For @ForeignAffairs this week, I walk through China's AI diplomacy, from establishing the World AI Cooperation Organization to the bilateral dialogue with the United States, and argue it is anchored by two objectives: overcoming U.S. technology restrictions and casting China as the champion of the developing world. While some in Washington want to keep AI safety talks separate from the broader strategic competition, Beijing draws no such distinction, and it has repeatedly wrong-footed the United States as a result. A reinvigorated U.S. AI diplomacy and competitive approach to the dialogue, backed by stronger export controls, can strengthen America's position and make real progress on AI safety. https://t.co/BsrXITQeBc
@vince_chow1 It does raise the question of what the purpose of the exercise is. Releasing this only in English suggests the primary interest is in influencing the AI safety community outside China.
On Monday, BIS released an interim final rule aiming to address remote access, the practice of Chinese firms renting advanced U.S. chips through the cloud that they're banned from buying outright. My new piece at @CNASdc unpacks this rule, what it gets right, and where it falls short. 🧵
I’ll support it if it happens, but it seems suboptimal to mandate labeling before the U.S. government has made the public case for the risks of Chinese models, e.g., by regularly testing the models and releasing/broadcasting results. At least do it in parallel to rolling this out.
Today in the @washingtonpost, I argue that divided government can actually create opportunities for a balanced policy on AI, and I outline three areas for cooperation that are essential to continued US leadership: energy, high-skilled immigration, and governance.
Will be interesting to see how Malaysian, Singaporean, Indonesian, and Thai officials react to this on the eve of the ASEAN summit, which the President is attending (along with the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Commerce...).
NEW: The Department of Commerce just published new AI and semiconductor export control regulations that close some major loopholes in existing export controls. The regulation includes new rules to: (1) counter Chinese smuggling of AI chips; (2) restrict Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips; and (3) block Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC.
These rules are a major step forward. They still contain some key gaps that need to be filled urgently in a follow-up rule, namely, they do not block Chinese companies from buying AI chips inside the United States or renting access to AI chips at US-based data centers. However, this rule will help and is the first good-faith effort to actually close loopholes in export controls in a year and a half. Hopefully more will follow.
1. Countering Chinese smuggling of AI chips. The rule expands export controls on AI chips to five new countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil. It does not block AI chip orders to these countries, but requires a US government review (unless it is a US company that meets certain requirements). This is a massively needed step. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have been the second, fourth, fifth, and eighth biggest importers of AI chips this year.
The rule doesn’t cover Taiwan itself, where chip smuggling is a massive issue (exports of AI chips to China are still not illegal under Taiwanese law), and still doesn’t prevent AI chip sales to Chinese companies in the United States, which somehow remain legal. Ultimately, large orders of AI chips by untrusted companies in any country should require a license to fully combat smuggling, as Chinese companies will move to buy AI chips anywhere there isn’t a license requirement. But this is a start.
2. Restricting Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips. The rule creates a new remote access control that restricts companies from providing Chinese companies with remote access to AI chips. It requires a US export license to provide Chinese companies with access to 12 million TPP or more (equivalent to ~200 of the most advanced Blackwell chips, or ~800 H100 chips). This applies to chips already shipped, as well as all future shipments. Some of these requirements even apply retroactively; Commerce says existing rules already barred data supplying a majority of a data center’s compute to Chinese companies, and tells companies that violated this to self-disclose. This effectively kills the business of neoclouds like Megaspeed that exist to provide remote access to large amounts of AI compute to China.
The biggest gap is the remote access controls do not apply to data centers in the United States. So Chinese companies can legally train on large numbers of Blackwells at data centers in Northern Virginia. This gap should be closed immediately with a new rule that uses Commerce’s US persons authority to capture this activity. The rule also exempts recommendation algorithms, so impact will depend on enforcement. Last, new authorities included in the text of the AI Overwatch Act would strengthen Commerce's ability to enforce these controls--that bill should pass immediately.
