Hyperliquid.Labs

The blockchain to house all finance. Trade, build apps, and launch tokens on the same hyper-performant chain. X by
@Hyper FND

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@Strategies Bella😍

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@Degenomist_ @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama 📹 LIVE! 🤖 https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@Henrik_on_HL @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama Good luck to all who are ready to join the future 🚀 https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@Messistfc @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama Higher the purchase, higher the reward possibility! https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@0xRory @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama 🪂 Extra rewards for early birds—be quick! 👇https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@whoisnarhan @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama Rewards done right. https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@0xG00gly @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama ⤵️ Get Exclusive Bonus⤵️ https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@tofemseks @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama But that's not all! 🧵https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@BidenCho @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama things are heating up .. 👇 https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@WhiteyWoofman @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama Early Birds Bonus! 👇https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@Thatonedogexbt @HyperliquidX @DefiLlama 💰 Early birds win big https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

Lets go 👉

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

$HYPE is just around the corner 👀

Use your $USDC #ETH to get $HYPE'd 🤣🤣

Trade now and get extra $HYPE @
https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Hyperliquid.Labs @ddldg]

@HyperliquidX @DefiLlama $HYPE is just around the corner 👀

Use your $USDC #ETH to get $HYPE'd 🤣🤣

Trade now and get extra $HYPE @
https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t https://t.co/IGAgAonn4t

[Justin Drake @drakefjustin]

13th AMA from Ethereum Foundation Research

→ submit questions now, on X or Reddit
→ answers roll in tomorrow, Feb 25 at 2pm UTC

https://t.co/S0fc0jfMZG

With two AMAs per year since 2019, EF Research (EFR) is committed to transparency. The team is packed with talent. Learn more about the 40 EFR members spread across 6 sub-teams at https://t.co/eCXBfDBqr4 :)

Applied Research Group (ARG)

Han @han__0110
Jacob @jacobykaufmann
Kev @kevaundray
Mike @mikeneuder
Toni @nero_eth
Rahul @raxhvl

Consensus R&D (CR&D)

Alexander @alexanderlhicks
Ansgar @adietrichs
Carl @carlbeek
Dankrad @dankrad
Francesco @fradamt
George @asn_d6
Justin @drakefjustin
Luca @luca_zanolini
Pop
Roberto @robsaltini
Vitalik @vitalikButerin

Cryptography

Antonio @asanso
Arantxa @arantxazapico
Benedikt
Dmitry @khovr
Gottfried
Mary

Protocol Security

Andrés @nethoxa
Bhargava @ibags
David @infosecual
Fredrik @fredriksvantes
Justin @JustinTraglia
Tyler @Z3nChada

Research Ops

Alex @ralexstokes
Barnabé @barnabemonnot
Josh @joshrudolf
La Donna @ladonnarhiggins
Ladislaus @ladislaus0x
Will @corcoranwill

Robust Incentives Group (RIG)

Anders @weboftrees
Caspar @casparschwa
Davide @DavideCrapis
Julian @_julianma
Thomas @soispoke

[terence @terencechain]

Reminder: Holesky upgrade to Pectra is happening in less than 24 hours!
📅 Epoch 115968
⏰ Feb 24, 21:55 UTC

[timbeiko.eth @TimBeiko]

ELI5 why we cannot "rollback" Ethereum?

After yesterday's Bybit hack, crypto commentators are again asking why Ethereum cannot "rollback" the chain to reverse the hack.

While experienced ecosystem actors near-unanimously agree that this is infeasible, it's worth breaking down why this reasonably sounding proposal is technically intractable for less knowledgeable observers. If that's you, consider this an "ELI5" version of why this is impossible.

First, some context on rollbacks:

The idea of a blockchain "rolling back" stems from an early incident in the Bitcoin blockchain. In 2010, less than two years since Bitcoin's launch, a bug in the client software caused 184 billion (yes, *billion*) Bitcoins to be minted in block 74638.

To fix this, Satoshi released a software patch to the Bitcoin client which invalidated the transactions. This had the effect of "rolling back" the chain which had kept growing in the meantime to block 74637. In less than a day, the new chain had accumulated enough proof-of-work to become canonical and all user transactions that had been rolled back were included in the new chain. Note that at the time, Bitcoin's mining difficulty was 10 billion times lower than today, and the BTCUSD price was about 0.07$.

In short, this situation was unique in that a clear protocol bug led to the problematic transactions, which could easily be identified due to their large amount. Additionally, Bitcoin's limited adoption made it easy to distribute a new client version and quickly mine a new chain segment.

