 will operate at 95-100% capacity from day one and expects to generate INR 80-85 Cr of incremental revenue in the 3 quarters of FY27 it will be operational.
B) Full-year annualized revenue from the expanded capacity is INR 110-120 Cr - compared to SteriPort’s current ~INR 121 Cr contribution (42% of INR 288 Cr). This is effectively a near-doubling of SteriPort revenue within 12-15 months. EBITDA margin for SteriPort specifically is 26-27% vs company blended 22%.
3.The India IV fluid market fundamentals are genuinely strong - CMD Bhavesh Patel shared on the call that India’s IV fluid market is approximately 185 crore bottles per year, growing 8-10% annually with 12-15 crore bottles of incremental demand added each year.
A) India’s per capita IV fluid consumption is 1.2 liters vs 3.5 liters in the US and Europe - even if you discount 25% of India’s population as unreachable, the structural headroom is massive, driven by insurance penetration, hospital bed capacity expansion, and rising per capita income.
B) The two-port sub-market (which SteriPort serves) is growing at 12-13% vs the overall industry’s 8% - driven by conversion from conventional packs. CMD estimates two-port demand will reach 75-80 crore bottles by 2030 from approximately 20-25 crore bottles today. Amanta targets 20-25% market share in this sub-segment - that translates to 15-20 crore bottles per year at 2030 demand levels.
4.The 10.8 MW captive solar project is commissioning around May 25-30, 2026 and will save approximately INR 75 lakh per month = INR 9 Cr per year in power costs from FY27 onwards.
A) This is a direct EBITDA addition with zero revenue impact - on a base PAT of INR 15 Cr, INR 9 Cr of annual power savings represents a 60% boost to PAT purely from solar, before accounting for the new SteriPort capacity revenue.
B) Post solar commissioning, Amanta’s EBITDA margin is guided to expand from 22% to 24-25% when the new SteriPort capacity is absorbed. PAT margin is expected to improve by at least 3 percentage points once full leverage kicks in - implying PAT margin moving toward 8-9% from the current 5%.
5.Export share jumped from 32% in FY25 to 39% in FY26 - key markets are Thailand, UK, Philippines, and South Sudan, across 25-30 countries total. Amanta has been present in UK for over 20 years.
(1/2)
Bonus - TVS Credit (NBFC arm = non-banking financial company that provides consumer and vehicle loans) hit a record PBT of INR 1,248 Cr in FY26 (22% YoY), with book size at INR 30,631 Cr (15% YoY). AA+ rated, 2.4 Cr total customers, disbursed loans to 53 lakh new customers in FY26 alone.
Also, TVS signed a joint development agreement with Hyundai Motor Company for an electric 3-wheeler - Hyundai leads design and R&D, TVS provides EV platform and India market expertise. This is not yet priced into any analyst model.
What is operating free cash flow and why does it matter for a 2-wheeler company?
Operating free cash flow (= cash generated from core business operations minus capital expenditure) is the truest measure of how much real money a manufacturing company is producing. Revenue and profit can be inflated by accounting choices - cash cannot.
When TVS grew operating free cash flow 47% to INR 3,805 Cr in a year when it also spent heavily on Norton, capacity expansion, and R&D, it means the core Indian business is generating significant surplus after all reinvestment.
For retail investors, a company that consistently grows free cash flow while expanding capacity is building long-term compounding power - not just reporting paper profits.
Insights from TVS Motor Company 4Q FY26 Concall (May 13, 2026) on India’s 2-Wheeler Sector:-
https://t.co/NbCfM6naPr Motor posted its best year ever across every financial metric in FY26 - revenue at INR 47,270 Cr (30% YoY), operating PBT at INR 4,975 Cr (40% YoY), EBITDA at INR 6,079 Cr (37% YoY), and net profit at INR 3,615 Cr - all all-time highs.
A) EBITDA margin improved 60 basis points to 12.9% - this is remarkable given commodity headwinds, because TVS started this growth cycle at 6.5% EBITDA barely 5 years ago. CEO K.N. Radhakrishnan explicitly pointed this out on the call when asked about margin guidance.
B) Operating free cash flow grew 47% to INR 3,805 Cr - a company generating this kind of cash conversion on a 30% revenue growth base is compounding efficiently, not just growing.
https://t.co/LX144brVng grew more than 2x the industry rate in every segment in FY26 - domestic 2-wheeler ICE grew 19% vs industry 10%, international grew 31% vs industry 23%, and 3-wheelers surged 63% to 2,20,000 units vs 1,35,000 in FY25.