3. Blocking Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC. The rule closes loopholes in existing controls that Chinese companies are likely exploiting to illicitly make AI chips at TSMC or Samsung. Specifically, it now requires any Chinese chip designer who is seeking to make a 16/14nm or more advanced chip at TSMC/Samsung to get a U.S. export license, and restores old rules that weren’t being enforced until now that require any untrusted company anywhere in the world to get a license to make an AI chip at TSMC or Samsung. This is a significant upgrade.
Overall, this is a major step forward to countering Chinese smuggling of and access to advanced AI chips. The work here is not done, as there are some critical loopholes that remain open and need to be closed in a follow-up rule (namely those related to activities inside the United States). Commerce should move extremely quickly to close these. But this is the first time in over 18 months that the administration is starting to take export controls seriously, and does represent a meaningful step forward.
Last, the fact that the Commerce press release says this rule was “written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council” is remarkable and unprecedented. I have never seen a BIS rule that was not written by BIS. That implies that Commerce was dragged kicking and screaming over the finish line by the White House and Treasury, and instructed to publish this rule rather than the rumored weaker one that it preferred. Remarkable.
The Trump administration just dropped new remote access rules, no doubt spurred by the Nvidia scandal.
In the first paragraph, they made Commerce publish a line effectively indicating the Administration’s lack of faith in Commerce.
Remarkable.
https://t.co/P08lzTe7TD
When I was in government, I regularly talked to many companies, civil society organizations, etc. that didn’t share my view about some policy area. This was indeed an issue from my perspective, because I and many others think the stakes are high and having the key stakeholders on board makes policy much more effective (almost regardless of the direction of policy). In many cases, in my judgement, those differences were downstream of a difference in perspective on China as an adversary, and not just a technical or legal dispute. I was calling attention to that first order difference. I speak only for myself, not “China hawks,” and I never suggested this was a “problem” that made someone or some company a criminal.
Any competent reader of English would interpret your tweet—a screenshot of my quote and writing “They believe that, once sanctions have been imposed, anyone who opposes them is basically some kind of traitor”—as ascribing that view to me. But thank you for clarifying.
The notion that by renting GPUs to Chinese firms the United States can “monitor what the Chinese are doing” is an argument American businesses have made for decades to justify selling technology into the China market—and yet in practice they never seem to actually share this information with the U.S. government…
This from @SemiAnalysis_ is helpful on the logic of banning chip sales directly into China, but being cool with letting Chinese AI firms access US chips housed in Southeast Asian clouds. https://t.co/pOLw1uVnIZ
The Diffusion Rule was avant-garde art—misunderstood and even reviled when it was released, those in the scene knew it was a necessary step forward and its essential logic is only becoming more widely accepted with the passage of time.
Re point 1: once you accept that Chinese customers can switch to data centers in countries the rule doesn’t cover, you end up reinventing something like the diffusion rule, as @alasdairpr and I argued back when the administration repealed the rule. https://t.co/KJGwL8ZsQX
UPDATE: @mackhawk and others @business report today that Supermicro servers with banned Nvidia chips ended up at a Shanghai data center linked to Huang and Megaspeed. This was all there for U.S. authorities to discover while Huang was held in Singapore from June 2025 to February 2026. https://t.co/qCkCUIp5lP
This fascinating statement today from Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs on its investigation into Megaspeed and Alice Huang raises new questions about how the U.S. government—even beyond the Commerce Department—is negligent in enforcing exporting controls and missing opportunities in its AI diplomacy.
Singapore frames its investigation as a potential customs violation, not a breach of U.S. export controls or espionage. You only need to look at geography to understand why separating commercial law enforcement from foreign policy is core to Singapore’s strategy for surviving and thriving in the U.S.-China technology competition. The statement says clearly that “While Singapore does not enforce unilateral export controls imposed by other countries, we expect all companies operating here to take into account such regulations...Where there is evidence of breaches of Singapore law, we take firm action.”
This ambiguous stance can be frustrating for U.S. policymakers, but more often than not it leaves open opportunities for cooperation and advantage—as Singapore’s timeline shows:
1. Singapore’s investigation, begun in February 2025, centered on whether Megaspeed had routed hardware through Singapore to Malaysia and from there “to another destination”—clearly China—“contrary to declarations made in Singapore.”
