Daniel Allen

🇮🇹🇩🇪🇺🇸 Opinions my own. Former @Livermore_Lab CGSR. @JamesMartinCNS. @UChicago. OSINT, arms control, WMDs, nonproliferation. Bylines @Diplomat_APAC

[Daniel Allen @daniel_llen]

This is an underground facility likely to be used for training and research on hardened UGFs at (35.7173, 51.5179). While current construction has been minimal, tracking developments through satellite imagery will help us better understand other UGFs in Iran. A brief 🧵

[Nicole Grajewski @NicoleGrajewski]

Pezeshkian toured Imam Hussein University’s Underground Technologies Center, viewing a tunneling machine model. Iran appears to have fortified some underground site entrances with thick concrete domes, potentially shielding key nuclear or military facilities from strikes.

[Dr. Jeffrey Lewis @ArmsControlWonk]

Some news! As many of you know, I've been a Distinguished Research Fellow at @FPRI, consulting with @aaronstein1 on space and missile defense. Today it gets much better: the whole freaking open-source research team is joining FPRI full time. (1/4)

[Nicole Grajewski @NicoleGrajewski]

France is America’s oldest ally and the only country in Europe with an independent nuclear deterrent. I appreciate a good France joke, but I’d hoped for one that required a bit more creativity.

Setting that aside, I study nuclear weapons, including nuclear warfighting and the material effects of those weapons. You served in the military, and I’m not questioning your understanding of military operations. Nor am I disputing the physics of hard-target defeat. Depending on the precise depth, geology, and desired damage criterion, conventional penetrators may indeed be insufficient against deeply buried facilities.

What I am disputing is the strategic logic. Iran remains some distance from producing a deployable nuclear weapon. After the 12-day war, many of us argued that the greater concern was the surviving centrifuge base, accumulated technical expertise, and the potential emergence of parallel or covert enrichment pathways. Iran allegedly has centrifuges at Pickaxe as reported by WSJ, unclear what other elements of the fuel cycle or weapons-related work are there. Weaponization, warhead design and validation, integration with a delivery system, and the development of a credible operational capability remain separate technical and organizational hurdles. Destroying a centrifuge hall is therefore not synonymous with creating or eliminating an immediate nuclear weapons threat. Moreover, it is likely Iran possesses additional centrifuges in other locations too.

Your proposal is unsound because it treats nuclear weapons as merely very large bunker busters. They are not. Their military effects cannot be separated from their political effects. A U.S. decision to employ even a low-yield B61 against an enrichment facility would fundamentally alter the normative and political environment governing nuclear use.

It would establish a precedent that Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang could readily invoke when confronting hardened conventional or nuclear-related targets of their own. More importantly, it would erode the distinction between conventional and nuclear hard-target defeat, weaken the nuclear taboo, and impose substantial alliance-management, proliferation, and coercive credibility costs on the United States that far exceed the operational value of eliminating a single facility.

I hope this clarifies my position, dear.

[Daniel Allen @daniel_llen]

@NicoleGrajewski hell yeah nicole

[Dr. Jeffrey Lewis @ArmsControlWonk]

After more than fifteen years, I've resigned from @JamesMartinCNS. 280 characters isn't enough to name all the colleagues who, against all better judgment, became friends. You know who you are — whether you should admit it is a separate question.

[Nicole Grajewski @NicoleGrajewski]

Pleased to share that “Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine” is now officially available in the United States.

[Carl Parkin @CRParkin]

@dex_eve

[Nicole Grajewski @NicoleGrajewski]

Wonder if any of the strikes targeted shipments of Iranian military equipment to Venezuela

[Carl Parkin @CRParkin]

Baby's first news hit! I'm quoted in @AP today by @jongambrellAP about Iran's reconstruction of it's solid fueled missile program.