A) Compare this to Hero MotoCorp which is predominantly domestic-ICE-economy focused - TVS’s diversification across premium, EV, international, and 3-wheeler is now visibly showing up in the market share gap. TVS has outgrown the industry for 3 consecutive years.
B) International business hit 15.8 lakh units in FY26 - 33% YoY - highest ever. Q4 international revenue alone was INR 2,999 Cr. Africa, Sri Lanka, Nepal are firing. LatAm is the next strategic focus for the next 2-3 years.
3.EV is becoming a material business - 3.7 lakh EV 2-wheelers in FY26 (33% YoY), Q4 alone saw 1,15,000 units (51% YoY), and EV revenue for FY26 is approximately INR 5,000 Cr as confirmed by CEO on the call.
A) EV 2-wheeler penetration in Q4 reached 7.8% of total 2-wheeler industry vs 7.1% in the year-ago quarter. Full-year industry penetration moved from 6.2% to 6.6% - the directional shift is real and accelerating.
B) EV monthly production is being ramped from 30-32K units per month (FY26 average) to 40K now and targeting 50K per month. TVS has 9 lakh+ cumulative iQube customers and recently launched iQube S (4.7 KW battery, 175 km range).
4.A major capex cycle is underway for FY27 - TVS is adding 1.5 million units of capacity within the next 12 months to take total capacity to approximately 8.3 million units per annum. Work already began in Q4 FY26.
A) Total FY27 capex guidance: approximately INR 3,500 Cr - broken into INR 2,000 Cr for product development, INR 1,000 Cr+ for new capacity, and remaining for R&D and testing infrastructure.
B) Contrast this with Bajaj Auto which has not announced comparable capacity additions - TVS is betting that supply, not demand, will be the constraint in the 2-wheeler market over the next 2 years. This is either prescient or risky depending on how FY27 demand evolves.
https://t.co/1lfdBbbsi8 is TVS’s highest-conviction long-term bet - total investments in Norton since 2021 have been a large part of the INR 2,400 Cr deployed in FY26 (predominantly Norton). Q2 FY27 is the commercial launch window for models Manx, Manx R, Atlas, and Atlas GT.
A) Norton will be manufactured partly at Hosur, India (leveraging cost base) and partly at Solihull, UK (high-end heritage positioning). CEO said he has personally seen the products and called them potential category-redefining vehicles in the global super-premium segment.
B) FY27 investment outflows will drop INR 500-600 Cr vs FY26’s INR 2,400 Cr as Norton moves from investment phase to revenue phase - this is a potential PAT expansion lever that most models have not yet priced in.
Insights from KP Green Engineering (KPGEL) H2 FY26 Concall (May 13, 2026) on Green Infrastructure Manufacturing:-
1.FY26 was a breakout year - revenue crossed INR 1,250 Cr for the first time (78% YoY vs INR 702 Cr in FY25), EBITDA surged 117% to INR 249 Cr, and PAT grew 85% to INR 136 Cr.
A) EBITDA margin expanded from 16% to 20% in one year - CFO Salim Yahoo attributed this to product customisation and economies of scale, not just volume.
B) 5-year track record: 100% revenue CAGR and 136% net profit CAGR - rare for a listed manufacturing company of this size.
2.The INR 1,831 Cr order book as on March 31, 2026 is targeted for full execution within FY27 - management confirmed this directly when pressed by Pankaj from Axis Capital.
A) Largest single order: INR 819+ Cr BSNL telecom tower project - pan-India supply with long-term O&M (Operations and Maintenance) income attached.
B) Bidding pipeline stands at INR 3,000+ Cr with a 60-70% tender success ratio - confirmed by CFO in the Q&A session.
3.Capacity utilization is a critical watch metric - current installed capacity is 4,00,500 MT per annum (metric tons per annum), but FY26 utilization was only 1,24,500 MT - approximately 30-34%.
A) FY27 target utilization: 50-60%, implying revenue execution headroom without any fresh large capex.
B) Next major capex direction is backward integration - rolling mills to secure raw material supply and protect margins, not capacity addition.
https://t.co/nVsOlX9U0O’s largest hot-dip galvanizing plant commissioned at Matar - 90,000 MT per annum capacity with a single-dip capacity of 15 MT per batch.
A) KPGEL is the first company in India to power a galvanizing plant using a 20-25% green hydrogen blend with LPG - CFO called it “one of its kind” with no comparable in the industry.