2. As the investigation progressed, Singapore learned of U.S. interest in Megaspeed in June 2025 when BIS conducted a shipment verification with Huang present. Singapore police interviewed Huang the same day and impounded her, which the statement suggests they may have held for the next eight months.
3. To continue the investigation, Singapore needed information on U.S.-based Supermicro. Its police say they repeatedly requested assistance from the DOJ and FBI in their investigation of Megaspeed, beginning at a meeting in July 2025, but that Singapore “has to date received limited information or assistance in respect of the company.”
4. By February 2026, Singapore police concluded they lacked the evidence to charge Huang, but that she had lied to them and would be barred from re-entering the country. They returned her passport and she left the next day. In March 2026, the DOJ charged a Supermicro co-founder and two others with violating U.S. export controls through a company Culper Research has identified is affiliated with Megaspeed.
Why didn’t the DOJ help Singapore on Supermicro before or even after the indictment? Why didn’t it move on Megaspeed and/or Huang as early as June 2025, when it could have known Singapore police were investigating her and held her passport, or July 2025 when Singapore police flagged the connection in a meeting, all while she was still in Singapore not Beijing? Bloomberg reported today DOJ is investigating Huang, but it’s hard not to see this as eight plus months of missed opportunities.
Had the U.S. government helped Singapore police last year, Huang could plausibly have been detained in Singapore to face trial there or even extradition to the United States. A counterintelligence risk and chip smuggling channel could have been flipped into a diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement win. Instead, our unwillingness to provide assistance to a cross-pressured country like Singapore—which has good reasons not to bend over backward for us on this issue—undermines the credibility of U.S. diplomacy and AI policy. It’s hard to ask other countries to run risks on our behalf if we’re unable to support them or take action.
https://t.co/KG0I1BsHMO
This will get missed in the news of Jensen resigning, but it's super important.
Singapore says it was holding Alice Huang's passport thru Feb 2026, but got little help from the U.S. in its investigation. Trump was briefed on Alice in fall 2025.
That means the U.S. did nothing for months as Singapore held a Chinese spy who the U.S. knew was in a relationship with the most important person in A.I. Hard to understand. https://t.co/O8Yh5PLVVB
I remember the first time I walked into the Oval Office to brief President Biden. I'd just been appointed as the White House Special Advisor for AI. The President sat behind the Resolute desk and began with a single question: "What is the worst harm that AI could enable?"
I had no shortage of worries. We talked about the pace of technological progress — how, thanks to better chips and algorithms, what was cutting-edge that day would be commonplace within a couple of years. We talked about how high the ceiling on intelligence was, and about the dangers that AI would likely bring in areas like cybersecurity and bioweapons. We talked about how technology was fast and government was slow.
Then he asked about the benefits. He cared about ending cancer as much as anything in the world, and AI — managed well — offers more hope for that than anything else.
Most of all, we talked about what became the argument of the book my White House colleague @TantumSCollins and I have written: that democracies must lead in inventing this technology, turn that lead into a lasting advantage, and do it all without betraying their own values. Achieving all three at once will be a bitter struggle. Every choice pits security against liberty, speed against caution, power against principle.
Today THE BITTER STRUGGLE is out from Crown, in hardcover, ebook, and audio. It’s our account of what happened, what’s coming, and what’s at stake. We don’t pretend the answers are easy — in some ways we’re more worried than when we started. But these questions are too important to be debated only behind closed doors, including the door to the Oval Office. We hope you will join the debate.
https://t.co/shdmbLbAdh
The story keeps getting crazier. To recap everything that has been reported so far:
- The US intelligence community discovered that Jensen Huang, the CEO of the largest company in the world, was sleeping with Alice Huang, a Chinese spy and an executive at Megaspeed. (FT)
- Multiple independent investigations have concluded that Megaspeed is likely a Chinese cutout, which helps Chinese companies access AI chips or circumvent export controls. (NYT and Bloomberg)
- The US intelligence community also concluded that Alice Huang’s goal was to convince Jensen to lobby the U.S. government to loosen export controls on advanced AI chips. (NYT)
- The intelligence community relayed this information to “a small group of top US government officials” earlier this year. (FT)
- Over the last year, Jensen Huang has repeatedly lobbied the U.S. government to loosen export controls on advanced chips. @BISgov has done so, not only by permitting the export of H200 chips to China, but also not enforcing export controls that would have required a license for exports of the most advanced Blackwell chips to Megaspeed and Southeast Asia.