Ethereum and TheDAO:

Ethereum's early history had a superficially similar crisis which often leads to confusion about the practicality of rollbacks. In 2016, a popular Ethereum application, TheDAO, had ~15% of all ETH in existence under its control. Unfortunately, a hacker found a bug in the application's code that allowed them to steal all of these funds. This was notably different than the Bitcoin situation because the Ethereum protocol worked as intended, it was the application built **on** Ethereum that had an issue.

Luckily, the developers of TheDAO had implemented a failsafe where withdrawals from the applications were frozen for a month before they were completed. This presented a unique opportunity to address the bug: the code of the application could be changed to prevent the funds from ultimately going to the hackers.

Because there was no way in the application itself to do this, Ethereum protocol developers had to make the change directly in the blockchain's history. This is called an "irregular state change", because the "state" of the application was changed by manually updating the database, rather than, say, by a valid Ethereum transaction.

A rough comparison to the Bitcoin bug above would be to have set the balance of the addresses that received the 184 billion BTC to 0, rather than re-mining a chain excluding those transactions.

This upgrade was contentious and the Ethereum community effectively fractured over it. A subset of miners refused to run the software patch and kept mining on the chain where the hack happened, which still exists as Ethereum Classic. The chain that is known as Ethereum today is the one where this software upgrade was activated.

Again, this situation was unique. Hacked funds from TheDAO were effectively frozen for a month, giving time for the community to coordinate on a software upgrade. The funds being frozen had another major advantage: there was no "contagion" from the hack. Had the hacker been able to move funds at will, "freezing" the funds would be an impossible cat and mouse game, as the protocol is open source and any potential change which froze the funds would have to be broadcast to the hacker, giving them plenty of time to move their funds elsewhere.

Which brings us to the Bybit incident.

Why we can't rollback Ethereum

Earlier this week, the Bybit exchange had 401,346 ETH (~1.4B USD) stolen. The theft was caused by the custodian of the funds signing a misleading transaction in a compromised multisig interface.

The root cause for this hack was higher up the stack than both TheDAO and the Bitcoin overflow bug. There were no issues with the Ethereum protocol, or even with the underlying multisig application used by Bybit. Instead, a compromised interface made it appear as though a transaction was doing one thing while it was actually doing another.

From the perspective of the Ethereum protocol, there is nothing to distinguish that transaction from other legitimate transactions on the network. There is no protocol rule that was broken where patching the issue would isolate the hacked funds, like in the case of the Bitcoin exploit.

Furthermore, the funds were immediately available for the hacker to spend. Unlike in the case of TheDAO, where the community had a month to deploy a surgical intervention, here the hackers immediately started moving the funds onchain.

Even if we could solve the cat and mouse game described above, the Ethereum ecosystem is far different today than in 2016. DeFi and bridges to other chains mean that any stolen funds can easily be mixed within a web of applications. For example, stolen funds can be swapped on a decentralized exchange, with the resulting tokens being used as collateral in a DeFi protocol, where the borrowed assets are bridged to a completely separate chain.

This level of interconnectedness means that any irregular state change, even if socially palatable, would have near-intractable ripple effects. A "full rollback", where a portion of the recent chain history was invalidated, would be even worse. Any settled transaction, many of which have implications outside Ethereum (e.g. exchange sales, RWA redemptions, etc.) would be undone, with no way to revert the offchain half of it.

So, to conclude, while Bitcoin was able to "rollback" its blockchain 15 years ago, today, the interconnected nature of Ethereum and settlement of onchain <> offchain economic transactions, make this intractable today.

Technically, irregular state changes are still possible on Ethereum in cases where funds are frozen and isolated. The last time such a change was proposed, in 2018, to address a bug in Parity's multisig wallet where ~500,000 ETH were frozen (see EIP-999), it was strongly opposed by the community of the contention resulting from TheDAO.

[Scroll @Scroll_ZKP]

https://t.co/u9FkoZiqgF

[Stacy Muur @stacy_muur]

Ethereum’s Open Intents Framework Dropped Yesterday ⛺

Explained (Like You’re 5… and Then 25)

30+ teams are uniting behind to unify fragmented L2s into one seamless experience.

Dive into bite-sized 🍕 Q&amp;A to get the scoop ↓

[Cantina 🪐 @cantinasecurity]

The next chapter of @ethereum security begins 🪐

Today marks the beginning of a new competition: a comprehensive review of Pectra, in partnership with the @ethereumfndn.

💰 $2,000,000 USDC
📆 Live now - March 24th
🔗 Below