B) This directly lowers fuel cost exposure and improves ESG compliance - dual benefit heading into geopolitically uncertain FY27.
5.Working capital stress is real but intentional - inventory days jumped from 96 days to 195 days.
A) CFO called this a “hedging strategy” - stocking steel inventory ahead of geopolitical disruptions to protect execution margins and material availability.
B) Long-term debt-to-equity remains low by industry standards - average cost of borrowing is 8.5-9%, credit rating is A category, no venture debt or high-cost instruments used.
Bonus -
KPGEL is an SME-listed company (BSE scrip 544150) eyeing main board migration under SEBI’s 3-year listing criteria. CFO hinted at quarterly reporting once migration happens. IPO in 2024 raised INR 190 Cr - the largest BSE SME IPO in history till date.
What is a hot-dip galvanizing plant and why does it matter for an investor?
Galvanizing is the process of coating steel with zinc to prevent corrosion.
Every transmission tower, solar structure, telecom tower, and crash barrier that KPGEL manufactures must be galvanized before delivery.
Owning Asia’s largest galvanizing plant (90,000 MT capacity) means KPGEL controls a critical bottleneck that most competitors outsource. This removes third-party dependency, reduces turnaround time, protects margins, and allows the company to bid and execute larger orders faster than peers.
For investors, in-house galvanizing capacity at this scale is a durable cost and speed advantage - not a headline.
@LearningEleven@soicfinance@pankajtibre
What is a JLG (Joint Liability Group) and why does it matter for Utkarsh’s story?
JLG = microfinance model where 5-10 women borrowers form a group and collectively guarantee each other’s loans. No collateral.
Repayment happens through weekly center meetings. Utkarsh was built on this model - it was 88% of the book in 2020.
When the MFI sector saw overleveraging (multiple lenders giving loans to the same borrower), collection discipline collapsed in FY25-26.
Utkarsh’s GNPA spiked because the JLG model has zero collateral - when collections stop, there is nothing to recover.
The recovery thesis here is:
(1) the bad legacy JLG book is being fully provisioned and sold to ARCs,
(2) new JLG disbursements are under strict MFIN 2.0 guardrails limiting borrower leverage, and
(3) the bank is rapidly shifting to secured products. If credit costs normalize to 2% by FY28, the operating leverage on a now-fixed cost base makes the ROE math work.
(2/2)
Insights from Utkarsh Small Finance Bank Q4 FY26 Concall on Small Finance Banks and MFI Recovery:-
1.The worst is behind - management confirmed it directly, and the numbers back it. Fresh NPA slippages (net of recoveries and upgradations) fell from ~INR 710 Cr in Q4 FY25 to ~INR 170 Cr in Q4 FY26 - a 76% reduction in one year. GNPA improved ~330 bps QoQ to 7.7% as of March 2026. Net NPA at ~3.3%.
Target: below 1% by FY28. JLG X-Bucket collection efficiency hit 99.7% in March 2026, up from 98.5% in April 2025 - highest in last 4 quarters.
2.The most important structural shift: JLG was 88% of the loan book in March 2020. It is now 28%.
A) Secured lending crossed 51% of the gross loan book (up from 43% a year ago). Target = 55% in coming years. This is a fundamental risk profile change - not cosmetic.
B) MBBL (Micro Banking Business Loans - loans to graduating JLG customers with proven repayment) grew 122% YoY and 40% QoQ. Now 27% of the micro-banking book. Penetration still below 15% - significant headroom to scale.
C) CGFMU credit guarantee coverage: ~70% of the microfinance book is now covered (counting Q4 FY26 disbursements).
Critically - Utkarsh has not taken any accounting benefit from this yet. Only the premium cost has been charged to P&L. Any future claims = pure upside.
3.Non-MFI lending is growing - and the numbers are real.
A) MSME book: INR 4,456 Cr (15% YoY). GNPA improved to 3.4% from 3.6%. Largely secured by hard collateral (residential/commercial property). Micro LAP delivering disbursement yield of ~18%.
B) Housing loans: INR 990 Cr (8% YoY). BBG (Business Banking Group): 19% YoY - fully secured against immovable collateral.
C) CV & CE book: contracted 1% QoQ to INR 1,090 Cr deliberately. Used vehicles now 30% of disbursements (up from less than 15% a year ago). Post-October 2024 portfolio NPA is below 2%.
4.Disbursements turned the corner in Q4 - first time in multiple quarters.