[Fabian Hinz @fab_hinz]

Longer thread about what we know and what we don’t know about the strange rocket/missile launch observed in Iran on September 18. 1/15

[Decker Eveleth @dex_eve]

I wrote something on MIIS, American cultural perceptions, and why we can't have a healthy nuclear community.
https://t.co/WkiXubcL9V

[Daniel Allen @daniel_llen]

Always exciting to publish something new. If you’re interested in how small, cheap drones can target some of our most irreplaceable assets, give this a read!

https://t.co/JWOKGlm2jW

[Small Wars Journal @smallwars]

New #SWJEssay: Cheap Drones, Priceless Targets: Fortifying America’s Bomber Fleet
ㅤㅤ ㅤ
By: Daniel Allen and Marco Volpitta
ㅤㅤ ㅤ
𝙰̲𝚋̲𝚜̲𝚝̲𝚛̲𝚊̲𝚌̲𝚝̲:
ㅤㅤ ㅤ
"In June of 2025, Ukraine’s #OperationSpiderweb proved that 117 cheap drones were sufficient to cripple a third of Russia’s bomber fleet overnight. Ukraine’s massive operational success underlined a simple fact: the logic of previous aircraft basing no longer holds.
ㅤㅤ ㅤ
Remoteness is no longer as effective a shield as once thought, and threats towards high-value assets can come in the form of small drones and large, expensive missiles. What was once efficiency is now complacency, and the U.S. Air Force needs to learn from the mistakes of our adversary to minimize the risk of a strike that could cause irreparable damage to the U.S. bomber fleet. Solutions to this problem exist, and if implemented by the United States, can provide increased resiliency to our strategic assets in the 21st century."
ㅤㅤ ㅤ
🤔 💭𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘴 𝘴𝘶𝘨𝘨𝘦𝘴𝘵, "𝘛𝘰 𝘥𝘦𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘥 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘣𝘰𝘮𝘣𝘦𝘳 𝘧𝘭𝘦𝘦𝘵 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘩 𝘢𝘯 𝘢𝘵𝘵𝘢𝘤𝘬, 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘜𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘭𝘺 𝘢 𝘭𝘢𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘦𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘥𝘦𝘭 𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘭𝘺 𝘥𝘦𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘱𝘢𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘴, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢 𝘷𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘮𝘦𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘥𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘨𝘶𝘢𝘳𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘣𝘰𝘮𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮 𝘢 𝘤𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘺." 𝘞𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘸𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘭𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘭𝘪𝘬𝘦❓
ㅤㅤ ㅤ
🔗: https://t.co/7lVwlKDMG3ㅤ

[Fabian Hinz @fab_hinz]

New MDI blog post: Ukraine’s Flamingos take to the skies

https://t.co/4r1uuWzOO5

[Dr. Jeffrey Lewis @ArmsControlWonk]

A new @ACWPodcast where @aaronstein1 and I discuss @alexbward's reporting on the Pentagon process restricting Ukraine's ability to strike targets in Russia.
https://t.co/lZSszhH6zI

[Decker Eveleth @dex_eve]

Middlebury Institute of International Studies will be closing down most of its programs by June 2027.

[Nicole Grajewski @NicoleGrajewski]

The Countdown to Prevent Another Iranian Nuclear Crisis Just Began

My thoughts on snapback for ⁦@CarnegieEndow⁩ https://t.co/MdgYx9y0WE

[Nicole Grajewski @NicoleGrajewski]

E3 letter to the President of the UNSC, triggering snapback

[Dr. Jeffrey Lewis @ArmsControlWonk]

I just got around to looking at that video and all I can say is STOP THAT. The North Koreans are much more careful and even then we almost always find the factory in a day.

[Sam Lair @sam_lair]

I wrote about Iran's missile failure rates during True Promise II
Folks get caught up in the 50% failure rate figure from TP I and assume similar numbers are true for TP II and the 12 Day War. But, official statements and video evidence suggest its the failure rate is only 10%!

[Sam Lair @sam_lair]

My colleague @shendre3000 and I wrote about Houthi SAMs.
Turns out the Houthis are making jank thermal batteries to maintain their older SA-7b MANPADS, but the process behind it is wild!
Seth wrote about the Houthis converting Russian AAMs to SAMs. Links below:

[Fabian Hinz @fab_hinz]

Ukraine’s giant Flamingo cruise missile appears to use an Ivchenko AI-25TL turbofan engine repurposed from an Aero L-39 jet trainer.