- Although @CommerceGov leadership was presumably briefed on this information by the U.S. intelligence community, @BISgov has taken no actions to tighten controls on Megaspeed or Southeast Asia.
- Megaspeed remains a preferred cloud partner of Nvidia, and continues to receive Nvidia Blackwell chips despite employing a Chinese spy who reportedly is romantically engaged with the CEO of Nvidia.
- Tens of billions of dollars worth of AI chips have been exported to Southeast Asia this year alone, and Malaysia and Singapore are now two of the four largest importers of AI chips in the world.
What is going on here??? We need answers. The question of who gets the most advanced AI chips in the world is literally the defining strategic question of our time. And not only does it seem like the MSS may be directly influencing the debate on export controls in the United States, but also @CommerceGov is refusing to listen to the warnings of the IC on this issue. What is a POSSIBLE good explanation for why Megaspeed is still receiving chips? Why is there not a license requirement for AI chip shipments to all of Southeast Asia? This is beyond strange at this point.
The fallout from this story will be massive. Obviously, the motivations underpinning Nvidia’s policy views opposing export controls must now all be questioned. But also, how did @BISgov sit on this information and has still taken no actions? We need answers.
We're hosting @BuchananBen for a fireside chat to discuss his new book at @CNASdc on Wednesday, November 12. Register to watch virtually below. DM if for an in-person invite (space permitting). https://t.co/jwYJfEXp7L
Treasury just published new proposed Outbound Investment regulations, which would represent a significant expansion of the existing program. This is just a proposed rule, and it deserves a thorough review, but some initial reactions:
1. The rule would prohibit most private investment in any Chinese firm that develops an “SI system,” including any product that operates using an SI system. It defines “SI system” extremely broadly, such that it likely captures the vast majority of Chinese software products. As a result, the proposed rule likely would prohibit most private investment in Chinese software firms, as well as Chinese firms that build products that incorporate AI (i.e., the entire Chinese robotics and drone industry, and undoubtedly many others).
2. The rule adds biotech as a covered sector and would prohibit most private investment in the vast majority of the sector. It would ban private investment in Chinese companies that use biological systems to modify, enhance, produce, or control any pharmaceutical compound, to include both small and large molecules. This likely captures most Chinese firms engaged in biologic drug manufacturing or drug discovery. Biotech and biomanufacturing are areas where U.S. investment has massively fueled China’s capabilities, which are rapidly approaching--and in some cases surpassing--those of the United States. The scope of this rule signals that the administration sees this as a massive national security concern.
3. The rule does not make major changes to the types of transactions covered. Crucially, this means it does NOT prohibit investment in publicly traded securities of these companies, the purchase of goods or licensing of products from these companies, or the export of goods to these companies. But it does ban most types of private investment (i.e., VC, PE, joint ventures, greenfield investments, etc) in companies engaging in these activities.
4. This rule will no doubt change before it is finalized, and I expect the definitions of prohibited activity related to SI and biological systems will be narrowed in the final rule. But it is also a strong signal that the administration does not want U.S. investment or know-how supporting China’s development of advanced technologies, and as a result may be willing to significantly expand outbound investment restrictions.
5. Finally, this highlights a major schism inside the administration on how to prevent China from catching up to the United States in the most advanced technologies. The Treasury Department is signaling that it is willing to significantly tighten restrictions on Americans’ ability to invest in critical technology sectors in China that would help develop these technologies, given their importance to national security. And meanwhile, the Department of Commerce is taking the exact opposite approach, loosening restrictions on American companies that seek to export goods to these companies. It doesn’t make sense for the administration to be tightening restrictions on investments, while loosening restrictions on exports. Something has to give.