A) JLG disbursements: +58% QoQ, +2% YoY. Non-JLG: +41% QoQ, +51% YoY. Management says they are still at only 70% of optimal disbursal capacity.
B) New portfolio (disbursements post-October 2024 under MFIN 2.0 guardrails) is performing well - collection efficiency above 99.5%.
5.Liability franchise quietly strengthened during the crisis.
A) CASA deposits: +11% YoY, +13% QoQ. CASA ratio: 24%. CASA + Retail Term Deposit ratio: 83% (up from 71% in March 2025). Retail term deposits: +20% YoY.
B) Cost of funds fell 45+ bps YoY - from 8.3% (Q4 FY25) to 7.9% (Q4 FY26). Expected to decline further as repo rate cuts reprice through. CD ratio: 83% (down from 87%). Surplus liquidity: ~INR 3,800 Cr. LCR: 175%.
6.P&L reality: still loss-making, but the underlying engine is recovering.
A) Q4 net loss: INR 188 Cr - entirely driven by provisioning on legacy portfolio. Reported full-year PPoP: INR 56 Cr. Adjusted PPoP (adding back INR 84 Cr of interest reversals due to slippages): ~INR 140 Cr for full year.
B) Capital adequacy: 17.7% - comfortable. Rights issue of INR 950 Cr completed November 2025. No equity dilution planned immediately. Tier-2 or ARC sale route if needed.
C) Credit cost guidance: 3%-3.5% in FY27, 2%-2.5% in FY28. Management called this “conservative” given the trajectory. ROE target: 15%+ by FY28 exit. CEO Govind Singh confirmed directly: “worst is behind us.”
Bonus - Collection workforce expanded to 1,200+ people. Last quarter, 900 people in the field collected ~INR 50 Cr from the NPA and write-off pool (~20% recovery rate on collections).
As X-bucket normalization completes (1 more quarter), ~30% of this collection force will be redeployed to chase the legacy write-off pool - a free option on higher recoveries over the next 1.5 years.
(1/2)
Insights from Cipla Q4 FY26 Concall on Indian Pharma:-
1.FY26 was a milestone year financially. Revenue = INR 28,163 Cr. Q4 revenue = INR 6,541 Cr. FY26 EBITDA margin = 21%.
Q4 EBITDA margin = 15.2% - lower because of higher R&D spend & geopolitical cost impact. FY26 PAT = INR 3,879 Cr (13.8% of sales).
ROIC = 22.9%.
Net cash on balance sheet = INR 10,526 Cr against debt of only INR 614 Cr.
2.India crossed INR 12,500 Cr in revenues - the largest franchise.
A) Q4 India growth = 15% YoY. FY26 full year = 9% YoY. Chronic mix = 60% (IQVIA MAT March ’26). Foracort (inhalation) crossed INR 1,000 Cr. Dytor (cardiac) = INR 650 Cr brand growing at 25% YoY.
B) 33 brands now have revenue exceeding INR 100 Cr (4 added this year). 23 brands in top 300 of the Indian pharma market.
C) FY27 guidance: confident of double-digit market-beating India growth. Low seasonality base from FY26 + strong chronic portfolio = tailwind.
3.North America is the make-or-break story for FY27.
A) FY26 US revenue = USD 780 million. Q4 = USD 155 million (annualized ~USD 620 million). Target = USD 1 billion exit run rate by Q3/Q4 FY27. Gap to bridge = ~USD 380 million.
B) Bridge drivers: generic Ventolin (first AB-rated, CGT = 6 months exclusivity, launching Q1 FY27 with ramp in H2), Advair, Symbicort + 1 more respiratory asset - all expected approvals in FY27. 1 big peptide asset also pending. Management said 2-3 products are USD 100 million+ annualized opportunities each.
C) Lanreotide is completely excluded from FY27 guidance. Partner’s remediation is ongoing. Alternate US manufacturing site being developed. Earliest return = FY28. If it comes back, it is pure upside to guidance.
D) Albuterol market share steady at 19.6% (IQVIA MAT March ’26). Pipeline over next 3 years = 40-50 products, including 12 first-to-files and 8 B2 opportunities.
4.FY27 EBITDA margin guided at 18.5% to 20% - and the shape matters more than the average.
A) H1 FY27 will be below the 18.5%-20% average (no new US launches yet, high fixed costs from US facility investment). H2 will be above 20% as launches ramp up.
B) R&D will stay at ~7% of revenue. People costs elevated due to US facility hiring - but revenue from those facilities now starting to arrive.
C) FY28 target = 20%+ sustained. CFO Adukia said “20 plus is something that we should anyway sustain going forward.”
5.Biosimilars - Cipla’s next decade bet.
A) Global biosimilar market = ~USD 200 billion opportunity. ~100 biologics losing exclusivity over the next decade. Cipla is building 6-8 in-house assets over 5-8 years via JV with Kemwell. Adding 1-2 assets per year.
B) 2 assets already in development for developed markets (US/EU). 1 already in clinical trial under US IND. In-licensing also being considered for near-term opportunities not covered in-house.
Bonus - R&D spend hit INR 1,974 Cr in FY26 (7% of revenue). The reason it looks high vs filings is the nature has changed - more Respiratory, more Peptides, more Oligonucleotides. These cost 5-10x more per filing than a standard generic ANDA. NPV per project, not filings per rupee, is now the internal benchmark.
What is CGT (Competitive Generic Therapy) and why does Cipla’s generic Ventolin approval matter?
CGT is a US FDA designation for generic drugs that have inadequate competition - typically 3 or fewer approved generics. Drugs with CGT designation get expedited review AND 6 months of market exclusivity on approval.
Generic Ventolin (Albuterol MDI) carries CGT. Cipla is the first to get AB-rated approval from a US facility.
For 6 months after launch, Cipla will be the only generic - allowing near-innovator pricing on a high-volume asthma rescue inhaler.
This single product could add USD 50-100 million to the FY27 US run rate. Combined with Advair, Symbicort and the peptide asset, this is how Cipla gets to USD 1 billion.
@LearningEleven@pankajtibre
Insights from BKT Q4 FY26 Concall on Off-Highway Tyres:-
1.Record volumes, flat revenue - the FY26 story in one line. Annual OHT volume = 317,356 MT (highest ever). Q4 = 85,820 MT, up 5% YoY (highest ever quarter). But FY26 revenue = INR 10,656 Cr - flat YoY - dragged by realized forex loss of INR 164 Cr on sales. Volume engine fired. Revenue engine stalled.
2.EBITDA fell 10% YoY despite margins holding structurally.
A) FY26 EBITDA = INR 2,423 Cr, margin 22.7%. Q4 EBITDA = INR 663 Cr, margin 22.9%.
B) FY26 PAT = INR 1,222 Cr. Freight cost running at 4.5%-5% of revenue, expected to rise marginally.
3.Raw material storm is accelerating - management confirmed directly.
A) RM basket rose 4%-5% in Q4 FY26.
B) Q1 FY27 expectation: another 7%-8% RM price increase. BKT has taken 3%-5% price hikes across geographies + targeting 2% more by end of May 2026. Rajiv Poddar admitted: “we may have some margin pressures” in near term.
4.Biggest capex cycle in BKT history - INR 6,800 Cr total through FY29.
A) INR 3,000 Cr already spent. Remaining = INR 3,800 Cr over FY27-29. FY27 capex guided at INR 1,500-1,800 Cr. Maintenance capex extra at INR 200 Cr/year.
B) Board freshly approved additional INR 2,000 Cr for OHT + on-highway expansion and AI-enabled automation.
C) Net debt = INR 895 Cr (gross debt INR 4,049 Cr, cash INR 3,154 Cr). Funding mix for remaining capex: “a mix of both” - no peak debt ceiling committed.
5.On-highway pivot - INR 5,000 Cr revenue target by 2030, 90 distributors already in place.
A) TBR (Truck Bus Radial): Phase 1 at 800 tyres/day, scaling to 3,800 tyres/day. Revenue impact in Q1 FY27 = “very insignificant.”
B) PCR (Passenger Car Radial): launching end of CY2026, first phase capacity = 6,700 tyres/day. Pricing at par with Bridgestone - not discounted.
C) 2-wheeler tyres re-launched with Ranveer Singh as brand ambassador. Current capacity = 100,000 tyres/month.
6.EUR/INR is BKT’s silent tailwind for FY27. Q4 FY26 realization = ~INR 99/EUR. Current spot = ~INR 111. CFO Bajaj confirmed FY27 hedge rate “will definitely be better.”
For an export-heavy business, this ~12% realization improvement directly supports margins against the RM cost surge.
Bonus - Carbon black capacity scaled to 265,000 MTPA (new line commissioned Dec 2025), targeting 360,000 MTPA in Q1 FY27. Split: 30% captive consumption, 70% sold externally. Specialty grade approvals secured for plastics, power cables, and inks - new revenue streams opening.
What is OHT and why does BKT dominate it?
OHT = tyres for tractors, excavators, combine harvesters, mining equipment - not cars or trucks.
BKT makes 3,000+ product variants across agriculture, construction, and industrial use globally. Switching cost is extremely high - a farmer cannot swap tyre brands mid-harvest season.
BKT’s moat = product breadth + vertical integration (own carbon black + captive 64 MW power plant) = 22%-23% EBITDA margins even in a flat revenue year. The on-highway pivot is BKT using that same cost advantage to enter a larger, less cyclical market.
@pankajtibre@soicfinance@LearningEleven@NeilBahal
Insights from Raymond Realty Q4 FY26 Concall (MD & CEO Harmohan Sahni, May 6, 2026) on Indian Real Estate:-
1.FY26 revenue came in at INR 3,039 Cr - a 29% YoY jump. Q4 alone clocked INR 1,176 Cr, up 53% in a single quarter. More importantly, quarterly bookings surged 139% YoY - not a fluke, MD called it a “deliberate result of a multi-year strategic roadmap.”
2.The biggest strategic milestone of FY26 was the JDA (Joint Development Agreement) portfolio shift.
A) In FY25, JDA projects contributed only 22% of booking value. By FY26, non-Thane (JDA) bookings hit 54% - achieving the 50-50 target one full year ahead of the FY27 deadline.
B) The JDA model is asset-light - no land purchase, just approval costs. 7 JDA projects now live with a combined revenue potential of INR 17,000 Cr, including Bandra, BKC, Wadala, Sion, Kandivali.
https://t.co/DeQQR2h6rf Gross Development Value (GDV) now stands at approximately INR 42,000 Cr.
A) Thane legacy land (100 acres, 60 acres under active development) accounts for INR 25,000 Cr of this.
B) JDA portfolio contributes INR 17,000 Cr. Thane Pokhran micro-market is priced at INR 23,000-25,000 per sqft - the highest band in a district that ranges from INR 7,000 to INR 25,000.
4.Margin reality is more nuanced than headline numbers suggest.
A) FY26 blended EBITDA margin = 16%. Q4 alone touched 21.5%. The gap exists because every new project launch starts at single-digit margins and creeps up as construction progresses.
B) Management guided FY27 EBITDA margin at 16%-18% on a blended basis - flat to marginal improvement. Target is 20% once the portfolio matures. No JDA is signed below 20% EBITDA threshold.
5.Balance sheet is under control despite rapid scaling. Net debt = INR 656 Cr. Gross debt-to-equity = 0.6x vs internal cap of 1:1. Liquidity buffer = INR 358 Cr - enough to self-fund FY27 requirements without additional raises.
6.Six-year CAGR since 2021 is the number that stops you in your tracks.
A) Booking value pre-sales CAGR = 50% over 6 years.
B) Reported P&L revenue CAGR = 84% over the same period.
This is not a cyclical real estate story - this is a compounding execution story built on a legacy 100-acre land bank that cost them zero in acquisition.
https://t.co/X8C4r59Rgy flow will remain negative for the next 2 years - and management was upfront about it. Internal accruals from Thane = INR 450-500 Cr per year. FY25 JDAs adding INR 100-150 Cr. Total internal generation = INR 600-650 Cr.
But reinvestment into approvals, new launches, and balance sheet building keeps overall OCF negative. Growth has a price - this is it.
Bonus - Q4 was defined by a “strategic blitz.” Address by GS Wadala + Address by GS Sion launched together, releasing a combined GDV of INR 6,400 Cr into the market in a single quarter. TenX Habitat - the company’s first-ever project, 3,100 homes - is now fully sold out and received its Occupancy Certificate. That is a complete project lifecycle closed on a 100-acre land that management says still has decades of value left.
What is GDV (Gross Development Value) and why does it matter?
GDV = Total saleable area x current market price per sqft. It is the maximum revenue a developer can generate if every unit in every project is sold at today’s rates.
For a real estate company like Raymond Realty, GDV of INR 42,000 Cr is the revenue pipeline sitting on the balance sheet - not booked yet, but contracted, approved, or under development. It is to a real estate company what order book is to an infrastructure company. The bigger and more diversified the GDV, the longer and more predictable the revenue runway. INR 42,000 Cr GDV with 29% annual revenue growth = visibility for 10+ years of compounding.
That is why analysts track GDV additions every quarter - it tells you whether the company is refilling its growth pipeline faster than it is depleting it.